Does share pledging affect firms' use of derivatives? Evidence from China

We investigate whether share pledging by controlling shareholders affects firms' use of derivatives. Our findings suggest that share-pledging firms are more likely to use derivatives than non-share-pledging firms. In cross-section analyses, we observe that the relationship is more pronounced when the margin call risk is higher, for example, if controlling shareholders own fewer shares, firms are located in regions with higher levels of marketization, or firms have a higher stock price crash risk. Our findings indicate that shares pledged by controlling shareholders steer firms toward the use of derivatives to hedge firm activities and alleviate the margin call risk.     

Profitability of politically corrupt firms: Evidence from Romania

Extending the twin-agency problem model, this paper shows that political corruption affects firms by empowering the controlling shareholders and thereby intensifying agency conflicts within selected firms instead of simple political extractions. The fact that controlling shareholders of politically corrupt firms divert more resources from their firms explains the inferior accounting performance despite the well-documented benefits of political connections. Moreover, a higher degree of diversion does not result in a value discount due to the increased value of control. These are demonstrated by evidence from a unique series of political events in Romania in 2015.     

大股东制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应——来自1999-2003年中国上市公司的证

In this paper, due to the important influence of corporate governance on corporate financial behaviors and from an angle of corporate governance, we develop six hypotheses based on overseas and home relevant researches and data of Chinese listed companies from 1999 to 2003, and then we do hypotheses testes with regression models to examine the impact of share percent of the top 5 shareholders and counterbalance mechanism among blockholders on cash dividend distribution of listed companies, and to explore influence and counterbalance mechanisms in tunneling of cash dividend which derived from the special phenomena of “same shares same rights but different price”. We find that share percent of top 5 shareholders, control ability (or combined control ability) and balance degree (or combined balance degree) of blockholders have important influence on tunneling of cash dividend distribution. Lastly, the paper proposes five suggestions to restrict controlling shareholders to enlist private benefits from tunneling of cash dividend and to protect rights and interests of small and medium shareholders.     

Foreign strategic ownership and minority shareholder protection

We show foreign strategic investors provide monitoring protection, by reducing tunneling through intercorporate loans. Further, foreign strategic investors mitigate minority shareholders expropriation through controlling excessive borrowing, whereas firms without foreign-founders channel excessive borrowing to controlling shareholders using intercorporate loans. The monitoring benefits are greater when corporate governance is weaker, and when foreign strategic investors are from English common law countries. Compared to foreign investor proxies typically used in Chinese studies, we use foreign-founder shareholders. As foreign-founders are long-term investors facing high liquidity risk, they are highly motivated to actively monitor and influence firm behaviours.     

关联交易、控制权收益与盈余质量

Controlling shareholders pursue benefits of control (private benefits and shared benefits) via related party transactions, which result in different levels of earnings quality. Using data from all A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets in the year 2001 and 2002, we found that when the share ratio of controlling shareholder is less than 50%, they prefer pursuing private benefits of control via related party transactions, giving rise to deterioration in earnings quality. By comparison, when the share ratio is more than 50%, controlling shareholders prefer pursing shared benefits of control through related party transactions, which improve earnings quality as a result.      

Selection Bias and the Underwriter Certification of the Largest Shareholders in Seasoned Equity Offerings

The largest shareholders of issuing firms in Hong Kong are eligible to underwrite rights issues and open offers. We hypothesize that the largest shareholders as underwriters who possess more information are better than investment banks in certifying firm value. Our analyses show that the largest shareholders self‐select into their preferred issuing firms, and a selection bias in the choice of underwriters arises. After controlling for firm and issue characteristics and addressing the selection bias, our findings support our hypothesis. We also find that investment banks with greater access to information through prior underwriting relationship provide better certification than investment banks without such relationship.     

Multiple large shareholders and corporate social responsibility reporting

This study examines whether multiple large shareholders play a role in corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting. Employing data from Chinese listed firms during 2008–2015, we find both the shareholding and the identity of large shareholders are associated with CSR reporting. Specifically, we show the higher shareholding of the controlling shareholders, the poorer quality of CSR reporting. However, this entrenchment effect is mitigated when the power is more balanced between the controlling and non-controlling large shareholders. Further examination shows the power balancing effect is more significant when the controlling and non-controlling shareholders are of the same identities.     

