从全球主权债务危机看中国地方政府债务风险

美国金融危机后,各国主权债务问题浮出水面。从冰岛债务危机到迪拜债务危机,再到欧元区债务危机,欧美发达经济体的债务风险凸现。虽然中国政府的债务还处于安全界限之内,但地方政府债务膨胀到令人担忧的地步,如何化解地方政府债务风险成了当务之急。     

主权债务危机的原因及警示

近期,随着希腊债务危机以及有关国家债务危机的频频爆出,全球主权债务危机愈演愈烈,主权债务风险进一步扩大,整个金融界也为此焦虑不安,都密切关注着国际债务动态的发展趋势。文章对主权债务危机产生的原因及对我国的警示提出自己的观点。     

反思中国地方债务风险——从希腊债务危机中得到的启示

体制问题、隐性担保、通胀可被摊薄、持续的扩张性财政政策等原因构成了希腊主权债务危机的实质,再加上美国虎视眈眈、恰到好处的引爆,最终酿成了蔓延欧洲的主权债务危机。我国的地方债务从多个方面与希腊的主权债务危机有相似之处,反思这些相似之处,以提起对地方债务风险的重视,尤其是认识其可能产生的影响具有重要意义。     

全球主权债务风险与国别脆弱性评估

新冠疫情的暴发把各国政府债务水平推向历史新高，发达经济体长期以来的“低通胀、低利率”局面出现逆转，陷入债务困境的新兴市场和发展中经济体数量不断增加，国际社会开始担忧再度出现类似拉美主权债务危机的系统性风险。在这一背景下，本文构建了一个分析主权债务风险和评估国别脆弱性的整体性框架。首先，根据2022年政府债务负担指标取值的历史相对水平可知，全球债务负担水平仍属于中等范畴，但部分经济体已进入高风险区间，且新兴市场和发展中经济体比发达经济体面临更加严峻的流动性风险。其次，采用债务动态分析方法，分析了不同类型经济体政府债务负担水平决定因素的差异，并且探讨了通胀和利率上升等新变化对其主权债务风险的影响。相比发达经济体，新兴市场和发展中经济体更容易因为外部冲击而陷入债务困境，而且难以借助通胀和财政调整手段来缓解主权债务风险。最后，结合两类经济体主权债务风险来源的差异，分别设计了短期脆弱性评估框架，并给出各国脆弱性排名。     

人口老龄化会提高主权债务违约风险吗?——来自发展中国家的证据

本文选用1984-2012年共37个发展中国家作为样本,从人口结构变迁的视角分析主权债务违约的成因.结果发现:短期债务会提高主权债务违约风险,而政府总债务对其影响并不明显;通货膨胀率也会提高主权债务违约概率,而其他经济变量对其影响并不明显;政治风险会增加主权债务违约的可能性;而外部金融环境对债务违约没有带来显著影响;人口结构对主权债务违约产生显著影响.具体来说,人口老龄化程度较低时,其对主权债务违约影响不明显,但当人口老龄化程度越过“门限值”时,则会显著提高主权违约风险.     

地方政府债务风险来源分析与化解对策

财政分权、地方政府官员行为、公共支出结构、基础设施建设和地方政府债务的关联影响是重要的学术研究问题.本文在对地方政府债务问题进行研究,从经济、体制和政治三个层面分析总结地方政府债务的风险来源,提出化解地方政府债务风险的对策建议.     

美国债务危机的演进、影响及前景展望

2011年之前,全球对主权债务危机的担忧主要集中在欧洲,美国债务危机还只是少数具有前瞻性学者的猜想。而今,随着标普下调美国长期主权信用评级,标志着美国也已陷入主权债务危机的泥沼,对美债危机的讨论随即成为全球金融市场的新热点。本文着重阐述了美债危机发端、显现和深化的演进过程,进而分析了其对美国经济、美国国债市场以及中国等新兴市场国家的影响,最后对其可能的政策前景进行了展望。     

