Implementing the lead user method in a high technology firm: A longitudinal study of intentions versus actions

The customer or user's role in the new product development process is limited or nonexistent in many high technology firms, despite evidence that suggests customers are frequently an excellent source for new product ideas with great market potential. This article examines the implementation of the Lead User method for gathering new product ideas from leading edge customers by an IT firm that had not previously done much customer research during their new product development efforts. This case study follows the decision‐makers of the firm through the process, where the end result is the generation of a number of useful product concepts. Besides the ideas generated, management at the firm is also impressed with the way the method makes their new product development process more cross‐functional and they plan to make it a part of their future new product development practices. Approximately one year later the firm is revisited to find out if the Lead User method has become a permanent part of their new product development process. The authors find, however, that the firm has abandoned research on the customer despite the fact that several of the lead‐user derived product concepts had been successfully implemented. Management explanations for their return to a technology push process for developing new products include personnel turnover and lack of time. Using organizational learning theory to examine the case, the authors suggest that the nontechnology specific product concepts generated by the lead users were seen as ambiguous and hence overly simplistic and less valuable by the new product development personnel. The technical language spoken by the new product personnel also increased the inertia of old technology push development process by making it more prestigious and comfortable to plan new products with their technology suppliers. The fact that the firm was doing well throughout this process also decreased the pressure to change from their established new product development routine. The implications for these finding are that: 1) it is necessary to pressure or reward personnel in order to make permanent changes to established routines, and 2) researchers should be careful at taking managers at their word when asking them about their future intentions.     

Standardization Alliance Networks,Standard-Setting Influence,and New Product Outcomes*

Standardization alliances evolve through collaborations among firms for developing and implementing industry technical standards. Cooperative standard setting can help allied firms to gain access to external knowledge and technologies, but it is unclear how the configuration of a standardization alliance can result in improving a firm’s performance in new product development. This study examines how standardization alliance network-based resource advantages vary across a firm’s network position and the firm’s ability to influence industry standard setting and new product outcomes. Empirical analyses, based on archival data from 170 Chinese automobile manufacturers from 1999 to 2013, indicate that firms that span structural holes in standardization alliance networks gain an advantage when focusing on early new product introductions but suffer a disadvantage when aiming at more innovative products. In contrast, taking a central position in standardization alliance networks is negatively related to a firm’s speed in bringing new products to market but positively related to the firm’s new product introduction rate. Further, standard-setting influence significantly mediates the effect of network position on a firm’s new product speed to market. Increasing centrality and structural holes can lead to the improvement of a firm’s standard-setting influence, and this, in turn, positively affects speed to market.     

Product variety and firm survival in the microcomputer software industry

This article provides an analysis of product variety and scope economies in the microcomputer software industry by using detailed firm‐level and product‐level information on firms' bundling of functionalities over application categories and computing platforms. We find that the management of product variety through the way different application categories are integrated in products and the platforms on which these products are offered can be as important as the significance of scope economies at the more aggregated firm level. Specifically, we find that there is little evidence of firm benefits from economies of scope in production, but there is substantial evidence that products benefit from economies of scope in consumption. In addition, we find that firms with products that encapsulate more application categories perform better, and those with products that cover more computing platforms perform worse. Finally, changes in product variety through new product introductions improve firm performance, but extensions to existing products hinder the performance of the firm and the product. We conclude that research in scope economies can benefit from a more detailed model of the evolution of product variety that includes data and analysis at the firm level and at the product level. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Should System Firms Develop Complementary Products? A Dynamic Model and an Empirical Test