Shareholder voting rights in early American corporations

In early American corporations, the power of large shareholders was frequently limited by voting rules that partially disenfranchised them. In particular, stock held in an individual's name was granted a number of votes per share that decreased with the number of shares held. Using data from the corporations created in New York up to 1825, this paper analyses the use of these ‘graduated’ voting rights. Consistent with the view that they were intended to help small investors protect themselves against the predations of controlling shareholders, the data indicate that graduated voting rights were imposed in industries that attracted small investments from ordinary households. The results highlight the importance of concerns over the controlling influence of large shareholders in early corporate governance.     

控制权收益与企业融资方式选择——基于Myers-Majluf模型的分析框架

将控制权收益引入Myers-Majluf模型中,本文建立了一个企业融资方式选择模型。模型预测,由于控股股东和外部投资者的利益冲突,选择股权融资的上市公司存在过度投资行为,而选择负债融资的企业一般不存在过度投资行为;进一步的研究表明,控股股东的控制权收益加剧了企业股权融资偏好和过度投资行为。     

Government ownership and stock liquidity: Evidence from China

This paper documents that state ownership is associated with higher stock liquidity, a finding consistent with lower investor risk perception of firms that benefit from state ownership, like preferential financing and implicit government guarantees. The effect is found to be stronger when government ownership confers stronger benefits like firms with state controlling rather than non-controlling shareholders, and when the benefits of government ownership are important – for smaller firms, for financially constrained firms, and especially during the financial crisis period. These results suggest that investors perceive government ownership as value-enhancing, which increases their willingness to trade in such stocks.     

投资者法律保护与终极所有权结构关系研究

以2004—2006年A股上市公司为样本,考察投资者法律保护与金字塔结构下终极所有权结构的关系。结果显示:投资者法律保护程度越低,控股股东越有动机以较少的现金流投入来掌握企业的控制权,以便于通过财富放大效应进行掏空和寻租来谋取控制权私利;但是,当企业由国有企业控制而非民营企业控制时,控股股东控制权与现金流所有权分离度对投资者法律保护程度的敏感度降低,原因在于,在当前转轨经济阶段,中国国有企业产权公有的性质本身就是一种替代性的投资者保护机制。     

Media Coverage and Firm Valuation: Evidence from China

Drawing on both a managerial discipline perspective and an information intermediary perspective, we explore how media coverage of a firm’s controlling shareholder influences firm valuation in corporate China. Using 366 listed family firms in China from 2003 to 2006, we find that firms in which controlling shareholders receive more neutral media reports enjoy higher valuation, whereas negative media reports on controlling shareholders impose adverse effects on firm valuation. Interestingly, favorable media coverage of the controlling shareholders does not enhance firm value. Further analyses reveal that ownership structure and audit quality moderate the relationship between media coverage and firm valuation. Our study complements the emerging literature on the monitoring role of the media on the stock markets.     

上市公司控制权溢价与中小投资者保护

上市公司中控股股东往往会利用控制权溢价为自己谋求私利,从而损害了中小股东的利益。在运用2002-2006年的样本数据,对中国上市公司控制权的隐性利益水平所进行的实证分析,结果表明中国上市公司的转让溢价与转让比例呈正相关,与转让溢价水平与净资产收益率、现金比率、流通股数和公司规模均呈负相关。同时,随着转让比例的上升,一开始溢价比例会增加,当转让比例增大达到一定程度时,溢价比就会随之下降。用法律或制度安排保护中小股东以及或者形成较为分散的股权结构对于保护中小投资者权益更为有利。     

企业控制机制:控制权争夺的边界和效应

公司兼并和收购市场中企业控制权机机制、控制权争夺的价值、控制权争夺的福利效应、大股东在公司控制权争夺中对公司政策产生影响。外部性排除了负有义务的股东完全取得接管收益的可能性,无论控制权争夺的结果如何,股东财富在控制权争夺其间是增加的。从股东的福利效应方面来说,控制权争夺的失败也就是股东财富的损失。大股东提高了预期利润,并且他们所占股份越多,则提高越大。董事会的失误导致了敌意接管的出现,可由公司控制的外部市场对董事会的疏忽作用进行弥补。     

