Standards, trade and competition in the emerging global information infrastructure environment

Decentralized construction of the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) is substituting market-driven, ‘de facto’ standards and voluntary agreements on standards for technical compatibility, in place of the engineering decisions once made by public (and quasi-public) telecommunications network operators. Due to strategic economic behaviours on the part of private businesses and national governments, the goal of a fully interoperable GII remains elusive. The Internet does not offer an entirely credible alternative model, as the standards that have facilitated its explosive growth also are contributing to serious congestion problems, and the solutions proposed point to the Internet's re-integration into the public switched telecommunications network. Technical standards will shape the GII's implications for international trade and competition, and thus raise important, but inadequately recognized issues for regulation, competition and trade policy.     

Investigation of factors affecting the diffusion of mobile telephone services: An empirical analysis for Vietnam

This paper analyzes the diffusion of mobile telecommunications services in Vietnam and examines how telecommunications regulation and potential substitute/complement services affect the growth of the number of mobile telephone subscribers. Using a logistic diffusion model, it is found that fixed telephone services are a complement while data services have a negative relation to mobile telephone services in Vietnam. As for regulation, the policy of introducing competition has been found to be the most effective in influencing the adoption of mobile services. Another important result is that the estimated potential market is roughly 76% of the total population. The findings suggest that suitable regulation that guarantees competition in the mobile telecommunications market in a developing country such as Vietnam is one of the most important factors for a positive diffusion process.     

Vertical Integration in International Telecommunication System

The process of liberalization and privatization is drastically altering the links among international telecommunications carriers. The model presented in this paper analyses the international telecommunications market illustrating the effects of vertical mergers, under symbiotic production conditions, when vertically integrated and unintegrated carriers coexist. The effect of competition is analysed both in the final market and in the intermediate one where carriers compete over tariffs to get an appropriate distribution of profits. In particular, the results show the relations between final market prices, intermediate tariffs and market dimensions and their implications on profits.     

Regulatory inertia versus ICT dynamics: The case of product innovations

This article conjectures that the legacy industry-specific regulation that has governed the telecommunications sector for a long time is in basic conflict with the dynamics and product innovations that characterize the modern information and communications technology (ICT) sector. Reasons for the failure of legacy regulation to promote product innovations are explained and proposals for alternatives, such as deregulation and regulatory reform are discussed. Both regulation and competition policy are more difficult for ICT than for other sectors. Therefore both, regulation and competition policy may need reforms in order to deal with new problems. The most drastic and most realistic alternative to legacy-type regulation remains deregulation and a move to competition policy. Symmetric regulation, smart regulation, quasi-Coasean approaches and subsidies all have some limited applicability to specific situations, but are all associated with complications that have to be resolved, while competition policy is a comprehensive alternative. Last-mile access and gatekeeper access are analyzed as two main areas of legacy regulation, which are in danger of being exported to other ICT areas. Such exports may negatively affect the dynamics of the ICT industry. Rather than being exported, legacy regulations should be reduced in order to enhance product innovations.     

Bertrand equilibrium with differentiated products considering fixed costs: Korean price regulation in the mobile telephone industry

In some industries such as telecommunications and electricity, the fixed costs are so high that competition is not sustainable without considering the fixed cost in pricing. The sustainability of competition is as important as enhancing competition when an industry is in the transitional period from being a monopoly owned or managed by the government to a competitive market structure driven by the market. A price competition model with asymmetric firms and product differentiation is considered in which firms compete with a normal profit constraint. The constraint is related to the sustainability of competition and can be realized through price regulation. With this constraint, firms gain only normal profit in equilibrium despite the asymmetry, and consumer surplus is maximized. The equilibrium is meaningful in defining the industry performance intended through the regulation. Moreover, the price regulation of the Korean mobile telephone market is considered to discuss any implications of this equilibrium.     