While Nintendo develops many video games internally, Apple is only marginally involved in the development of iPhone applications. This paper addresses the question: to what extent and how should system firms be involved in the development of complementary products for their “core products”? These core products may include video consoles, electronic book readers, etc. This is a highly relevant question, because the success of core products depends strongly on their complementary products, e.g., video games and electronic books. This study proposes a dynamic model for the degree that system firms should be involved in complementary product development by considering, as contingency factors, the novelty of the core, and the novelty of the complementary products. Both novelties influence the degree to which system firms should be involved in the development of complementary products. In terms of a system firm's involvement, this study makes a distinction between the degree of integration and the degree of ownership. The degree of integration reflects the extent to which the system firm is actively involved in the coordination of the complementary product, e.g., to ensure that the complementary product is optimally aligned with its core product and that the full potential of the core product is achieved. The degree of ownership reflects the extent to which the system firm finances the development of the complementary product and therefore, the degree of formal control authority over the complementary product. This model was tested using data from a survey of 99 development projects for mobile telecommunications applications. The results reveal that integration by the system firm contributes to the performance of complementary products for new core products but has a negative effect if a new complement is developed for a mature core product. In addition, ownership contributes to performance if both the core and complementary products are new. In other circumstances, a clear effect of ownership by the system firm on performance is not found. The implications of our findings are that system firms should be strongly involved in complementary product development when they introduce a new core product, and even more so if the complementary products are new. However, they should decrease their degree of involvement over time as the core product matures and, again, even more so if the complementary product is new. The paper concludes by providing practical implications for system firms in the mobile telecommunications industry and beyond.     

How New Product Introductions Affect Sales Management Strategy: The Impact of Type of "Newness" of the New Product

How do firms adjust sales management strategy for new product launch? Does sales management strategy change more radically for different types of new products such as new‐to‐the‐world products versus product revisions? Because firms introducing a new product rely considerably on their sales force in the product launch effort, the types and degree of changes made in managing the selling effort are important issues. Past studies have demonstrated that firms make substantial adjustments in their sales management strategy when they introduce a new product. This study expands on previous investigations by examining whether sales management strategy changes are conditioned by the type of newness of the new product to the market and to the firm. Australian sales managers were asked to respond to a mail questionnaire concerning pre‐ and post‐new product launch sales management activities. Three groups of firms were compared: (1) those with new‐to‐the‐market and new‐to‐the‐firm products (i.e., new‐to‐the‐world products); (2) those with products new to the firm but not new to the market; and (3) those with products that are revisions to the firm and not new to the market. The study finds that firms do not make the most adjustments for products with the greatest degree of market newness—the new‐to‐the‐world types of products—except in the sales management strategy categories of compensation and supervision. In the other sales management strategy categories defined for study—organization, training, quotas and goals, and sales support as well as for all categories in the aggregate—sales management strategy changes were greatest in incidence, as measured both by the percent of firms making changes and the average number of changes per firm, when the new product was new to the firm but not new to the market. These results suggest that, because different types of new products face different competitive environments, there may be greater incentive for a not‐new‐to‐the‐market new‐to‐the‐firm product to make changes in sales strategy. Uncertainties about market size and customer location with new‐to‐the‐world products may limit the understanding of what changes to make in the strategy categories of quotas and territories. Similarly, uncertainties about product use and customer acceptance of new‐to‐the‐world products may limit the development of training and sales support materials by these firms. Instead, these firms may rely more on compensation and supervision to direct sales efforts for new‐to‐the‐world products. However, observing the market experience and performance of the first‐to‐market product can benefit firms launching a not‐new‐to‐market and new‐to‐the‐firm product, allowing them to rely more on strategy changes in training, sales support materials, organizational adjustments such as redeployments, and quotas.     

Sources and assessment of complexity in NPD projects

When examining the reasons why NPD projects are late, over budget, or why they suffer from performance problems, complexity is often directly linked to the results achieved. While some research has been done in the complexity area, more research is needed to assess the role that complexity plays in the successful development of new products. In this paper complexity is defined and several reasons are examined why this factor can be a significant issue in successfully managing NPD efforts. Several sources of complexity are also examined including technological; market; development; marketing; organizational; and intraorganizational complexity, i.e., one company partnering with another to develop a new product or technology. A template is then constructed to help product developers evaluate complexity in their development projects. Finally, the paper concludes with suggestions of how the complexity template can be applied by development managers and their teams.     

