Why government banks underperform: A political interference view

This study proposes a political interference hypothesis to explain how political considerations depress the performance of government banks. We define political interference as a situation in which government bank executives are replaced within 12 months after the country’s major elections (presidential or parliamentary elections). We classify political and non-political government banks as those that experience or do not experience political interference, respectively. The hypothesis firstly suggests that once government banks undertake political interference, their financial performance deteriorates. That is, political banks display the worst performance, followed by non-political banks and private banks have the best performance. Next, we posit that the impact of political interference is greater in developing countries than in developed countries. Finally, we hypothesize that the underperformance of government banks will be reduced if we remove political interference. By employing bank data from 65 countries from the period of 2003–2007, our hypothesis effectively explains why government banks in developed countries escape relatively unscathed, while those in developing countries suffer significantly.     

The Government’s Role in Government-owned Banks

In this study, we reinvestigate the question of whether government banks are inferior to private banks. We use cross country data from 1993 to 2007 to trace the different types of government banks. These types comprise banks that acquire distressed banks, normal banks, or no banks at all. Contrary to common belief, the evidence shows that unless government banks are required to purchase a distressed bank because of political factors (the government’s role), their performances are at par with that of private banks. This fact particularly holds true in countries with poor records on political rights and governance.     

市场模式、政府模式与城商行流动性风险化解—一个三期博弈的分析框架

分析城商行流动性风险化解中的政府手段和市场机制,对于下一步规范城商行营商环境、化解流动性风险具有参考意义。本文首先通过银行间的博弈模型,发现政府持股比例越高会增加城商行同业负债比例,进而提高流动性风险发生的可能性;当经济处于下行周期时,全社会资金需求不足,大型银行资金投放的机会成本降低,有利于城商行获得同业负债,但却进一步积累了流动性风险。其次,通过系统GMM对2011—2018年80家城商行的非平衡面板数据进行分析,实证结果验证了理论假说。最后,结合理论与实证分析,进一步提出政府行为边界,破除隐性担保,建立城商行资金内部定价机制以及完善城商行监管体系等方面的政策建议。     

Relationship-based debt financing of Chinese private sector firms: The role of social connections to banks versus political connections

We study whether a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it obtain loans. In China, Regulation No. 18 (announced in 2013) prohibits all high-level government officials from being independent directors of firms. As a result, many firms lost their political connections. We find that after firms lose their politically connected independent directors, firms having no social connections to banks experience, on average, a 12% decrease in the bank loan ratio relative to the median ratio; but those whose board chairs or CEOs are socially connected to local bank branch heads experience a 22% increase in the loan ratio relative to the median. However, this positive effect is short lived and thus not a new equilibrium. Overall, our findings support the hypothesis that a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it get bank financing.     

The Relation Between Bank Resolutions and Information Environment: Evidence from the Auctions for Failed Banks

This study examines the impact of disclosure requirements on the resolution costs of failed banks. Consistent with the hypothesis that disclosure requirements mitigate information asymmetries in the auctions for failed banks, I find that, when failed banks are subject to more comprehensive disclosure requirements, regulators incur lower costs of closing a bank and retain a lower portion of the failed bank's assets, while bidders that are geographically more distant are more likely to participate in the bidding for the failed bank. The paper provides new insights into the relation between disclosure and the reorganization of a banking system when the regulators' preferred plan of action is to promote the acquisition of undercapitalized banks by healthy ones. The results suggest that disclosure regulation policy influences the cost of resolution of a bank and, as a result, could be an important factor in the definition of the optimal resolution strategy during a banking crisis event.     

Does political pressure matter in bank lending? Evidence from China

Using provincial data from China between 2002 and 2011, we find substantial evidence indicating a positive association between the growth of bank loans issued by commercial banks and the political pressures faced by provincial leaders. This association is particularly true for state‐owned banks, which are much more politically pressurized than others, but is relatively attenuated in provinces with a more developed banking sector. We also find that bank loans issued under greater political pressures are less commercially oriented and have lower quality. Our findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity analyses and alternative measures of political pressure. Overall, our study contribute to a growing literature emphasizing the role of the political incentives of government officials in fuelling economic growth through credit allocation.     

Ownership structure and risk-taking: Comparative evidence from private and state-controlled banks in China

This study examines the impact of ownership structure on Chinese banks' risk-taking behaviours. We classify the Chinese commercial banks into three categories based on the types of controlling shareholder, and find that banks controlled by the government (GCBs) tend to take more risks than those controlled by state-owned enterprises (SOECBs) or private investors (PCBs). This is attributed to the severe political intervention and weak incentives to follow prudent bank management practices for GCBs. We also find that the results are more pronounced among banks with concentrated ownership presumably because the large controlling power helps to enhance the monitoring of the management and promotes prudent operating procedures. Our findings have important implications for the ongoing reform in the Chinese banking sector.     

