Internal financial constraints,external financial constraints,and investment choice: Evidence from a panel of UK firms

This paper uses a panel of 24,184 UK firms over the period 1993–2003 to study the extent to which the sensitivity of investment to cash flow differs at firms facing different degrees of internal and external financial constraints. Our results suggest that when the sample is split on the basis of the level of internal funds available to the firms, the relationship between investment and cash flow is U-shaped. On the other hand, the sensitivity of investment to cash flow tends to increase monotonically with the degree of external financial constraints faced by firms. Combining the internal with the external financial constraints, we find that the dependence of investment on cash flow is strongest for those externally financially constrained firms that have a relatively high level of internal funds.     

The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash

We model a firm's demand for liquidity to develop a new test of the effect of financial constraints on corporate policies. The effect of financial constraints is captured by the firm's propensity to save cash out of cash flows (the cash flow sensitivity of cash). We hypothesize that constrained firms should have a positive cash flow sensitivity of cash, while unconstrained firms' cash savings should not be systematically related to cash flows. We empirically estimate the cash flow sensitivity of cash using a large sample of manufacturing firms over the 1971 to 2000 period and find robust support for our theory.     

Effects of financial constraints on corporate policies in Australia

We jointly study the impact of financial constraints on Australian companies’ investment decisions and demand for liquidity. By examining a large sample of Australian firms over the period 1990–2003, we find that financial constraints not only reduce the sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal funds, but also increase the responsiveness of cash holdings to internally generated cash flows. Further analysis shows that the impact of financial constraints varies across different cash flow states; that is, financial constraints have a small effect on corporate investment and cash policies when cash flows are positive. In contrast, the severity of constraints is high in negative cash flow years in which the cost disadvantage of external finance coincides with deteriorating operating performance.     

The determinants of cash flow sensitivity of cash: The family ownership effect

This paper investigates firms’ cash flow sensitivity of cash (CFSC) in a European setting. We examine the differing effects of financial constraints and income and substitution effects on CFSC in the context of the family ownership structure. When examining the shareholders’ behavior within the ownership structure of family firms, we find a positive CFSC level for our full sample. Our results show a significant connection between the family ownership structure and CFSC’s determinant factors: the higher (lower) sensitivity for the firms with more (less) financial constraints suggests that family firms are financially less constrained than non-family firms. Additionally, contrary to prior literature, we find income and substitution effects have a nonnegative effect on CFCS. We explain this finding from a productivity shocks perspective related to the financial crisis, which occurs during our analysis period.     

The evolution of financial constraints

We demonstrate that the severity of financial constraints has declined over time for two reasons: (i) improved access to external funds as evidenced by a decreased reliance on internal cash flows, and (ii) an inward shifting investment frontier with reduced investment opportunities. The decline in financial constraints coincides with the documented diminishing sensitivity of investment to cash flows, yet we show that cash flows remain a determining factor in helping constrained firms overcome restricted access to external capital. There is a flight-to-quality during economic shocks, where the adverse effects following periods of tightened credit are particularly pronounced for smaller firms, with larger firms appearing largely unaffected.     

Do financial factors affect the capital–labour ratio? Evidence from UK firm-level data

This paper analyses how firms’ capital–labour ratio is affected by cash flow, leverage, and collateral, and how this effect differs at firms more and less likely to face financing constraints using a rich UK firm-level data set. It is common in the literature to examine the impact of financial constraints on hiring and firing decisions separately from their impact on decisions related to investment in physical capital. We argue that as long as firms use both inputs in production and there is some substitutability between them, the two decisions need to be jointly analysed. When we differentiate across firms that are more or less financially constrained, we find that the former group exhibits higher sensitivities of the capital–labour ratio to firm-specific characteristics compared to the latter.     

A bright side of financial constraints in cash management

This paper tests whether financial constraints play a disciplinary role in cash dissipation in the presence of agency problems. We hypothesize that when firms have difficulty raising external funds, empire-building managers of cash-rich firms will be less likely to spend cash on negative NPV projects as compared to unconstrained managers. Empirically, we examine firm performance after cash dissipation and associate it with the degree of financial constraints. We find that cash spending by managers in financially constrained firms is associated with higher future profitability and stock returns compared to cash spending by managers in unconstrained firms. Further tests reveal that the positive effect of financial constraints on firm performance is not driven by differences in corporate governance. Financial constraints actually substitute for good governance in disciplining managers. We find that corporate governance improves the efficiency of cash dissipation in unconstrained firms, but not in constrained firms. Likewise, financial constraints' disciplinary effect is found to be concentrated in firms that are poorly governed.     

