中美财产税制度的比较

相对于美国发达的财产税体系,我国的财产税存在着财产税的主体税种不明确,财产税收入在地方政府收入中的比例过低,地方政府缺少对财产税的立法权及税率、税基与减免税的调整权等缺点,另外我国的财产税优惠制度也不是很完善。我国应借鉴美国的做法,来完善我国的财产税制度。     

中美财产税制度的比较

相对于美国发达的财产税体系,我国的财产税存在着财产税的主体税种不明确,财产税收入在地方政府收入中的比例过低,地方政府缺少对财产税的立法权及税率、税基与减免税的调整权等缺点,另外我国的财产税优惠制度也不是很完善。我国应借鉴美国的做法,来完善我国的财产税制度。     

解构与转型:地方政府财产税税权分配模式探究

我国省级及以下层级政府统称为地方政府,财产税收入在地方政府收入中占有重要地位,是地方政府提供公共产品的财力保证。财产税税权如何在省级政府和省级以下地方政府之间的划分,不仅关系到不同层级地方政府的财政收入和公共服务的提供,地区经济发展政策的制定,而且对于我国税制的完善和分税制财政体制的真正确立有重大的意义。本文通过建立数理模型分析财产税作为地方税主体税种在省县两级政府分配的利弊,最后为财产税税权如何配置提供政策建议。     

美国财产税政策及其优惠机制

财产税是美国州政府和地方政府收入的重要来源之一,美国政府对财产税的税收优惠政策形式多样,并在实践中取得了积极的成效。其优惠政策主要包括减税和免征、“断路器”税收抵免、延期纳税和分类税率等。本文介绍了美国财产税体系及其税收优惠机制,并就如何完善我国财产税优惠政策提出了相关建议。     

美国和日本的财产税制及其借鉴

美国和日本的财产税制度均比较健全。借鉴其成熟做法和成功经验,我国的财产税制建设应根据我国的国情和经济社会政策目标确定财产税改革的目标、措施、进程;应赋予地方政府更多的财产税管理权限;应建立、健全房地产所有权人的利益保障机制和财产计税价格评估机制。     

部分国家的不动产税简介

美国 美国对不动产保有课税只设置单一的税种,称之为财产税.财产税是美国地方政府重要的财政来源,是地方税的主体税种,它占地方政府所有税收收入的比重一直超过80%.美国财产税的纳税义务人为不动产的所有人.课税对象是纳税人所拥有的不动产,主要包括土地和房屋建筑物.财产价值的估算是美国财产税制度的核心.     

增值税改革与财产税的协调

我国正在进行增值税的改革,扩大增值税的征收范围,远景是合并营业税,这预示着未来财政分配的重要变革。而且我国也正在研究开征房产税,准备把财产税作为地方政府主要财政收入来源。增值税作为地方政府主要收入来源,财产税作为地方政府主要来源,协调增值税和财产税作为地方政府主要收入来源是主要方案。采取增值税和财产税混合作为地方政府财产收入来源是解决方法。     

加拿大的财产税及对我国的借鉴

加拿大的财产税是多个税收项目组成的复合税。税基、税率、纳税人等在各省区之间各不相同、因地制宜。财产税已成为加拿大地方政府财政收入的主要来源。借鉴加拿大财产税的有关经验，改革我国的财产税，有利于优化税种结构，完善我国的地方税体系。     

美国马里兰州财产税税制概况及特点

财产税是美国地方政府的主体税种。本文系统介绍了美国马里兰州财产税税制的概况及特点,并对我国建立物业税制度提出了一些建议,如物业税税制宜简不宜繁、对个人房地产应设立较轻的税负、加强评税机构及相关制度的建设、在试点的基础上逐步开征物业税等。     

