The Cost of Capital of Cross‐listed Firms

This paper analyses the cost of capital of firms with foreign equity listings. Our purpose is to shed light on the question whether international and domestic asset pricing models yield a different estimate of the cost of capital for cross‐listed stocks. We distinguish between (i) the multifactor ICAPM of Solnik (1979) and Sercu (1980) including both the global market portfolio and exchange rate risk premia and (ii) the single factor domestic CAPM. We test for the significance of the cost of capital differential in a sample of 336 cross‐listed stocks from nine countries in the period 1980–99. Our hypothesis is that the cost of capital differential is substantial for firms with international listings, as these are often large multinationals with a strong international orientation. We find that the asset pricing models yield a significantly different estimate of the cost of capital for only 12% of the cross‐listed companies. The size of the cost of capital differential is around 50 basis points for the US, 80 basis points for the UK and 100 basis points for France.     

Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic and Cross‐border Takeover Bids

This paper analyses the short‐term wealth effects of large intra‐European takeover bids. We find announcement effects of 9% for the target firms compared to a statistically significant announcement effect of only 0.7% for the bidders. The type of takeover bid has a large impact on the short‐term wealth effects with hostile takeovers triggering substantially larger price reactions than friendly operations. When a UK firm is involved, the abnormal returns are higher than those of bids involving both a Continental European target and bidder. There is strong evidence that the means of payment in an offer has an impact on the share price. A high market‐to‐book ratio of the target leads to a higher bid premium, but triggers a negative price reaction for the bidding firm. We also investigate whether the predominant reason for takeovers is synergies, agency problems or managerial hubris. Our results suggest that synergies are the prime motivation for bids and that targets and bidders share the wealth gains.     

The Debt Trap: Wealth Transfers and Debt‐Equity Choices of Junk‐Grade Firms

If outstanding debt is risky, issuing equity transfers wealth from equity holders to debt holders. If existing leverage is high and bankruptcy costs are small, this wealth transfer effect outweighs the gains to stockholders from optimizing firm value. Empirically, we find that for investment‐grade firms, higher leverage implies a greater likelihood of issuing equity, as expected in a standard tradeoff model. However, consistent with the impact of wealth transfer effects, for junk‐grade firms, higher leverage implies a greater likelihood of issuing debt. The analysis implies an additional route through which historical shocks determine firms’ financing choices.     

The Wealth and Risk Effects of the Gramm‐Leach‐Bliley Act (GLBA) on the US Banking Industry

Abstract:   The Gramm‐Leach‐Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 marks the end of Depression era regulations like the Glass‐Steagall Act of 1933 and Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. These acts have restricted banks from securities and insurance underwriting business. This paper examines the impact of the GLBA on the banking industry. We find that the banking industry has a welfare gain from this law. We investigate two different categorizations of the banking industry. We find that Money Center banks followed by the Super Regional banks benefited most from this deregulation. On the other hand, banks that had Section 20 investment subsidiaries gained more than other banks in the second category. The results also show that the exposure to systematic risk for different categories of banks decreased after the passage of this law, which implies that the GLBA is fairly successful in containing the risk that accompanied the act and also created diversification opportunities. For Money Center banks, Super Regional Banks, banks with a section 20 subsidiary and banks with a new financial subsidiary, a shift in the exposure to systematic risk can explain the overall cross sectional variation in return from the deregulation. In both categorizations we find that larger banks gained more, while the overall explanatory power of profitability is not conclusive.     

Earnings Conservatism, Litigation and Contracting: The Case of Cross‐Listed Firms

Abstract:   We compare earnings conservatism of UK companies cross‐listed in the US to that of UK companies without a US‐listing. We expect that conservatism will be more pronounced for cross‐listed firms than for firms with a UK listing only, because the cross‐listed firms face a stricter enforcement regime. Furthermore, cross‐listed firms may use a listing on a US exchange to signal high‐quality reporting to investors. Using a matched‐pairs research design, we find that earnings of UK cross‐listed firms are significantly more conservative than earnings of UK firms without a US listing. Moreover, cross listed firms display particularly high levels of conservatism during the early years of their cross‐listing. This indicates that firms use earnings conservatism to commit to highly demanding reporting requirements and in doing so communicate a perception of investor care.     

