Carbon Trading with Imperfectly Observable Emissions

The Kyoto Protocol foresees emission trading but does not yet specify verification of (uncertain) emissions. This paper analyses a setting in which parties can meet their emission targets by reducing emissions, by investing in monitoring (reducing uncertainty of emissions) or by (bilaterally) trading permits. We derive the optimality conditions and carry out various numerical simulations. Our applications suggest that including uncertainty could increase compliance costs for the USA, Japan and the European Union. Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union might be able to gain from trading due to higher permit prices. Emissions trading could also lower aggregate uncertainty on emissions.     

Allowing for Household Preferences in Emission Trading – A Contribution to the Climate Policy Debate

In the context of emission trading it seems to be taken as given that people's preferences can be ignored with respect to the whole process of fixing emission targets and allocating emission permits to polluters. With this paper we want to reopen the debate on how citizens can be involved in this process. We try to show how citizen preferences can be included in the process of pollution control through emission trading. We propose an emission trading system where all emission permits are initially allocated to households who are then allowed to sell them in the permit market or to withhold (at least some of) them in order to reduce total pollution. This proposal tries to overcome the fundamental disadvantage of traditional permit systems which neglect consumer preferences by solely distributing emission permits to producers / polluters. In our system the property right to nature is re-allocated to the households who obtain the opportunity of reducing actual emissions according to their personal preferences by withholding a part or all of the emission permits allotted to them. Such a change in environmental policy would mark a return to the traditional principles of consumer sovereignty by involving households (at least partially) in the social abatement decision process instead of excluding them. Another advantage of admitting households to the TEP market as sellers or buyers of permits is that this increases the number of agents in the permit market and thus significantly reduces the possibilities of strategic market manipulations.     

Technology adoption decisions under a mixed regulatory system of tradable permits and air pollution fees for the control of Total Suspended Particulates in Taiwan

By using a newly proposed tradable permit system built under the current air pollution fee regulation for the control of Total Suspended Particulates in Taiwan as an example, a mixed-integer non-linear programming model that minimizes the total regulatory costs of firms is applied to investigate how different permit trading ratios and the design of banking might affect firms’ technology adoption decisions and permit trading behavior. By incorporating binary variables in the model to represent firms’ decisions as to whether or not to install new control equipment, the results show that when the unit air pollution fee rate is higher than the firms’ abatement costs, the design of banking causes many firms to install new control equipment that results in an over-reduction of emissions. If no air pollution fee is imposed, the trading ratio plays a more important role than the reservation rate for banking in determining the firms’ emission reduction strategies under a pure permit trading scheme. While the conclusion from this study that uses a non-uniformly mixed pollutant as an example may hold only when certain conditions are met, the framework can be applied to other uniformly mixed pollutants through parameter changes without any limitation. In addition, the modeling technique presented here offers policy-makers a very convenient approach to empirical analysis.      

Permit Trading and Credit Trading: A Comparison of Cap-Based and Rate-Based Emissions Trading Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition

This paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions (permit trading) and on relative standards per unit of output (credit trading). Two types of market structure are considered: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. We find that output, abatement costs and the number of firms are higher under credit trading. Allowing trade between permit-trading and credit-trading sectors may increase welfare. With perfect competition, permit trading always leads to higher welfare than credit trading. With imperfect competition, credit trading may outperform permit trading. Environmental policy can lead to exit, but also to entry of firms. Entry and exit have a profound impact on the performance of the schemes, especially under imperfect competition. We find that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total industry emissions. Under credit trading several levels of the relative standard can achieve the same total level of emissions.     

THE SO2 EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAM: COST SAVINGS WITHOUT ALLOWANCE TRADES

Title IV of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act initiated a historic experiment in incentive-based environmental regulation by permitting electric generating facilities to trade allowances for emission of sulfur dioxide. To date, relatively little allowance trading has occurred. However, the costs of compliance have been much less than anticipated. The purpose of this paper is to address the apparent paradox—that the allowance trading program may not require (very much) trading in order to be successful. Title IV represented two great steps forward in environmental regulation: (i) a move toward performance standards and (ii) formal allowance trading. The first step has been sufficient to date for improving dynamic efficiency and achieving relative cost-effectiveness.     

