A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?

The present study investigates theoretically the lending responses of government-owned and private banks in the event of unexpected financial shocks. Our model predicts that public banks provide more loans to the real sector during times of crisis, compared to private banks which cut down on lending and increase liquidity holdings. We put forth three reasons for this heterogeneous behavior. First, the objective of public banks, in contrast to their private peers, is not only to maximize profits given risks, but also to stabilize and promote the recovery of the economy. Second, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals or avoid a bank run in a severe crisis, because the state has better access to additional funds making a recapitalization more likely. And finally, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals due to their higher credibility in promising a future recapitalization in the case of a severe crisis.     

Federal Reserve financial crisis lending programs and bank stock returns

We use an E-GARCH model to estimate the wealth effects of Federal Reserve lending during the financial crisis to Investment banks (I-Banks), “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) banks, and “traditional” commercial banks. Borrowing from the Term Auction Facility program has negative wealth effects for all banks and I-banks in particular. We also find that the market view of the liquidity programs changed across the sample sub-periods. I-Bank and TBTF bank borrowing from the discount window is initially viewed positively, however continued use of the discount window and the Term Auction Facility was generally (though not universally) viewed negatively. Commercial Paper Funding Facility program participation is consistently positive only for traditional banks and programs that focus on the purchase of specific securities (e.g., commercial paper) to address specific problems also appear to primarily benefit traditional banks. The inconsistency of results across the time periods of the crisis is telling as market participants struggled to discern what access to these programs meant.     

Bank soundness and bank lending to new firms during the global financial crisis

This paper examines how the soundness of financial institutions affected bank lending to new firms during the 2008 financial crisis by using a unique firm–bank match‐level dataset of 1,467 unlisted small and medium‐sized enterprises incorporated in Japan. We employ a within‐firm estimator that can control for unobserved firms’ demand for credit through firm ? time fixed effects. The major findings of this paper are the following four points. First, sounder financial institutions may be generally less likely to provide financing to new firms. Second, our results suggest that sounder financial institutions were less likely to provide loans to new firms during the 2008 financial crisis. Third, financial institutions were less likely to provide financing to new firms during such crisis as compared to those with the same soundness during non‐crisis periods. Finally, such lending relationships to new firms that are established during the financial crisis by sounder financial institutions are more likely to be continued than such lending by less sound financial institutions.     

Government lending in a crisis

The economic disruption from the COVID-19 pandemic prompted governments around the world to initiate an unprecedented number of temporary lending and tax deferment programs. Which firms will benefit from these programs? What are the implications for firm balance sheets and post-crisis survival? We provide some novel insights on these questions by studying one of the first government programs of this type, which Sweden launched at the height of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. The Swedish program allowed firms to temporarily suspend payment of all labor-related taxes and fees, treating these deferred amounts as a short-term loan from the government. Firms participating in the program are younger, less profitable, hold fewer cash reserves, are more leveraged, and have less unused slack in their credit lines when the crisis hits. Given the structure of the Swedish program, it provided more liquidity to firms with relatively larger ex ante wage bills. Exploiting this feature of the policy, we find that firms use the program to increase overall debt levels rather than to substitute for other borrowing. The leverage increase is due entirely to higher levels of non-bank debt. Firms use the funds to avoid making even deeper cuts to current assets. Despite the increase in leverage, access to the lending program is unrelated to the likelihood a firm files for bankruptcy and is negatively related to the likelihood a firm encounters severe financial distress in the years immediately following the crisis.     

Anxious periods and bank lending

We examine the lending behavior of banks during anxious periods. The main characteristic of anxious periods is that the perceptions and expectations about economic conditions worsen for economic agents even though the economy is not in a recession. We identify distinct periods of anxiety for consumers, CEOs (firms) and analysts. Subsequently, we study the lending behavior of US banks during the anxious quarters from 1985 to 2010, using bank-level data. The results show that banks’ lending falls when consumers and analysts are anxious, and this effect is more pronounced when banks hold a higher level of credit risk. These effects are more pronounced in anxious periods that were followed by recessions, and in these periods loan growth also responds negatively to the anxiety of CEOs. Yet, these effects are quite less prevalent in the period after 2001.     

