Keeping Their Cards Close to Their Chests: How Non‐Delegating CEOs Avoid Forced Career Ends

It is a common belief that CEOs must delegate to be successful. We hesitate to support this generalization and investigate how the distribution of responsibility within top management teams (TMTs) can influence the likelihood of a CEO’s dismissal. Consistent with an agency theory perspective, our results indicate that CEOs may choose not to delegate their responsibilities to other executive TMT members, so as to benefit from an increased information asymmetry vis‐à‐vis the board of directors. Taking the resource‐based view as a complementary theoretical perspective, we find that non‐delegating CEOs benefit from their greater firm‐specific knowledge, which the board of directors considers as a valuable resource that should be retained. Our work also demonstrates that a more intense CEO–TMT interaction weakens the relation between non‐delegation and the likelihood of CEO dismissal. In sum, our research shows that the CEO’s delegation decision does not necessarily lead to a competence distribution that is in the firm's best interest; rather, it reflects a complex interplay between the potentially opportunistic career interests of the CEO, the involvement of other TMT members and the board of directors. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Managerial incentives and R&D investments: The moderating effect of the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance

Literature regarding the impact of managerial incentives on firm’s research and development (R&D) investments suggests that due to the riskiness of R&D activities, firms need to provide managerial incentives to encourage managerial discretion on corporate long-term investments of R&D. In spite that managerial incentives influence corporate R&D spending, some also argue corporate R&D spending a function of managerial incentive schemes. This paper applies the simultaneous equation to investigate the association between managerial discretion on R&D investments and the incentive scheme of CEO compensations by using the sample firms listed in Taiwan Security Exchange and Taipei Exchange. The results indicate that the listed firms in Taiwan simultaneously determine corporate R&D investments and CEO compensations. They reward their CEOs in compliance with their efforts on R&D investments and CEO compensation motivates CEOs to align their interests with firms’ long-term investments on R&D. A further analysis of the protection effect from the directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance suggests that D&O protection intensifies the relationship between R&D investments and CEO compensation. It encourages CEOs to allocate resources on R&D activities and make CEO incentive contracts efficacious on corporate long-term investments. The result is robust in the electronic industry of Taiwan.     

Corporate elite characteristics and firm's internationalization: CEO-level and TMT-level roles

This study attempts resolution of certain ambiguities of the corporate elite – Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Top Management Team (TMT) – effect on corporate internationalization strategy. This work hypothesized that curvilinear relationship exists between CEO position tenure, TMT size, and TMT tenure heterogeneity and a firm's internationalization, by combining previous upper echelon theory and processing international business school perspective. Our detailed empirical findings indicate that CEO and TMT characteristics show a nonlinear relationship, based on 165 samples of Taiwanese firms operating in a technologically intensive industry. An inverted U-shaped relationship exists between CEO position tenure and TMT size regarding a firm's internationalization. These associations are an inverted U-shape, when internationalization level facing TMT tenure heterogeneity is accounted for.     

CEO optimism,CEO selection,compensation, and corporate investment decision: The case of CEOs who were rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover

What happens to CEOs after they are let go by their firm? This study is designed to investigate CEOs who are rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover. CEOs defined as “moderately optimistic” and those who left voluntarily from their departing firms, are younger, have better prior performance, and work in larger firms are found to have a greater likelihood of being rehired as a CEO by another employer. Moreover, new-hire firms with higher growth opportunity and higher R&D expenditures are found to be significantly more willing to hire overconfident CEOs. Furthermore, more-optimistic CEOs are found to receive higher total compensation from their new-hire firms than CEOs who are less optimistic. Finally, overconfident CEOs working in firms with high growth opportunity and higher R&D show a significantly greater tendency toward increasing firm investment.     