Intellectual Property, Architecture, and the Management of Technological Transitions: Evidence from Microsoft Corporation

Many studies highlight the challenges facing incumbent firms in responding effectively to major technological transitions. Though some authors argue that these challenges can be overcome by firms possessing what have been called dynamic capabilities, little work has described in detail the critical resources that these capabilities leverage or the processes through which these resources accumulate and evolve. This paper explores these issues through an in‐depth exploratory case study of one firm that has demonstrated consistently strong performance in an industry that is highly dynamic and uncertain. The focus for the present study is Microsoft, the leading firm in the software industry. The focus on Microsoft is motivated by providing evidence that the firm's product performance has been consistently strong over a period of time in which there have been several major technological transitions—one indicator that a firm possesses dynamic capabilities. This argument is supported by showing that Microsoft's performance when developing new products in response to one of these transitions—the growth of the World Wide Web—was superior to a sample of both incumbents and new entrants. Qualitative data are presented on the roots of Microsoft's dynamic capabilities, focusing on the way that the firm develops, stores, and evolves its intellectual property. Specifically, Microsoft codifies knowledge in the form of software “components,” which can be leveraged across multiple product lines over time and accessed by firms developing complementary products. The present paper argues that the process of componentization, the component “libraries” that result, the architectural frameworks that define how these components interact, and the processes through which these components are evolved to address environmental changes represent critical resources that enable the firm to respond to major technological transitions. These arguments are illustrated by describing Microsoft's response to two major technological transitions.     

How New Product Strategies Impact on Performance

What is involved in a successful new product program? Is it high spending on risky R&D? Is it close contact with customers? Is it the overall competitive strength of the firm? Well, it might be any of these things, and more, according to Robert G. Cooper, depending on your definition of success. In an exhaustive examination of the new product strategies and performances of 122 industrial products firms, Cooper found that the strategy that a firm elects for its new product program is closely linked to the performance results that firm achieves. But what's performance? Cooper's analysis uncovered three different and independent ways of viewing new product performance. He brings some clarity to the meaning of a “high-performance” product innovation program, but there's a catch—the strategies leading to high performance in one direction are quite different from the strategies leading to positive results by other measures. In his summing up, Professor Cooper proposes sets of generalized strategies—guides to action—that product innovation managers should consider.     

The dynamics of product innovation and firm competences

This study examines how product innovation contributes to the renewal of the firm through its dynamic and reciprocal relation with the firm's competences. Field research in five high‐tech firms of varying age, size, and level of diversification is combined with analysis of existing theory to develop the findings of the study. Based on the notion that new products are created by linking competences relating to technologies and customers, a typology is derived that classifies new product projects based on whether a new product can draw on existing competences, or whether it requires competences the firm does not yet have. Following organizational learning theory, these options are conceptualized as exploitation and exploration. These organizational learning concepts are used to gain a dynamic and path‐dependent view of product innovation and firm development, and to reveal the unique nature and challenges of different types of product innovation. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

All experience is not created equal: learning,adapting, and focusing in product portfolio management

This study explores the contingencies relating firm experience to product development capabilities, focusing on experience type (breadth versus depth) and timing (prior versus concurrent). Results from empirical tests in the U.S. mutual fund industry offer two primary findings. First, firms increase proficiency at adapting their processes to address new opportunities as they accumulate experience in entering new niches, but face initial hurdles broadening their experience base. Second, concurrent learning is capacity constrained, as product quality increases in the number of products introduced simultaneously in one niche, but quality decreases as the firm's concurrent portfolio of new products broadens. Jointly, these findings highlight that dynamic capabilities are built through prior adaptation experience and that management of a product development portfolio is an important managerial capability. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ordered to Innovate: A Longitudinal Examination of the Early Periods of a New Product Development Process Implementation in a Manufacturing Firm