财产税的发展与改革现状及对我国的启示

一。世界各国财产税概要 关于财产税最早的记录可以追溯到公元前1066年的周代。虽然当今世界上已有约130个国家建立了各种各样的财产税制度。并且这些国家都把财产税作为地方财政收入的主要来源，但是各国政府仍致力于找到一种更合适的评估方式和税收体制。表1列举了世界各地的不同财产税制。及其在各国地方税收收入和GDP中所占的比重。一类是像澳大利亚、加拿大等国家，它们征收的财产税已达一定规模，在地方预算中占很大比例；     

tay's as good as cay

The empirical evidence that the consumption–wealth ratio, cay, has strong in-sample predictive power for future stock returns has been interpreted as evidence that consumers take account of future investment opportunities in planning their consumption expenditures. In this paper we show that the predictive power of cay arises mainly from a “look-ahead bias” introduced by estimating the parameters of the cointegrating regression between consumption, assets, and labor income in-sample. When a similar regression is run, replacing the log of consumption with an inanimate variable, calendar time, the resulting residual, which we label tay, is shown to be able to forecast stock returns as well as, or better than, cay. In addition, both cay and tay lose their out-of-sample forecasting power when they are re-estimated every period with only available data.     

上善若水工行人

28年的风雨兼程,她由小变大;28年的千锤百炼,她由弱变强;28年的栉风沐雨,铭刻着几代工行人艰苦奋斗、拼搏进取的缩影,他们在平凡的岗位上,传承敢于承担、乐于奉献,兢兢业业、奋勇争先的精神,创造了一个又一个金灿灿、沉旬甸的硕果。     

当亿万富豪，思想和行动一样远

创业板在金融风暴的2009年启动,正好见证了中国十多年来创业投资的风雨历程,而资本市场A就的A多中国亿万富豪,也极好地证明了实体经济与资本市场相结合确实是国家、企业和个人发达致富的A要之路。本文提出要敢于提出大目标,以“反推法”设计实施A目标的路线图,高屋建瓴而又脚踏实地,则中国广大创业者的亿万富豪之梦并非遥不可及     

Sustainability as Adaptability

Most corporations now view sustainability as a key requirement for competitive advantage, but few claim to have achieved it. One of the key obstacles separating intention from execution is that the sustainability frameworks employed by companies tend to be insufficiently clear, precise, or comprehensive to guide decision making. One of the most pressing challenges for corporate leaders today is, of course, to sustain the economic viability of the core businesses. But given the implicit “beyond business” focus of most sustainability efforts, corporate executives would be better served by a more integrated, holistic framework—one that enables them to make tradeoffs among the economic, social, and ecological aspects of business. This article introduces such a framework—one that redefines sustainability as the ability of companies to adapt to change in three different spheres of operation—ecological, social, and economic—with a near‐term as well as a longer‐term planning horizon. Without such adaptation, business models become obsolete for reasons that can range from economic failure, to competitive inferiority, to social or ecological limits. This ability to adapt can be measured and valued by using the BCG Adaptive Advantage Index, a composite measure of corporate performance during market downturns. The BCG analysis also shows that although the most adaptive companies tend to report lower profits and have lower values during periods of relative stability, such companies perform consistently better over full cycles. Creating social and ecological value alone doesn't automatically confer economic rewards, but—with the right business model and capabilities—it can. The authors explore some of the business model archetypes that successfully achieve this “co‐optimization.”     

Money as stock

The fiscal theory determines the price level from the value of nominal government debt as a claim to government primary surpluses, just as private stock is valued as a claim to corporate profits. Valuation equations are not constraints, so this theory does not mistreat the government's intertemporal budget constraint. I anchor the analysis in a simple cash in advance model. When money demand falls to zero, I show that the price level can still be determined by the government debt valuation equation.     

Strategy as ecology

Microsoft's and Wal-Mart's preeminence in modern business has been attributed to any number of factors--from the vision and drive of their founders to the companies' aggressive competitive practices. But the authors maintain that the success realized by these two very different companies is due only partly to the organizations themselves; a bigger factor is the success of the networks of companies with which Microsoft and Wal-Mart do business. Most companies today inhabit ecosystems--loose networks of suppliers, distributors, and outsourcers; makers of related products or services; providers of relevant technology; and other organizations that affect, and are affected by, the creation and delivery of a company's own offering. Despite being increasingly central to modern business, ecosystems are still poorly understood and even more poorly managed. The analogy between business networks and biological ecosystems can aid this understanding by vividly highlighting certain pivotal concepts. The moves that a company makes will, to varying degrees, affect the health of its business network, which in turn will ultimately affect the organization's performance--for ill as well as for good. Because a company, like an individual species in a biological ecosystem, ultimately shares its fate with the network as a whole, smart firms pursue strategies that will benefit everyone. So how can you promote the health and the stability of your own ecosystem, determine your place in it, and develop a strategy to match your role, thereby helping to ensure your company's well-being? It depends on your role--current and potential--within the network. Is your company a niche player, a keystone, or a dominator? The answer to this question may be different for different parts of your business. It may also change as your ecosystem changes. Knowing what to do requires understanding the ecosystem and your organization's role in it.     

