A partial adjustment theory of the balance of payments

This paper develops a partial adjustment theory of the balance of payments by incorporating the inter-temporal optimizing behavior of the two agents of the society: the public and the central bank. The central bank is viewed as the government's regulator of domestic credit and its objectives are taken as distinct from and possibly at odds with the public's objectives due to imperfect competition in the political marketplace. The final equation derived here implies that the balance of payments reflects both the active behavior of the central bank concerning foreign reserves and the contribution of the public's flow demand for money.     

Political monetary cycles and a de facto ranking of central bank independence

Political monetary cycles are less likely to occur in countries with independent central banks. Independent central banks can withstand political pressure to stimulate the economy before elections or finance election-related increases in government spending. Based on this logic and supporting evidence, we construct a de facto ranking of central bank independence derived from the extent to which monetary policy varies with the electoral cycle. The ranking avoids well-known problems with existing measures of central bank independence and provides independent information about average inflation and inflation volatility differences across countries.     

An Institutional Analysis of the Design and Sequence of Trade and Investment Policy Reform

Countries vary in their political commitment to change and inthe capability of their bureaucracies. Policies vary in theirorganizational and political demands. These institutional variationscan be incorporated into the design of trade and investmentpolicy reform. In virtually all countries the presumption shouldbe for reforms to dismantle—not reconfigure—restrictiveentry rules and dysfunctional discretionary investment incentives.But there is no single approach, common across countries, throughwhich trade policy reform should proceed. Countries with weakadministrative capabilities should push import liberalizationto the limits. But politically constrained countries with astronger administrative capability might consider roundaboutreforms that secure outward orientation without full-scale,prior import liberalization.     

中国能进一步提高央行独立性以改善货币政策可信度吗?

中央银行独立性是决定货币政策可信度(信誉)的一个重要体制性特征因素。在中国,央行独立性受到政治基础结构、司法独立性、经济金融基础结构和社会文化环境等制度结构方面的现实约束,即便照搬西方国家经验在立法层面确立央行独立性,这种外生的法定独立性也不能转化为真正的实践准则;在当下的中国要改善货币政策可信度,不能期望进一步提高央行独立性来实现,而应寻求其他路径。     

Trading Arrangements and Industrial Development

This article outlines a new approach for analyzing the roleof trade in promoting industrial development. It offers an explanationas to why firms are reluctant to move to countries with lowerlabor costs and shows how trade liberalization can change theincentives for firms to locate in developing countries. It modelseconomic development as the spread of concentrations of firmsfrom country to country. Different trading arrangements mayhave a major impact on this development process. By changingthe attractiveness of countries as a base for manufacturingproduction, they can potentially trigger—or postpone—industrialdevelopment. The analysis shows that unilaterally liberalizingimports of manufactures can promote industrialization but thatmembership in a preferential trading arrangement is likely tocreate larger gains. South-South preferential trading arrangementswill be sensitive to the market size of member states, whileNorth-South arrangements seem to offer better prospects forparticipating southern countries, if not for excluded countries.     

Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes

Making the central bank an agency with the mandate and reputationfor maintaining price stability is a means by which a governmentcan choose the strength of its commitment to price stability.This article develops four measures of central bank independenceand explores their relation with inflation outcomes. An aggregatelegal index is developed for four decades in 72 countries. Threeindicators of actual independence are developed: the rate ofturnover of central bank governors, an index based on a questionnaireanswered by specialists in 23 countries, and an aggregationof the legal index and the rate of turnover. Legal independence is inversely related to inflation in industrial,but not in developing, countries. In developing countries theactual frequency of change of the chief executive officer ofthe bank is a better proxy for central bank independence. Aninflation-based index of overall central bank independence contributessignificantly to explaining cross-country variations in therate of inflation.     

ORGANIZED LABOR, POLITICS, AND LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Organized labor is usually viewed as an obstacle to labor marketadjustment. But unions' responses to adjustment programs infact range from militant opposition to acquiescence or evenexplicit cooperation. Three sets of variables shape these responses:the strength and characteristics of the union movement itself;economic cycles; and political institutions and their ties tounions. •Strength of the labor movement: In industrial democracies,an aggressive stance on wages tends to be associated with moderatelystrong unions. Small or weak unions are less militant, as mightbe expected; more surprisingly, large and powerful unions alsotend to be more moderate, primarily because of their greaterparticipation in consultation and decisionmaking at the nationallevel. The experience in developing countries is somewhat different:only a few of these have strong labor movements, and among these,militancy is common. The large share of wage labor in the publicsector complicates comparisons with industrial nations, sincegovernments as employers clearly behave differently from privateemployers, particularly in hard times. •Economic cycles: Depression almost invariably reducesmilitancy in developing as well as industrial nations. •Political institutions: The nature of the political regime—democraticor authoritarian—is only roughly associated with how governmentshandle labor relations, and correspondingly with the optionsavailable to unions. More important in shaping unions' behaviorare the nature of the political party system and how unionsare connected with parties. The conditions needed to gain workers'cooperation are analogous to those which encourage businessto invest: political stability, a voice in policy that affectstheir interests, and arising from these, the confidence thatcurrent sacrifices will ultimately yield a fair share of futurebenefits.      