The Effects of Public Venture Capital Investments on Corporate Governance: Evidence From IPO Firms in Emerging Markets

This study examines the impact of public venture capital (hereafter PVC) investments on corporate governance of initial public offering (hereafter IPO) firms in emerging markets. Using data collected from Taiwan PVC investments during 1996–2005, we analyse three corporate governance features in IPO firms: earnings management, board characteristics, and excess control by controlling shareholders. We find that PVC‐backed firms use fewer accounting accruals in their IPO financial statements than non‐PVC‐backed firms. This result suggests that PVC‐backed IPO firms engage in less earnings management than non‐PVC‐backed IPO firms. We also find PVC‐backed firms tend to set up their boards with fewer non‐independent directors and supervisors at IPO. This result indicates that PVC‐backed IPO firms have better board structures than non‐PVC‐backed IPO firms. Finally, we find that controlling shareholders are less likely to exert excess control in PVC‐backed firms than in non‐PVC‐backed firms. Overall, our results indicate that PVC investments add value to new IPO firms not only in financing their capital needs but also in creating better corporate governance structures in emerging markets.     

The Effects of Reversible Investment on Capital Structure and Credit Risks

We propose a structural model with an optimal switching of diffusion regimes that integrates a wide range of investment reversibility. The default boundary and switching thresholds are endogenously determined, and they enable us to comprehend the interrelated problems of the investment decision, capital structure, and credit risks. We examine not only the under/overinvestment but also the under/overdisinvestment. The leverage ratio decreases when the firm has an option to invest in a reversible project, which can alleviate the capital structure puzzle. Furthermore, the model significantly reduces the wide dispersion of yield spreads depending on the credit grade of bonds.     

The Effects of Ownership Structure and Intragroup Loans on Leverage: Evidence from Family Firms in Chile

This article examines the effects of family control and pyramidal ownership on firms’ capital structure decisions. After studying a sample of listed family and nonfamily firms in Chile, we find that families take a conservative approach to debt and financial risk exposure. We test the hypothesis that family firms restrict the use of debt in order to avoid the monitoring role of creditors, which could limit their enjoyment of the private benefits of control. In keeping with this hypothesis, we find a U-shaped relationship between leverage and the degree of pyramidal ownership that is more pronounced among family firms than nonfamily firms. We do not find any evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that family-controlled firms have low leverage ratios due to their access to internal capital markets. In fact, conversely, we find that listed family firms provide more loans to related companies than comparable nonfamily firms.     

The Role of Investment,Financing and Dividend Decisions in Explaining Corporate Ownership Structure: Empirical Evidence from Spain

This paper analyses the determinants of ownership structure by focusing on the role played by investment, financing and dividend decisions. The use of the Generalised Method of Moments allows us to provide new evidence on this important corporate governance topic, since it controls for the endogeneity problem. Our most relevant findings show that: i) increases in debt lead insiders to limit the risk they bear by reducing their holdings; ii) monitoring by large outside owners substitutes for the disciplinary role of debt; and iii) both inside and outside owners are encouraged to increase their stakes in the firm in view of higher dividends. Our results hold after controlling for equity issues and share repurchases.     

The Costs, Wealth Effects, and Determinants of International Capital Raising: Evidence from Public Yankee Bonds

This paper examines the costs, wealth effects, and determinants of international capital raising for a sample of 260 public debt issues made by non-U.S. firms in the Yankee bond market. We find that investors demand economically significant premiums on bonds issued by firms that are located in countries that do not protect investors' rights and do not have a prior history of ongoing disclosure. The results provide support for the literature that suggests better legal protections and more detailed information disclosure increases the price investors will pay for financial assets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: F3, G1.     

The Value of Crowdfunding: An Explanation Based on Demand Uncertainty and Comparison with Venture Capital

This article notes that an advantage of crowdfunding is in its ability to help start-up firms acquire more accurate market demand information regarding new products when compared with venture capital (VC). The whole market of a given product can be conceptualized as being segmented into several, small local markets. VC has a comprehensive knowledge of local markets in general but is prone to noisy aggregate demand information as a result. While crowdfunding investors have intimate knowledge regarding local demand information in their respective locales, they lack knowledge in other local markets. We show that under certain conditions, crowdfunding can provide more accurate demand information and therefore can generate better incentives to entrepreneurs while improving product quality and helping entrepreneurs make correct decisions on whether or not to launch a new product. Therefore, the wisdom of the crowd can be more valuable than the wisdom of the expert.