Diversity as strategy

IBM's turnaround in the last decade is an impressive and well-documented business story. But behind that success is a less told people story, which explains how the corporation dramatically altered its already diverse composition and created millions of dollars in new business. By the time Lou Gerstner took the helm in 1993, IBM had a long history of progressive management when it came to civil rights and equal-opportunity employment. But Gerstner felt IBM wasn't taking full advantage of a diverse market for talent, nor was it maximizing the potential of its diverse customer and employee base. So in 1995, he launched a diversity task force initiative to uncover and understand differences among people within the organization and find ways to appeal to an even broader set of employees and customers. Gerstner established a task force for each of eight constituencies: Asians; blacks; the gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered community; Hispanics; white men; Native Americans; people with disabilities; and women. He asked the task forces to research four questions: What does your constituency need to feel welcome and valued at IBM? What can the corporation do, in partnership with your group, to maximize your constituency's productivity? What can the corporation do to influence your constituency's buying decisions so that IBM is seen as a preferred solution provider? And with which external organizations should IBM form relationships to better understand the needs of your constituency? The answers to these questions became the basis for IBM's diversity strategy. Thomas stresses that four factors are key to implementing any major change initiative: strong support from company leaders, an employee base that is fully engaged with the initiative, management practices that are integrated and aligned with the effort, and a strong and well-articulated business case for action. All four elements have helped IBM make diversity a key corporate strategy tied to real growth.     

Strategy as revolution

How often does the strategic-planning process start with senior executives asking what the rest of the organization can teach them about the future? Not often enough, argues Gary Hamel. In many companies, strategy making is an elitist procedure and ?strategy? consists of nothing more than following the industry's rules. But more and more companies, intent on overturning the industrial order, are rewriting those rules. What can industry incumbents do? Either surrender the future to revolutionary challengers or revolutionize the way their companies create strategy. What is needed is not a tweak to the traditional strategic-planning process, Hamel says, but a new philosophical foundation: strategy is revolution. Hamel offers ten principles to help a company think about the challenge of creating truly revolutionary strategies. Perhaps the most fundamental principle is that so-called strategic planning doesn't produce true strategic innovation. The traditional planning process is little more than a rote procedure in which deeply held assumptions and industry conventions are reinforced rather than challenged. Such a process harnesses only a tiny proportion of an organization's creative potential. If there is to be any hope of industry revolution, senior managers must give up their monopoly on the creation of strategy. They must embrace a truly democratic process that can give voice to the revolutionaries that exist in every company. If senior managers are unwilling to do this, employees must become strategy activists. The opportunities for industry revolution are mostly unexplored. One thing is certain: if you don't let the revolutionaries challenge you from within, they will eventually challenge you from without--in the marketplace.     

tay's as good as cay: Reply

In a recent comment on our published work [Lettau, M., Ludvigson, S., 2001. Consumption, aggregate wealth, and expected stock returns. Journal of Finance 56, 815–850], Michael Brennan and Yihong Xia [2005. tay's as good as cay. Finance Research Letters 2, 1–14] advance the following argument: A “mechanistic” variable tay, where t is a linear time trend, forecasts stock returns. Since “t has no foresight,” the argument goes, the predictive power of this variable must be attributable to what they call “look-ahead bias.” The authors assert that cay is subject to the same look-ahead bias (generated because we use the full sample to estimate the cointegrating parameters in cay), implying that its forecasting power must be spurious. In this response, we explain why this critique is misplaced.