Does stable ownership create value? Evidence from the global financial crisis

We investigate the value of stable ownership for a sample of European firms using the global financial crisis as an exogenous shock and pre-and post-crisis years as benchmark periods. Consistent with the argument that stable ownership allows managers to focus on the creation of long-term value, we find that stable ownership resulted in higher stock returns and a higher market-to-book ratio during the crisis. This positive effect of stable ownership was not reversed after the crisis. Stable institutional blockholdings were more valuable in countries with weaker investor protection. However, the positive effect does not apply to firms in which a family is the largest blockholder. Finally, we also find that ownership stability was associated with a higher level of investments, illustrating that stable ownership affects real corporate decisions.

     

Do investors affect financial analysts’ behavior? Evidence from short sellers

We examine how short sellers affect financial analysts’ forecast behavior using a natural experiment that relaxes short-sale constraints. We find that increased ease of short selling improves analyst earnings forecast quality by reducing forecast bias and increasing forecast accuracy. The improvements can be explained by both the disciplining pressure from short sellers and increased price efficiency from incorporating information in a timely manner. Although it is well documented that financial analysts can affect investors, our paper provides novel evidence on how sophisticated investors, short sellers, can affect analysts.     

Can SRI funds better resist global financial crisis? Evidence from Japan

This paper compared Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds and conventional funds in the Japanese market with respect to the impact of the global financial crisis in 2008. Taking the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as a particular event, we estimated the average cumulative abnormal returns of both funds by event study methodology using a Fama–French three-factor model and EGARCH model. Our results suggest that SRI funds better resisted the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers than conventional funds. We also found that this result can be attributed to the existence of international funds, possibly because investors might evaluate the CSR activities of international firms more than those of domestic firms. Alternatively, it can be interpreted that the universe of domestic SRI funds is too limited to enjoy risk diversification.     

Is there a bright side to government banks? Evidence from the global financial crisis

Using a sample of banks from 56 countries, this paper investigates the lending behavior of government banks during the crisis of 2008, and its association with bank performance and the economy. Contrary to the traditional wisdom, we find that government banks can play a beneficial role under certain circumstances. Government banks have higher loan growth rates than private banks during the crisis. In countries with low corruption, the increased lending by government banks is associated with better bank performance and more favorable GDP and employment growth in the crisis period. In contrast, the results for countries with high corruption are more consistent with the political view: the increased lending by government banks is associated with underperformance relative to private banks, and creates no beneficial effects on either GDP growth or employment.     

Do small businesses adjust their capital structure? Evidence from the global financial crisis in Japan

We investigate the extent to which small businesses adjust their capital structures to target levels when their leverage increases substantially during a financial crisis. We examine Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee (ECG) program during the 2008 global financial crisis. The increased leverage from the use of the ECG program during the crisis increased the probability of default. Additionally, small businesses adjusted their leverage ratios to the target range before the crisis. However, such adjustments were weak during and after the crisis, particularly for target firms in the ECG program.     

Did the banking sector foresee the financial crisis? Evidence from risk factor disclosures

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Beginning in December 2005, the SEC required registrants to discuss “the most significant factors that make the company risky” under the...     

Are two heads better than one? Evidence from the thrift crisis

We employ a natural experiment from the 1980s, predating the ubiquitous clamor for independence influenced corporate governance structures, to examine which governance mechanisms are associated with firm survival and failure. We find that thrifts were more likely to survive the thrift crisis when their CEO also chaired the firm’s board of directors. On average, chair-holding CEOs undertook less aggressive lending policies than their counterparts who did not chair their boards. Consequently, taxpayer interests were protected by thrifts that bestowed both leadership posts to one person. This is an important policy issue, because taxpayers become the residual claimants for depository institutions that fail as a result of managers adopting risky strategies to exploit underpriced deposit insurance. Our findings corroborate recent evidence that manager-dominated firms resist shareholder pressure to adopt riskier investment strategies to exploit underpriced deposit insurance.     

