The Determinants of Bank Capital Ratios in a Developing Economy

This paper reports new findings on the determinants of bank capital ratios. The results are from an unbalanced panel data set spanning eight years around the period of the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis. Test results suggest a strong positive link between regulatory capital and bank management’s risk-taking behaviour. The risk-based capital standards of the regulators did not have an influence on how regulatory capital is adjusted by low-capitalized banks, perhaps due to the well-documented banking fragility during the test period. Finally, bank capital decisions seem not to be driven by bank profitability, which finding is inconsistent with developed country literature that has for long stressed the importance of banks’ earnings as driving capital ratios. Although the study focuses only on one developing economy, these findings may help to identify the correlates of bank capital ratios in both developed and developing economies since this topic has received scant attention of researchers. These findings are somewhat consistent with how banks engaging in risky lending across the world could have brought on the 2007–2008 banking liquidity and capital erosion crisis.     

Hedging derivatives in the banking industry: Evidence of investor confusion

Hedging derivatives are complex instruments that require particular scrutiny by bank regulators to ensure that a bank’s risk profile is consistent with sound banking practices. The Basel II agreement envisions a system of banking oversight that includes market discipline as a key element of the regulatory framework. A necessary condition in achieving market discipline is that market participants must be able to decipher the underlying conditions from reported results. We examine the relationship between investor confusion and the income effects arising from fair value recognition of hedging derivatives in the banking industry. We use abnormal trading volume as a proxy for investor confusion, and we find a positive and significant relationship between fair value accounting incomes and two alternative measures of abnormal trading volume. The findings suggest that accounting requirements alone may be insufficient to communicate the complexities of hedging derivatives to investors in a way that achieves the market discipline prescribed by Basel II. Bank regulators may need to augment extant efforts for transparency to ensure that risks are adequately communicated to the market.     

银行监管与风险管理

银行的风险管理是银行管理人员及监管部门都十分重视的问题。可是 ,双方的目的是很不同的。银行监管部门担心的是银行业的安全问题 ,而银行管理人员担心的是如何为股东创造价值的问题。本文讨论银行应该如何通过风险衡量 ,权益分配及内部资金调拨来为股东创造价值 ,同时又满足银行监管部门的要求。     

Does banking system transparency enhance bank competition? Cross-country evidence

There seems to be a consensus among regulators and scholars that in order to improve the functioning of a banking system it is necessary to raise the level of bank information disclosure. However, its influence on bank competition – which is an important factor affecting the efficiency and stability of the banking system – is left out of consideration. To test whether greater bank information disclosure is associated with both lower market power and lower concentration in the banking markets, we use country-level data covering the years 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2010. Our findings show that countries with higher levels of bank transparency have lower levels of bank concentration, while the link between transparency and market power is less pronounced. We also show that the reduction of competition due to stricter disclosure requirements depends on bank credit risks and the relationship is U-shaped.     

It takes more than two to tango: Multiple bank lending,asset commonality and risk

Multiple-bank lending is the most prevalent form of bank-firm credit relationships in nearly all countries. It results in high asset commonality and interconnectedness, allows idiosyncratic risks to become systemic, and makes the banking system more fragile and vulnerable to shocks. Using detailed, granular-level, supervisory data on large corporate loans, we show that multiple bank lending is driven, inter alia, by regulatory limits on large credit exposures. These limits, aimed at mitigating an individual bank's concentration risk, force firms to explore alternative sources of funding, making the common borrowers' phenomenon more prominent. We find that multiple bank lending is determined endogenously, and its likelihood increases with the level of portfolio similarity between lenders. The size of the original lender and its systemic importance magnifies this effect. We argue that banks do not internalize the systemic effect of their lending decisions and that multiple bank lending constitutes an insurance mechanism related to an implicit "too-many-to-fail" guarantee. Its externalities are suboptimal and should be reinforced with better monitoring by the related authorities.     

The determinants of U.S. banks’ international activities

This paper develops a model and structural dynamic estimation of bank behavior to map the relationship between U.S. banks’ choices of foreign banking activities, and bank and foreign market traits. This estimation framework is applied to a unique bank-level dataset compiled from regulatory sources, covering U.S. banks’ foreign activities in 83 host markets over the 2003–2013 period. Bank traits are better able to explain the evolving patterns of foreign banking than host market characteristics. After controlling for these traits, the post-financial crisis period shows a structural shift away from cross-border claims towards foreign affiliate activities. Structural estimates of foreign market entry costs and regulatory attitudes towards risk are derived. Simulation exercises confirm the strong impact of banks’ and regulators’ risk stance on bank profits and portfolio composition.     