Multidimensionality of text based financial constraints and working capital management

Using a novel text-based measure of financial constraints and primarily employing firm fixed-effect model, we find that financial constraints have a significantly negative association with cash conversion cycle (CCC), implying that financially constrained firms have a higher level of working capital management efficiency. In order to get a deeper insight, we consider two distinct dimensions, − ‘growth oriented’ and ‘contractual-obligation oriented’ financial constraints - and re-examine the relationship with CCC and its components. We find that firms facing growth oriented (contractual-obligation oriented) financial constraints have shorter (longer) CCC. It appears that compared to contractual-obligation oriented financially constrained firms, growth-oriented constrained firms receive more favorable treatments from their suppliers (longer payable period) as well as from their customers (shorter receivable period) - leading to a lower CCC. On the other hand, contractual-obligation oriented financially constrained firms have a longer inventory period, resulting in a longer CCC.     

Excess cash holdings and investment: the moderating roles of financial constraints and managerial entrenchment

Our study investigates the relationship between excess cash holdings and investment behaviour under two dimensions of financial constraints and managerial entrenchment, based upon a sample of Taiwanese firms operating in an environment characterized by poor legal protection for investors, with data covering the years 2000–2006. We find that excess cash is significantly correlated with capital expenditure, particularly for firms financially constrained and with severe managerial entrenchment. However, the evidence shows that excess cash is insensitive to R&D expenditure under these two dimensions.     

金融发展对中国中小板上市公司融资约束的影响

从投资-现金流的敏感性角度出发,利用我国中小企业板上市公司在 2004-2014年的数据为研究样本,通过建模实证研究金融发展对中国中小板上市公司融资约束瓶颈的影响程度.结果表明,中国中小上市公司的投资与其内部现金流有着显著的正向关系;金融发展能够缓解中小上市公司的融资约束现象,且金融发展程度越高,对中小板上市公司的融资瓶颈约束缓释效果越强,即减缓了企业的投资-现金流敏感性.     

Corporate precautionary cash holdings

This paper models the precautionary motive for a firm's cash holdings. A two-period investment model shows that the cash holdings of financially constrained firms are sensitive to cash flow volatility because financial constraints create an intertemporal trade-off between current and future investments. When future cash flow risk cannot be fully diversifiable, this intertemporal trade-off gives constrained firms the incentives of precautionary savings: they increase their cash holdings in response to increases in cash flow volatility. However, there is no systematic relationship between cash holdings and cash flow volatility for unconstrained firms. We test the empirical implications of our theory using quarterly information from a sample of U.S. publicly traded companies from 1997 to 2002, and find that the empirical evidence supports our theory.     

Financial constraints on credit ratings and cash-flow sensitivity

This study investigates whether financial constraints, as measured by the level of credit ratings and their migrations would affect the firm's cash flow allocation policies and reflect the main financial constraints on a firm's cash flow sensitivity of cash. For a given credit quality shock, control for firm-level characteristics and endogeneity of cash flow allocation, our results suggest that firms with higher credit financial constraints have significantly higher cash flow sensitivities on cash holding, investment, and debt financing activities. Our results provide evidence that credit rating risk has a larger impact on cash flow allocation and drives the financial constraints on cash flow sensitivity for various reasons, including precautionary motivation and restricted access to external financing.     

The effect of financial constraints,investment policy,product market competition and corporate governance on the value of cash holdings

This study empirically investigates the value shareholders place on excess cash holdings and how shareholders’ valuation of cash holdings is associated with financial constraints, firm growth, cash‐flow uncertainty and product market competition for Australian firms from 1990 to 2007. Our results indicate that the marginal value of cash holdings to shareholders declines with larger cash holdings and higher leverage. However, firms that are more financially constrained, that have higher growth rates and that face greater uncertainty exhibit a higher marginal value of cash holdings. These findings are consistent with the explanation that excess cash holdings are not necessarily detrimental to firm value. Firms with costly external financing and that also save more cash for current operating and future investing needs find that the market values these cash hoarding policies favourably. Finally, there is limited evidence of an association between various corporate governance measures and the value of cash holdings for a shorter sample period.     

