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Using a longitudinal data set covering a span of 10 years, we investigate the impact of vertical and horizontal pay disparity on non‐CEO executive turnover and subsequent firm performance. Hypothesizing differential responses to pay disparity depending on a non‐CEO executive's responsibilities, we first categorize non‐CEO executives based on their job demands and their role in the organization (e.g., oversight, divisional). We then explore how pay disparity influences the relationship between executive category and turnover, and how the level of pay disparity impacts the relationship between turnover and firm performance. We find that executive category significantly impacts the likelihood of turnover, and also influences firm performance. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 相似文献
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We suggest that the equivocal empirical results of board leadership structure on firm performance have both methodological and conceptual roots. We stress that whether board leadership structure enhances or lowers performance depends on its fit with a firm's internal and external conditions, a point that has not been comprehensively addressed by the extant literature. To guide future research in this field, we develop five testable propositions and offer some suggestions on how these propositions may be empirically tested. 相似文献
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Gang Wang Kaitlyn DeGhetto B. Parker Ellen Bruce T. Lamont 《Journal of Management Studies》2019,56(1):172-202
CEO duality reduces boards’ monitoring capacity. But governance substitution theory holds that boards of directors who can effectively monitor their CEOs are more likely to adopt the CEO duality governance structure. By examining relationships between board characteristics underlying their monitoring capacity and CEO duality, we bring evidence to bear on governance substitution theory. Further, by applying a managerial discretion theory lens to CEO duality, we extend governance substitution theory to the cross‐country context where institutional features vary in their constraints on managerial discretion. Meta‐analytic results from a dataset of 297 studies across 32 countries/regions provided support for the majority of our predictions. As predicted, board independence and certain types of board human capital were positively related to CEO duality. Unexpectedly, board ownership was negatively related to CEO duality. Additionally, country‐level managerial discretion significantly moderated the board independence‐ and human capital‐duality relationships (but not the board‐ownership‐duality relationship) as predicted. 相似文献
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陈钢 《南京审计学院学报》2015,12(2):19-28
利用2007年至2012年我国A股上市公司相关数据,以上市公司总经理继任来源与董事会选择偏好之间的关系为切入点,从决策模糊性、认知风格、学习理论等理论视角出发,研究上市公司董事会是否存在总经理继任来源选择偏好。结果显示:董事会在做出总经理继任者选择决策时,会考虑前任总经理的继任来源。具体而言,若前任总经理属于内部继任,则新继任总经理更可能来自于公司内部;若前任总经理属于外部继任,则新继任总经理更可能来自于公司外部。在进一步验证董事会层面和总经理层面因素对总经理继任来源选择偏好的影响后发现,董事会规模越大、独立董事比例越高、前任总经理任期越长,存在总经理继任来源选择偏好的可能性越大。 相似文献
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How does CEO political ideology influence the pay disparity between a CEO and typical firm employees? Drawing on the upper echelons theory, we postulate that politically liberal CEOs are more inclined to address within-firm vertical pay disparity versus conservative or neutral CEOs, because liberals attend more closely to potential inequality issues and are more open to social changes. We furthermore contend that the effect of CEO political ideology varies across certain contextual factors. Results based on a sample of United States public firms support our arguments. Our study contributes to the literature on income inequality by highlighting CEO political ideology as a crucial determinant and investigating the boundary conditions. 相似文献
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Using two‐year longitudinal data from a large sample of US employees from a service‐related organization, the present study investigates the relative effects of three forms of pay‐for‐performance (PFP) plans on employees’ job performance (incentive effects) and voluntary turnover (sorting effects). The study differentiates between three forms of pay: merit pay, individual‐based bonuses, and long‐term incentives. By definition, these PFP plans have different structural elements that distinguish them from each other (i.e., pay plan form) and different characteristics (functionality), such as the degree to which pay and performance are linked and the size of the rewards, which can vary both within and across plan types. Our results provide evidence that merit raises have larger incentive and sorting effects than bonuses and long‐term incentives in multi‐PFP plan environments where the three PFP plans are operating simultaneously. Only merit pay has both incentive and sorting effects among the three PFP plans. The implications for the PFP‐related theory, as well as for the design and implementation of PFP plans, are discussed. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 相似文献
