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1.
In the standard model of voluntary public good provision and other game theoretic models, climate-friendly leadership of a country is not successful: A unilateral increase of this country’s greenhouse gas abatement measures, i.e., contributions to the global public good of climate protection, will not lead to a positive reaction by the other countries but instead trigger a reduction of their abatement efforts and thus a crowding-out effect. In this paper it is shown how this undesired consequence need no longer occur when elements of behavioral economics are incorporated in the otherwise standard model of public good provision. In particular, strategic complementarities between the public good contribution of the leading country and those of the follower may result either if the follower has specific non-egoistic or other-regarding preferences or if the leader’s contribution positively affects the follower’s beliefs, i.e., his conjectural variations, about the leader’s behaviour. 相似文献
2.
A significant reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions requires international cooperation in emission abatement as well
as individual countries’ investment in the adoption of abatement technology. The existing literature on climate policy pays
insufficient attention to small countries, which account for a substantial proportion of global emission. In this study, we
investigate how climate policy and learning about climate damage affect investment in abatement technology in small countries.
We consider three alternative climate policy instruments: emission standards, harmonized taxes and auctioned permits. We say
that learning is feasible if an international environmental agreement (IEA) is formed after the resolution of uncertainty
about climate damage. We find that, either with learning and quadratic abatement costs or without learning, harmonized taxes
outperform emission standards and auctioned permits in terms of investment efficiency. Without learning, a large cost of nonparticipation
(that a country incurs) in the IEA can be beneficial to the country. Whether learning improves investment efficiency depends
on the size of this nonparticipation cost. 相似文献
3.
Consider trade liberalization between two countries, each of which produces two private goods and provides on a voluntary basis one public good (the common). In these circumstances, what are the consequences of trade liberalization on the production of the public good and on welfare in both countries? Using a Ricardian framework, we first show that the opening of trade increases the opportunity cost of producing the public good in both countries and will therefore reduce the aggregate supply of the public good. On the other hand, at the autarky equilibrium, only one country supplies the public good, the other “free rides”. The analysis of the welfare incidence of the opening of trade then reveals that the country which provides the public good under autarky always enjoys a welfare gain from trade while the free rider under autarky does not unless the terms of trade are sufficiently in its favour to compensate for the reduction in the supply of the common. Finally, if all countries involved in trade liberalization can without cost coordinate their supplies of the common, then the implementation of the first-best outcome is shown to be possible with a conditional Paretian transfer scheme. 相似文献
4.
When abatement costs are uncertain but correlated, and a country becomes privately informed that costs are low, then unilateral actions can serve as a signalling device to reveal low costs and this can have the potential to trigger positive responses abroad. However, the country engaging in unilateral actions is the one with the highest expectation about the other countries’ reactions, and it might suffer from an effect similar to the winner’s curse. 相似文献
5.
Uncertainty is an obstacle for commitments under cap and trade schemes for emission permits. We assess how well intensity
targets, where each country’s permit allocation is indexed to its future realized GDP, can cope with uncertainties in international
greenhouse emissions trading. We present some empirical foundations for intensity targets and derive a simple rule for the
optimal degree of indexation to GDP. Using an 18-region simulation model of a cooperative, global cap-and-trade treaty in
2020 under multiple uncertainties and endogenous commitments, we show that optimal intensity targets could reduce the cost
of uncertainty and achieve significant increases in global abatement. The optimal degree of indexation to GDP would vary greatly
between countries, including super-indexation in some advanced countries, and partial indexation for most developing countries.
Standard intensity targets (with one-to-one indexation) would also improve the overall outcome, but to a lesser degree and
not in all individual cases. Although target indexation is no magic wand for a future global climate treaty, gains from reduced
cost uncertainty and the potential for more stringent environmental commitments could justify the increased complexity and
other potential downsides of intensity targets.
相似文献
6.
This paper shows that a 2 × 2 Ricardian model has a unique general equilibrium, and the comparative statics of the equilibrium involve discontinuous jumps. If partial division of labor occurs in equilibrium, the country producing both goods would impose a tariff, whereas the country producing a single good would prefer unilateral free trade. If complete division of labor occurs in equilibrium, both countries would negotiate to achieve free trade. In a model with three countries, the country which does not have a comparative advantage relative to the other two countries, and/or which has low transaction efficiency, may be excluded from trade. 相似文献
7.
