WTO环境下倾稍与反倾稍政策的博弃分析

近年来,博弈论在经济决策中的广泛应用为我们提供了关于个人和群体行为新的分析框架。本文基于博弈论的有关原理对WTO环境下各国的倾销与反倾销政策进行了分析。2001年我国加入WTO后对外贸易发展迅速,然而一些国家运用反倾销政策对我国出口产品进行制裁,使我国市场频频遭遇国外倾销。为遏制国外企业对我国市场的进一步倾销,企业彼此间应加强商业联系,建起反倾销联盟。政府也要建立行之有效的反倾销机制。如果我们能够熟悉反倾销博弈规则,正确选择贸易策略,那么在贸易利益博弈中我们也可能成为受益者。     

倾销与反倾销的博弈论分析

传统的国际贸易理论认为 ,反倾销对被倾销国的国民福利有利 ,因此 ,许多国家纷纷采用反倾销政策。但根据博弈论分析却得出了相反的结论 :反倾销对被倾销国的国民福利有害无益。而且 ,现实中是否应该反倾销 ,是一个博弈策略问题 ,需要视现实条件而定 ,不应该作简单的断言。通过反倾销的博弈论分析模型 ,理论上探讨了倾销与反倾销双方的实际最优博弈策略。     

论倾销与反倾销动态博弈中可信性问题

在国际贸易中,反倾销作为一种保护公平贸易的措施被写进了各国的法律和国际协定之中。从法律本身意义上来说,反倾销应该是一种防御性的工具;但是从动态博弈的角度上看,一个可信的威胁也可以使反倾销成为一种攻击性或者对抗性的武器。通过对倾销与反倾销的动态博弈分析,说明进口国反倾销策略行为对出口国倾销行为“威胁的可信性”及其重要性,为政府和企业的决策层提供参考。     

国际反倾销与国内反低价倾销的差异性

国际上对倾销、反倾销与我们国内对低价倾销、反低价倾销的认定标准是完全不同的。国际反倾销与国内反低价倾销在执法的具体措施上有着很大的不同。二者在执法的具体么及雅程度上有较大差别。国际反倾销与国内反低价倾销的行政执法机关是不同的，二者保护的对象其侧重点是有所区别的。     

从反倾销案例看中国企业的反倾销博弈策略

倾销与反倾销是国际贸易中的一种博弈 ,谁有胆识 ,谁熟悉规则 ,谁就可能占上风。近年来 ,中国遭受的反倾销案件在国际反倾销案件总数中比重较大 ,且经常处于不利的境地 ,很大程度上并非因为存在真正的“倾销” ,而是由于对规则的陌生和反倾销应诉准备的不足。加入WTO以后 ,我国要利用有利的成员国地位 ,要理直气壮 ,积极应诉 ,把握机会 ,胜算博弈。     

中国企业面对外国产品倾销的自我保护市场战略

面对外国产品在我国的倾销,本文分析指出中国企业应积极构建企业能力平台,以消费者为中心选择差异化竞争路径,通过实施中国企业自我保护市场战略,抑制外国产品倾销,维护公平市场秩序。     

民营企业反倾销应诉与会计准则国际趋同

随着企业经营的国际化，反倾销将成为一项持续的工作。面对倾销与反倾销，各国逐步认识到了会计准则国际趋同的必要性。为此，我国于2006年颁布了新会计准则体系，这对反倾销应诉产生了积极作用。下面笔者将分别分析新、旧会计准则对我国反倾销应诉的影响。     

倾销、反倾销与反倾销应诉博弈

随着中国加入WTO,中国面临的挑战将更为广泛、更为严峻,因为WTO中更多的成员会利用多边贸体系中的法律来起诉中国。因此,中国必须积极应对加入WTO带来的反倾销诉讼。通过对倾销、反倾销和反倾销应诉博弈模型分析,提出了倾销、反倾销应诉的一些策略。     

国际贸易中倾销与反倾销的博弈分析

中国是发展中国家中举足轻重的大国，面对WTO，只有建立起中国的反倾销体系，才能有理、有利、有节地反击对方，保护自己，使不公平的国际贸易旧秩序有所改善，从而促进中国对外贸易的发展。本文利用博弈论的方法研究了倾销与反倾销的过程，并提出了建议。     