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This study analyses the relationship between ownership structure and board of director composition and their influences on the total factor productivity (TFP) of Taiwan's firms. The empirical results show that the curvilinear specification is better to capture the relationship between inside ownership and firm productivity. Meanwhile, the ownership structure in a firm indeed affects differences in TFP between conglomerate firms and non‐conglomerate firms, high‐tech firms and non‐high‐tech firms, and family‐owned firms and non‐family‐owned firms. Additionally, a smaller board may be less encumbered by bureaucratic problems and more functional and CEO duality may be able to improve productivity. Furthermore, productivity deteriorates with increasing proportion of collateralised shares. More institutional holdings, however, are an effective way to alleviate the negative impact of collateralised shares on TFP. 相似文献
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薪酬结构中包含绩效工资的组织都面临着如何合理确定员工的工作绩效的问题。员工的绩效评价结果的好坏直接关系到绩效工资的高低,进而影响其工作积极性。要做出合理、公正的绩效评价,管理者就必须与员工进行有效的绩效沟通。掌握绩效沟通策略,提高组织的绩效管理水平。 相似文献
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Perceptions of manager discretion in incentive allocation are theoretically and practically important to help explain the much‐debated relationship between performance‐related bonuses and intrinsic motivation. We argue, and demonstrate, that perceived managerial discretion is a key moderator to this relationship because of its relevance to procedural fairness. In a first study, we developed a measure for perceived manager discretion and distinguished it from related concepts. In a second experiment, we found that higher bonuses associated with higher levels of perceived manager discretion enhanced procedural fairness but those based on lower discretion did not. In a third field study, we found that actual bonuses implemented by a service organization enhanced intrinsic motivation indirectly through procedural fairness, but only when employees perceived their bonus to be based on higher levels of perceived manager discretion. Conversely, when bonus level was associated with lower perceived manager discretion, it negatively predicted of intrinsic motivation. 相似文献
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The authors extend prior literature by examining, in two distinct field settings, smallest meaningful pay increases (SMPIs) in terms of magnitude, behavioral intention, and affective reactions. In Study 1, a two‐wave study of 177 employees of a university medical center in the United States, the authors find stable thresholds of about 5.0 percent for positive reactions to pay increases (magnitude [5.4 percent], behavioral intentions [4.2 percent], and affective reactions [5.6 percent]). In Study 2, a sample of 495 university employees in Finland, the authors also find stable but slightly higher thresholds of about 8 percent for behavioral intentions (8.4 percent) and positive affective reactions (7.2 percent) to pay increases. They also find threshold effects of ?5.7 percent for behavioral intentions and ?5.8 percent for negative affective reactions in response to restricted future pay increases levied in the transition to a new pay system. Discussion of the results centers on pay raise administration and future research regarding implied and direct pay reductions. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 相似文献
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Khaled Elsayed 《Corporate Governance: An International Review》2007,15(6):1203-1214
Most research investigating the impact of board leadership structure as a corporate governance mechanism, on corporate performance has focused largely on either the Anglo‐American context or the Asian experience and has come up with diverse conclusions. This study sheds light on the extent to which corporate leadership structure affects corporate performance by providing empirical evidence from a sample of Egyptian listed firms. The initial econometric results indicate that CEO duality has no impact on corporate performance. However, when an interaction term between industry type and CEO duality is included in the model, the impact of CEO duality on corporate performance is found to vary across industries, a result that is supportive of both agency theory and stewardship theory. In addition, when firms are categorised according to their financial performance, CEO duality attracts a positive and significant coefficient only when corporate performance is low. 相似文献
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在环境规制日益严格、环境治理好坏影响企业可持续发展的情况下,企业制定高管薪酬契约时不仅要考虑财务绩效,也需将环境绩效纳入考核范畴。选取2013-2017年沪深两市A股重污染行业上市公司为样本,检验高管薪酬与环境绩效、财务绩效的敏感性,以及内部控制在其中的调节作用。研究发现:内部控制强的企业环境绩效显著优于内部控制弱的企业;内部控制可以强化高管薪酬与财务绩效的敏感性;内部控制弱的企业环境绩效提升会降低高管薪酬,而内部控制强的企业不存在这种现象。建议政府通过奖励与惩罚双重机制,督促企业保护环境;企业加强内部控制,合理激励高管;高管增强环保意识,辅助企业实现绿色经营,三方协力提升企业环境绩效。 相似文献
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Collins G. Ntim Sarah Lindop Dennis A. Thomas Hussein Abdou Kwaku K. Opong 《International Journal of Human Resource Management》2019,30(6):921-963