排污权交易政策对企业环保行为的传导机制研究

从企业的目标函数和生产函数两个角度出发,分析了排污权交易政策对企业环保行为的影响机理,并讨论了排污权交易政策下企业的环保行为选择。研究发现：排污权交易政策通过影响企业的资本要素分配,从而影响企业环境资源的使用成本,进而影响企业的生产和环保行为决策;在排污权交易政策的作用下,企业主要采取不同的污染治理投资策略来满足该政策的规制。基于此,政府应制定配套政策和措施,引导企业沿着“政策遵从—环保投资策略—新环保技术采纳”的行为选择路径进行行为决策,以实现排污权交易政策的目标。     

FDI and the Capital Intensity of "Dirty" Sectors: A Missing Piece of the Pollution Haven Puzzle

In an increasingly integrated world, falling trade barriers mean that the role environmental regulations play in shaping a country's comparative advantage is greater than ever. This has lead to fears that “dirty” industries will relocate to developing regions where environmental regulations may be less stringent. A number of reasons have been offered to explain why, despite anecdotal evidence and the predictions of theoretical studies, little empirical verification for the existence of pollution havens has been found. Little attention, however, has been paid to the capital intensity of pollution intensive sectors. We investigate the relationship between US outward FDI and factor endowments across sectors to two developing countries. We highlight the role of capital and believe it partially explains why pollution havens are not more widespread. Our approach also highlights those countries that are likeliest to become pollution havens. A multivariate analysis reveals some evidence of pollution haven consistent behavior.     

Contract-Based Trading Programs in Environmental Regulation

Emissions trading markets have been successful in addressing pollution problems where regulated entities can be treated in a similar manner and precise control of emissions quantities across time and space is not critical. In other situations, trading must account for individual circumstances, complexity, and the patchwork of existing regulations. In these circumstances trading systems have elements of contracts, in that transactions are unique and must be negotiated and approved individually. Such programs imply a high payoff to improved environmental information and to innovations in trading systems that allow making better use of such information. (JEL Q21 , Q25 , Q28 )     

“Cleansing the air at the expense of waterways?” Empirical evidence from the toxic releases of coal-fired power plants in the United States

Environmental policies in the United States have primarily taken the form of media-specific regulations that emphasize end-of-pipe pollution control. This can lead to the shifting of pollution across environmental media, thereby having the potential to solve one environmental problem by creating a new problem. This study uses data from 228 coal-fired power plants that report to the Toxics Release Inventory to conduct an empirical examination of the extent to which media-specific regulation has caused power plants to shift their toxic air releases to waterways, land, or transfers for offsite recycling facilities. Controlling for plant-level fixed effects, scale of production, and environmental inspections and enforcement under air regulation, this study finds that adopting tougher air pollution regulation that designates counties as being in nonattainment status with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards significantly increased toxic releases to waterways and land.     

Environmental regulation and trade pattern：a case of China

As a growing number of countries, including both developed and developing countries, have in recent yearstaken environmental regulation at different levels, a question of great concern has been raised： can the regulation alterthe existing trade volume and trade pattern, and ultimately drive pollution-intensive industries to countries with low-levelregulations or even those without regulations at all？ Starting from the three different propositions concerning therelationship between environmental regulation and trade pattern, this paper applies cointegration analysis and errorcorrection model to empirically testing the relationship between environmental regulation and trade in China during theperiod of 1985-2005. Our empirical results indicate that in the short run the collection of pollution discharge fees bearsa positive impact on the export share of clean products of total exports. Thus, higher pollution discharge fees raise theratio of clean products exports to total exports. This further indicates that more stringent environmental regulationpromotes the exports of clean products. In the long run pollution discharge fees are positively correlated with the exportshare of clean products but negatively associated with their import share. Such correlations imply that environmentalregulation tends to facilitate the international specialization in line with comparative advantages.     