赞比亚何以成为新冠疫情以来第一个主权违约的非洲国家

赞比亚是新冠疫情以来第一个主权违约的非洲国家，其双边官方债权人、多边官方债权人、市场债权人（包括主权债券和非主权债券）在新冠疫情暴发至赞比亚违约期间，分别采取了协调进化、维持现状和角色缺位等策略。以国际货币基金组织为代表的多边官方渠道“最后贷款人”角色缺位是造成赞比亚成为新冠疫情以来第一个主权违约的非洲国家的直接原因。赞比亚本轮债务问题的根源在于西方国际发展方案与赞比亚国情长期不匹配所引发的民粹主义施政纲领过度融资。赞比亚主权违约与减债协调过程显示出多元债权人关系正在使得发展中国家债务问题更为复杂化，这也是本轮国际减债协调与全球债务治理改革的核心问题。     

稳增长和防风险双底线下的宏观经济*——2016年宏观经济形势分析与2017年预测

2016年经济呈现出短期底部企稳与泡沫聚集的特点。在潜在增长平台下移、周期性、结构性以及趋势性因素共同作用的背景下,经济下行压力依然巨大,2017年宏观经济仍将持续筑底。而底部运行的深度和持续的长度取决于世界经济复苏程度、中国经济潜在增长水平、新产业新动能培育、房地产周期调整、政治经济周期波动以及对潜在风险的化解与对策等多种因素。与此同时,在“债务—投资”驱动模式下,我国债务规模快速攀升,债务水平已经积累至相当程度,债务的结构性风险突出,尤其是广义政府债务水平超出国际警戒线。而中国经济目前存在的深层次问题本质上大多与债务风险密切相关。比如资产泡沫的聚集,实际上是“债务—投资”驱动模式中投放的大量货币在股市、债市以及房地产等领域的伺机流动。债务风险有可能是引发中国经济爆发危机的关键点。从目前情况来看,中国具备防范危机的实力,但是对于可能引发危机的潜在因素必须重视。一方面,树立正确的危机观,不惧怕危机,建立危机应急机制。另一方面,在债务风险演变至债务危机前,防患于未然,建立风险缓释机制。     

日本债务问题是否会引爆新的国际金融危机？

近来,国际舆论的焦点转向了日本,担心日本可能将是全球金融危机的下一个引爆点。尽管日本的债务水平是不可持续的,可能会因公债余额占GDP比重持续上升招致国际评级机构继续调降其主权债务评级,但日本债务问题与美国和欧洲均不同,至少在短期引发日本债务危机乃至全球金融风险的可能性较小,而其长期债务风险不容小觑。     

后金融危机时代中国地方债发行模式与风险管理浅析

在中国,地方政府融资渠道的变迁关系到经济增长的速度、金融系统的稳定以及中央与地方的权利配置。2011年底地方自行发债启动,这一方面确认了地方债的合法性,另一方面开始了向地方政府自主发债的过渡。在这一重要的经济制度建立之初,有必要从地方债产生的原因、存在的问题入手,借鉴国外地方债发行模式的经验,深入探讨和研究地方债的风险管理问题,为中国地方债发行的健康发展提供有益参考。     

中国主权债务的现状分析及其风险防范对策

20世纪70年代以来,国际债务危机频繁发生,陷入危机的国家都遭受了重大损失。2007年由次贷危机所引发的经济衰退使一部分发达国家和发展中国家陷入债务危机,造成了全球的金融动荡。为此,改革国际货币体系、控制外债流动性风险、增强中国在国际市场上的融资能力具有重要的意义。     

地方政府债务风险预警评估分析及对策研究——以河北省为例

不少地方政府负债问题日益突出,严重影响到该地区政治与经济的可持续发展。通过对地方政府直接和间接负债状况及其形成原因的分析,可运用建立预警系统的方式来应对债务风险:转变政府职能,细化事权财权之间的分配;加强民间资本的投资,增加地方政府融资渠道;完善监督制度,加强债务管理;建立风险预警机制,建立地方政府偿债机制。     

Debt markets and corporate debt structure in an emerging market: The South African example