Firms can generate rather long‐lasting growth spurts through continuous innovation. Moreover, literature suggests that, when growing organically, firm performance is enhanced through a revenue expansion emphasis encompassing new‐to‐the‐world or new‐to‐the‐firm physical goods or service augmentations. This organic approach usually outperforms cost‐reduction programs, which often yield minor improvements to existing products; or an emphasis on simultaneous revenue expansion and cost reduction. While this finding has the major implication that firms should focus and generate more radical new products for long‐term success, there is need for research that investigates how firms should implement the strategy change to organic growth via innovation. The authors present a case study, which suggests that in the short run, it might be better to commence a revenue expansion strategy by focusing on incremental new product development (NPD) efforts, rather than focusing too much on new‐to‐the‐world or new‐to‐the‐firm products. Moreover, analyses of the rich, multimethod data, collected over a two‐and‐a‐half‐year interaction with the focal firm, illustrates that to increase success prospects of an organic innovation strategy, managers should not only engage incrementally innovative new product projects initially, but also ensure proficiency in commercializing the new product with cross‐functional NPD teams. Thus, in early stages of organization transformation, the merits of the organic growth strategy will be swiftly demonstrated, the cross‐functional teaming skills are learned and tested, and the new strategy becomes institutionalized. While somewhat contradictory to other studies on this topic, this more evolutionary exploration provides a new perspective for organizational change, especially when a firm is ordered to innovate. In conclusion, the insights gleaned in this study shed light on the journey from stagnating firm to a successful serial innovator via formalized NPD process implementation.     

Launch decisions and competitive reactions: an exploratory market signaling study

When firms launch a new product into the marketplace they often aim to find a balance between building scale and provoking extensive and quick competitive reactions. Competitors react to new products when they perceive the product introduction as hostile, committed or when they feel that the product entry will have a large impact on their profitability. The present study develops a framework that shows how strong and fast incumbents react to perceived market signals resulting from a new product's launch decisions (broad targeting, penetration pricing, advertising intensity and product advantage). The strength of the relationships between the launch decisions and the perceived market signals was expected to depend on one industry characteristic (i.e., market growth) and on one entrant characteristic (i.e., aggressive reputation). We distinguished three market signals in our framework: hostility, commitment and consequences. Signal hostility refers to the extent to which the approach used by an acting firm to introduce the new product is perceived hostile whereas the commitment signal refers to the extent to which incumbents perceive the entrant firm to be committed to the new product introduction. The consequence signal is defined as the incumbents' perception of the impact of a new product entry on their profitability. We tested our framework using cross‐sectional data provided by 73 managers in The Netherlands who recently reacted to a new product entry. The results clearly reveal which launch decisions create which market signals. For example, incumbents consider high advantage new products hostile and consequential. Penetration pricing and an intense advertising campaign are also considered hostile, especially in fast growing markets. Broad targeting is not perceived hostile, especially not when used by entrants with an aggressive reputation. In addition, this study explored the impact of three perceived market signals on the strength and speed of competitive reaction. The results reveal that perceived signals of hostility and commitment positively impact the strength of reaction, whereas the perceived consequence signal positively impacts the speed of reaction. The article concludes with the implications of our study for managers and academics. The relevance to managers was assessed from both the perspective of the incumbent firm that must defend, and that of the rival firm that is introducing the new product.     

Linking Product Development Outcomes to Market Valuation of the Firm: The Case of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry*

The purpose of this research was to examine empirically the effects of new product development outcomes on overall firm performance. To do so, first product development and finance literature were connected to develop three testable hypotheses. Next, an event study was conducted in order to explore whether the changes in the stock market valuation of firms are influenced by the outcomes of efforts to develop new products. The pharmaceutical industry was chosen as the empirical context for the present study's analysis largely because the gate‐keeping role played by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) provides a specific event date on which to focus the event study methodology. As such, this study's events were dates of public announcements of the FDA decisions to approve or to reject the New Drug Applications submitted by the sponsoring firms. Consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, this study's results show that market valuations are responsive strongly and cleanly to the success or failure of new product development efforts. Hence, one of this study's key results suggests that financial markets may be attuned sharply to product development outcomes in publicly traded firms. This study also finds that financial market losses from product development failures were much larger in magnitude than financial market gains from product development successes—indicating an asymmetry in the response of financial markets to the success and failure of new product development efforts. Hence, another implication of this study's results is that managers should factor in a substantial risk premium when considering substantial new development projects. The present study's results also imply that managers should refrain from hyping new products and perhaps even should restrain the enthusiasm that the financial community may build before the product fully is developed. The effect on firm value is severe when expectations about an anticipated new product are not fulfilled. Managers in effect should take care to build reasonable and realistic expectations about potential new products.     