A Pollution Offset System for Trading Non-Point Source Water Pollution Permits

Water pollution from non-point sources is a global environmental concern. Economists propose tradable permit systems as a solution, but they are difficult to implement due to the nature of non-point sources. We present a pollution offset system for trading non-point source water pollution permits. Conventional pollution offset systems suffer from thin markets and transaction costs. In this paper, we show how to overcome these problems with a centrally managed common-pool market. We define permits as allowable nitrate loading to a groundwater aquifer. This trading system utilizes estimates of potential nitrate leaching from land uses, a set of transport coefficients generated from a simulation of nitrate transport in groundwater, an online trading system, and a linear program to clear the market. We illustrate the concept using a hypothetical case study.     

How Reliable Are Estimations of East-West Trade Potentials Based on Cross-Section Gravity Analyses?

Gravity equations have been used repeatedly to predict the East-West trade potential since the opening-up of Eastern Europe in 1989. Most of the research in the field was done by means of cross-section data. While earlier studies indicated huge unexhausted bilateral trading potentials for the East and for the West, more recent studies have demonstrated that most of the East-West trading potential has already been consumed. In this paper, we provide insights into the prediction performance of cross section gravity equations (applied for level projections). We found rather large forecast interval spans around the predicted values. The intervals are of a size that makes any conclusions about absolute trade potentials questionable. Thus we think that cross-section gravity analysis does not permit any definite judgment as to whether actual East-West trade has already reached its potential level.     

Multinational taxation and international emissions trading

Many studies have shown that the activities of multinational corporations are quite sensitive to differences in income tax rates across countries. In this paper I explore the interaction between multinational taxation and abatement activities under an international emissions permit trading scheme. Four types of plans are considered: (1) a single domestic permit system with international offsets; (2) separate national permit systems without trade; (3) separate national permit systems with limited offsets; and (4) an international permit trading system. For each plan, I model the incentives for the multinational firm to choose abatement activities at home and abroad and to transfer emissions credits between parent and subsidiary. Limits on trading across countries restrict efficiency gains from abatement, as is well known. But if available offset opportunities are limited to actual abatement activities, those activities are also more susceptible to distortions from incentives to shift taxable income. Transfer-pricing rules can limit but not always eliminate these distortions. In a system of unlimited international trading, abatement is efficiently allocated across countries, but tax shifting can still be achieved through intra-firm transfer pricing. From the basis of efficiency for both environmental and tax policies, the best design is an international permit trading system with transparent, enforceable transfer-pricing rules.     

Integrated transitions toward sustainability: The case of water and energy policies in Israel

Transition Management literature has examined how long-term transitions could be directed toward greater sustainability. However, it has mostly taken a sectoral approach which neglects the potential relationships between environmental changes and policy dynamics in different sectors. This paper examines parallel and interrelated dynamics in the Israeli water and energy sectors by combining insights from the literature on policy dynamics, transition management, co-evolution, and policy integration. The developed approach examines how sectoral transitions may be coupled and technological regimes may co-evolve. Israel has battled water, energy and other scarcities from its formation. Consecutive dry years, the loss of stream flows, salinization of the coastal aquifer, and severe pollution are problems facing water managers, while air pollution, imported fossil fuels and carbon emissions are salient energy issues. Water and energy sectors are both in transition because earlier policies have resulted in socially-induced scarcity, degradation of environmental assets and loss of adaptive capacity to respond to future challenges. Current approaches to water and energy scarcities have evolved around technological configurations which emphasize traditional supply side solutions such as seawater desalination and additional power plants. They may be difficult to change without explicit integrative transitions management.     