现金股利政策:法律保护的结果还是法律保护的替代——来自我国上市公司的证据

与LLSV横向研究不同,本文从纵向检验了现金股利法律保护替代模型与结果模型在我国的适用性。首先,纵向分阶段的回归分析和差异检验表明:两模型在我国的适用性呈现出阶段性特征,在法律保护较弱的阶段,法律保护替代模型具有一定的适用性,随着法律保护程度的提高,法律保护结果模型对我国上市公司的现金股利政策更有解释力。其次,检验了我国交叉上市公司与无交叉上市公司现金股利支付率的差异,进一步证明了现金股利法律保护结果模型的适用性。同时,我们也发现一个有趣的问题,现金股利支付率与每股收益显著负相关,与增长机会不具有显著负相关性,说明公司的现金股利政策不是根据盈利状况和增长机会做出的。     

Who creates jobs in developing countries?

This paper investigates the contribution of small firms to employment, job creation, and growth in developing countries. While small firms (<20 employees) have the smallest share of aggregate employment, the small and medium enterprise sector’s (<100 employees) contribution is comparable to that of large firms. Small firms have the largest shares of job creation, and highest sales growth and employment growth, even after controlling for firm age. Large firms, however, have higher productivity growth. Conditional on size, young firms are the fastest growing and large mature firms have the largest employment shares but small young firms have higher job creation rates.     

Rules Governing the Transfer of Ownership: Wealth Effects and the Influence of Ownership Structure

This paper studies a unique change in regulation governing the transfer of share ownership in New Zealand. The new regulation requires all listed firms to adopt one of three proposed takeover regimes, ranging from almost free transferability of shares to a uniform pricing rule. Our empirical results indicate that a higher proportion of shares held by blockholders makes adoption of a liberal takeover regime more likely. We also find that an increase in the proportion of non‐beneficial shares held by directors and shares held by trust companies increases the probability that a firm adopts a more restrictive takeover regime. Furthermore, the results from an event study show that firms adopting the liberal takeover regime experience substantial positive abnormal returns compared to firms adopting the standard or restrictive regime.     

Large Shareholder Tunneling and Risk of Stock Price Crash： Evidence from China

Although several studies have examined the economic consequences of large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior, little attention has been paid to the negative effects of tunneling on firms＇ extreme events. In this article, we investigate how tunneling behavior affects firm-level stock price crashes. The findings indicate that the probability of stock price crashes is positively associated with the extent of tunneling behavior by large shareholders. The positive relationship is more pronounced after the split of share structure reform and is moderated by the firm＇s financial conditions. This study contributes to the emerging body of literature focusing on the economic consequences of tunneling and stock price crashes. The conclusions drawn from the study also provide a frame of reference for investor protection and investment portfolios based on large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior in China.     

不同成长机会下的上市公司股权结构、资本结构与公司绩效——以A股流通服务业上市公司为例

文章以我国流通服务业上市公司为研究样本,分析了上市公司资本结构和股权结构对公司绩效的影响,以及成长机会在其中的调节作用.研究结果表明流通服务业上市公司第一大股东持股比例、第二到第十大股东持股比例、长期负债资本比对公司绩效存在显著正向影响;国有股持股比例、高管持股比例、资产负债率对公司绩效存在显著负向影响.随着公司成长机会的增加,第二到第十大股东持股,非国有法人股持股对公司绩效正向影响作用增强;而第一大股东持股比例、国有股持股比例、高管持股比例、资产负债率与长期负债资本比对公司绩效的影响并不随着公司成长性的变化而变化.文章研究对于流通服务业上市公司股权结构和资本结构优化提供了有益的启示.     

Infant firms in emerging market: An analysis of stand-alones vs. subsidiaries

Newly established manufacturing firms in Korea without any corporate shareholder participation — stand-alones — exhibit significantly higher profitability and smaller asset size compared to those set up by corporate shareholders — subsidiaries. This pattern holds even for stand-alones and subsidiaries set up by the same controlling shareholder. Such differences in profitability do not seem to be driven by inherent differences in business risk nor reflected in post-establishment survival rates. Moreover, infant firms' overall profitability depends more on internal transactions with affiliated firms than external transactions.