Liquidity regulation and bank lending

Bank liquidity shortages during the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 led to the introduction of liquidity regulations, the impact of which has attracted the attention of academics and policymakers. In this paper, we investigate the impact of liquidity regulation on bank lending. As a setting, we use the Netherlands, where a Liquidity Balance Rule (LBR) was introduced in 2003. The LBR was imposed on Dutch banks only and did not apply to other banks operating elsewhere within the Eurozone. Using this differential regulatory treatment to overcome identification concerns and a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the LBR increased the volume of lending by Dutch banks relative to other banks located in the Eurozone. Increased equity, an inflow of retail deposits and subsequent increase in balance sheet size allowed Dutch banks to increase lending despite having to meet the LBR requirements. The LBR also affected the loan composition of Dutch banks (with corporate and retail lending increasing more than mortgage lending) and the maturity profile of loan portfolios. Our results have relevance for policymakers tasked with monitoring the impact of liquidity regulations on banks and the real economy.     

Rescue packages and bank lending

This paper examines whether the rescue measures adopted during the global financial crisis helped to sustain the supply of bank lending. The analysis proposes a setup that allows testing for structural shifts in the bank lending equation, and employs a novel dataset covering large international banks headquartered in 14 major advanced economies for the period 1995–2010. While stronger capitalisation sustains loan growth in normal times, banks during a crisis can turn additional capital into greater lending only once their capitalisation exceeds a critical threshold. This suggests that recapitalisations may not translate into greater credit supply until bank balance sheets are sufficiently strengthened.     

Sentiment volatility and bank lending behavior

Using a panel of commercial, co-operative and savings banks from G7 countries, we investigate whether the changes in sentiment and its volatility affect banks' lending behavior. We show that the changes in economic agents' sentiment and its volatility affect bank lending negatively, while the impact sizes differ across indicators. We also examine volatility effects on banks' loan growth as uncertainty reaches excessive levels. We highlight the role that several bank-specific variables play on bank lending and discuss to what extent uncertainty effects are transmitted on credit growth through them.     

Climate transition risk and bank lending

We investigate whether and how banks in the global syndicated loan market adjusted the pricing and supply of credit to account for higher climate transition risk (CTR) in the years following the 2015 Paris Agreement. We measure CTR by considering the pollution levels of borrowers and the engagement of countries where borrowers are headquartered in addressing climate change issues. The evidence is mixed and points to nonlinear relations between lending variables and CO2 emissions. Policy events such as the Paris Agreement and government environmental awareness are significant climate risk drivers that, when combined, may amplify banks' perception of CTR.     

Capital ratios and bank lending: A matched bank approach

This paper examines the impact of bank capital ratios on bank lending by comparing differences in loan growth to differences in capital ratios at sets of banks that are matched based on geographic area as well as size and various business characteristics. We argue that such comparisons are most effective at controlling for local loan demand and other environmental factors. For comparison we also control for local factors using MSA fixed effects. We find, based on data from 2001 to 2011, that the relationship between capital ratios and bank lending was significant during and shortly following the recent financial crisis but not at other times. We find that the relationship between capital ratios and loan growth is stronger for banks where loans are contracting than where loans are expanding. We also show that the elasticity of bank lending with respect to capital ratios is higher when capital ratios are relatively low, suggesting that the effect of capital ratio on bank lending is nonlinear. In addition, we present findings on the relationship between bank capital and lending by bank size and loan type.     

民间借贷危机催生金融改革

愈演愈烈的民间借贷风波,严重影响到温州的经济和社会稳定,特别是温州中小企业主跑路和跳楼情况引起了高层关注3月28日,国务院总理温家宝主持召开国务院常务会议,决定设立温州市金融综合改革试验区。会议批准实施《浙江省温州市金融综合改革试验区总体方案》,要求通过体制机制创新,构建与经济社会发展相匹配的多元化金融体系,使金融服务明显改进,防范和化解金融风险能力明显增强,以切实解决温州经济发展存在的突出问题,引导民间融资规范发展。     

Predatory lending and the subprime crisis

We measure the effect of a 2006 antipredatory pilot program in Chicago on mortgage default rates to test whether predatory lending was a key element in fueling the subprime crisis. Under the program, risky borrowers or risky mortgage contracts or both triggered review sessions by housing counselors who shared their findings with the state regulator. The pilot program cut market activity in half, largely through the exit of lenders specializing in risky loans and through a decline in the share of subprime borrowers. Our results suggest that predatory lending practices contributed to high mortgage default rates among subprime borrowers, raising them by about a third.     

Changes in bank lending standards and the macroeconomy

Identifying macroeconomic effects of credit shocks is difficult because many of the same factors that influence the supply of loans also affect the demand for credit. Using bank-level responses to the Federal Reserve's Loan Officer Opinion Survey, we construct a new credit supply indicator: changes in lending standards, adjusted for the macroeconomic and bank-specific factors that also affect loan demand. Tightening shocks to this credit supply indicator lead to a substantial decline in output and the capacity of businesses and households to borrow from banks, as well as to a widening of credit spreads and an easing of monetary policy.     

