Aktienanlage für Lebensversicherer unter Solvency II

Life insurance companies are among the largest institutional investors. As part of their investment policy they are subject to special legal requirements. In particular the calculation of the solvency capital that has to be deposited for the market risk has changed under Solvency II. A widely spread thesis on this topic is that investments in equity have become unprofitable for life insurers due to solvency capital requirements – compared to previous periods of high equity ratios of temporally over 25%. Therefore insurers might have dropped their average stock quotas to below 5%.The intention of the present study is to analyze whether the capital requirements for the equity investments under Solvency II are a hurdle to achieve a reasonable profitability or – opposite to that – whether the equity investments are a suitable investment to provide an acceptable return on assets. For this purpose the solvency capital requirements of the equity investment under Solvency I considering the BaFin stress test are compared with the new solvency capital requirements under Solvency II including the symmetric adjustment factor (SA). Furthermore the diversification effects are taken into account; they are analyzed on the basis of the SFCR reports of the life insurance companies first published in 2017. As a result the risk capital requirements for equity investments under Solvency II have been reduced to more than 50% compared to prior solvency requirements and depending on the observed scenarios. Whilst Solvency I required an underlying risk capital of 31% at the end of 2017, Solvency II requires only 13.56% following the standard model and after aggregating the risk-mitigating effects in the group scenario. This effect results in a surplus of 7.2%, considering industry-standard capital costs for the underlying solvency capital and an average stock market return of 8% per annum. Consequently the equity investment is suitable to increase the profitability of the investments of German life insurance companies especially in the environment of low interest rates in the capital market for fixed income titles.     

The role of rating agency assessments in less developed countries: Impact of the proposed Basel guidelines

We assess the potential impact for non-high-income countries (NHICs) of linking bank capital asset requirements (CARs) to private sector ratings–as contemplated by the new Basel proposal. Specifically, we show that linking bank CARs to external ratings would have a series of undesirable effects for NHICs. First, since ratings are by far less widespread for banks and corporations in NHICs, bank CARs would be practically insensitive to improvements in the quality of assets, widening the gap between banks of equal financial strength located in higher and lower income countries. Second, bank and corporate ratings in NHICs (as opposed to their homologues in high-income countries) are strongly linked to their sovereign ratings. This would expose bank capital requirements in NHICs to the same “pro-cyclical” swings, which have characterized sovereign rating revision in the recent crisis episodes. We conclude that linking bank CARs to private sector ratings would worsen the availability and cost of credit to NHICs – with potential negative effects on the level of economic activity – and suggest that a reassessment of the Basel proposal may help to avoid such undesired consequences.     

When do banks take equity in debt restructurings?

This article examines the conditions under which bank lendersmake concessions by taking equity in financially distressedfirms. I show that the role banks play in debt restructuringsdepends on the financial condition of the firm, the existenceof public debt in the firm's capital structure and the abilityof public debt to be restructured. Empirically, I find thatfor firms with public debt outstanding, banks never make concessionsunless public debtholders also restructure their claims. Whenbanks do take equity, on average they obtain a substantial proportionof the firm's stock, and they maintain their position for overtwo years.     

How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too‐Big‐to‐Fail Problem*

As bank regulatory reform tries to come to grips with the lessons of the financial crisis, several experts have proposed that some form of contingent convertible debt (CoCo) requirement be added to the prudential regulatory toolkit. In this article, the authors show how properly designed CoCos can be used not just to absorb losses, but more importantly to encourage banks to recognize losses and replace lost equity in a timely way, as well as to manage risk more effectively. Their proposed CoCos requirement strengthens management's incentives to promptly replace lost capital and enhance risk management by imposing major costs on the managers and existing shareholders of banks that fail to do so. Key elements of the proposal are that conversion of the CoCos into equity would be (1) triggered at a high trigger ratio of equity to assets (long before the bank is near an insolvency point), (2) determined by a market trigger (using a 90‐day moving average market equity ratio) rather than by supervisory discretion, and (3) significantly dilutive to shareholders. The only clear way for bank managements to avoid such dilution would be to issue equity into the market. Under most circumstances—barring an extremely rapid plunge of a bank's financial condition—management should be able and eager to replace lost capital in a timely way; as a result, dilutive conversions should almost never occur. Banks would face strong incentives to maintain high ratios of true economic capital relative to risky assets, and to manage their risks effectively. This implies that “too‐big‐to‐fail” financial institutions would not be permitted to approach the point of insolvency; they would face strong incentives to recapitalize long before that point. And if they should fail to issue new equity in a timely manner, the CoCos conversion would provide an alternative means of recapitalizing banks well before they reach the brink of insolvency. Thus, a CoCos requirement would go a long way to resolving the “too‐big‐to‐fail” problem. Such a CoCos requirement would not only increase the effectiveness of regulation, but also reduce its cost. It would be less costly for banks to raise CoCos than equity, reflecting both the lower adverseselection costs of CoCos issuance and the potential tax advantages of debt. And precisely because of the low probability of CoCo conversion, the Cocos would be issued at relatively modest (if any) discounts to otherwise comparable but straight subordinated debt. Thus requiring a mix of equity and appropriately designed CoCos would be less costly to banks, and would entail less of a reduction in the supply of loans than would a much higher book equity requirement alone.     