Loek Groot 《Resource and Energy Economics》2010,32(1):45-64
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it exhibits that standard tools in the measurement of income inequality, such as the Lorenz curve and the Gini-index, can successfully be applied to the issues of inequality measurement of carbon emissions and the equity of abatement policies across countries. These tools allow policy-makers and the general public to grasp at a single glance the impact of conventional distribution rules such as equal caps or grandfathering, or more sophisticated ones, on the distribution of greenhouse gas emissions. Second, using the Samuelson rule for the optimal provision of a public good, the Pareto-optimal distribution of carbon emissions is compared with the distribution that follows if countries follow Nash–Cournot abatement strategies. It is shown that the Pareto-optimal distribution under the Samuelson rule can be approximated by the equal cap division, represented by the diagonal in the Lorenz curve diagram. 相似文献
8.
This paper analyzes the effect of emission permit banking on clean technology investment and abatement under conditions where the stringency of the future cap is uncertain. We examine the problem of heterogeneous firms minimizing the cost of intertemporal emission control in the presence of stochastic future pollution standards and emission permits that are tradable across firms and through time. A firm can invest in clean capital (an improved pollution abatement technology) to reduce its abatement cost. We consider two possibilities: that investment is reversible or irreversible. Uncertainty is captured within a two period model: only the current period cap is known. We show that if banking is positive and marginal abatement costs are sufficiently convex, there will be more abatement and investment in clean technology under uncertainty than there would be under certainty and no banking. These results are at odds with the common belief that uncertainty on future environmental policy is a barrier to investment in clean capital. Moreover, under uncertainty and irreversibility, we find that there are cases where banking enables firms to invest more in clean capital. 相似文献
9.
Jinhua Zhao 《Journal of public economics》2003,87(12):2765-2789
A major concern with tradable emission permits is that stochastic permit prices may reduce a firm’s incentive to invest in abatement capital or technologies relative to other policies such as a fixed emissions charge. However, under efficient permit trading, the permit price uncertainty is caused by abatement cost uncertainties which affect investment under both permit and charge policies. We develop a rational expectations general equilibrium model of permit trading and irreversible abatement investment to show how cost uncertainties affect investment under permits. We compare the resulting investment incentive with that under charges. After controlling for the assumption that random shocks affect the abatement cost linearly, we find that firms’ investment incentive decreases in cost uncertainties, but more so under emissions charges than under permits. Therefore, tradable permits in fact may help maintain firms’ investment incentive under uncertainty. 相似文献
10.
Ficre Zehaie 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2009,44(3):337-350
Self-protection has private goods characteristics as it reduces own exposure to pollution given a certain level of pollution.
We study the effect of timing self-protection before, after or simultaneously with abatement. We find that self-protection
when timed before abatements has strategic effects. In this case self-protection, shifts the second stage subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of abatements such that own contributions of abatement are decreased and those of the other country are increased.
Thereby shifting future abatement costs to the other country. When countries cooperate only on abatement, the incentives to
shift future abatement costs are greater. Contrary to, intention, cooperation on abatement may in fact worsen environmental
quality if it does not include self-protection. 相似文献
11.
Panos Hatzipanayotou Sajal Lahiri Michael S. Michael 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2005,107(2):315-333
We construct a two‐country model where pollution from production is transmitted across borders. Pollution abatement is undertaken by both private producers and the public sector. We characterize Nash optimal levels of the policy instruments in the two countries: emission taxes and funds allocated for public abatement activities. We examine the implications of a number of multilateral policy reforms. One of our findings is that the magnitude of the beneficial effect of a reform depends on the scope of the reform; if it is restricted to a subset of policy instruments, then the efficacy of environmental policy reform can be greatly undermined. 相似文献
12.
Giorgos N. Diakoulakis Athanasios Kampas 《Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics》2023,94(1):343-359
This article develops a theoretical model that explores firms' abatement choices. The main results are: First, in a market comprised of a not sufficiently large number of heterogeneous firms always there exists a subset of firms that are willing to undertake abatement activities, if their marginal altruistic cost of emissions is positive. Second, a low emission tax induces abatement when a firm is egoistic or if its altruistic cost of emissions has a concave structure. In contrast, if the firms’ altruistic cost of emissions has a convex structure, then intermediate emission taxes are required. Third, the effect of firms’ altruistic cost of emissions on the emission tax that induce the socially optimum abatement is also conditional on the genuine altruistic preferences and finally, the social planner has an incentive to impose a Pigouvian emission tax when firms are profit maximizers. Otherwise, a lower tax suffices. 相似文献
13.
