激励不足：下岗失业人员小额担保贷款的运行壁垒

小额担保贷款是促进再就业的有效途径之一,但由于其在运行中贷款对象的经营能力与贷款期限的不对称,贷款人的收益与风险的不对称,担保机构的责任与收益不对称,使得三个利益主体都存在激励不足,小额担保贷款在很多地区没能发挥预期作用。针对这一现象,文章作者提出相应的对策以促进小额担保贷款业务的开展,进而从根本上发挥其促进再就业的作用．     

黑龙江省小额担保贷款机制创新的探讨

黑龙江省的小额担保贷款总体规模较小,覆盖面不够广,应．采取建立风险补偿机制、借鉴后续支持模式、建立信用社区和社区银行等创新模式,推进小额担保贷款广泛开展。     

当前城市小额贷款发展中的问题与完善对策

城市小额贷款扶持了中国一大批下岗失业人员自主创业,但目前存在着外部政策约束、内部机制缺陷和贷款者素质三方面影响城市小额创业贷款发展的因素,针对存在的问题,笔者提出了创立专门为低收入阶层和微小企业服务的区域性小额贷款金融机构的政策性建议,从放宽准入限制、扩大资金来源渠道、放松利率管制、扩展服务范围与领域、加强风险控制、完善外部环境等方面提出具体对策.     

科技型中小企业政府资助效应提升研究——基于企业生命周期的观点

为促进科技型中小企业在自主创新创业、促进经济增长和解决就业等方面发挥更为重要的作用,政府以创新基金、小巨人基金等形式对科技型中小企业进行了直接资助。但是,研究发现,在企业生命周期发展的不同阶段中,由于政府直接资助金额与科技型中小企业所需要的资金额之间存在着不同程度的缺口,导致政府资助效应在不同企业生命周期的差异。为提升政府对科技型中小企业的资助效应,本文建议调整政府对不同生命周期企业的直接资助力度,将部分直接资助的财政资金转变为贷款担保再保险基金,充分发挥政府财政资金的杠杆作用与示范带头作用,撬动与带动更多的社会资金进入到科技型中小企业中去,以弥补政府直接资助金额与企业所需资金额的巨大缺口。     

陕西中小企业融资抵押担保对策分析

中小企业在促进经济增长、提供就业岗位等方面有着重要的作用。文章从陕西中小企业的融资抵押担保现状出发,分析了存在的问题,从扩大担保贷款规模、促进集合担保业务的开展及担保机构与银行之间建立风险共担机制等三个方面提出了相应的解决对策,以供参考。     

关于国家开发银行煤炭大中型项目贷款担保方式的探讨

关于国家开发银行煤炭大中型项目贷款担保方式的探讨国家开发银行煤油局贷款处张晓军国家开发银行是我国政策性贷款、放款的主力银行，承担着把短期金融债券资金借给中长期建设项目的巨大风险。要实现保本微利的经营目标，就必须以政策性原则为根本，以安全性原则为前提，...     

关于对创业带动就业工作的认识和建议

党的十八大报告明确提出:要贯彻劳动者自主就业、市场调节就业、政府促进就业和鼓励创业的方针。创业不单是创业者个人创下自己一份事业、产业,而且创下多个新的就业机会,同时也减轻了政府就业工作的压力。大多数的异常活跃、自主经营的小业主吸纳新增失业人员就业、农村剩余劳动力转移就业、下岗失业人员再就业的比重越来越大,他们是创业者的基础力量,是创业带动就业的主力军。因此"以创业带动就业"是一条既有效增加就业、又增加经济社会快速增长的良性发展道路。本文通过对潍坊市寒亭区创业带动就业工作的认识,认真总结近年来该区创业带动就业的经验行业做法,进而发现工作中存在的问题和不足,从而提出对以后创业带动就业工作的建议和措施。     

扶上马,送几程?

商业贷款门槛太高,风险投资成本太大,科技担保贷款给了科技创业企业最初的支持。但是,孩子总要断奶,科技担保贷款能陪伴企业走多远?     