Do institutions prevent contagion in financial markets? Evidence from the European debt crisis

ABSTRACT

The recent European Sovereign Debt Crisis brought in attention a number of structural problems in the European Union. Part of the effort to correct these problems in the countries that were mostly affected by the crisis were a number of policy responses from the European Union, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Local Governments. In this study, we attempt to assess the success of these responses to constrain the contagion of the crisis from the banking sector to the real economy sectors of the Eurozone countries. Our results show that policy announcements from the EU/ECB/IMF affect the transmission of shocks generated in the banking sector to the market. Moreover, policy responses of the national governments also seem to play a role in the contagion of the crisis.     

Has the global financial crisis produced a New World Order?

Described by Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, as the worst financial crisis in global history, the economic impact of the global financial crisis would have been much worse had it not been for Asia (excluding Japan). In broad terms, the crisis has accelerated the secular emergence of Asia, whereas the US recovery is weak by historical standards and problems in Europe continue. What accounts for this two-tier pattern of world growth? Does this juxtaposition signal a permanent re-ordering of world business - in other words, a New World Order?     

What explains global exchange rate movements during the financial crisis?

A striking and unexpected feature of the financial crisis has been the sharp appreciation of the US dollar against virtually all currencies globally. The paper finds that negative US-specific macroeconomic shocks during the crisis have triggered a significant strengthening of the US dollar, rather than a weakening. Macroeconomic fundamentals and financial exposure of individual countries are found to have played a key role in the transmission process of US shocks: in particular countries with low FX reserves, weak current account positions and high direct financial exposure vis-à-vis the United States have experienced substantially larger currency depreciations during the crisis overall, and to US shocks in particular.     

Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide

This paper investigates the influence of corporate governance on financial firms' performance during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Using a unique dataset of 296 financial firms from 30 countries that were at the center of the crisis, we find that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period. Further exploration suggests that this is because (1) firms with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis, which resulted in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period, and (2) firms with more independent boards raised more equity capital during the crisis, which led to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debtholders. Overall, our findings add to the literature by examining the corporate governance determinants of financial firms' performance during the 2007–2008 crisis.     

Should investors invest in hedge fund-like mutual funds? Evidence from the 2007 financial crisis

This study empirically examines the value added for investors during the 2007–2009 financial crisis from hedge fund-like equity mutual funds, including 130/30, market neutral, and long/short equity funds. We find that based on the information ratio, all market neutral funds, top 90% of long/short funds, and top 25% of 130/30 funds outperform a long-only passive index fund over the crisis period. However, we find little evidence of abnormal performance by the average and median funds in our sample, based on either unconditional or conditional four-factor alphas. The reason for the overall under-performance in the crisis period is that while short positions taken by these funds do generate alpha, the gain from their short positions is not sufficiently large to offset the loss from their long positions. Finally, the abnormal performance of short positions is found to be attributable to managers’ characteristic-adjusted and industry-adjusted stock selection skills. One implication of this study is that even though market neutral and long/short funds on average may not generate alpha, investors can benefit from holding these funds, especially the former, that can provide a hedge against down markets due to their low betas and that can be useful for asset allocation.     

Are short sellers incrementally informed prior to earnings announcements?

Contrary to the hypothesis that informed short sellers increase their positions prior to earnings announcements, we find that short activity declines in the pre-announcement period compared with activity in non-announcement time. This statistically significant, but economically modest, decline may suggest that the fraction of informed short sellers actually increases if (as Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) suggest) the uncertainty around earnings announcements increases short selling costs and causes uninformed short sellers to withdraw from the market. While we find a statistically and economically significant inverse relation between pre-announcement short activity and announcement period returns, when we control for the non-announcement ability of short sellers to predict future returns documented by Diether et al. (2009), the significance of the relation between pre-announcement short activity and announcement period returns vanishes. Thus, we infer that short sellers are not incrementally informed prior to earnings announcements.     

Are safe haven assets really safe during the 2008 global financial crisis and COVID-19 pandemic?

This study evaluates the safe-haven role of twelve assets against the US stock market during the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) and the COVID-19 pandemic. Our results show that silver and the Islamic stock index were safe havens during the 2008 GFC, and the Islamic stock index and Tether have been safe havens during COVID-19. We observe that the Islamic stock index and Tether have emerged as strong new safe havens. However, our supplementary analysis reveals that gold and Bitcoin still exhibit safe-haven behavior during severe market downturns. Overall, our findings suggest that safe-haven assets may vary over time.     

