Board involvement in international joint ventures

The last two decades have witnessed substantial scholarly interest in corporate boards, yet little research has been devoted to boards of international joint ventures (IJVs). We combine the corporate governance and alliance governance literatures in order to study this important ex post governance mechanism for IJVs. We identify a fundamental tension inherent in IJVs, which arises from the unique features of this organizational form and influences the level of involvement by their boards. International joint ventures are hybrid organizational forms that can require administrative control to facilitate monitoring and coordinated adaptation in the presence of exchange hazards. At the same time, the fact that IJVs operate in different host countries can make it efficient to delegate authority to local management for certain collaborations. In investigating the determinants of IJV board involvement, we therefore examine characteristics of IJVs that reflect this underlying tension. We conclude that board involvement reflects efficiency considerations in individual ventures, and the administrative control provided by boards is an important dimension of IJV governance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Partnering with Foreign Firms: How Do Chinese Managers View the Governance and Importance of Contracts?

It is a widespread perception that the role of contract in Chinese society is limited because obligations often derive from personal relationships. It is not clear how Chinese managers view the governance and importance of contracts when they deal with foreign counterparts in their joint ventures. To addresses this issue, this study proposes and verifies the governance structure and performance implications of interpartner contracts in a setting of international joint ventures (IJVs). Extant research on IJVs has extensively examined IJV performance but inadequately assessed how this performance is influenced by contractual design. Our analysis of 114 sample IJVs in China suggests that the governance structure of an IJV contract includes four dimensions, namely, issue inclusiveness, term specificity, contingency adaptability, and contractual obligatoriness. Each of these dimensions is validated to be important to IJV formation, interpartner cooperation, and process efficiency as perceived by Chinese managers working in IJVs.     

Product diversification in international joint ventures: performance implications in an emerging market

This study extends product diversification research to a new organizational form (IJV) and a new environmental context (emerging market). It explores the extent to which product relatedness with both foreign and local parents affects IJV performance as perceived by venture managers. After controlling for relevant variables, analysis of the data containing 134 IJVs in China validates our major premise: the relatedness of an IJV's products with that of its foreign and local parents is positively associated with its performance. An IJV maintaining bilateral related diversification (i.e., with both parents) performs better than a venture maintaining a unilateral related linkage (i.e., with one parent), which in turn outperforms an IJV which is unrelated to either parent. When resource complementarity or goal congruity between parents is higher, there is a stronger positive relationship between product relatedness and IJV performance. When structural opportunities are fewer or institutional deterrence is higher, there is a weaker positive relationship between product relatedness and IJV performance. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inter-partner control,trust, and radical innovation of IJVs in China: A contingent governance perspective

International joint ventures (IJVs) in emerging markets need to develop radical innovation to compete successfully in the rapidly changing business landscapes there. Taking a contingent governance perspective, this study examines how formal and social governance mechanisms, namely inter-partner control and inter-partner trust, affect radical innovation development in IJVs through knowledge acquisition and integration, and how emerging market institutional governance structures moderate the effectiveness of the two internal governance mechanisms. Based on a sample of 181 IJVs in China, we find that both inter-partner control and inter-partner trust promote IJV radical innovation; moreover, legal enforceability weakens the impact of inter-partner control but strengthens that of inter-partner trust on IJV radical innovation; likewise, government intervention risk weakens the positive role of inter-partner control yet strengthens that of inter-partner trust. This study extends both the innovation and IJV governance literature by connecting governance mechanisms to IJV radical innovation and uncovering important institutional contingencies.     

Intended and unintended termination of international joint ventures

This study proposes that international joint ventures (IJVs) are terminated either when the initial purposes of the formation of the IJV have been achieved (intended termination), or when unanticipated contingencies that emerge in the external, internal, or inter‐partner conditions after the establishment of the IJV impede the continuation of its operation (unintended termination). Our study examines the factors that affect intended and unintended termination and the longevity of IJVs. The findings show that approximately 90 percent of all IJV terminations are unintended and 10 percent intended, and that the frequency of intended termination and unintended termination varies noticeably depending on the initial purposes of formation. This suggests that the termination of IJVs is significantly contingent on their formation. The findings also show that the longevity of IJVs varies according to the initial purposes of formation, the initial conditions under which the IJV is formed, and the types of unanticipated contingencies that it encounters. The key theoretical issues and practical implications of the distinction between the intended and unintended termination of IJVs are also discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Control,collaboration, and productivity in international joint ventures: theory and evidence