Bank dividends,risk, and regulatory regimes

This paper investigates the relation between bank dividends and bank risk over the period 1984–2011, and assesses the existence of risk-taking and risk-shifting in the US commercial banking sector subject to regulatory regime changes. The introduction of PCA in 1992 and TARP in 2008 constitute significant regulatory regime changes, and provide the necessary framework to explore whether regime-dependent risk-shifting or risk-taking is present. We find strong evidence of risk-shifting and risk-taking over the post-PCA regime spanning the period 1992–2008. We interpret this evidence as indication of ineffectiveness of PCA in controlling risk-taking and risk-shifting. The finding of risk-taking just prior to the recent financial crisis suggests that risk-taking may be a factor contributing to this crisis. As risk-taking and risk-shifting are important aspects of bank behavior (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009), these results are of interest to bank regulators and important to Basel III.     

The effect of capital adequacy guidelines on large bank holding companies

The United States federal bank regulators imposed numerical capital guidelines in 1981. If these guidelines are binding on bank holding companies, then theoretical evidence suggests that banking organizations may be increasing asset risk. This study tests empirically the hypothesis that the guidelines are binding. Two models of changes in bank holding company equity capital to assets ratios are developed and tested using maximum likehood estimation: a regulatory model and a market model. The results indicate that most large bank holding companies are influenced by regulatory forces.     

Do Strict Regulators Increase the Transparency of Banks?

We investigate the role that regulatory strictness plays on the enforcement of financial reporting transparency in the U.S. banking industry. Using a novel measure of regulatory strictness in the enforcement of capital adequacy, we show that strict regulators are more likely to enforce restatements of banks' call reports. Further, we find that the effect of regulatory strictness on accounting enforcement is strongest in periods leading up to economic downturns and for banks with riskier asset portfolios. Overall, the results from our study indicate that regulatory oversight plays an important role in enforcing financial reporting transparency, particularly in periods leading up to economic crises. We interpret this evidence as inconsistent with the idea that strict bank regulators put significant weight on concerns about the potential destabilizing effects of accounting transparency.     

The regulations–risk taking nexus under competitive pressure: What about the Islamic banking system?

Does market power condition the effect of bank regulations and supervision on bank risk taking? We focus on three regulatory tools: capital requirements, the restriction of activities, and official supervisory powers. Employing 10 years of unbalanced panel data on 123 Islamic and conventional banks operating in the Middle East and Asia, we arrive at the following conclusions. First, banking market power strengthens the negative impact of capital regulation on bank risk taking. Second, our empirical results suggest that the negative effect of activity restrictions on stability is diminished when banks have greater market power. Finally, we do not find strong evidence that the negative effect of supervisory power on banks’ risk taking is conditioned by their competitive behavior. In further analysis, we differentiate between Islamic and conventional banks regarding their competition, as well as their risk behavior. The results differ according to the banking business model. These findings could be useful for bank regulators in light of the accomplishment of Islamic banks’ regulatory framework. Indeed, the adoption of Basel III represents a significant regulatory challenge, given that it does not take into account the specificities of Islamic banks.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

Valuation effects of new capital issues by large bank holding companies

Bank regulators in the United States and other major industrial nations have agreed on a framework for regulating bank capital, proposing that all banking organizations maintain common equity and perpetual preferred capital equal to 4 percent of risk-adjusted assets. This proposal raises important questions about the effect of different capital definitions on banking organizations. This article examines the stock market valuation effects of banks' issuing securities that are considered regulatory capital over the 1982–1986 period. The results are consistent with Myers and Majluf's securities overvaluation hypothesis.     

Small European banks: Benefits from diversification?

Motivated by the liberalisation and harmonisation of financial systems in Europe, we investigate whether the observed shift into non-interest income activities improves performance of small European credit institutions. Using a sample of 755 small banks for the period 1997–2003, we find no direct diversification benefits within and across business lines and an inverse association between non-interest income and bank performance. Our findings are robust to a set of sensitivity analyses using alternative samples and controlling for the regulatory environment. Furthermore, the results provide circumstantial evidence for the presence of economies of scale. The absence of benefits of diversification confirms findings for other banking markets and suggests small European banks enter lines of business where they currently lack expertise and experience. These results have implications for bank supervisors, regulators and bank managers.     

