公司面临融资约束时投资与现金流的相关性

本文以2010年年末A股上市公司为研究对象,研究公司在面临融资约束时,现金流对投资的影响,并进一步引申到分析融资约束对代理问题所引起的过度投资行为影响如何。本文采用主成分分析法来衡量公司的融资约束水平,对融资约束程度不同的公司进行分组。实证结果表明:公司在面临融资约束时,投资对现金流存在依赖关系。而公司面临融资约束并不能很好的抑制管理者的过度投资行为。     

信息不对称及信号传递对上市公司融资方式的影响

信息不对称是现代企业的一个重要理念。信息不对称会导致投资不足或投资过度等问题,从而影响到企业融资方式的选择。降低企业的投资不足或投资过度行为,以及企业向外部投资者传递好的内部信息的融资方式的选择都会导致偏好负债融资,即在信息不对称条件下,企业如果需要外部融资,则会先选择负债融资,后选择股票融资。而在我国,正好相反,上市公司表现出强烈的股权融资偏好。这一现象在实践中对公司融资后的资本使用效率、公司成长和公司治理、投资者利益以及货币政策的实施等方面都有不利影响,因此必须加以规范治理。     

信息不对称及信号传递对上市公司融姿方式的影响

信息不对称是现代企业的一个重要理念.信息不对称会导致投资不足或投资过度等问题,从而影响到企业融资方式的选择.降低企业的投资不足或投资过度行为,以及企业向外部投资者传递好的内部信息的融资方式的选择都会导致偏好负债融资,即在信息不对称条件下,企业如果需要外部融资,则会先选择负债融资,后选择股票融资.而在我国,正好相反,上市公司表现出强烈的股权融资偏好.这一现象在实践中对公司融资后的资本使用效率、公司成长和公司治理、投资者利益以及货币政策的实施等方面都有不利影响,因此必须加以规范治理.     

两权分离对EVA治理国有企业过度投资效应的影响研究

本文利用国有上市公司数据,实证检验了股权集中背景下,EVA考核对现金流权和控制权发生分离和未发生分离、不同两权分离度的国有上市公司过度投资的治理效应差异。研究结果表明,相比于两权未发生分离的国有企业,EVA业绩考核对两权分离的国有企业过度投资行为抑制作用更明显;对于两权分离的国有企业,两权分离度越大,EVA业绩考核对企业过度投资行为抑制作用越明显。本文肯定了EVA本土化的治理效果,丰富了影响EVA治理过度投资的内部因素研究,为我国国有企业改革的深化提供了一定的经验证据。     

终极控制权下过度投资及债务约束机制研究——基于2008-2011年沪深A股上市企业财务数据

本文选用2008-2011年沪深A股上市企业财务数据作为样本,对终极控制权背景下企业过度投资和债务约束机制进行研究.研究结果表明,最终控制权控股比例的上升,提高了企业过度投资的程度;最终控制人控制权与现金流权分离度的提高,对企业的过度投资规模有激励效应.企业进行债务融资可以减少企业的过度投资行为:债务结构中的短期融资有效抑制了企业的过度投资规模,长期债务对过度投资有正向激励.     

论融资约束、R&D投资与公司成长性

本文以2004-2008年期间A股上市公司为样本观测值,检验了融资约束、R&D投资与公司成长性之间的关系.研究发现,公司受到的融资约束水平越高,R&D投资对内部现金流量的敏感性越强;在不同融资约束水平下,R&D投资对公司成长性的影响具有差异性,且随着融资约束水平的增强,R&D投资对公司成长性的促进作用逐渐降低.     

民营控股上市公司的股权结构与投资决策

固定资产投资对宏观经济增长和微观企业发展的意义重大。近年来,对企业投资问题的研究围绕着投资与现金流敏感性问题出现了大量的实证研究。本文采用投资-现金流敏感度模型实证结果发现:随着最终控制人现金流权与控制权的缺口扩大,投资与现金流敏感度增强,但是投资与长期投资机会Tobin's Q的相关性下降。实证结果支持自由现金流假说下的代理理论,即我国民营控股上市公司的投资之所以受内部现金流的影响,是因为最终控制人具有强烈的规模扩张、投资过度的倾向。     

股权结构、内部现金流与企业投资行为

对于内部现金流影响企业投资行为的原因存在两种不同的解释,即对应过度投资的自由现金流假说和对应投资不足的融资约束假说。本文通过实证分析发现,由于管理层"沟堑效应"(entrenchment)和大股东掏空小股东的"隧道效应"(tunnelling)的存在,管理层激励效应和大股东监督效应对投资-现金流敏感性的影响是非线性的。具体地讲,随着管理层持股比例的增加,投资-现金流敏感性先增加后降低;随着第一大股东持股比例的增加,投资-现金流敏感性也出现先增加后降低,都出现了倒U型的关系。最终的实证结果支持了FHP提出的融资约束假说。     