The Immediate Impact of New Product Introductions on Stock Price: The Role of Firm Resources and Size*

New product development and introduction is an ongoing important issue to facilitate a firm's success. To demonstrate the financial impact of new product introductions and the supporting role of firm resources and organizational structure, the authors collected 409 new product announcements from 1990 to 1998 and used event methodology and regression models in this research. Building on resources and capabilities perspectives, the present study argues that firm resources with emphases on research and development (R&D) are imperative to materialize new product concepts. However, the research revealed that R&D resources have dual effects on immediate shareholder value (i.e., abnormal stock returns). On one hand, when the firm commits only lower to moderate levels of R&D, investors would have perceived such R&D as expenditures reducing the firm's profit margin and thereby negatively evaluate R&D resources. Nevertheless, when the firm has dedicated its resources to R&D significant enough to signal investors its potential benefits can outweigh its costs, it generates positive shareholder value. Further, the study found that investors honor positive marketing resources that are critical to promote and launch new products to customers. Apart from resources perspectives, according to the organizational structure literature, firm size reflects the layers of bureaucracy within an organization. The research found a negative effect on shareholder value, indicating that investors evaluate more optimistically smaller firms that are likely to be more innovative and entrepreneurial resulted in more breakthrough products. In conclusion, this study provides value to practitioners in understanding the impact of firm size and, more importantly, to what extent they dedicate their resources in R&D and marketing to generate different performance outcomes.     

New Products and Financial Risk Changes

The historic focus of new products research has been on the ability of new products to enhance the profitability and competitive position of the innovating firm. In this article, Timothy Devinney shows that there exists an overlooked and potentially significant side effect associated with new product innovations: financial risk changes. He reports that significant financial risk changes occurred in approximately 50% of the new product announcements he examined. The magnitude of these financial risk changes translates into overestimates or underestimates of the firm's cost of capital by 17% to 18% and is strongly and positively related to the size of the firm and the firm's new product innovation activity.     

The Impact of Product Portfolio Strategy on Financial Performance: The Roles of Product Development and Market Entry Decisions

Innovation is one of the most important issues facing business today. The major difficulty in managing innovation is that managers must do so against a constantly shifting backdrop as technologies, competitors, and markets constantly evolve. Managers determine the product portfolio through key decisions about product development and market entry. Key strategic questions are what portfolio strategies provide the greatest reward. The purpose of this study is to understand the relative financial values of each component of a product portfolio. Specifically, the paper examines the short‐term and long‐term financial impacts of product development strategy and market entry strategy. These strategies reflect two critical tensions that must be balanced in product portfolio decision making and essentially determine a firm's product portfolio. In doing so, the paper also investigates how a firm's capabilities drive each component of a product portfolio. From the empirical analyses in the context of the biomedical device industry, the paper found important insights regarding product portfolio strategies. First, a large product portfolio helps a firm's financial performance. In particular, the pioneering new products have strongest impacts on short‐term performances, and nonpioneering mature products do not provide significant contribution. Second, the results indicate a persistent first‐mover advantage. The first‐to‐market new products yield not only an immediate effect, but also persistent long‐term effects, suggesting that it is important to be first in the market even though there may be short‐term losses. Third, the results suggest the need to balance between “mature” and “new” products. Also, firms need to balance “first‐to‐market” and “late‐entered” products. Because a new or pioneering product requires more resource, it may hurt other products in the portfolio. Thus, without support from mature or follower products, new products and pioneering products alone may not increase firm sales or profit. Fourth, from a long‐term perspective, the paper found that the financial market only rewards a firm's overall capability to deliver new products first in the marketplace. Thus, short‐term performance is mainly driven by product‐level innovativeness, whereas firm‐level innovativeness enhances forward‐looking long‐term performance. Fifth, the paper also found that pioneering new products are driven by integrating both primary and complementary technological capabilities. And nonpioneering new products are mainly driven by the capabilities in primary technology domain. These results provide important insight into the relative value and timing of return on investment in radical versus incremental innovation and alternative market entry strategies. By understanding the performance trade‐offs of these different factors in the short and long term, one can develop better guidelines for optimizing innovation strategies, and their dependence on both external and internal environmental conditions.     