The macroeconomic impact of bank capital requirements in emerging economies: Past evidence to assess the future

We test for emerging economies the hypothesis – previously verified for G-10 countries only – that the enforcement of bank capital asset requirements (CARs) curtails the supply of credit. The econometric analysis on individual bank data suggests three main results. First, CAR enforcement significantly trimmed credit supply, particularly at less-well capitalized banks. Second, the negative impact has been larger for countries enforcing CARs in the aftermath of a currency/financial crisis. Third, the adverse impact of CARs has been somewhat smaller for foreign-owned banks, suggesting that opening up to foreign investors may have partly shielded the domestic banking sector from negative shocks. Overall, CAR enforcement – inducing banks to reduce their lending – may have had both beneficial and detrimental effects. On one hand, it may have reduced ill-advised lending – possibly induced by banks' exploitation of the public safety net – and this is desirable. On the other hand, CAR enforcement may have induced an aggregate credit slowdown or contraction in the examined emerging countries, thus exacerbating liquidity constraints and negatively affecting real activity. This paper is relevant to the ongoing debate on the impact of the revision of bank CARs, as contemplated by the new Basel proposal. Our results suggest that in several emerging economies the revision of bank CARs could well induce a credit supply retrenchment, which should not be underestimated.     

Does the market discipline banks? New evidence from regulatory capital mix

While bank capital requirements permit a bank to freely substitute between equity and subordinated debt, lenders and investors view debt and equity as imperfect substitutes. It follows that, after controlling for the level of regulatory capital, the mix of debt in capital isolates the role that the market plays in disciplining banks. I document that the mix of debt in capital affects bank behavior, but only when investors can impose real constraints. In particular, the mix of debt reduces the probability of failure and future distress for BHC-affiliated institutions (where the investor has control rights through an equity position) and for stand-alone banks before the Basel Accord (when debt issues included restrictive covenants). However, substituting equity for subordinated debt at the bank holding company level or in stand-alone banks since the Basel Accord (where the investor has few protections) only increases the probability of distress and failure.     

Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable: Bank Capital as a Substitute for Prudential Regulation

The Financial CHOICE Act recently passed by the House proposes to create an “off‐ramp” that would allow banks to escape burdensome prudential regulation if the ratio of their equity capital to their total assets is 10% or more. The Financial Economists Roundtable supports this idea as a means of reducing regulatory costs, but believes some additional safeguards are needed. A capital ratio of 10% may not be high enough to discourage banks from excessive risk taking. A solution is to have two capital requirements for banks choosing the off‐ramp: one absolute (as proposed in the act) and one risk‐based. The FER believes that many banks will prefer this regime to the current burdensome prudential regulation, especially if regulators simplify the setting of risk weights and make them more rule‐based. Regulators setting minimum capital requirements should consider not only a bank’s stand‐alone risk, but also the systemic risk posed by banks, as well as the tendency of accounting measures of income and assets to overstate the economic value of banks’ equity capital. The Financial Choice Act would also eliminate useful elements of ongoing supervision and regulation, not all of which can be addressed by higher capital alone. Furthermore, to facilitate regulatory learning about risks, off‐ramped banks should continue to report the data that regulators use for stress tests, even if they are no longer subjected to the discipline of stress tests. Finally, the act is viewed as too permissive in its treatment of off‐ramped banks that get into trouble. To prevent gaming of regulation, FERC recommends that off‐ramped banks that subsequently fall below the minimum requirements should be required to raise new capital immediately.     

Extending the Basel II approach to estimate capital requirements for equity investments

Under the Basel II banking regulatory capital regime the capital requirements for credit exposures are calculated using the Asymptotic Single Risk Factor (ASRF) approach. The capital requirement is taken to be the contribution of an exposure to the unexpected loss on the bank’s diversified portfolio. Here we extend this approach to calculate capital requirements for equity investments. We show that in the case when asset values have a normal distribution an analytical formula for the unexpected loss contribution may be developed. We show that the capital requirements for equity investments are quite different to those of credit exposures, since equity investments can suffer substantial loss of value even when the underlying company has not defaulted.     