The real effects of financial constraints: Evidence from a financial crisis

We survey 1,050 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the U.S., Europe, and Asia to directly assess whether their firms are credit constrained during the global financial crisis of 2008. We study whether corporate spending plans differ conditional on this survey-based measure of financial constraint. Our evidence indicates that constrained firms planned deeper cuts in tech spending, employment, and capital spending. Constrained firms also burned through more cash, drew more heavily on lines of credit for fear banks would restrict access in the future, and sold more assets to fund their operations. We also find that the inability to borrow externally caused many firms to bypass attractive investment opportunities, with 86% of constrained U.S. CFOs saying their investment in attractive projects was restricted during the credit crisis of 2008. More than half of the respondents said they canceled or postponed their planned investments. Our results also hold in Europe and Asia, and in many cases are stronger in those economies. Our analysis adds to the portfolio of approaches and knowledge about the impact of credit constraints on real firm behavior.     

The determinants of corporate cash management policies: Evidence from around the world

We examine the determinants of corporate cash management policies across a broad sample of international firms. We document that firms in countries with strong legal protection of minority investors are more likely to decrease their cash holdings in response to an increase in cash flow than are firms in countries with weak legal protection. This relationship is most pronounced for firms that are financially constrained and those with high hedging needs. More importantly, we do not find evidence that financial development plays an incremental impact on the cash flow sensitivity of cash, after controlling for the effect of legal protection. Therefore, we argue that the legal protection of investors (rather than financial development) represents the first-order effect in influencing international firms' cash management policies. The results are robust to alternative specifications. In general, our findings reinforce the importance of country-level legal protection of investors in mitigating the effects of firm-level financial constraints and hedging needs on corporate cash management policies.     

Do Acquisitions Relieve Target Firms’ Financial Constraints?

Managers often claim that target firms are financially constrained prior to being acquired and that these constraints are eased following the acquisition. Using a large sample of European acquisitions, we document that the level of cash that target firms hold, the sensitivity of cash to cash flow, and the sensitivity of investment to cash flow all decline, while investment increases following the acquisition. These effects are stronger in deals that are more likely to be associated with financing improvements. Our findings suggest that acquisitions relieve financial frictions in target firms, especially when the target firm is relatively small.     

Determinants of Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity

I classify firms into groups of high, low, and negative sensitivity. I find that investment-cash flow sensitivity is nonmonotonic with respect to financial constraints, cash flows, and growth opportunities. Firms classified as negative cash flow sensitive have the lowest cash flows, highest growth opportunities, and appear the most financially constrained. Cash flow insensitive firms have the highest cash flows, lowest growth opportunities, and appear the least financially constrained. To a large extent, the negative relationship between cash flow and investment is driven by the opposite trends followed by investment and cash flow, as firms grow through stages of their life cycle.     

Supply of capital and capital structure: The role of financial development

We explore the effect of financial development on corporate capital structure and the tightness of financial constraints that firms face. We employ an econometric technique that allows us to explicitly test for convergence in capital structure. This technique increases the power of our statistical tests. In doing so, we identify a group of convergent firms. The driving force of convergence is financial development, which positively affects the firms' leverage ratio. We also identify a group of firms, whose leverage is not affected by financial development, because they are financially constrained.     

Are firms accessing venture funding more financially constrained? New evidence from capital structure adjustments

We analyze whether firms that receive venture capital (VC) at a later date face more financial constraints than a one-by-one matched sample of firms that did not receive VC funding (control group). The aim is to check whether their financial flexibility explains why they decide to seek external equity funding. In contrast with other papers, which focus on the sensitivity of investments to cash flow, we study this issue by applying a dynamic model to analyze the speed of adjustment to their target debt levels prior to receiving the first VC investment. We analyze a representative sample of 237 Spanish unlisted firms that received VC between 1995 and 2007 and its corresponding control group. We find that firms that receive VC funding show a significantly lower speed of adjustment than their matched peers before the initial VC round. It seems that the former are more concerned about funding the required investments than about adjusting the firm's debt ratio to a target level. Our results confirm the role of VC in filling the equity gap in constrained unlisted firms. From a capital structure perspective, VC may become a tool for these companies to balance their capital structure in a growth process.     

CEO inside debt and investment‐cash flow sensitivity

This paper provides a new explanation for investment‐cash flow sensitivity from the perspective of CEO inside debt holdings. We examine the effect of CEO pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt) on investment‐cash flow sensitivity for a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms from 2006 to 2012. We find that the firms with higher relative CEO leverage ratios (CEO's debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm's debt/equity ratio) generate higher investment‐cash flow sensitivity. Moreover, one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of the relative CEO leverage ratio enlarges investment‐cash flow sensitivity by 50 per cent. This positive relationship still holds even after we take account of endogeneity and financial constraints.