Basak Bayramoglu 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2010,37(2):180-195
In this paper, we investigate how the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs) affects the incentives for the
private sector to invest in environmentally-friendly technology. The givens are a transboundary pollution problem involving
two asymmetric countries in terms of benefits arising from global abatement. There is a single polluting firm in each country.
We account for two types of IEAs: an agreement based on a uniform standard with transfers and an agreement based on differentiated
standards without transfers. To carry out this study, we use a two-stage game where the private sector anticipates its irreversible
investment given the expected level of abatement standards resulting from future negotiations. Our findings indicate that
the implementation of the agreement based on a uniform standard with transfers may be preferable for the two countries, as
it creates greater incentives for firms to invest in costly abatement technology. This result arises when this technology’s
level of the sunk cost of investment is low. If this level is sufficiently high, the implementation of the same agreement
is not beneficial to countries, because it takes away the incentive of each firm to invest in new abatement technology. Moreover,
this agreement is not able to generate any positive gains for either country through cooperation, thus no country is motivated
to cooperate. 相似文献
14.
The present paper analyzes the investment effects of emission trading scheme (ETS) when emission permits are bankable and there is technological uncertainty with regard to the abatement cost. A real option model is employed to accommodate irreversibility of investment and cost uncertainty. In the absence of abatement cost uncertainty, a bankable ETS reduces a firm's incentive for environmental investment, because the firm can utilize the banked permits for future compliance which act as substitutes for abatement investment. However, when cost uncertainty is prevalent, investment may reduce the opportunity cost of irreversible investment under the banking system, thereby increasing a firm's investment incentive. The condition is derived under which a bankable ETS provides higher investment incentives than a non-bankable ETS does. 相似文献
15.
《Research in Economics》2007,61(2):62-70
This paper mainly focuses on the role of information in the competition for FDI when host countries are not sure of the “fixed cost” differences MNEs are working with to make FDI in different countries. It is found in this paper that as the public information increases and the uncertainty declines, host countries will first provide more and more subsidies to compete for FDI, which will reduce their welfare; then after the current uncertainty has been reduced to a relatively low level, any further reduction in uncertainty will pull down their subsidies and increase their welfare. 相似文献
16.
We study how uncertainty and risk aversion affect international agreements to supply global public goods. We consider a benchmark model with homogeneous countries and linear payoffs. When countries directly contribute to a public good, uncertainty tends to lower signatories' efforts but may increase participation. Despite risk aversion, uncertainty may improve welfare. In contrast, when countries try to reduce a global public bad, uncertainty tends to increase signatories' efforts and decrease participation. In that case, an ex-ante reduction of uncertainty may have a large positive multiplier effect on welfare. 相似文献
17.
Tadashi Morita 《Review of International Economics》2012,20(4):821-827
This paper constructs a two‐country model in which oligopolistic firms export goods and undertake cost‐reducing R&D investment. Each country imposes tariffs. A decrease in the tariff rates in both countries decreases cost‐reducing R&D investment. 相似文献
18.
We study an international climate agreement that assigns emission quotas to each participating country. Unlike the simplest models in the literature, we assume that abatement costs are affected by R&D activities undertaken in all firms in all countries, i.e. abatement technologies are endogenous. In line with the Kyoto agreement we assume that the international climate agreement does not include R&D policies. We show that for a second-best agreement with heterogeneous countries, marginal costs of abatement differ across countries. In other words, the second-best outcome cannot be achieved if emission quotas are tradable. 相似文献
19.
To mitigate climate change, states must make significant investments into energy and other sectors. To solve this problem, scholars emphasize the importance of leveraging private capital. If states create institutional mechanisms that promote private investment, they can reduce the fiscal cost of carbon abatement. We examine the ability of different international institutional designs to leverage private capital in the context of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Empirically, we analyze private capital investment in 3749 climate mitigation projects under the CDM, 2003–2011. Since the CDM allows both bilateral and unilateral implementation, we can compare the two modes of contracting within one context. Our model analyzes equilibrium private investment in climate mitigation. When the cost of mitigation is high, unilateral project implementation in one host country, without foreign collaboration, draws more investment than bilateral contracting, whereby foreign investors participate in the project. 相似文献
20.
In this paper we revise and extend the theory of the evaluation of public investments under uncertainty. Precisely, we argue that the value of the investments that the public sector would be willing to undertake is never below its market value, and that it can be higher if it provides social insurance. 相似文献