商业信用对非效率投资的影响:融资抑或治理

基于2003-2012年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验商业信用对非效率投资的影响。研究发现:上市公司的过度投资行为主要是由代理冲突比较严重且公司存在大量自由现金流而引发,投资不足主要是由融资约束引发,并非由债权代理冲突引发;上市公司的商业信用能够抑制过度投资,发挥治理作用。同时,商业信用又能够缓解投资不足,发挥融资功能。     

终极控制、内部现金流与投资支出

基于2005-2008年我国A股上市公司的研究样本,以终极控股股东的现金流权、控制权与现金流权分离度作为控股股东与少数股东利益一致程度的代理变量,对投资现金流敏感性进行实证检验,揭示上市公司投资行为特征。研究表明:我国上市公司投资现金流敏感性普遍存在。对于国有终极控股公司,这种敏感性随着终极控股股东现金流权的增加而降低,同时随着控制权与现金流权分离度的增加而增加,支持了自由现金流过度投资假说,也体现了终极控股股东利益趋同效应与侵占效应对投资支出的影响,并且终极控股股东利益侵占效应发生不仅需要能力和动机,还需要公司具有充足现金流这一"机会",较少的现金流能够有效地抑制国有终极控股公司的过度投资行为;而非国有终极控制公司更可能面临着融资约束,但尚未得到严格的实证支持。     

管理者过度自信与企业投资行为异化——来自我国证券市场的证据

Based on data of A-shares listed companies in China, this paper studies the relationship between managerial overconfidence and firms’ overinvestment behaviors. We first define a manager as an overconfident one if his or her compan’s announced earnings forecast is higher than its actual earnings at least once in 2002–2004. After controlling such factors as growing opportunity, size, etc., we find that overconfident managers tend to over-invest and their overinvestment behaviors have higher sensitivity to cash flow generated by financing activities. In other word, when their firms obtain an abundant cash flow from financing activities, overconfident managers will over-invest, or vise versa. Contrary to other relevant studies, we find that the sensitivity between over-investment and free cash flow has little to do with managerial overconfidence. Robustness testing is conducted to verify the reliability of our conclusions. We also use “whether top managers increase their holdings of company shares within the observation period” as a substitute variable for managerial overconfidence and run the tests again, and the results are consistent with the above. Finally, findings of this paper indicate that it is necessary for firms to establish a scientific and rigorous investment managing mechanism. Translated and revised from Nankai Guanli Pinglun 南开管理评论 (Nankai Business Review), 2008, (2): 77–83     

Corporate governance and investment-cash flow sensitivity: Evidence from emerging markets

Controlling for country-level governance, we investigate how firms' corporate governance influences financing constraints. Using firm-level corporate governance rankings across 14 emerging markets, we find that better corporate governance lowers the dependence of emerging market firms on internally generated cash flows, and reduces financing constraints that would otherwise distort efficient allocation of investment and destroy firm value. Additionally and more importantly, firm-level corporate governance matters more significantly in countries with weaker country-level governance. This suggests substitutability between firm-specific and country-level governance in determining a firm's investment sensitivity to internal cash flows.     

The impact of managerial ability on crisis-period corporate investment

In this study, we document a strong positive relation between pre-crisis managerial ability and corporate investment during the crisis period, which remains robust in the presence of a large array of control variables capturing corporate governance attributes, executive compensation incentives and CEO characteristics. This relationship was prevalent only among firms with CEOs that had general managerial skills, rather than firm-specific skills. Our results also show that the positive relationship between managerial ability and corporate investment was supported by the capacity of such firms to secure greater financing and be less vulnerable to financial constraints during the crisis. Finally, we find that, on average, the stock market evaluates crisis-period investments positively, yet this effect is evident solely among firms characterized by high pre-crisis managerial ability. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that high managerial ability helps to mitigate underinvestment problems during a crisis which in turn increases firm value.     

Institutional investors' corporate site visits and corporate investment efficiency

This study examines the association between institutional investors' corporate site visits (CSVs) and the visited firms' investment efficiency. Using unique CSVs' data from China, this study provides empirical evidence that institutional investors' CSVs lessen the visited firms' corporate investment inefficiency, including both over- and underinvestment. The negative relationship between CSVs and investment inefficiency is less pronounced for firms with higher quality financial reporting and better corporate governance. In addition, CSVs show a decrease in corporate overinvestment by monitoring the risk-taking activities of younger CEOs and expansionary firms, and supervising the use of excess free cash flows. Meanwhile, CSVs could mitigate underinvestment by reducing managerial shirking from entrenched CEOs, such as dual or longer-tenured CEOs. The possible economic mechanism behind this association is that CSVs increase institutional shareholding percentages. All the main findings are robust to a battery of endogeneity and robustness tests.     

Do financial constraints in an unstable emerging economy mitigate the opportunistic behavior of entrenched family owners?