Bank concentration,competition, and crises: First results

Motivated by public policy debates about bank consolidation and conflicting theoretical predictions about the relationship between bank concentration, bank competition and banking system fragility, this paper studies the impact of national bank concentration, bank regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood of a country suffering a systemic banking crisis. Using data on 69 countries from 1980 to 1997, we find that crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems even after controlling for differences in commercial bank regulatory policies, national institutions affecting competition, macroeconomic conditions, and shocks to the economy. Furthermore, the data indicate that regulatory policies and institutions that thwart competition are associated with greater banking system fragility.     

Capital changes at large affiliated banks

The federal bank regulators imposed numerical capital guidelines in December 1981. If these guidelines are binding, then banking organizations may respond to the costs of regulation in various ways. If the regulations are not binding, then further reliance may be placed on market discipline. This study develops two models of changes in the equity capital to assets ratio of large banks affiliated with bank holding companies—a regulatory model in which capital regulations are a binding influence and a market model in which financial markets influence capital ratios. The two models are examined empirically through a disequilibrium framework and maximum likelihood estimation techniques. The results suggest that most banks are predominantly influenced by regulatory forces. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Florida State University     

Measuring systemic risk: A risk management approach

This paper proposes a new method to measure and monitor the risk in a banking system. Standard tools that regulators require banks to use for their internal risk management are applied at the level of the banking system to measure the risk of a regulator’s portfolio. Using a sample of international banks from 1988 until 2002, I estimate the dynamics and correlations between bank asset portfolios. To obtain measures for the risk of a regulator’s portfolio, I model the individual liabilities that the regulator has to each bank as contingent claims on the bank’s assets. The portfolio aspect of the regulator’s liability is explicitly considered and the methodology allows a comparison of sub-samples from different countries. Correlations, bank asset volatility, and bank capitalization increase for North American and somewhat for European banks, while Japanese banks face deteriorating capital levels. In the sample period, the North American banking system gains stability while the Japanese banking sector becomes more fragile. The expected future liability of the regulator varies substantially over time and is especially high during the Asian crisis starting in 1997. Further analysis shows that the Japanese banks contribute most to the volatility of the regulator’s liability at that time. Larger and more profitable banks have lower systemic risk and additional equity capital reduces systemic risk only for banks that are constrained by regulatory capital requirements.     

Regulatory competition and forbearance: Evidence from the life insurance industry

Regulatory separation theory indicates that a system with multiple regulators leads to less forbearance and limits producer gains while a model of banking regulation developed by Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) predicts the opposite. Fragmented regulation of the US life insurance industry provides an especially rich environment for testing the effects of regulatory competition. We find positive relations between regulatory competition and profitability measures for this industry, which is consistent with the Dell’Ariccia and Marquez model. Our results have practical implications for the debate over federal versus state regulation of insurance and financial services in the US.     

Competition among Financial Intermediaries When Diversification Matters

Many models predict that the diversification and efficiency of financial intermediaries (“banks”) increases with their size, so that a relatively unrestricted banking sector will settle into an equilibrium with several large, well-diversified, and competitive banks. However, this prediction is at odds with the actual pattern of unrestricted banking sector evolution in many countries. I develop a model that motivates this actual pattern and examine the model's implications for regulatory policy. I show that an investor's return from a bank depends on the number of investors using that bank; this adoption externality makes investor beliefs about other investors' actions critical for bank competition. In a young banking system with free entry, coordination problems lead to excessive fragmentation, and debt overhang makes it difficult for small banks to capture additional market share. As the system matures, many banks fail, and the survivors become the focus of investor beliefs; these incumbents gain a strong advantage over entrants, facilitating collusion. Entry restrictions reduce fragmentation but aid collusion, while government insurance for investors reduces incumbency advantage and collusion but may cause excessive fragmentation. Thus, regulators may wish to impose temporary entry restrictions, along with partial insurance. These results are consistent with historical evidence from several countries.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G21, G22, L13.     

Is bank diversification a linking channel between regulatory capital and bank value?

This study investigates the interrelationship between bank regulatory capital and bank diversification. We argue that regulatory capital might act as a substitutive mechanism of diversification to alleviate a bank's default risk. As a result, regulatory capital is likely to discourage firms from excessive diversification, which might in turn indirectly improve bank value. Using a sample of listed banks in developed countries from 2011 to 2017, we find that total regulatory capital is inversely associated with bank diversification. Narrower regulatory capital ratios only have a significant association with income-based but not with asset-based diversification. Our results also reveal an indirect effect of regulatory capital on bank value mediated by bank diversification (i.e. indirect-only mediation). Overall, our study provides novel insights into the complementarity of the institutional and strategic domains so as to understand the far-reaching implications of regulation reforms for the strategic behaviour of banking companies.