Why government banks underperform: A political interference view

This study proposes a political interference hypothesis to explain how political considerations depress the performance of government banks. We define political interference as a situation in which government bank executives are replaced within 12 months after the country’s major elections (presidential or parliamentary elections). We classify political and non-political government banks as those that experience or do not experience political interference, respectively. The hypothesis firstly suggests that once government banks undertake political interference, their financial performance deteriorates. That is, political banks display the worst performance, followed by non-political banks and private banks have the best performance. Next, we posit that the impact of political interference is greater in developing countries than in developed countries. Finally, we hypothesize that the underperformance of government banks will be reduced if we remove political interference. By employing bank data from 65 countries from the period of 2003–2007, our hypothesis effectively explains why government banks in developed countries escape relatively unscathed, while those in developing countries suffer significantly.     

The Impact of Central Bank Independence on Political Monetary Cycles in Advanced and Developing Nations

This paper examines the extent to which monetary policy is manipulated for political purposes during elections. We do not detect political monetary cycles in advanced countries or developing nations with independent central banks. We do find evidence, however, in developing countries that lack central bank independence. Furthermore, we find some evidence that these cycles are not caused by monetization of election-related fiscal expansions. This suggests that pressure by politicians on the central bank to exploit the Phillips curve may be an important factor in generating political monetary cycles.     

Replacing a “Disobedient” Central Bank Governor with a “Docile” One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Inflation

This paper identifies two mechanisms that empirical papers on central bank independence assume to be embedded in the yardstick measure of turnover rate of central bank governor: (i) the removal of a governor who is perceived as a challenger by the government and (ii) whether his/her replacement is an ally of the government. We identify the first mechanism with premature exits of central bankers and the second by examining whether or not the incoming governor is drawn from the ranks of the executive branch of the government. We find that only premature exits and replacements with government allies increase inflation.     

Do Markets Care about Central Bank Governor Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets

Based on a new daily data set for 20 emerging markets over the period 1992–2006, we examine the reactions of foreign exchange markets, domestic stock markets, and sovereign bond spreads to central bank governor changes. We find that the replacement of a central bank governor negatively affects financial markets on the announcement day, which is in line with the hypothesis that newly appointed central bank governors suffer from a systematic credibility problem at the beginning of their tenure. We also find some evidence that changes in perceived central bank independence affect markets.     

Pointers to government policies for technical innovation

The main phases in postwar industrial development patterns are summarised to show where we are now, and to indicate possible future directions for government policies towards technological innovation. A number of tables compare policies in different OECD countries, and the text draws attention to such underlying principles as going for high-technology industries, ensuring consistency within a government's policies, or the wise use of government procurement activities.     

The Impact of Women's Schooling on Fertility and Contraceptive Use: A Study of Fourteen Sub-Saharan African Countries

This article examines the relationship between female schoolingand two behaviors—cumulative fertility and contraceptiveuse—in fourteen Sub-Saharan African countries where Demographicand Health Surveys (DHS) have been conducted since the mid-1980s.Average levels of schooling among women of reproductive ageare very low, from less than two years to six. Controlling forbackground variables, the last years of female primary schoolinghave a negative relation with fertility in about half the countries,while secondary schooling is associated with substantially lowerfertility in all countries. Female schooling has a positiverelationship with contraceptive use at all levels. Among ever-marriedwomen, husband's schooling exerts a smaller effect than doesfemale schooling on contraceptive use and, in almost all cases,on fertility. Although the results suggest commonalities amongthese Sub-Saharan countries, they also reveal intriguing internationaldifferences in the impact of female schooling, which might reflectdifferences in the quality of schooling, labor markets, andfamily planning programs, among others.     

How Do Central Bank Governors Matter? Regulation and the Financial Sector

Do past employment characteristics of central bank governors affect financial regulation? To answer this question, we construct a new data set based on curriculum vitae of all central bank governors around the world in 1970–2011. We interpret work experiences as indicators of preferences toward deregulation. Over the average duration in office (5.6 years), a governor with financial sector experience is associated with three times more deregulation than a governor without experience in finance. Similar results hold for past experience at the IMF; in contrast, past experience at the BIS and the UN are associated with less deregulation.     

Bank ownership and performance. Does politics matter?