This study analyzes the following unresolved questions: In international joint ventures (IJVs) in a developing country, how could different IJV structures address control and collaboration considerations, and what is the likely effect of such different structures on IJV productivity? Theoretically, we suggest that the ambiguity surrounding these questions reflects the tendency of researchers to view control and collaboration as opposing objectives, studying one or the other; in contrast, we provide a more integrative perspective that blends the two objectives, focusing on common underlying issues relating to enhancing partner commitment, ensuring partner knowledge contributions, and reducing partner risks. We address the most salient design consideration for IJV partners, that is, IJV ownership structure, to posit that joint consideration of the control benefit of a higher foreign ownership level in IJVs and the collaboration benefit of a more balanced IJV ownership structure results in an expected inverted U‐curve relationship between foreign ownership and IJV productivity. Additionally, we posit and test how three environmental contingencies, by affecting the need for control and collaboration in IJVs, would further influence the specific shape of the inverted U‐curve relationship. We find strong support for our theory using an extensive longitudinal dataset of over 5,000 IJVs in China from 1999–2003. We discuss the value of our approach and findings both for researchers and for IJV partners seeking the dual benefits of control and collaboration. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

AGENCY COSTS AND THE PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE INTERNALIZATION

Recent studies have examined the determinants of international joint venture (IJV) formations and stock market reactions to such investments. Less is known, however, about the evolution of IJVs and the attendant performance implications for parent firms. This paper examines one specific type of IJV evolution, IJV internalization, whereby one firm acquires the IJV by buying out its partner(s). Standard agency theory variables are hypothesized to influence parent firm valuation effects. The results indicate that parent firm valuation effects are positively related to the parent firm equity owned by insiders and the interaction of debt financing and free cash flow. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The assignment of call option rights between partners in international joint ventures

We examine call option rights as a contractual clause in international joint ventures (IJVs) and propose that the assignment of the call option right in an IJV is determined by certain ex ante asymmetries between the partners. Results show that between the two partners in an IJV, the firm with greater complementarity with the venture and greater prior IJV experience is more likely to hold the call option right; in addition, the firm's contractual choice on the call option right and its ownership choice on a greater initial equity stake are substitutive. Our focus on explicit call options advances the real options theory of collaborative agreements, and our results also highlight that option rights be considered an important part of alliance design. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Absorptive capacity,learning, and performance in international joint ventures

This paper proposes and tests a model of IJV learning and performance that segments absorptive capacity into the three components originally proposed by Cohen and Levinthal (1990). First, trust between an IJV's parents and the IJV's relative absorptive capacity with its foreign parent are suggested to influence its ability to understand new knowledge held by foreign parents. Second, an IJV's learning structures and processes are proposed to influence its ability to assimilate new knowledge from those parents. Third, the IJV's strategy and training competence are suggested to shape its ability to apply the assimilated knowledge. Revisiting the Hungarian IJVs studied by Lyles and Salk (1996) 3 years later, we find support for the knowledge understanding and application predictions, and partial support for the knowledge assimilation prediction. Unexpectedly, our results suggest that trust and management support from foreign parents are associated with IJV performance but not learning. Our model and results offer a new perspective on IJV learning and performance as well as initial insights into how those relationships change over time. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Explaining IJV survival in a transitional economy through social exchange and knowledge‐based perspectives

In this study, we combine social exchange and knowledge‐based perspectives to develop a general path model of IJV survival. We further refine our expectations by considering the transitional economic context of our study and the somewhat unique managerial values resulting from the legacy of Marxist ideology. Results from structural equation modeling suggest that an imbalance in the management control structure between the parents leads to parental conflict and an increased likelihood of IJV failure. An imbalance in the ownership control structure, however, had no influence on conflict or survival. In general, support from the foreign parent is positively related to IJV learning and IJV survival. However, higher levels of technical support provided by the foreign parent to the IJV reduced the level of parental conflict, whereas management support had no effect on conflict. Our results suggest some dilemmas for firms pursuing IJVs in transitional economies. Although the foreign parent often contributes critical resources to the IJV, providing it with bargaining power and a high level of influence, an imbalance in management control between the partners may ultimately be detrimental to IJV survival. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Perceived fairness,decision control,and commitment in international joint venture management teams