Competition in telecommunications

The author examines the impact of competition from both domestic and international perspectives. He provides a critique of the pro-competition argument, although a number of advantages of competition are also outlined. The advantages are discussed in relation to equipment and services. International trends towards competition are then described and the disadvantages of such trends are debated in relation to cross-subsidization, interconnection, the telecommunications manufacturing industry, and the market structure. Finally, competition in the international arena is discussed.     

Regulation of international roaming in the European Union—Lessons learned

This paper analyzes the evolution of prices and competition in intra-EU international roaming markets. It addresses three main research questions: (i) to what extent have market forces by themselves brought competition to retail roaming markets? (ii) Has the evolution of market dynamics in wholesale roaming improved competition? (iii) Is wholesale regulation sufficient to lead to a reduction in retail roaming prices? Data show that there has been little price-based competition both at wholesale and retail levels, despite prices being well above costs and the significant margins allowed by regulation. Available data from the period preceding the entry into force of the first EU roaming regulation also point to the same conclusion. Lack of competitive pressure in retail roaming markets and inelastic demand give little incentives for retail roaming service providers to lower prices. Wholesale international roaming markets have complex competition dynamics. They are characterized by the reciprocity of wholesale roaming agreements and traffic internalization inside transnational groups. These circumstances limit price competition at the wholesale level. The traditional regulatory approach applied to electronic communication markets has been primarily focused on wholesale regulation. However, empirical evidence shows that even if wholesale charges are reduced, retail roaming markets continue to operate at very high retail margins (for example, more than 200% retail mark-up over wholesale charges for data roaming services and incoming calls). This proves that in international roaming markets wholesale charge reductions are not necessarily passed on to retail prices. It can thus be inferred that wholesale price regulation alone is in most cases not sufficient to ensure that benefits are passed through to end users.     

Network liberalization and developing countries: The case of Chile

The opening of Chile's telecommunications infrastructure to private and foreign investment has led to a rapid modernization of the network and to improvements in universal service. In 1994 all remaining regulatory entry barriers to the local, long-distance and international markets were removed for both service providers and network operators. Full digitization of switches and specific characteristics of the Chilean network structure have led to fierce price competition in the market. In spite of the small market size the strategic behaviour of the main market players is unlikely to succeed. As a result the market is likely to remain highly competitive. While the liberalization process has so far spurred the universal service goal, further improvements will mainly depend on whether entry takes place in the local market.     

Competition and regulation in China's 3G/4G mobile communications industry—Institutions,governance, and telecom SOEs

When it comes to the analysis of the intrinsic mechanism of market behaviors and hence competition development and regulatory imperatives in the Chinese telecommunications industry, currently there is no consistent pattern offered in the literature. In China's emergent 3G/4G era, market behaviors can be affected by various institutional factors, along with various forms of informal forces, which may translate into different implications for competition regulation. Based on extensive archival research and interview, this current study aims to bridge the gap by following an interpretive approach. An input–output model was substantiated for pattern-matching in the Chinese context base on the postulation of a series of propositions and hence Industry-Gray-Box. Accordingly, two categories of market behaviors, that is, market-driven vs. institutions-driven, were arguably delineated as being underpinning the competition development. Policy implications and future reform imperatives were discussed. This study may advance knowledge in terms of: (1) the establishment of a relatively consistent pattern for mapping the landscape of China's communications industry; (2) the substantiation of the inner working mechanism of China's SOE system in the telecommunications sector; and (3) original first attempt in identifying different roles of telecom SOEs and the governing forces that affect them. The paper also offers extensive and cohesive insights on China's formal and informal institutional environment in general and for telecommunications in particular. Measurements developed in this study may serve as basis for future study.     