Cash-flow shortage as an endogenous bankruptcy reason

This paper develops a simple model for a leveraged firm and endogenizes the firm’s bankruptcy point by assuming that equity issuance is costly. Equity-issuance costs reflect the difficulties in issuing new equity for firms that are close to financial distress. The resulting model captures cash-flow shortage as a reason to go bankrupt, though the equity value is positive. I analyze the optimal bankruptcy point as well as corporate bond prices and yield spreads for various levels of equity-issuance costs in order to study the impact of different liquidity constraints. Finally, I discuss the consequences on optimal capital structure.     

区域性股权市场服务小微企业的实践与探索

区域性股权市场作为我国多层次资本市场的重要组成部分,可以为中小微企业提供以股权融资为核心的综合金融服务,为地方政府扶持中小微企业政策提供平台,在服务地方中小微企业方面发挥着不可或缺的作用。近十年来,各区域性股权市场已在拓宽融资渠道、促进改制升级、支持科创企业发展、服务基层金融工程、协助政策实施等方面积累了丰富的实践经验。后续仍应通过政策引导和制度创新,充分发挥区域性股权市场的功能作用,畅通其与更高层次资本市场间的有机联系机制,适时启动改革创新试点,并营造良好的市场发展环境,多措并举推动区域性股权市场不断走向成熟和完善,为小微企业发展和经济转型升级做出更大贡献。     

The Mismatch Between Mutual Fund Scale and Skill

I demonstrate that skill and scale are mismatched among actively managed equity mutual funds. Many mutual fund investors confuse the effects of fund exposures to common systematic factors with managerial skill when allocating capital among funds. Active mutual funds with positive factor-related past returns thus accumulate assets to the point that they significantly underperform. I also show that the negative aggregate benchmark-adjusted performance of active equity mutual funds is driven mainly by these oversized funds.     

The Role of Private Equity in Life Sciences

In a roundtable published in this journal a year ago, there was a clear consensus that the R&D function in big pharma was inefficient and in need of major restructuring, possibly through increased investments by venture capital and private equity firms. In this discussion, an accomplished group of industry practitioners begins by looking at the prospects for both venture capital and private equity to play meaningful roles in financing early- and mid-stage drug development. In so doing, they explore questions like the following:

• • Are there ways for big pharma and biotech to reduce “science risk” and make R&D funding more profitable and attractive to venture capital and private equity—and perhaps even hedge funds?
• • What roles do you see for specialty PE firms like Symphony Capital and Paul Capital, which are now bundling mid-stage development assets and securitizing royalties?

Then the panelists turn to the broader life sciences industry and consider the outlook for leveraged private equity transactions involving marketed products, late-stage development, and services. Here they consider issues like the following:

• • Will PE be attracted to less-R&D-intensive activities like medtech and generics?
• • Have the recent consolidation through mergers and reorganization of big pharma into decentralized business units created opportunities for carve-outs of certain businesses?

For big pharma and life sciences companies in general, the answers to such questions point to greater specialization and focus achieved partly through strategic alliances with venture capital, private equity, and even hedge funds, and involving marketed products and services as well as early-stage drug development.     

Aligning Incentives at Systemically Important Financial Institutions: A Proposal by the Squam Lake Group

To address the moral hazard problem that can motivate bank executives to take excessive risks and to fail to raise capital when needed, a group of 13 distinguished financial economists recommends that systemically important financial institutions be required to issue contingent convertible debt (CoCos) and to hold back a substantial share—as much as 20%—of the compensation of employees who can have a meaningful impact on the survival of the firm. This holdback should be forfeited if the firm's capital ratio falls below a specified threshold. The deferral period should be long enough—the authors suggest five years—to allow much of the uncertainty about managers' activities to be resolved before the bonds mature. Except for forfeiture, the payoff on the bonds should not depend on the firm's performance, nor should managers be permitted to hedge the risk of forfeiture. The threshold for forfeiture should be crossed well before a firm violates its regulatory capital requirements and well before its contingent convertible securities convert into equity. The Swiss Bank UBS has paid bonuses to its top 6,500 executives that have been structured in exactly this way. Management forfeits its deferred compensation if the bank's regulatory capital ratio falls below 7.5%, and its contingent convertible debt is set up to convert into equity if the bank's capital ratio falls below 5%.     