Previous research examining the effectiveness of international joint ventures (IJVs) has focused on differences in the backgrounds and bargaining power of IJV parent firms, while little attention has been given to the IJV itself. This study takes a different perspective by examining the relationship between IJV parent firms and the IJV. Specifically, we examine how IJV and parent involvement in strategic decision‐making influences the IJV management team's commitment to the IJV and to the parent firms. We hypothesize that the IJV management team tends to be more committed to the IJV than to the parent firms, and that there is a strong positive relationship between procedural justice, strategic decision control, and organizational commitment. A field study involving 51 IJVs supported our hypotheses. We discuss the implications of organizational commitment and procedural justice for managing IJVs. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Government corruption and foreign stakes in international joint ventures in emerging economies

This paper analyzes the relationship between government corruption and the changes in the equity stake of foreign partners in international joint ventures (IJVs) formed with local firms in emerging Asian economies. This relationship is defined according to transaction cost theory. This relationship is complemented by the introduction of a moderating variable derived from organizational learning theory: the country experience of foreign partners. This article is based on a sample of 171 European firms, which formed IJVs in emerging Asian economies during the year 1996. Using an event history analysis, the evolution of each European equity stake was followed-up from year 1996 to the end of the period at risk on January 2007. From the empirical results presented in this article, some findings have been drawn on the attitudes of foreign firms toward government corruption in emerging Asian economies. First, we showed that the government corruption is significantly related to the likelihood of foreign partners to terminate the IJV. However, the nature of this relationship is differentiated according to the score used to measure government corruption. The relationship is positive when using the Transparency International score and negative with the Political Risk Services score. Second, we put into evidence that the country experience of foreign partners moderates the relationship between government corruption and the changes in the equity stake of foreign partners in IJVs in emerging Asian economies.

Executive preferences for governance modes and exchange partners: An information economics perspective

This study investigates how executives address information asymmetry and adverse selection surrounding international joint ventures (IJVs) and acquisitions. We argue that executives can address such exchange hazards not only through their governance decisions, as prior research indicates, but also through their selection of exchange partners. Our experimental design complements prior research on firms' governance choices in three ways: (1) by incorporating multiple potential exchange partners rather than taking a single partner as given for a realized transaction; (2) by accommodating multiple potential entry modes to address interdependencies across governance structures; and (3) by providing direct evidence on executives' assessments of IJVs and acquisitions. We join together organizational governance research and decision‐making research on IJV partner selection, two literatures that have largely developed separately. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Acquisition of organizational capabilities and competitive advantage of IJVs in transition economies: The case of Vietnam

Using Vietnam as the context, the study empirically examines how the competitive advantage of international joint ventures (IJVs) in transition economies is affected by the acquisition of resources from foreign partners and of local market-based resources. Our study contributes to the nascent literature on IJVs in transition economies by producing several novel and interesting findings. First, it demonstrates the need to modify certain arguments of the resource-based view (RBV) when applied to IJVs in transition economies. This paper shows that the peculiar market characteristics of transition economies serve as an imitation barrier turning even property-based resources into sources of sustainable competitive advantage. Second, the positive impact of knowledge-based resources on the IJV’s competitiveness seems to be significantly enhanced as the ownership by the foreign parent increases. Lastly, competitive advantage of IJVs appears to be strengthened when the transfer of property-based resources is complemented by that of knowledge-based resources, and when the transfer of internal, firm-specific resources is complemented by that of external, market-based ones. We believe that these findings make significant, incremental theoretical and empirical contributions to both the RBV and IJV literatures.

Antecedents and performance consequences of learning success in international joint ventures

This study examined a sample of organizations involved in international joint ventures, (IJVs) in Malaysia. Drawing upon the resource based view of the firm this paper investigates the antecedents and performance consequences of learning success of foreign partners in IJVs. Data was analysed using two-stage least squares regression (2SLS). Results suggest that a learning orientation, IJV partner mutual dependency and management control, have a positive effect upon the learning success. Results also suggest that organizations with higher levels of learning orientation and learning success have higher levels of business performance. The findings imply that foreign partners in IJVs that are successful in achieving their learning goals, and improving their knowledge, will be winners in terms of improving their business performance.     