The endless need for regulation in telecommunication: An explanation

Telecommunication services have existed as a legal monopoly nearly throughout its entire history. In 1998, telecom market liberalisation was achieved across the European Union (EU) through the introduction of competition among telephone services. Asymmetrical obligations were deemed necessary in order to compensate the market power of the former monopolist.As the evolution of asymmetrical regulation in Spain illustrates, obligations and the telecommunications operators subject to them increased with the regulatory framework established in 2002 in the EU. This new regulatory framework may continue to expand through the inclusion of functional separation as another possible asymmetrical obligation. In short, it seems that the regulatory pressure on the telecommunications industry is increasing, despite the lapse in time since the liberalisation of the industry.In this paper, a methodology developed by the Austrian School of Economics is applied in order to explain why the telecommunication market is subject to increasing regulation in Europe, rather than deregulation, after more than 10 years of liberalisation. In particular, Mises's theory of price control is used to explain the evolution of the regulation of local loop unbundling.     

Rollout and regulation of Fibre-To-The-Premises networks. Insights from the Spanish case

In 2017, the coverage of Fibre-to-the-Premises (FTTP) infrastructure reached 71% of households in Spain, surpassing most of the other Member States of the European Union (EU) and only outweighed by Portugal, Latvia and Lithuania. This article analyses the factors that have contributed to the deployment of these fibre networks by both the incumbent and the alternative operators that previously relied on the Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) of copper cables. An investment-friendly regulatory framework, which did not mandate access to the optical loops, and a telecommunications market comprised of dissimilar actors in the fixed and mobile segments, have been key to the deployment of FTTP networks in Spain. Additionally, based on historical coverage data, we test retrospectively, the sensitivity of geographic market segmentation to the time of the analysis and criteria for potential NGA competition. As per the analysis, the unregulated area where facility-based competition may be expected range between 23% and 61% of the premises upon the case. We discuss the implications of having mandated a Virtual Unbundled Local Access (VULA) to New Generation Access (NGA) infrastructure in 2013, examining the most likely operators' strategies. We conclude that, in the Spanish market, an earlier regulation would have reinforced inter-platform NGA competition at the expense of more limited coverage. The analysis can provide policy-makers with useful insights about the trade-off between coverage and infrastructure competition.     

Competition or regulation for multimedia?

The reform undergone in telecommunications within the European Union promotes competition as the main tool for regulation. Yet, the rules related to competition may not be easily distinguished from additional regulation.     

Mobile voice diffusion and service competition: A system dynamic analysis of regulatory policy

Dynamic behavior in mobile telecommunications markets is often the result of interactions between market actors. As the structure and dynamic complexity of such interactions tend to be difficult to identify, it is challenging for regulators to anticipate the effects of their policy decisions. This article uses system dynamics to evaluate the effect of technology harmonization and mobile number portability policies on mobile voice diffusion and service competition. This is realized by first modeling the endogenous feedback structure resulting in dynamic behavior in the mobile telecommunications market and then by configuring the model for retrospective simulations of the Finnish market. Based on the retrospective simulations, the effect of technology harmonization and mobile number portability policy decisions is analyzed and the usefulness of system dynamics is demonstrated.     

Competitive dynamics in Polish telecommunications, 1990–2000: growth,regulation, and privatization of an infrastructural multi-network

This paper analyzes the relationship between governmental regulatory policies and competitive dynamics amongst private operators and the national monopolist, TP SA, in three network segments of the Polish telecommunications sector. Special attention is paid to the evolution of organizational strategies in a regulatory environment characterized by constant strategic indecision and reorientations of national policy makers. The paper finds that regulatory/competition coevolution has taken diverse forms in the three network subsegments, with asymmetric duopoly operating in the local fixed network, hidden competition at work in the long-distance fixed network, and oligopolistic technology-driven competition characterizing the high-growth cellular network. The conclusion reached is that Polish telecommunications to date has been stuck in a broad stage of pre-competitive market maneuverings by domestic and international capital, in preparation for privatization of the national operator and for full liberalization as part of EU integration.     