Do different forms of government ownership matter for bank capital behavior? Evidence from China

This study attempts to reconcile the conflicting theoretical predictions regarding how government ownership affects bank capital behaviour. Using a unique Chinese bank dataset over 2006–2015 we find that government-owned banks have higher target capital ratios and adjust these ratios faster compared to private banks, supporting the ‘development/political’ view of the government’s role in banking. This effect is stronger for local government-owned and state enterprise-owned banks than for central government-owned banks. We also find that undercapitalized government-owned banks increase equity while undercapitalized foreign banks contract assets and liabilities as their respective main strategy to adjust their capital ratios.     

支持企业改制与维护金融债权的兼容性思考

国企在改制过程中逃废银行债务问题是社会普遍关心的难题 ,本文从理论上论证了支持企业改制与维护金融债权的统一性 ,并从经济学角度对企业改制逃废债行为进行了分析 ,认为逃废债是企业产权明晰化内在要求的必然体现 ,是企业权衡改制成本与收益后作出的一种利己选择 ,也是企业、银行、地方政府与中央政府多方博弈的结果。为此提出了实现二者兼容性的对策与思路。     

Depositor market discipline: New evidence from selling failed banks

This paper studies depositor behavior following the acquisition of failed banks by healthy banks in FDIC-supervised transactions. Using a US bank branch-based dataset spanning 2007 to 2014 we find that failed bank depositors discipline acquiring banks post-resolution. This appears to be related to features of the acquiring banks' asset quality and loan composition, but it may also be linked to irrational desciplinary behavior or post acquisition integration issues. We also find some evidence that depositor market discipline may have an impact on the competitive fetaures of local banking markets post resolution.     

Political monetary cycles and a de facto ranking of central bank independence

Political monetary cycles are less likely to occur in countries with independent central banks. Independent central banks can withstand political pressure to stimulate the economy before elections or finance election-related increases in government spending. Based on this logic and supporting evidence, we construct a de facto ranking of central bank independence derived from the extent to which monetary policy varies with the electoral cycle. The ranking avoids well-known problems with existing measures of central bank independence and provides independent information about average inflation and inflation volatility differences across countries.     

Bank privatization in developing and developed countries: Cross-sectional evidence on the impact of economic and political factors

We examine how political, institutional, and economic factors are related to a country’s decision to privatize state-owned banks. Using a panel of 101 countries from 1982 to 2000, we find that political factors significantly affect the likelihood of bank privatization only in developing countries. Specifically, in non-OECD countries, bank privatization is more likely the more accountable the government is to its people. In contrast, none of our political variables affects the bank privatization decision in developed countries. Economic factors (such as the quality of the nation’s banking sector) are significant determinants of bank privatization in both OECD and non-OECD nations.     

Political institutions and bank risk-taking behavior

This paper examines the impact of political institutions on bank risk-taking behavior. Using an international sample of banks from 98 countries over the period 1998–2007, I document that sound political institutions stimulate higher bank risk-taking. This is consistent with the hypotheses that better political institutions increase banks’ risk by boosting the credit market competition from alternative sources of finance and generating the moral hazard problems due to the expectation of government bailouts in worst economic conditions. While it is contrary to the hypotheses that better political institutions decrease banks’ risk by lowering the government expropriation risk and the information asymmetries between banks and borrowers. The results are robust to a number of sensitivity tests, including alternative proxies of bank risk-taking and political institutions, cross-sectional bank- and country-level regressions, endogeneity concerns of political institutions, country income levels, explicit deposit insurance schemes and sample extension from 1998 to 2014. I also examine the interdependence between political and legal institutions and find that political and legal institutions complement each other to influence bank risk-taking behavior.     

Is there a bright side to government banks? Evidence from the global financial crisis

Using a sample of banks from 56 countries, this paper investigates the lending behavior of government banks during the crisis of 2008, and its association with bank performance and the economy. Contrary to the traditional wisdom, we find that government banks can play a beneficial role under certain circumstances. Government banks have higher loan growth rates than private banks during the crisis. In countries with low corruption, the increased lending by government banks is associated with better bank performance and more favorable GDP and employment growth in the crisis period. In contrast, the results for countries with high corruption are more consistent with the political view: the increased lending by government banks is associated with underperformance relative to private banks, and creates no beneficial effects on either GDP growth or employment.     

Bank political connections and performance in China

We examine the effects of bank’s political connection on bank performance and risk in China. We use hand-collected information on CEOs’ professional background to identify their political affiliations, and find that banks whose CEOs have former government experiences have higher return on assets, lower default risk, and lower credit risk. Additionally, politically connected banks have disproportionally higher performance when the CEOs previous worked in the same city where the current bank’s headquarter locates, had past banking experiences, spend more on entertainment and travel costs, and have higher previous administrative rankings (e.g., at the provincial or state level). These results suggest that politically connected banks have better access to lending to politically connected firms, which are high yield assets and more likely to be bailed out when in distress. Our results offer a mechanism of political rent seeking, consistent with the institutional environment of China’s banking and political system.     

