Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and firm innovation

In this paper, we investigate the impact of directors’ and officers’ insurance (D&O insurance) on firm innovation in China. We find that D&O insurance is significantly positively associated with firm innovation, which indicates that D&O insurance enhances managers’ tolerance for failure. To address endogeneity concerns, we adopt the propensity score matching method and difference-in-differences approach. We find that firms with D&O insurance have a stronger risk bearing capacity. Further analyses show that the impact of D&O insurance on firm innovation is more pronounced in firms with a better legal environment, male executives, and stronger external supervision.     

U.S. consumer demand for prize-linked savings: New evidence on a new product

We report on the potential American demand for prize-linked savings, a savings account that also awards prizes. Our survey data suggests significant interest among individuals with little actual savings, without regular saving habits, who play lotteries extensively, and are optimistic.     

Direct evidence of risk aversion as a source of advantageous selection in health insurance

Using the self-stated degree of risk aversion regarding health from the GSOEP we find some evidence for risk aversion being a source of advantageous selection. Risk averse men more often procure supplementary insurance for hospital visits despite needing the additional coverage less.     

Transferable Ageing Provisions in Individual Health Insurance Contracts

Abstract. We consider lifetime health insurance contracts in which ageing provisions are used to smooth the premium profile. The capital stock accumulated for each individual can be decomposed into two parts: a premium insurance and an annuitized life insurance, only the latter being transferable between insurers without triggering premium changes through risk segmentation. In a simulation based on German data, the transferable share declines in age and falls with an increasing age of entry into the contract. In spite of different benefit profiles, it is almost identical for women and men.     

When prices hardly matter: Incomplete insurance contracts and markets for repair goods

This paper looks at markets characterized by the fact that the demand side is insured. In these markets, a consumer purchases a good to compensate consequences of unfavorable events, such as an accident or an illness. Insurance policies in most lines of insurance base indemnity on the insured's actual expenses, i.e., the insured would be partially or completely reimbursed when purchasing certain goods. In this setting, we discuss the interaction between insurance and repair markets by focusing, on one hand, upon the development of prices and the structure of markets with insured consumers, and, on the other hand, the resulting backlash on optimal insurance contracting. We show that even in the absence of ex post moral hazard the extension of insurance coverage will lead to an increase in prices as well as to a socially undesirable increase in the number of repair service suppliers if repair markets are imperfect.     

Disorganization and financial collapse

Since the fall of communism, the former Soviet Union experienced a strong output decline and a dramatic increase in arrears and barter. We develop a model which explains how these three phenomena are connected. We introduce liquidity and credit constraints into a model of disorganization and show how these problems can alleviate the hold-up problem. We argue further that barter creates a hostage that allows to deal with disorganization when credit enforcement becomes prohibitively costly. Based on a firm survey in Ukraine in 1997, we test how input shortages, financial shortages and barter affect output growth of firms.     

Migration as an antidote to rent-seeking?

We develop a new mechanism through which skilled migration may influence economic performance in the sending country. If agents can choose between acting as rent-seekers and engaging in productive activities, and only productive skills are exportable, a positive probability of migration (to a more secure economy) reduces the relative expected returns from rent-seeking, thus decreasing the proportion of skilled workers who opt for “parasitic” activities. Such an improvement in the allocation of talent may prevail over the loss of skilled workers due to outmigration. However, we show that this result is not robust to the introduction of endogenous protection. If productive workers share their resources between accumulation of productive capital and investment in security, prospective migration may induce a weaker protection against rent-seeking, which in turn might depress average income in the source economy.     

Why is child labor illegal?

We present a theory of the emergence of laws restricting child labor or imposing mandatory education that is consistent with the fact that poor parents tend to oppose such laws. We find that if altruistic parents are unable to commit to educating their children, child-labor laws can increase the welfare of higher-income parents in an ex ante sense. On the basis of an empirical analysis of Latin-American household surveys, we demonstrate that per capita income in the country of residence has the predicted effect on child labor supply, even after controlling for other household characteristics.     

Financial liberalization,private investment and portfolio choice: Financialization of real sectors in emerging markets

Using firm level panel data, we analyze the impacts of rates of return gap between financial and fixed investments under uncertainty on real investment performance in three emerging markets, Argentina, Mexico and Turkey. Employing a portfolio choice model to explain the low fixed investment rates in developing countries during the 1990s, we suggest that rather than investing in irreversible long-term fixed investments, firms may choose to invest in reversible short-term financial investments depending on respective rates of returns and the overall uncertainty in the economy. The empirical results show that increasing rates of return gap and uncertainty have an economically and statistically significant fixed investment reducing effect while the opposite is true with respect to financial investments.     

The social economic impact of AIDS: Accounting for intergenerational transmission,productivity and fertility

In this paper we develop a model that aims to investigate the economic and demographic impacts of three effects of the HIV-AIDS epidemic in developing countries. The direct effect of the HIV epidemic is that it increases mortality and morbidity. The two indirect effects, resulting from the first, are the reduction in productivity of adults and the transmission of the disease to their offsprings. We allow these different effects to act either separately or together, and we investigate the marginal efficiency of health expenditures on the survival probability of individuals and demographics. The direct effect of the HIV virus is that it leads adults to increase their own health expenditure and to decrease that of their children. On the contrary, the transmission effect of the HIV virus leads parents to spend more on their children than on their own. We show that the reduction in productivity of young adults decreases health expenditures for themselves and their children. Furthermore, we find that the productivity effect dominates by large the two others. Moreover, when adults decide to have fewer children because of HIV, we show that the ratio of low to high skilled workers increases. This demographic impact impoverishes the economy in the short and medium run.     

Vertical integration and investor protection in developing countries

The industrial organization of developing countries is characterized by the pervasive use of subcontracting arrangements among small, financially constrained firms. This paper asks whether vertical integration relaxes those financial constraints. It shows that vertical integration trades off the benefits of joint liability against the costs of rendering the supply chain more opaque to external investors. In contrast to the commonly held view that pervasive input and capital market imperfections are conducive to vertical integration, the model predicts that the motives for vertical integration are not necessarily higher in developing countries. In particular, vertical integration is more likely to arise at intermediate levels of investor protection and better contract enforcement with suppliers reduces vertical integration only if financial markets are sufficiently developed. Evidence supporting both predictions is discussed.