This paper uses a new dataset to reassess the relationship between bank ownership and bank performance, providing separate estimations for developing and industrial countries. It finds that state-owned banks located in developing countries tend to have lower profitability and higher costs than their private counterparts, and that the opposite is true for foreign-owned banks. The paper finds no strong correlation between ownership and performance for banks located in industrial countries. Next, in order to test whether the differential in performance between public and private banks is driven by political considerations, the paper checks whether this differential widens during election years; it finds strong support for this hypothesis.     

WHO WINS AND WHO LOSES FROM VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTS?:The Case of Footwear

Voluntary export restraints have been a popular resort of industrialcountries faced with increasing competition from exports ofdeveloping countries. As a strategy for circumventing the rulesof the GATT (whose regulations preclude increases in tariffs),these nontariff barriers have been rather successful; whetherthey have been as successful in their aim of protecting andstimulating the industry concerned is another matter. This article looks at what happened when industrial countriesimposed—and then removed—voluntary export restraintson the footwear industry during the 1970s and 1980s. Why didprotectionism spread so fast and then dissipate almost as rapidly,and what effects did this coming and going have on the exportingcountries We suggest that industrial countries removed the restraintsbecause they found ?them either superfluous (the expected employmenteffect failed to materialize) or ineffective (the principalexporters maintained their market share during the height ofthe restrictions), or else because the industry was able toadjust by importing footwear at a profit. Predicting the effect of VERs, and determining how best to managethem, are critical questions for developing countries strugglingto improve their export performance in the 1990s. The resultsof detailed study of a representative industry, summarized here,may assist in the prediction and determination.      

Alleviating Transitory Food Crises in Sub-Saharan Africa: International Altruism and Trade

The donor community has responded to unexpected or transitorydrops in domestic food production in many countries in Sub-SaharanAfrica. An empirical framework estimates and analyzes the correlationbetween this food aid and domestic production. Both emergencyfood aid and commercial imports are used to offset the effectsof negative output shocks in Sub-Saharan African countries—themajor recipients of global emergency food aid. On average everyone-ton drop in cereal production is offset by the deliveryof 0.8 tons of cereal and dairy products from abroad (over fouryears). Most food aid arrives within a year of a shock, andcorrelation of shocks over time along with the differences betweencrop years and calendar years may explain the link between aidand production. The economic and political considerations alsodetermine the global response to the emergency food needs ofcountries in Africa. The international response is not contingenton the form of government or the level of political and humanrights violations. Poorer countries and those with well-establishednon-emergency food aid programs receive larger amounts of emergencyaid when needed.     

HOW MUCH DOES TRADE WITH THE SOUTH AFFECT WORKERS IN THE NORTH?

Does trade with developing countries have a small and benigneffect on workers in industrial countries, as most economistshave maintained, or a large and adverse effect, as the generalpublic and advocates of protection believe? A review of theevidence suggests that neither of these positions is tenable.The methods that economists have conventionally used to measurethe effect of North-South trade are biased downward. The truesize of this effect remains uncertain, but some recent studiessuggest that it is much larger than previously estimated. Tradewith the South has probably significantly altered the sectoralcomposition of employment in the North, shifting workers outof manufacturing and into nontraded services. More important,it has probably significantly worsened the relative economicposition of unskilled workers in industrial countries, and mayalso have aggravated the problem of reconciling low inflationwith low unemployment. Even so, the adverse side effects oftrade with the South are much smaller than is popularly supposed.And the popular remedy—protection—is clearly wrong.What is needed instead is more action by governments to offsetthe reduction in the relative demand for unskilled labor throughtraining and education, job creation, and income redistribution.      

中央银行独立性:一个新政治经济学分析框架

中央银行独立性是中央银行制度建设的基础与理论探讨的焦点,许多机构或学者从不同角度予以分析论证。新政治经济学关于中央银行独立性的研究已经形成丰富的理论资源,诸如政治周期理论、时间非一致性理论及公共选择理论对于中央银行制度建设具有重要的学术价值。     

Determinants of Commercial Bank Interest Margins and Profitability: Some International Evidence

Using bank-level data for 80 countries in the years 1988–95,this article shows that differences in interest margins andbank profitability reflect a variety of determinants: bank characteristics,macroeconomic conditions, explicit and implicit bank taxation,deposit insurance regulation, overall financial structure, andunderlying legal and institutional indicators. A larger ratioof bank assets to gross domestic product and a lower marketconcentration ratio lead to lower margins and profits, controllingfor differences in bank activity, leverage, and the macroeconomicenvironment. Foreign banks have higher margins and profits thandomestic banks in developing countries, while the opposite holdsin industrial countries. Also, there is evidence that the corporatetax burden is fully passed onto bank customers, while higherreserve requirements are not, especially in developing countries.