Prior research is not conclusive whether information asymmetries or managerial discretion are the cause of observed investment-cash flow sensitivity. This paper examines the effect of family firms' governance heterogeneity on firm's investment-cash flow sensitivity in Brazil. The Brazilian economic and corporate governance context present several idiosyncratic features, including weak minority shareholder protection, an underdeveloped capital market, macro-economic uncertainties, the presence of controlling shareholders (especially families), and the excessive use of control-enhancing mechanisms, allowing us to explore in greater detail the drivers of investment-cash flow sensitivity. We find that investment is more sensitive to cash flow for firms with a highly entrenched family presence (divergence between corporate control and voting rights coupled with family management) than in less entrenched family firms. This result emerges primarily due to financial constraints from asymmetric information, rather than agency problems of free cash flow from abuse of managerial discretion. Our findings shed new light on the role of excessive control rights in investment decisions, allowing family managers to reallocate capital to cope with financial constraints in times of economic uncertainties.     

Management pay-performance sensitivity, internal cash flow and investment behavior: A test of the free cach flow theory and asymmetric information theory

The relationship between investment and financing, the two basic components of corporate finance, is of significant interest to researchers and practitioners alike. The free cash flow hypothesis and asymmetric information hypothesis are two important theories to explain the relationship between investment expenditure and cash flow. In this paper, we examine how consistency between the interests of management and shareholders influences investment-cash flow sensitivity, and how the nature of the controlling shareholder influences this relationship, so as to analyze how much the free cash flow hypothesis and asymmetric information hypothesis can explain the practice of investment and financing in China. We use pay-performance sensitivity as a proxy for the degree of consistency between shareholders and management interests. We find that investment-cash flow sensitivity is affected not only by financial constraints that caused by asymmetric information, but also by the shareholder-manager agency problem. It is found that the asymmetric information theory has more explanatory power than the shareholder-manager agency theory. In addition, the relationship between investment-cash flow sensitivity and pay-performance sensitivity is affected by the nature of controlling shareholders. Specifically, in the state-owned enterprises, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is mainly ascribed to information asymmetry problems, but in the non-state-owned enterprises, the investment-cash flow sensitivity mainly results from free cash flow. Translated and revised from Kuaiji Yanjiu 会计研究 (Accounting Research), 2007, (10): 73–81     

Alignment or entrenchment? Corporate governance and cash holdings in growing firms

This study contends that the association between corporate cash holdings and corporate governance is subject to the investment environments that firms face. For example, firms with an abundance of investment opportunities have a strong incentive to hold cash in order to maintain their competitive positions. Shareholders accept high levels of cash holdings in such growing firms if corporate governance can protect their interests. This study examines the effects of corporate governance on cash holdings for a sample of high-tech firms. The results show that CEO ownership, the directorship of venture capitalists (VCs), and independent directors play critical roles in corporate cash policy. In addition, the boards are more effective when the firms' CEOs are also their founders or when VCs hold a large stake of company shares. The effects of corporate governance are more significant in younger firms while the effects of firm-specific economic variables are more significant in older firms in the sample.     

The Relaxation of Financing Constraints by the Initial Public Offering of Small Manufacturing Firms

Capital market imperfections, such as information asymmetry, increase the cost of external funds compared to that of internal funds. This phenomenon creates financing constraints limiting the availability of external funds and making corporate investment excessively sensitive to cash flow. This study analyzes the effect of financing constraints on the investment by comparing the financial behavior of Korean firms before and after their stocks are newly listed on a stock exchange. The results show that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow will be higher during the period before initial public offering (IPO) than after IPO. In particular, the effect of financing constraints relaxation by IPO is more prominent in small than in large manufacturing firms.     

股权投资基金与企业实际投资的实证研究

股权投资基金与其他的融资方式相比有其独有的优势和特点,这种融资方式对于企业的投资决策和投资行为会产生其特有的影响。文章在综述国内外相关研究的基础上,以我国中小企业板上市公司为研究样本,构建实证模型,通过实证方法研究股权投资基金对企业实际投资的影响和作用。研究得出以下结论,中小企业板上市公司实际投资与股权投资基金的参与显著正相关,与公司成长性指标营业总收入增长率显著正相关,而实际投资与现金流指标和公司总资产负债率并不存在显著的相关性。     

融资约束、过度投资与现金流的价格敏感性

已有研究证实了盈余管理、会计稳健性以及边际投资收益递减规律均可能影响应计成分的持续性,揭示了资本市场对盈余的应计成分不存在“功能锁定”现象,但鲜有研究关注盈余的现金流成分与股价关系的影响因素。文章发现,过度投资会显著地降低现金流的价格敏感性,且对于现金持有水平高及融资约束程度高的公司,过度投资对现金流价格敏感性的影响更为显著。文章的研究结论一方面从经营活动现金流的价格敏感性视角揭示了过度投资的负面经济后果,另一方面也证实了市场对经营活动现金流同样不存在“功能锁定”现象。