Corporate strategy,executive selection,and firm performance

This article investigates three related questions: (1) Is corporate diversification strategy associated with the level of firm-specific experience (tenure) of selected CEOs? (2) Are tenure levels of selected CEOs related to subsequent organizational performance? and (3) Does diversification strategy influence the impact that CEO firm-specific experience has on subsequent organizational performance? Results indicate that while diversification levels do not relate to extent of tenure, the selection of CEOs with lower levels of firm-specific experience results in significantly improved performance among nondiversified firms. No such relationship is observed in more diversified firms.¹ © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Do CEO characteristics influence a firm’s investment in brand equity? Evidence from Chinese listed firms

This paper contributes to the upper-echelons theory by extending the investigation of how CEO characteristics, namely gender, age, tenure, education attainment, and duality, influence firms’ strategic decisions regarding brand equity investment. We gather 8830 firm-year observations from the Chinese listed firms for the period of 2012 to 2018. We develop several hypotheses and use a probit regression specification to test each hypothesis. The empirical results show that a CEO’s tenure and duality have a positive influence. Interestingly, the CEO’s age has a negative influence while their gender and education have no significant influence on a firm’s propensity to invest in brand equity. It indicates that longer tenures and duality lead CEOs to be confident making them more willing to invest in high-risk projects. It also indicates that older CEO’s are risk-averse, while gender does not play a role in the risk-taking appetite of the CEO. The results provide several implications for firms looking to develop influential brands, especially in China.

     

Should Directors Have Term Limits? – Evidence from Corporate Innovation

This paper examines the effect that directors with extended tenure have on corporate innovation based on a sample of US firms from 1996 to 2006. Using the propensity-score matched-pair research design, I find that firms with a higher portion of outside directors enjoying extended tenure produce significantly fewer patents and that these patents receive fewer subsequent citations. These firms also have lower research and development (R&D) productivity and exploration intensity than their matched control firms, although I found no significant difference in their R&D investment intensity. Difference-in-differences tests based on director deaths and regulatory changes in the early 2000s suggest that the adverse effect of long director tenure on innovation performance is causal. I also find that the effect is mitigated when long-tenured directors have more years of overlap in service with CEOs, and when long-tenured directors are executives at other firms. Finally, I find that boards with extended tenure attenuate the contributions of innovation outputs to future firm value and performance. These findings shed new light on the debate over length of board tenure and provide another justification for imposing term limits on directors.     

CEO overconfidence and labor investment efficiency

We examine the impact of CEO overconfidence on labor investment efficiency (LIE). The findings suggest that firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to have lower LIE. The findings are robust to alternative measures of CEO overconfidence and LIE and after accounting for endogeneity and CEO experience, age, managerial ability, high tech industry, and economic recession. Further analysis shows that: i) our findings are not due to the relation between net hiring and contemporaneous non-labor investments and the difference between high- and low-skilled labor, ii) firms with more analyst following, financially constrained firms, and firms located in states with wrongful discharge laws force CEOs to invest more efficiently in labor. In contrast, firms with dominant CEOs or facing high economic policy uncertainty are less efficient in labor investments, iii) firms with overconfident CEOs exhibit higher labor cost stickiness than those of non-overconfident CEOs, and iv) a lower LIE caused by CEO overconfidence has negative impacts on a firm's future profitability.     

A temporal perspective on the relationship between top management team internationalization and firms' innovativeness

This study examines whether top management team (TMT) internationalization is positively related to firm innovativeness. Besides focusing on the accumulation of top managers' international knowledge and capabilities, we explore the influence of moderators reflecting temporal concerns at three levels: CEO age, TMT tenure, and firm age. Combining upper echelons theory with innovation literature and using a sample of large stock-listed German firms, we demonstrate that TMT internationalization can increase firm innovativeness. This relationship is context-dependent on the age of the CEO. Overall, this paper sheds light on the antecedents of firm innovativeness and the consequences of increasingly international TMTs.     

Unionization and CEO turnover

This article investigates whether unions have power to influence turnover of poorly performing chief executive officers (CEOs). Employing the transparency coalition framework, we develop hypotheses regarding CEO tenure given unionization, performance-turnover sensitivity, and firm performance following CEO turnover. We use Cox regression and a data set of US firms from 1993 to 2013 to show that CEO turnover is accelerated at firms that unionize. Discontinuity analysis suggests that the relationship is causal. Overall, the results show the significance of unions in the key corporate governance event of CEO turnover and suggest that, though they may proceed independently and for their own traditional goals of good pay and job conditions for their members, unions can be allies of investors and boards or directors when it comes to removing underperforming CEOs.     