This is a first attempt at gauging the effects of corporate public debt issuance on the debt structure, risk profile and valuation of firms in an emerging market. We find that financial services firms, along with government institutions, are important early supporters of an organized public debt market. Firms in this market use equity, public debt and private debt funds simultaneously as need be. Consistent with predictions of the corporate debt structure literature, public debt-issuing firms are larger, older, more profitable, and less informational opaque than non-public debt-issuing firms. Moreover, public debt-issuing firms experience significant reductions in both overall and systematic risks, and incur lower cost of capital following issuance than non-public debt issuers. These and other findings of the study suggest deepening national debt markets can be a fruitful financial market development exercise for emerging markets.     

Young democracies and government debt: evidence from South America

I test the hypothesis that when democracies are young, or still fragile and unconsolidated, government debt tends to increase, presumably because of increased demand for redistribution, or to buy out the electorate, so that democracy becomes acceptable and “the only game in town”. I use a sample of all South American young democracies during the 1970–2007 period and the results, based on dynamic panel time-series analysis, suggest that those young democracies are indeed associated with larger government debt. Furthermore, I test the hypothesis that the outgoing dictatorships of the day bequeathed the young democracies with large government debt. This hypothesis is not confirmed by the analysis. Lastly, there is no evidence that, as those democracies mature over time, government debt tends to decrease. Given how I conduct the exercise, that is, the nature of the sample, the methodology I use and the counterfactuals I run, and also that there are always new episodes of democratisation being experienced by different countries around the world, with some being economically successful and others less so, the results I report are informative of what to expect in terms of government debt during political transitions into democracy when particular institutions are still not in place.     

Government size,government debt and globalization

This article empirically investigates the effect of globalization on government size and debt. Using panel heterogeneous cointegration techniques to a panel of developing and developed countries, it finds that globalization reduces government size and debt. In terms of components of globalization, government size is found to increase with trade openness but decreases with financial, social and political globalization. On the other hand, government debt increases with financial and trade openness but decreases with social and political globalization. The evidence is robust to different estimation methods and different samples. Our data also indicate unidirectional causality running from globalization measures to government size and debt.     

我国地方政府债务风险的 度量、评估与释放

本文度量和评估了我国地方政府的债务风险,结果显示,地方政府的债务余额虽在可控范围内,但新增债务比率已超过预警线,地方政府存在一定的潜在债务风险。本文从分权体制和道德风险两个层面剖析了引致地方政府债务风险的原因,梳理了应对地方政府债务风险的逻辑体系,从制度基础、事前审核把关、事中动态监控、事后反思改进等方面为解决地方政府债务风险提供了政策建议。     

Foreign currency debt, risk premia and macroeconomic volatility

This paper studies the relationships between foreign currency debt, macroeconomic volatility, and risk premia in a model of a small open emerging market economy. The external value of the local currency is counter-cyclical, so that foreign currency debt requires larger repayments than local currency debt in bad states of nature. The level of foreign currency-denominated debts, therefore, affects the volatility of aggregate demand and by extension of the exchange rate. Exchange rate volatility is in turn an important determinant of the risk premium on local currency debt. Finally, this risk premium is a major factor in the choice of local versus foreign currency for emerging market borrowers. The mutual endogeneity of foreign currency debt, risk premia, and macroeconomic volatility creates important feedback effects in the economy: small increases in international risk aversion may entail large amplification effects on macroeconomic volatility since domestic borrowers substitute towards cheaper but riskier foreign currency debt finance.     

Sudden Stops,Time Inconsistency,and the Duration of Sovereign Debt

We study the sovereign debt duration chosen by the government in the context of a standard model of sovereign default. The government balances off increasing the duration of its debt to mitigate rollover risk and lowering duration to mitigate the debt dilution problem. We present two main results. First, when the government decides the debt duration on a sequential basis, sudden stop risk increases the average duration by 1 year. Second, we illustrate the time inconsistency problem in the choice of sovereign debt duration: governments would like to commit to a duration that is 1.7 years shorter than the one they choose when decisions are made sequentially.