This paper examines the crucial question of whether chief executive officer (CEO) power and corporate governance (CG) structure can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) using a large up-to-date South African data-set. Our findings are threefold. First, when direct links between executive pay and performance are examined, we find a positive, but relatively small PPS. Second, our results show that in a context of concentrated ownership and weak board structures; the second-tier agency conflict (director monitoring power and opportunism) is stronger than the first-tier agency problem (CEO power and self-interest). Third, additional analysis suggests that CEO power and CG structure have a moderating effect on the PPS. Specifically, we find that the PPS is higher in firms with more reputable, founding and shareholding CEOs, higher ownership by directors and institutions, and independent nomination and remuneration committees, but lower in firms with larger boards, more powerful and long-tenured CEOs. Overall, our evidence sheds new important theoretical and empirical insights on explaining the PPS with specific focus on the predictions of the optimal contracting and managerial power hypotheses. The findings are generally robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneities, pay, and performance proxies. 相似文献
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Research linking broad‐based employee stock ownership (BESO) with firm performance continues to receive considerable attention both in and outside the field of management. Despite the evidence being generally positive regarding the BESO–firm performance relationship, there has been a relative dearth of research providing insights into the circumstances surrounding the effectiveness of BESO. With this research gap in mind, we formulated and launched this special issue. This guest editor introduction begins with a look at the research on this topic, followed by a brief discussion of each article accepted for publication. We conclude by highlighting the major themes from the collective contributions of the articles and share insights regarding future research in this growing research domain. 相似文献
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Wei Qiang Sze-Sze Wong Kevin Koh Yen H. Tong 《Corporate Governance: An International Review》2023,31(3):405-424
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Tournament compensation systems are widely used in practice and have been extensively analyzed theoretically. However, one major problem has hardly been studied in a company context so far: Although it is theoretically well understood that tournament compensation systems are only effective when employees are homogeneous, it has rarely been analyzed what companies can do when they are confronted with employee heterogeneity. In our article, we derive hypotheses on the performance effects of tournament compensation systems in a context of employee heterogeneity based on tournament and expectancy theory. Using personnel records from incentive travel contests, we are able to show that performance is lower in a situation with employee heterogeneity, but that in heterogeneous tournaments, incentives may still work for a subgroup of employees whom we term the “threshold group.” In addition, we also show how companies manage to design the information disclosure systems necessary to install effective “handicapping” or “league‐building” systems in order to increase the effort‐performance expectancy. 相似文献
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The paper reviews international literature on corporate governance and firm performance and investigates the relationship in the Indian context, taking into account the endogeneity in the relationship. Governance parameters include board size, directors’ shareholding, institutional and foreign shareholding, while the fragmentation in shareholding is captured by public shareholding. A simultaneous equation regression model for Tobin’s Q, as a measure of firm performance, is attempted using these variables, while controlling for industry effects and other non-governance variables. The data corresponds to a panel of 340 large, listed Indian firms for the period 1997–2001 spread across 24 industry groups. 相似文献
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从CEO心理特征视角出发,探究了CEO自恋与企业创新绩效之间的关系。以2011—2016年A股135家上市公司的纵向数据为样本,通过广义估计方程模型进行实证检验。研究发现:CEO自恋对企业创新绩效具有显著促进作用。进一步研究发现,CEO自恋对企业创新绩效的影响受到企业异质性的调节作用:相比小规模企业,大规模企业中CEO自恋对创新绩效的促进作用更显著;相比低财务杠杆企业,高财务杠杆企业中CEO自恋对创新绩效的促进作用更显著;相比非国有企业,国有企业中CEO自恋对创新绩效的促进作用更显著。 相似文献
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Marina Gigliotti 《International Journal of Human Resource Management》2013,24(4):889-903
This paper examines one of the most studied aspects regarding the compensation of top managers: the relationship between remuneration and corporate performance. The principle research objective is to find evidence of this correlation in Italian companies. Based on a sample of 145 Italian companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange, as analysed during the period between 2004 and 2009, the research findings do not demonstrate a link between company performance and the pay of top managers. Another empirical result that should be highlighted is the presence of a greater correlation between rate of pay and company size, in terms of stock turnover, which demonstrates the likely presence, at least in certain situations, of a dimensional premium that is to the benefit of the managers of larger companies. This research project evidences empirical results in the Italian context that support the findings of the most important international literature on the subject, as regards the absence of a connection between the compensation of managers and the performance of their firms. 相似文献