The Value of CEO Mobility: Contextual Factors That Shape the Impact of Prior CEO Experience on Market Performance and CEO Compensation

This study examines the value that prior CEO experience has for the companies that hire such CEOs—as reflected in the firms’ subsequent market‐based performance—as well as its value for the CEO that possesses this experience—as reflected in his or her initial compensation. While we suggest that shareholders tend not to benefit from firms hiring experienced CEOs, we also argue that particular firm and industry contextual factors that shaped the prior CEO experience help ameliorate this detrimental effect. Regardless, we also suggest that prior CEO experience generally stands to benefit the CEOs, in that it brings them a compensation premium over those CEOs without such prior experience. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 654 US CEO succession events that occurred between 2001 and 2004 and found broad support for our hypotheses. We close with a discussion of the implications of our findings for future research as well as what they mean for firms hiring experienced CEOs and for CEO careers more generally. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Chief executive officer attributes,sustainable performance,environmental performance,and environmental reporting: New insights from upper echelons perspective

This study examines the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) attributes on sustainable performance, environmental performance, and environmental reporting, which are motivated by institutionally driven environmental policies, regulations, and management in the context of Chinese listed firms. With the use of a comprehensive dataset of 2,854 Chinese listed firms over the 2010–2017 period (i.e., making over 16,000 individual firm‐year observations), our findings are fourfold. First, our overall findings reveal that CEOs with research background tend to engage more in activities that improve sustainable performance, environmental performance, and environmental reporting than do those without research background. Second, CEOs with financial expertise are positively linked with increased sustainable performance and environmental reporting. Third, CEOs with foreign exposure are more eager to engage in activities that enhance sustainable and environmental performance than do those without foreign exposure. Fourth, young CEOs tend to take actions that reduce both sustainable and environmental performance than do their older counterparts. We interpret our results within upper echelons theoretical perspective. The results are robust to alternative measures, potential endogeneities, and sample selection problems.     

Board Effectiveness and CEO Pay: Board Information Processing Capacity,Monitoring Complexity,and CEO Pay‐for‐Performance Sensitivity

We have developed an information processing theory of board effectiveness to examine board‐chief executive officers (CEOs) pay relations. We theorize that CEO pay reflects the information processing context of boards. Boards have limited information processing capacity and therefore prefer to use outcome‐based CEO pay when they have difficulty in processing information for monitoring their CEOs. Using a longitudinal sample of Standard and Poor's (S&P's) large‐, medium‐, and small‐cap manufacturing firms in the United States from 1998 through 2005, we found support for our theory. Large boards and boards in less complex monitoring contexts tend to link CEO pay less tightly to firm performance by providing less stock‐based incentives, and the tendency of large boards to decrease outcome‐based CEO pay is even greater when boards are not busy or when boards are in less complex monitoring contexts. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

How CEOs and TMTs Build Adaptive Capacity in Small Entrepreneurial Firms

Research suggests that a CEO may have more influence in the context of small entrepreneurial firms, but it is still unclear how a company's chief executive facilitates strategic decision‐making. Little is known about the ways in which these individuals build strategic capabilities, such as the capacity to adapt to changing environments. This study addresses these issues and develops a model indicating that transformational leadership facilitates behavioural integration and comprehensiveness in the decision process among members of the top management team (TMT), which in turn enhances organizational capacity to adapt to environmental changes. Survey results shed light on the complex way in which CEOs facilitate processes within the TMT and enhance small entrepreneurial firms’ capacity to adapt, thereby increasing their viability. This study contributes to the literatures on Upper Echelon Theory, strategic decision‐making, and dynamic capabilities by shedding light on the ways in which transformational leaders influence behavioural and decision‐making processes.     