Systemic Bank Risk in Brazil: A Comprehensive Simulation of Correlated Market, Credit, Sovereign and Inter-Bank Risks

In this study we present a comprehensive forward‐looking portfolio simulation methodology for assessing the correlated impacts of market risk, private sector and Sovereign credit risk, and inter‐bank default risk. In order to produce better integrated risk assessment for banks and systemic risk assessments for financial systems, we argue that reasonably detailed modeling of bank asset and liability structures, loan portfolio credit quality, and loan concentrations by sector, region and type, as well as a number of financial and economic environment risk drivers, is required. Sovereign and inter‐bank default risks are increasingly important in the current economic environment and their inclusion is an important model extension. This extended model is demonstrated through an application to both individual Brazilian banks (i.e., 28 of the largest banks) and groups of banks (i.e., the Brazilian banking system) as of December 2004. When omitting Sovereign risk, our analysis indicates that none of the banks face significant default risk over a 1‐year horizon. This low default risk stems primarily from the large amount of government securities held by Brazilian banks, but also reflects the banks' adequate capitalizations and extraordinarily high interest rate spreads. We note that none of the banks which we modeled failed during the very stressful 2007‐2008 period, consistent with our results. Our results also show that a commonly used approach of aggregating all banks into one single bank, for purposes of undertaking a systemic banking system risk assessment, results in a misestimate of both the probability and the cost of systemic banking system failures. Once Sovereign risk is considered and losses in the market value of government securities reach 10% (or higher), we find that several banks could fail during the same time period. These results demonstrate the well known risk of concentrated lending to a borrower, or type of borrower, which has a non‐zero probability of default (e.g., the Government of Brazil). Our analysis also indicates that, in the event of a Sovereign default, the Government of Brazil would face constrained debt management alternatives. To the best of our knowledge no one else has put forward a systematic methodology for assessing bank asset, liability, loan portfolio structure and correlated market and credit (private sector, Sovereign, and inter‐bank) default risk for banks and banking systems. We conclude that such forward‐looking risk assessment methodologies for assessing multiple correlated risks, combined with the targeted collection of specific types of data on bank portfolios, have the potential to better quantify overall bank and banking system risk levels, which can assist bank management, bank regulators, Sovereigns, rating agencies, and investors to make better informed and proactive risk management and investment decisions.     

How can we effectively resolve the financial crisis: Empirical evidence on the bank rehabilitation plan of the Japanese government

When the Japanese economy experienced a serious financial crisis in the late 1990s, the government attempted to promptly resolve this crisis by injecting public funds into bank capital, requiring these banks to compose and implement a rehabilitation plan. This paper empirically investigates whether this plan (the Business Revitalization Plan) worked effectively, emphasizing the inconsistency between strengthening the soundness of the banking industry (preventing bank failures) and expanding credit supply (improving macroeconomy). We present empirical evidence on this inconsistency and argue that the government failed to promptly resolve the serious financial crisis in Japan due to this reason.     

地方政府财政压力与银行信贷资源配置效率--基于我国城市商业银行的研究证据北大核心

基于2005-2015年我国城市商业银行的样本,本文研究省级地方政府财政压力是否对商业银行信贷资金投向和信贷资源配置效率产生影响。研究发现,地方政府财政压力是影响城市商业银行信贷资源配置的重要因素。具体而言,省级地方政府的财政压力越大,省内城市商业银行投向地方国有经济部门的贷款比率越高。然而,信贷资源更多投向地方国有经济部门的银行有更高的不良贷款率和更差的会计业绩。进一步研究发现,在财政压力大的省份,城市商业银行投向地方国有经济部门的贷款比率越高,则贷款拨备率越低,这表明城市商业银行会通过盈余管理行为来应对监管压力。本文研究结论对商业银行监管以及防范化解金融风险有重要启示。     

The impact of government ownership on bank risk

We use cross-country data on a sample of large European banks to evaluate the impact of government ownership on bank risk. We distinguish between default risk (likelihood of creditors’ losses) and operating risk (likelihood of negative equity). Our analysis is based on the joint use of issuer ratings, a synthetic measure of a bank’s probability of default, and individual ratings, which omit the influence of any external support and focus on a bank’s operating risk. We report two main results. First, government-owned banks (GOBs) have lower default risk but higher operating risk than private banks, indicating the presence of governmental protection that induces higher risk taking. Second, GOBs’ operating risk and governmental protection tend to increase in election years. These results are consistent with the idea that GOBs pursue political goals and have important policy implications for recently nationalized European banks.     

Selling Failed Banks

The average FDIC loss from selling a failed bank is 28% of assets. We document that failed banks are predominantly sold to bidders within the same county, with similar assets business lines, when these bidders are well capitalized. Otherwise, they are acquired by less similar banks located further away. We interpret these facts within a model of auctions with budget constraints, in which poor capitalization of some potential acquirers drives a wedge between their willingness and ability to pay for failed banks. We document that this wedge drives misallocation, and partially explains the FDIC losses from failed bank sales.