Are magnet effects caused by uninformed traders? Evidence from Taiwan Stock Exchange

Using transactions and quotes data, we find significant magnet effects of price limit rules in Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSEC). Consistent with Subrahmanyam [Subrahmanyam, A., 1994. Circuit breakers and market volatility: a theoretical perspective. Journal of Finance 49, 237–254], we find that when limit hits are imminent, trading activities intensify with higher volume and volatility. More importantly, our transactions data allows us to examine the roles of institutions and individuals in the magnet effects in TSEC. There is strong evidence that magnet effects are caused by uninformed individuals, whereas if trade volumes are dominated by institutions, no significant magnet effect is found. The policy implication of our findings is that transparency and institutional participation can help to reduce the frequency of magnet effects.     

Are IFRS value-relevant for separate financial statements? Evidence from the Italian stock market

Using a sample of Italian firms, this paper investigates whether separate financial statements are useful to capital market investors, and whether International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are more value-relevant than domestic generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). These issues are key in evaluating the decision made by some states in the European Union to extend the use of IFRS to separate financial statements. The study provides evidence that separate financial statements are value-relevant, regardless of the accounting standard set. However, contrary to expectations, separate financial statements under IFRS do not have incremental information content beyond domestic GAAP. There is even some evidence that domestic GAAP financial statements are more value-relevant than IFRS. Finally, this paper documents the important role of model specification in value-relevance studies.     

Firms as liquidity providers: Evidence from the 2007–2008 financial crisis

Using a supplier–client matched sample, we study the effect of the 2007–2008 financial crisis on between-firm liquidity provision. Consistent with a causal effect of a negative shock to bank credit, we find that firms with high precrisis liquidity levels increased the trade credit extended to other corporations and subsequently experienced better performance as compared with ex ante cash-poor firms. Trade credit taken by constrained firms increased during this period. These findings are consistent with firms providing liquidity insurance to their clients when bank credit is scarce and offer an important precautionary savings motive for accumulating cash reserves.     

How using derivatives affects bank stability in emerging countries? Evidence from the recent financial crisis

Based on banks exclusively from emerging countries over the whole period 2003–2011, this paper aims to investigate whether the use of derivative instruments are responsible in the amplification of the recent and global financial crisis. To do that, we measure the effect of derivatives use on stability of banks from emerging countries during normal period “the pre-crisis period”, 2003–2006, and turbulent period “the crisis and post-crisis period”, 2007–2011. We use the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator technique developed by Blundell and Bond to estimate our regressions.The main findings show that contrarily to forwards and swaps – which are not disruptive factors – futures and especially options, weaken the stability of banks from emerging countries. The major conclusion is that only options and futures can be considered as risky derivatives and partly responsible in the intensification of the last financial crisis.     

Did the securitization market freeze affect bank lending during the financial crisis? Evidence from a credit register

Using data from the Italian Credit Register we identify the adverse effect of the freeze of the securitization market on bank lending during the crisis of 2007–2008. Applying a differences-in-differences estimation to data on firms that borrow from multiple banks, we single out credit supply by including firm fixed effects. Our results show that the degree to which banks tightened credit supply to nonfinancial firms is positively related to the share of loans they securitized before the crisis. The tightening translated into lower credit growth, higher interest rates, lower probability of accepting loan applications and higher probability of relationship termination. Firms were unable to fully compensate the negative credit supply shock, which suggests that the securitization freeze played a role in reducing aggregate credit availability.     

How resilient and countercyclical were emerging economies during the global financial crisis?

By studying the cross-country incidence of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, we document a structural break in the way emerging economies responded to the global shock. Contrary to popular perceptions, emerging economies suffered growth collapses (relative to the pre-crisis levels) comparable to those experienced by developed economies, even when they continued growing. Afterwards, most economies returned to their pre-crisis growth rates. Although emerging economies were not able to avoid the collapse originated in the U.S. and then transmitted across countries, they were more resilient during the global crisis than during past crises. Namely, they resumed their higher growth rates earlier and converged more quickly to their pre-crisis growth trend. Moreover, breaking with the past, emerging economies did not fall more than developed economies during the global crisis and were able to conduct countercyclical policies, thus becoming more similar to developed economies.