Competition and geographical integration in commercial bank lending

This paper tests the hypothesis that interest rates on bank commercial loans in the regions of the United States are generated in an integrated national market. The tests — of a joint hypothesis compounded of integration, behavioral models, and the absence of systematic errors in the data — are applied to 60 series of data (short-term and long-term loans in five size classes in six regions). The joint hypothesis is not rejected for five of the six regions and four of the five size classes. The exceptional region is the Southeast; the exceptional loan-size class is $1,000 to $9,000, the smallest in the sample.     

Joint size and ownership specialization in bank lending

During the period 1996–2003 consolidation reduces the size diversity of Spanish banks but diversity in ownership forms increases as savings banks and cooperatives gain market share. This paper examines the implications of these structural changes in Spanish credit markets in terms of banks’ specialization (large or small borrowers, relational or transactional lending) and consequent credit availability for small and opaque firms. We find that size-of-the-borrower/size-of-the-bank specialization follows a different pattern in savings banks than in commercial banks, suggesting lower organizational diseconomies of size in the former than in the latter, which helps to explain the increase in ownership diversity over time. We also find that savings banks and cooperatives specialize relatively more in relational lending than commercial banks so ownership diversity assures funding for small firms even if bank consolidation continues.     

Political interference and crowding out in bank lending

I provide novel evidence on the real costs of political interference in bank lending. Analyzing staggered state elections in India, I show that politically motivated increased bank lending to farmers before elections crowds out lending to manufacturing firms. These lending distortions are larger where farmers have more political weight and where incumbents have more influence over banks. Reduced bank credit forces manufacturing firms to cut production and operate at lower factor utilization. I also provide evidence suggesting politically motivated increased agricultural lending before state elections contributed towards excessive indebtedness of farmers and a subsequent costly bailout in 2008.     

Switching costs and relationship profits in bank lending

This paper studies how the cost of switching banks affects the profits available from relationship based lending when the relationship produces inside information. Lower switching cost compounds the adverse selection problem, discouraging outsider banks to depress loan rates. The adverse selection effect eases off along with higher switching cost, leading to more aggressive bidding and thereby reduction in insider profits. Above a certain threshold, however, the adverse selection effect vanishes completely and the insider profits turn increasing in the switching cost. The model predicts that the availability of relationship credit is non-monotonously related to the magnitude of the switching cost.     

Applying portfolio theory to global bank lending

Portfolio theory provides some insights into how a bank should manage its global exposures. Practical application of some of the principles of portfolio analysis is possible if comparable credit ratings are available and if the impact on each loan's rating of likely future events can be assessed. If further restrictive assumptions are made about which quality dimensions of the portfolio are more important (and how much more important), and if judgements can be quantified about what risk-return tradeoffs are acceptable, then it is possible to derive measures to guide exposure and pricing decisions. This article is related to the other papers in this special issue in that country and corporate risk assessment methodologies can provide important inputs into the portfolio analysis. This paper, however, attempts to go beyond the evaluation of risk at the level of individual companies, countries, or other loan customers, and to focus instead on the problem of managing the riskiness of the overall bank loan portfolio.     

Does bank capital affect lending behavior?

This paper investigates the existence of cross-sectional differences in the response of lending to monetary policy and GDP shocks owing to differences in bank capitalization. It adds to the literature by using the excess capital-to-asset ratio, which can better control the riskiness of banks' portfolios, and by disentangling the effects of the “bank lending channel” from those of the “bank capital channel.” The results, based on a sample of Italian banks, indicate that bank capital matters in the propagation of different types of shocks to lending, owing to the existence of regulatory capital constraints and imperfections in the market for bank fund-raising.     

Evidence of a bank lending channel in the UK

Using balance sheet data for a panel of UK listed firms, we find evidence of a bank lending channel of monetary transmission. A higher interest rate induces more bank lending to listed companies, but this effect diminishes if monetary policy becomes tight enough to impose severe constraints on bank loan lending. The dynamic behaviour of bank debt versus non-bank debt shows that the lending channel works through cutting back loan supplies to small, bank-dependent firms while restricting the bank’s ability to provide financial assistance to other firms. We see cross-sectional differences between bank-dependent and non-bank-dependent listed companies, and between listed and non-listed companies: Both can contribute to the size effect of investment. Small firms bear most of the reductions in bank loan supplies, and since they do not have many alternatives to bank finance, they suffer more from monetary tightening than big firms. This is consistent with inventory behavior. Furthermore, we have found that big, non-bank-dependent firms can benefit more from the bank–firm relationship than small, bank-dependent firms.