谈我国面临倾销与反倾销的对策

截止目前为止，我国出口产品遭受国外反倾销立案调查的数量已达500多起，已成为反倾销的最大受害国。同时，外国产品纷纷在我国低价倾销。面对严峻的形势，我国企业应该了解WTO关于反倾销的条款，以便从容应诉，减轻和防止反倾销带来的损失。更重要的是，要充分利用反倾销条例对进口产品提出反倾销起诉，采取反倾销措施，从两方面对民族产业进行合理保护。     

当前国际倾销若干前沿问题研究

本文从理论与实践的结合上,对国际倾销的双重定义、多元特征、多级战略目标以及博弈风险等进行系统研究;从市场竞争学说的角度,阐明了"谁有能力发动倾销战、倾销战攻击的主要竞争对手是谁,倾销的价格到底有多低"等问题,揭示了笼罩在倾销战中的神秘面纱.     

WTO反倾销体制的无效性原因分析

反倾销方面的研究文献众多,但现有反倾销研究热衷于探讨为何反倾销措施大量增加方面的问题,而对价格承诺为何较少使用、反倾销体制为何不能有效阻止倾销等问题研究较少。文章把传统的倾销模型拓展到一个倾销商和进口国政府的动态博弈模型中进行分析,发现:在任何情况下倾销都是垄断出口厂商的占优策略;征收反倾销税比起自由贸易更有利于进口国福利。这对倾销现象有增无减、价格承诺比重很少、反倾销措施数量居高不下的现状提供了一个有益的理论解释,同时也揭示了现行反倾销措施对于遏制倾销的无效性。文章认为,相对于反倾销,反进口垄断更能够改善现行世贸组织体制的效率,并增进进口国福利。     

自利行为下我国遭遇反倾销诉讼原因的博弈分析

自上世纪90年代以来我国一直是美欧等西方发达国家反倾销的重点国家,这引起了我国学者对于倾销与反倾销的广泛研究。本文从自利行为角度对国企出口遭遇反倾销进行探讨。通过模型建构,得出结论:由于信息的不完全性,这使得进口方更容易错误地认为出口方有倾销行为。     

Dumping in a Global World: Why Product Quality Matters

Anti‐dumping actions are now the trade policy of choice of developing and transition economies. To understand why these economies have increasingly applied anti‐dumping laws, we build a simple theoretical model of vertical intra‐industry trade and investigate the strategic incentives of exporting firms to undertake dumping. We show that the definition of dumping matters. Based on a comparison of low‐quality and high‐quality prices, only unilateral dumping by the low‐quality firm obtains. By contrast, the standard WTO definition leads to either reciprocal or unilateral dumping by the high‐quality firm, depending on cross‐country differences in incomes, the height of tariff protection and on exchange rate changes.     

A Centennial of Anti‐dumping Legislation and Implementation: Introduction and Overview

A century has passed since the Government of Canada adopted the first recorded anti‐dumping law in 1904. The Canadian legislation was soon followed by similar legislation in most of the major trading nations in the industrialised world prior to and after World War I. Anti‐dumping provisions were later incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) following World War II. Nowadays, virtually all of the industrialised and developing countries in the world economy have adopted anti‐dumping legislation. In view of the long and increasingly widespread use of anti‐dumping measures, we marked the centennial of Canada's 1904 legislation with a symposium at the University of Michigan on 12 March, 2004. The symposium papers document the experiences with anti‐dumping and then ask whether and how anti‐dumping can be reformed. Although we all would probably agree that the best solution would be to retract all anti‐dumping legislation, this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. Anti‐dumping laws serve a variety of purposes, and powerful political forces stand in the way of eliminating these laws. Anti‐dumping provides a stronger and more focused means of safeguards protection against surges of imports than GATT‐legal safeguards laws permit. Anti‐dumping also formalises a meaning for ‘unfair trade’ that, though essentially meaningless from an economic standpoint, strikes a chord in public perception. And finally, in spite of its appearance of being constrained by objective administrative rules, anti‐dumping in practice is a potent political tool that governments are able to manipulate in order to satisfy powerful constituents. With all this going for it, anti‐dumping is unlikely ever to be relinquished as an economic policy tool by governments.     