建立住房抵押贷款二级市场的可行条件

住房抵押贷款二级市场即住房抵押债权转让市场,是指住房贷款由贷款银行或其他金融机构创造出来后,再转售给其他投资者,或者以抵押贷款为担保,发行抵押贷款债券的市场。二级市场又可以分为证券化市场和非证券化市场两部分。住房抵押贷款证券化就是指住房抵押贷款机构将其所持有的抵押债权汇集重组为抵押组群,经过政府机构或私人机构的担保和信用加强,以证券的形式出售给投资者。非证券化市场是指由投资者直接买断住房     

住房抵押贷款证券化“小史”

住房抵押贷款证券化就是对住房抵押贷款债权进行拆分整合并销售的过程。即住房抵押贷款机构将其持有的抵押债权汇集重组为抵押组群,经过政府机构或私人机构的担保和信用加强,转化为可在金融市场上流通的证券,进而通过发行证券在资本市场进行流通,完成住房抵押贷款机构将抵押贷款由债权变现的过程。     

Reverse Mortgages and Borrower Maintenance Risk

This paper develops a theoretical model of the problem of maintenance risk in reverse mortgages (RMs) and home equity conversion instruments generally. By maintenance risk, we refer to the incentive homeowners will have to reduce maintenance expenditures as their equity in the house falls during the term of the RM. The underlying reason for this tendency is the limited liability feature of RMs, given that a borrower's obligation to the lender at. maturity is limited to the value of the house.
The results of the model show that lenders will respond to this problem either by limiting the amount of RM loans to guarantee that maintenance risk is not a threat, or by charging an interest rate premium to cover the expected cost of default. Unfortunately, there do not exist data to test the importance of maintenance risk as a possible limitation on the extent of the RM market.     

吉林省金融机构对中小企业金融支持的对策分析

近年来,吉林省金融机构将开展中小企业业务作为改善业务结构、客户结构和调整战略方针、履行社会责任的重点,中小企业贷款满足率不断上升,但融资难问题,仍是制约不少中小企业进一步发展的障碍.加强对中小企业的金融支持,广大金融机构应提高服务中小企业发展的水平,增强金融创新能力,完善中小企业信贷考核体系,建立中小企业贷款风险补偿基金,发展多层次中小企业信用担保体系等,为中小企业的发展提供更有力的金融支持.     

Bank Real Estate Lending and the New England Capital Crunch

The stock of real estate loans held by New England banks has declined dramatically. Given the limited potential for real estate investments, weak demand for real estate loans is to be expected. However, supply as well as demand factors may account for some of the decline in bank real estate loans. This paper documents that bank lending for real estate may have been constrained by a capital crunch, whereby poorly capitalized banks shrank their assets, including real estate loans, to satisfy capital requirements. Because the loss of bank capital is so widespread in New England, bank-dependent borrowers may have difficulty obtaining real estate financing.     

Do Riskier Borrowers Borrow More?

Conventional wisdom in the mortgage industry holds that loan-to-value (LTV) ratios are positively correlated with mortgage default rates. However, not all empirical studies of mortgage loan performance support this view. This paper offers a theoretical signaling model of why the correlation between LTV ratios and default risk is contingent upon the default costs of the borrower. Specifically, the model proposes that when default costs are high there exists a separating equilibrium in which risky borrowers will self-select into lower LTV loans to reduce the probability of facing a costly default, while safe borrowers will self-select into higher LTV loans as a signal of their enhanced creditworthiness. This adverse selection process gives rise to the possibility of higher default probabilities for lower LTV loans. Conversely, when default costs are low the conventional result, in which risky borrowers select higher LTV loans than safe borrowers, is obtained. Empirical results, based on a sample of 859 single-family residential mortgage loans drawn from the portfolio of a national mortgage lender, are consistent with the separating equilibria predicted by the model.     