人力资本及其对应人力资源的确认与计量问题研究

企业按照契约约定授予人力资源拥有者以权益性工具,才是会计确认人力资本的基本依据;对因授予人力资源拥有者以股票而确认的人力资本,应记入"股本"账户,对因授予人力资源拥有者以股票期权而确认的人力资本,应记入"资本公积"账户;与人力资本对应的人力资源,在收到时就是资产,但因不能储存而不应确认为资产,应立即确认为成本或费用;作为所授予权益性工具之对价的人力资源,应按相应权益性工具的公允价值计量,并以此计量相应的人力资本。     

Cyclical adjustment of capital requirements: A simple framework

We present a model of an economy with heterogeneous banks that may be funded with uninsured deposits and equity capital. Capital serves to ameliorate a moral hazard problem in the choice of risk. There is a fixed aggregate supply of bank capital, so the cost of capital is endogenous. A regulator sets risk-sensitive capital requirements in order to maximize a social welfare function that incorporates a social cost of bank failure. We consider the effect of a negative shock to the supply of bank capital and show that optimal capital requirements should be lowered. Failure to do so would keep banks safer but produce a large reduction in aggregate investment. The result provides a rationale for the cyclical adjustment of risk-sensitive capital requirements.     

Private equity and regulatory capital

Regulatory capital requirements for European banks have been put forward in the Basel II Capital Framework and subsequently in the capital requirements directive (CRD) of the EU. We provide a detailed discussion of the capital requirements for private equity investments under different approaches. For the internal model approach we present a structural model that we calibrate to a proprietary dataset. We modify the standard Merton structural model to make it applicable in practice and to capture stylized facts of private equity investments. We also implement the early default feature with a fast simulation algorithm. Our results support capital requirements lower than in Basel II, but not as low as in CRD, thereby giving adverse incentives to banks for using advanced risk models. A sensitivity analysis shows that this finding is robust to parameter uncertainty and stress scenarios.     

资本成本、可持续增长与国有企业分红比例估算——模型构建及检验

本文以股利理论、资本成本理论与可持续增长理论分析为基础,构建了国有企业可持续分红比例估算模型,并进行了检验和分析。检验结果表明,国有企业在样本期间股东权益报酬率(即留存收益再投资收益率)总体能够满足国有股东必要报酬率(即股权资本成本)的要求,适度留存利润将有利于国有企业的价值创造。文章建议,国有企业应努力提高自身的盈利能力、营运能力,并保持合理的资本结构,在应对和处置市场风险方面发挥积极作用,从而在兼顾国有股权资本成本和可持续增长的基础上制定科学的分红政策。     

The impact of SEC investigations and accounting and auditing enforcement releases on firms’ cost of equity capital

I study the impact of an SEC investigation (as captured by accounting and auditing enforcement releases) on a firm’s cost of equity capital. AAERs are often used in accounting literature as a proxy for fraudulent financial reporting. Fraudulent financial reporting should lead to an increase in cost of equity capital as a firm’s future cash flows become less certain. Overall, this study provides evidence of changes in cost of equity capital for firms targeted by an SEC AAER on the date the investigation is first made public.     

Riding the waves of technology through the decades: The relation between industry-level information technology intensity and the cost of equity capital

This paper examines the effect that information technology (IT) investments have on the industry cost of equity capital. We find that industry IT intensity, defined as the relative amount of IT investment to total fixed asset expenditures, is negatively related to the industry cost of equity capital. These results indicate that industries with higher levels of IT investment have lower cost of equity capital. We also find that the relation between IT intensity and cost of equity capital changes over time. Initially, investors viewed IT investments as risky ventures and demanded higher levels of cost of equity (or higher return on their investment) for those industries investing in IT. However, beginning in the 1980s, as IT became more reliable, more cost effective, and had the ability to transform businesses, investors viewed IT Intensity as a positive business strategy with less associated risks and reduced their required cost of equity capital (or lower return on their investment). Extrapolating from our industry results, IT investments allow firms to potentially raise capital at a lower price so they have more assets to employ, indicating that IT investments can be a key factor for business success.     

Theories of bank behavior under capital regulation

This paper reviews academic studies of bank capital regulation in an effort to evaluate the intellectual foundation for the imposition of the Basel I and Basel II systems of risk-based capital requirements. The theoretical literature yields general agreement about the immediate effects of capital requirements on bank lending and loan rates and the longer-term impacts on bank ratios of equity to total or risk-adjusted assets. This literature produces highly mixed predictions, however, regarding the effects of capital regulation on asset risk and overall safety and soundness for the banking system as a whole. Thus, the intellectual foundation for the present capital-regulation regime is not particularly strong. The mixed conclusions in the academic literature on banking certainly do not provide unqualified support for moving to an even more stringent and costly system of capital requirements. These widely ambiguous results do suggest, however, that assessing the implications of capital regulation for balance-sheet risk and monitoring effort in diverse banking systems is an important agenda for future theoretical research in the banking area.