The Market Structure of Broadband Telecommunications

The recent growth of the Internet is creating markets for broadband telecommunications networks. In the past, virtually all such 'infrastructure' networks have been subject to government regulation. Two reasons advanced for this market intervention are (i) such networks constitute a natural monopoly, and (ii) to achieve 'universal service', in which all citizens have access to services. In this paper, we develop a model and estimate it using engineering data which tests if these two hypotheses are likely to obtain for broadband networks. We find that oligopolistic competition is likely to emerge for demand levels approaching that of today's cable television.     

Access regulation and infrastructure investment in the mobile telecommunications industry

While mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) increase competition in the mobile telecommunications industry, granting market access to MVNOs may have unwanted consequences. In particular, infrastructure investment by incumbent mobile network operators (MNOs) may be smaller. This paper examines the effects of MVNO entry and access regulation on the investment behavior of MNOs. It uses firm-level data for 58 MNOs in 21 OECD countries during 2000–2008. The results suggest that mandated provision of access is related to lower investment intensity of MNOs, while voluntary access provision has no effect. Although reduced investment incentives do not necessarily correspond to under-investment, this underscores the need for those countries where MVNOs are provided access to address the issue of investment incentives.     

Cable television and competition : Theory, evidence and policy

There is currently widespread discussion in the USA of the merits of amending legislation to allow competition in the cable television market, notably from the telecommunications companies. This article explores what economic theory can contribute to this debate, and adduces empirical evidence on the effects of competition in the cable market where it presently exists. The authors conclude that blocking entry into cable, and indeed into telecommunications markets, is likely to be poor policy, and that increased competition would foster the development of an efficient modern broadband network.     

英国电信产业的放松管制和对主导运营商BT的再管制

自 1 980年起 ,英国电信产业先后实施了邮政、电信分离 ,建立独立的管制机构 ,对开放市场准入和私有化以后仍然居于主导地位的运营商———英国电信公司 (BT)实施包括价格上限管制在内的一系列管制 ,促进了英国电信产业向竞争性结构的转化。目前 ,我国电信产业同样面临着放松管制以及放松管制以后如何重组和再管制主导运营商的棘手难题。本文拟对英国电信产业 2 0余年的改革经验进行比较系统的回顾和评析 ,以期对我国电信产业的下一步改革有所启示。     

Interconnection in international telecommunications: An empirical investigation of United States settlement rates

Several national governments have expressed concern at the inability of carriers to negotiate lower accounting rates. Ergas and Patterson (1991) and Frieden (1997) argue that it is only on bilateral markets with facilities-based competition at both ends that conditions favour accounting rates reductions. In the absence of facilities-based competition, Frieden also suggests that service providers, such as resellers, may provide a second best opportunity to place downward pressure on accounting rates. This study extends the work of Ergas and Patterson by developing an econometric model of settlement rate pricing. The model is estimated on data for 27 US bilateral telephone markets for the period 1985 to 1995. Parameter estimates are used to identify settlement rate determinants, and so highlight impediments to efficient international telecommunications pricing. A novel feature of the model is the inclusion of a resale market structure variable.     

Economic growth,telecommunications development and productivity growth of the telecommunications sector: Evidence around the world

This paper studies the relationships between economic growth, telecommunications development and productivity growth of the telecommunications sector in different countries and regions of the world. In particular, this study assesses the impact of mobile telecommunications on economic growth and telecommunications productivity. The results indicate that there is a bidirectional relationship between real gross domestic product (GDP) and telecommunications development (as measured by teledensity) for European and high-income countries. However, when the impact of mobile telecommunications development on economic growth is measured separately, the bi-directional relationship is no longer restricted to European and high-income countries. This study also finds that countries in the upper-middle income group have achieved a higher average total factor productivity (TFP) growth than other countries. Countries with competition and privatization in telecommunications have achieved a higher TFP growth than those without competition and privatization. The diffusion of mobile telecommunications services is found to be a significant factor that has improved the TFP growth of the telecommunications sector in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).