Bank Capital and the Credit Crunch: The Roles of Risk-Weighted and Unweighted Capital Regulations

We investigated whether in recent years banks have increased their holdings of securities at the expense of their holdings of business loans in response to shortfalls of their capital relative to risk-weighted capital standards and relative to a capital standard that made no explicit allowance for credit risk. We estimated that bank credit fell by about $4.50 for each $1 that a bank's capital fell short of the unweighted capital standard. Banks that had less capital than required by the risk-weighted standard appear to have shifted away from assets with low risk weights (securities and single-family mortgages) and to have shifted toward assets with higher risk weights (commercial real estate and commercial and industrial loans). When we included both shortfall variables in a regression, shortfalls relative to the unweighted capital standard significantly affected bank credit, while shortfalls of capital relative to the risk-weighted standard did not. We found no significant effects of capital shortfalls at other, local-competitor banks on bank portfolios. Delinquencies in a given category of a bank's loans generally had significantly negative effects on that bank's holdings of loans in that category. In contrast, banks tended to increase holdings of loans in categories in which local-competitor banks were experiencing higher delinquency rates.     

The Impact of Second Loans on Subprime Mortgage Defaults

An estimated 12.6% of primary mortgage loans were simultaneously originated with a second loan from 2004 until 2008, although relatively little is known about how the presence of such subordinate loans affects the default decisions of borrowers. We use a novel data series of loan servicing records from 2002 until 2010 to identify such borrowers and find evidence that the default behavior of these borrowers significantly differs from borrowers without second loans. Estimating a discrete‐time proportional odds hazard model, we find borrowers with a second loan were 62.7% more likely to default each month on their primary loan when conditioning alone on the attributes of the primary loan. However, borrowers of second loans were 58.3% less likely to default on their primary loan as compared to single‐loan borrowers with equivalent current combined attributes (i.e., loan‐to‐value, balance and interest rate). We hypothesize and provide empirical evidence that this occurs because borrowers with second loans have the option to sequentially default on each loan since subordinate lenders will not pursue foreclosure if borrowers have insufficient equity. Lenders of defaulted subordinate debt may revisit their decision to foreclose in the future after housing markets start to recover, thus prompting a new round of foreclosures.     

How Subprime Borrowers and Mortgage Brokers Shared the Pie

We develop an equilibrium model for origination fees charged by mortgage brokers and show how the equilibrium fee distribution depends on borrowers' valuation for their loans and their information about fees. We use noncrossing quantile regressions and data from a large subprime lender to estimate conditional fee distributions. Given the fee distribution, we identify the distributions of borrower valuations and informedness. The level of informedness is higher for larger loans and in better educated neighborhoods. We quantify the fraction of the surplus from the mortgage that goes to the broker, and how it decreases as the borrower becomes more informed.     

农民工就业质量的提高与“体面就业”

1999年国际劳工组织提出的“体面就业”的战略目标,已经成为世界各国政府经济和社会政策的重要内容。“体面就业”就是高质量的就业。当前中国农民工就业面临着就业规模大,就业质量低下的难题。农民工就业的现实状况,农民工就业质量的一系列理论问题,以及农民工就业质量的衡量标准和评价体系等等都亟待研究,以进一步提升中国农民工的就业质量,早日实现中国农民工“体面就业”。     

The Impact of Homeowners' Housing Wealth Misestimation on Consumption and Saving Decisions

Using a unique data set of 81,943 house value estimates by the homeowners and their financial institution, I find that homeowners overestimate their house value by 3.1%. After controlling for homeowners' socioeconomic characteristics, I find that ex ante homeowners who rate (cash-out) refinance an existing loan to increase savings (consumption) are significantly more likely to underestimate (overestimate) their house value. Moreover, overestimators (underestimators) are more likely to increase (reduce) their spending ex post . Finally, I also find that underestimators are more likely to prepay their loans and overestimators are more likely to default on their loans.     

我国社会保障制度对就业的影响

就业和社会保障是现代社会的基本问题,社会保障制度为劳动力市场的平稳运行提供保障,二者紧密相连。我国的社会保障制度基础、失业保险支出方向、社会保障面和社会保障水平、社会保障范围均对就业产生不利影响。