The Mixed Blessings of Technological Innovativeness for the Commercial Success of New Products

This study addresses the contradiction that, although technological innovativeness of new products is often seen as a major driver of competitive advantage and commercial success, empirical research is not always able to show a significant performance influence. In order to find an explanation, the effects of technological innovativeness are decomposed as its influence on the market, the innovating firm, and the firm's environment is considered. The proposed model is tested on a sample of new product development projects. In order to avoid systematic biases, this paper uses a longitudinal survey design with two informants and a sample that includes both incremental and highly innovative projects. The results show that technological innovativeness has both positive and negative effects on the commercial success of new products. On the one hand, technological innovativeness can increase customer value, which in turn has a positive effect on success. On the other hand, incorporating new technologies into new products also implies changes in the innovating firm and potentially in its environment. These changes have a negative impact on commercial success. The positive and negative effects compensate for each other, so that the total effect of technological innovativeness on commercial success is close to zero. The findings imply that firms developing new products through incorporating radically new technologies often seem to underestimate the inherent complexities with respect to both internal and external changes. Developing and introducing new products with a radically changed technology also implies anticipating the need for new competences, processes, structures, and network partners. Social and political resistance against technological changes, large investments in new infrastructures, and the long duration of these changes additionally become frequent features of such innovation endeavors. Hence, firms embarking on a path of exploiting radically new technologies should consider those complexities very carefully when making their new product development decisions.     

Product radicalness and firm performance in B2B marketing: A moderated mediation model

There has been ambiguity and controversy in establishing the links between the introduction of radical innovations and firm performance. While radical innovations create customer value and grow product sales, they are also fraught with uncertainty due to customer resistance to innovative products and significant costs associated with commercialization. This research aims to explain the contrarian findings between radical innovations and firm performance in a business-to-business (B2B) context by examining two mediating variables – new product advantage and customer unfamiliarity. Using a multi-informant approach, the authors collected survey data from a sample of 170 Spanish B2B firms engaged in new product development, provided by 357 managers. The authors find that, while new product advantage positively mediates the relationship between product radicalness and firm performance, customer unfamiliarity has a negative mediation effect on this relationship. Furthermore, the authors examine the moderated mediation effect by industry type, manufacturing vs. service, and find that it moderates the mediation of customer unfamiliarity: The negative impact of product radicalness on customer unfamiliarity is greater for manufacturing firms than for service firms. With these findings, the authors discuss implications for development and marketing of radical innovations and how those implications facilitate firm performance in the B2B context.     

The Contribution of In‐house and External Design Activities to Product Market Performance

Design may be seen as one of several key factors contributing to new product development, along with research and development, marketing, manufacturing, purchasing, etc. More and more, creative design comes to the fore, and many companies believe that superior design will be the key to winning customers. It has the ability to create corporate distinctiveness and also possesses the potential to give a product an individual or new look. Furthermore, the model of open innovation suggests that firms can and should use external and internal knowledge flows in order to create valuable ideas, and also internal and external paths to the market. Also, in the design process, a common trend toward external design skills has emerged in recent years. Due to cost and control factors, firms are increasingly outsourcing design activities. By using a sample of Belgian companies, this paper explores the contribution of design activities to product market performance. While there is mounting evidence that design can be seen as a strategic tool to successfully spur sales of new product developments at the firm level, the topic of design innovation has not yet been linked to the open innovation concept. In this paper, it is empirically tested whether design activities conducted in house differ in their contribution to new product sales from externally acquired design. So, do design activities that have been developed only with internal resources lead to a greater success than those that have been carried out with external sources of knowledge? Using a large cross‐section of manufacturing and service firms, the effects on sales of products new to the market and of imitations or significantly improved products of the firm are investigated. At first glance, the findings indicate that externally acquired design is not superior to in‐house design activities: the results show that only design activities that are mainly conducted with internal knowledge sources play a crucial role regarding the product innovation's success with market novelties. Design conducted in collaboration with external partners, however, has no significant influence. This is not the case for imitations, that is, products only new to the firm. Their success is also influenced by design activities developed with external collaborators. This effect is robust for several modifications of the model specification. In contrast to earlier literature on new technological developments, this paper argues that external design may not affect the sales of market novelties as the “market news” may spill over quickly to rivals through common suppliers including external designers.