An Analysis of Factors Influencing the Anti‐dumping Behaviour in India

The use of anti‐dumping measures as a trade protection tool, has increased phenomenally during the last decade. One significant aspect of this new trend is the increasing involvement of developing countries. India is one such country which has emerged as a very frequent user of anti‐dumping measures, surpassing even the traditional users. It had initiated more than 300 anti‐dumping cases by the end of 2002–03. Many of these cases are against developing countries. Most of the cases are concentrated in narrow range product groups, like chemicals and petrochemicals, iron and steel, pharmaceuticals and textiles. This study examines India's experience with anti‐dumping measures. The main objective of the study is to identify the factors which might have influenced the anti‐dumping behaviour in India. Discussion of these factors shows that imports have increased considerably. This is particularly true for a number of developing countries facing dumping charges in India. At the same time, many of the domestic producers of the like products have performed poorly during the last decade. Such trends may instigate the import‐competing industries to seek anti‐dumping protection and may also influence the authority to provide that. However, the results of our statistical exercise show that, although imports and performance of the domestic industry might have influenced the initiation of anti‐dumping cases, these factors did not seem to significantly influence the final decision of the authority. The results rather indicated a tendency on the part of the authority to provide anti‐dumping protection to industries, which are characterised by a large number of firms.     

How do countries respond to anti‐dumping filings? Dispute settlement and retaliatory anti‐dumping

Empirical studies have found that countries may respond strategically to the anti‐dumping petition filed against their exporters through their own retaliatory actions. Although most previous studies have focused on retaliatory anti‐dumping filings, in this paper we explore another potential avenue for strategic response—filing a complaint under the World Trade Organization's (WTO ) dispute settlement understanding. Using a panel of global anti‐dumping filings between 1995 and 2011, we analyse under what conditions countries will choose to retaliate through either an anti‐dumping petition or a WTO dispute, and to what degree these two strategies are complementary or act as substitutes. We find statistical evidence that countries are more likely to file a WTO dispute when they have also filed a retaliatory anti‐dumping petition, suggesting that these two strategies may be complementary.     

Some Remarks on Reforming WTO AD/CVD Rules

In these remarks, I argue that a plausible reason that anti‐dumping actions are so widely abused for protectionist purposes is that they represent a rare instance of essentially unilateral actions that are permissible within the WTO: under the banner of anti‐dumping actions, governments can block imports and provide their industries with import relief without fear of retaliation or demands for compensation from their trading partners. Cognisant of the great potential for abuse of anti‐dumping actions, the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI represents an extraordinarily detailed attempt by WTO member governments to ‘reign in’ this potential through a detailed set of rules governing the acceptable methodologies and procedures for initiating anti‐dumping actions. But as long as the underlying incentives for abuse remain, governments are likely to continue to find new and increasingly ingenious ways to respond to these incentives without running afoul of the rules. To create incentives for the use of anti‐dumping measures that are more in line with a cooperative international environment, I suggest extending WTO compensation provisions to cover anti‐dumping actions. In this way, the WTO might in effect ‘harness retaliation’ and convert it into a tool of international order in the area of anti‐dumping actions.     

Anti‐dumping Protection in a Liberalising Country: Mexico's Anti‐dumping Policy and Practice

The use of anti‐dumping policy has been steadily growing in recent decades, and so has the theoretical and empirical literature on anti‐dumping. However, while developing countries as a whole have become at least as active as the ‘traditional’ anti‐dumping regimes (the USA, the EU, Canada and Australia), the literature is almost exclusively concerned with the latter group. This article gives an overview of anti‐dumping policy and practice in Mexico, one of the leading ‘new’ anti‐dumping regimes. It assesses how anti‐dumping has expanded since the country began liberalising trade in the mid‐1980s, and discusses how the policy has been applied in a protectionist way that is not dissimilar to policy practice in the traditional user countries.     

Product Heterogeneity and Cost Allocations in Contingent Trade Protection

The WTO allows members to impose contingent protection, including anti‐dumping duties, within agreed constraints. Anti‐dumping proceedings typically name a single captioned product but include large numbers of individual products within that caption. The inclusion of multiple products creates a variety of issues for both anti‐dumping and other contingent protection measures, issues that have been prominent in national actions and WTO dispute settlements, but have been largely ignored in research. This work focuses on the most important such area, the allocation of costs among products in anti‐dumping proceedings. We develop a comprehensive economic analysis for cost allocation issues, and couple it with the accounting tools that must be used for its implementation, to derive the first‐best allocation methods for anti‐dumping purposes. These results have direct relevance in other contingent trade contexts, such as injury determinations and subsidy pass‐through analysis.