Tradable Discharge Permit System for Water Pollution: Case of the Upper Nanpan River of China

A discharge permit system for water pollution of theupper Nanpan River has been tested since 1992. Thispaper proposed the shift of the current non-tradablepermits to tradable permits to attain the samepollution reduction targets at a lower cost. It wasfound that this river appeared good for trading. Apilot trading program for point sources was thenrecommended to a smaller trading zone. There would beten potential trades for chemical oxygen demanddischarge, gaining an annual cost-saving of ChineseYuan 2.4 million, or saving 18.4% of the total annualcost to attain the reduction target without trading.The marginal pollution reduction cost was estimated atChinese Yuan 959 for one kilogram chemical oxygendemand per day. Meanwhile, `without trading' and `withtrading' scenarios would bring about 900.9 kg/day and51.5 kg/day of redundant reduction respectively. Thenet annual benefit arising from trading, about ChineseYuan 1.6 million, would still be significant. At last,the study recommended that compliance monitoring andexecuting institution requirements be kept in mindwhile designing the program. An information systemneeds to be established to provide potentialparticipants relevant information. The method ofpermit allocation and lifespan of permits should alsobe addressed later.     

New directions in emissions trading: the potential contribution of new institutional economics

Once an arcane topic even among environmental economists, emissions trading systems have substantially increased during this past decade in the USA. Moreover, the implementation of these systems has necessitated increased involvement of professionals in many fields besides economics. This paper reviews the practical experience of the six major types of emissions trading systems, focusing on credit market development, participation and results, including transaction costs. Five more recent applications of emissions trading also are considered, as well as the possibility of inter-pollutant trading. While inter-pollutant trading has been successfully used for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the applicability of this experience is probably very limited. Additionally, it would be highly premature to attempt an evaluation of these newer emissions trading systems, some of which have yet to be even partially implemented. In order to improve these latter and future programs, the paper considers the potential contribution of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) to emissions trading. The NIE is used to develop theoretical insights and a series of predictions about the performance of a range of emissions trading systems.     

Trade-offs in sulfur emission trading in Europe

How to implement emission trading is one question in the current negotiations on a new sulfur protocol in Europe. Whereas the current protocol stipulates a 30 percent uniform reduction, national emission ceilings included in the proposed new protocol imply differentiated reductions. In addition, emission and fuel standards are proposed. This paper examines the costs and environmental impacts of emission trading. Emission trading combined with regulations is a new element in the paper. Calculations using the RAINS (Regional Acidification INformation and Simulation) model suggest that overlaying emission trading on regulations not only reduces the cost savings but has beneficial impacts as well: ecosystem protection is not changed and significant decreases in environmental benefits for countries are largely avoided. Emission trading can also be used to decrease emissions and increase ecosystem protection. If combined with existing legislation, emission trading minimizes losses in expected environmental benefits for some countries, and most countries gain. However, the initial distribution of emission ceilings has to be used so that some countries are not confronted with higher costs. Trade-offs appear to exist between the use of emission trading to achieve cost savings on the one hand, and ecosystem protection and distributional equity on the other.     

Environment,imperfect competition,and trade: Insights for optimal policy in general equilibrium

I build a two-country general oligopolistic equilibrium model, in which sectors differ in emissions and technologies, and pollution can be transboundary. I derive the optimal bilateral environmental policy for the economy as a whole, for the cases in which the environmental damage either linearly or quadratically increases in total pollution. The analysis highlights that the optimal emission tax can even be negative, and bilateral trade liberalization should be matched with either a rise or a fall in the optimal emission tax. The moments of the emission distribution and technology distribution across sectors are fundamental to implement optimal environmental policies.     

On Pollution Permit Banking and Market Power

We consider a pollution permit market with a large firm and fringe of competitive firms. To smooth compliance towards a long-run emissions goal, firms are initially allocated a stock (i.e., bank) of permits that can be gradually consumed. We first show how the large firm can credibly manipulate the spot market in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Motivated by features observed in the US market for sulfur dioxide emissions, we then show that the introduction of stock transactions has no effects on market power, but that forward trading and incomplete observability of stock holdings do have pro-competitive effects. Both authors are also Research Associates at the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.