In Pursuit of Greatness: CEO Narcissism,Entrepreneurial Orientation,and Firm Performance Variance

Building upon the perspective that narcissism is a leadership trait with both ‘bright’ and ‘dark’ sides, the present study examines the question of whether companies led by narcissistic CEOs exhibit higher levels of entrepreneurial orientation (EO). Moreover, this research examines whether EO partially explains why narcissistic CEO‐led firms experience greater variability in firm performance. Using survey data collected from 173 CEOs, and an archival measure of firm performance variance, we find support for our model. These findings offer an improved understanding of how CEO narcissism influences performance variance, and why the firms they lead may even, at times, be viewed as on a path to success. Study implications are discussed.     

Relative CEO Underpayment and CEO Behaviour Towards R&D Spending

abstract Arguments based on labour market theory suggest that there may be CEO behavioural issues related to pay deviations from the labour market rate for CEO pay; however, few studies examine this phenomenon. This study attempts to address such behavioural issues by examining the influence of relative CEO underpayment on reductions in R&D spending, the differences in this relationship between firms in high R&D intensive versus low R&D intensive industries, and the moderating affect of ownership structure on the CEO underpayment and R&D spending relationship. Results suggest that relative CEO underpayment is associated with reductions in R&D spending in low R&D intensive industries and increases in R&D spending in high R&D intensive industries. Also, greater relative CEO underpayment leads to greater reductions in R&D spending in manager‐controlled organizations as compared to owner‐controlled organizations. This study provides evidence that pay deviations may, in fact, affect certain CEO behaviours, specifically relating to innovation.     

Over-investment in corporate R&D,risk, and stock returns

Large-size firms which significantly increase their R&D expenditures experience subsequently three-year-long negative abnormal stock returns on the magnitude of 56 basis-points per month. We find no robust evidence of significant event-induced abnormal returns for small-size sample firms or any systematic risk changes for the small- and large- size firms. We also find that the large-size sample firms generate relatively much larger cash flows (i.e., have significantly greater over-investment discretion) and have significantly larger (over-) valuation multiples than the small-size firms. Moreover, some of their operating performance measures show signs of deterioration instead of improvement following these R&D programs. These findings are consistent with the view that investors initially underestimate the over-investment in R&D by some large-size firms that appear to be overvalued and have high cash flows at the time of the investment, only to be disappointed later.     

CEO Overconfidence and Overinvestment Under Product Market Competition

How does product market competition influence whether CEOs with greater or lower levels of overconfidence are hired and whether CEOs overinvest in innovation? In a Cournot model in which firms hire a CEO to take charge of research and development (R&D) investment and production decisions, this paper shows that CEO overconfidence and overinvestment can be explained as an equilibrium outcome. More importantly, the intensity of product market competition and the equilibrium CEO overconfidence level (and R&D investment) exhibit an inverted U‐shaped relationship. As the product market tends toward perfect competition, all firms hire a realistic CEO and do not overinvest. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Top Management Team Functional Diversity and Firm Performance: The Moderating Role of CEO Characteristics

Past research indicates that the effect of TMT functional diversity on firm performance is equivocal. We address this issue by focusing on the integrative role of the CEO, postulating that the CEO's expertise and background characteristics affect the TMT functional diversity–firm performance relationship, because of their impact on the exchange and integration of distributed knowledge within the TMT. Using a dataset of 33 Dutch and Belgian Information Technology firms we investigate the moderating role of three sets of CEO characteristics (functional background, status as founder, and shared experience with the other TMT members) on the relationship between TMT functional diversity and firm performance. Our results reveal that CEO and TMT characteristics do interact in realizing the potential advantages of distributed TMT functional expertise.     

Incentive Alignment,CEO Pay Level,and Firm Performance: A Case of “Heads I Win,Tails You Lose”?

In recent years, rewarding CEOs with long‐term forms of compensation (e.g., stock options, performance plans, restricted stock) has become more popular than using year‐end pay adjustments. Surprisingly, there is little empirical evidence to support the benefits of this trend. This study found that the benefits of long‐term compensation flowed primarily to CEOs as they received significantly greater levels of total compensation than CEOs in firms that emphasized year‐end pay adjustments. Paradoxically, however, firms that emphasized year‐end pay adjustments performed significantly better than firms that were heavy users of long‐term forms of contingent compensation. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.