Frequency and directional reversal of equity ownership change in international joint ventures

Changes in equity ownership between international joint venture (IJV) partners over an IJV life-course represent an important behavioral manifestation of relational dynamics. We examine each occurrence of equity ownership change for two salient temporal properties: frequency (how often ownership change occurs) and directional reversal (when a partner buys and then sells, or vice versa, equity shares from another partner). Building on social exchange theory, we propose that initial partner equity imbalance and partners’ country’s individualism-collectivist culture has an imprinting effect on the likelihood of ownership change for both temporal properties. We developed a data set consisting of all equity changes in 200 Japanese automotive suppliers’ IJVs and found support for our hypotheses while controlling for transaction cost explanations. Our findings contribute to IJV research by shedding light on temporal aspects of equity ownership change over an IJV’s life course as well as the underlying exchange dynamics and the stability of IJV equity ownership distribution among partners.     

Effect of equity ownership on the survival of international joint ventures

This note extends transaction cost analysis of international joint ventures (IJVs) to include explicitly the effect of equity. It challenges the common practice of treating all foreign investments with between 5 percent and 95 percent equity as IJVs. A fine‐grained analysis of the role of foreign equity ownership on the survival of 12,984 overseas subsidiaries confirms a declining, nonlinear, and asymmetrical relationship between equity and mortality in overseas subsidiaries. While investments involving small ownership levels (<20%) have very high mortality rates, those with high ownership levels (>80%) have mortality rates comparable to that of wholly owned subsidiaries. Implications for research, practice, and policy are discussed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Home Alone: The Effects of Lone‐Insider Boards on CEO Pay,Financial Misconduct,and Firm Performance

Research summary: Corporate scandals of the previous decade have heightened attention on board independence. Indeed, boards at many large firms are now so independent that the CEO is “home alone” as the lone inside member. We build upon “pro‐insider” research within agency theory to explain how the growing trend toward lone‐insider boards affects key outcomes and how external governance forces constrain their impact. We find evidence among S&P 1500 firms that having a lone‐insider board is associated with (a) excess CEO pay and a larger CEO‐top management team pay gap, (b) increased likelihood of financial misconduct, and (c) decreased firm performance, but that stock analysts and institutional investors reduce these negative effects. The findings raise important questions about the efficacy of leaving the CEO “home alone.” Managerial summary: Following concerns that insider‐dominated boards failed to protect shareholders, there has been a push for greater board independence. This push has been so successful that the CEO is now the only insider on the boards of more than half of S&P 1500 firms. We examine whether lone‐insider boards do in fact offer strong governance or whether they enable CEOs to benefit personally. We find that lone‐insider boards pay CEOs excessively, pay CEOs a disproportionately large amount relative to other top managers, have more instances of financial misconduct, and have lower performance than boards with more than one insider. Thus, it appears that lone‐insider boards do not function as intended and firms should reconsider whether the push towards lone‐insider boards is actually in shareholders' best interests. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Anxiety of dependency in international joint ventures? An empirical study of drivers and consequences of relationship insecurity

This research introduces and delineates the concept of insecurity in IJV relationships. We define relationship insecurity as a parent firm's concerns about the continuance of the alliance arrangement and its partner's future provision of need satisfaction. According to interdependence theory, exchange partners that experience high dependence inevitably experience this ‘anxiety of dependency’, and the emergence of insecurity can destabilize the working relationship from within. We develop a conceptual model of the drivers and consequences of relationship insecurity in IJVs. Our survey results from 125 IJVs indicate that focal firm dependence and partner firm dependence both negatively affect insecurity, though the former is the dominant predictor. This surprising finding implies IJV partners experience ‘anxiety of low dependency’. The results suggest insecurity not only reduces directly IJV performance, but also lowers the quality of interpartner communication, which in turn dampens performance. Implications of these results are discussed.     

Contract,cooperation, and performance in international joint ventures

This study examines how contract, cooperation, and performance are associated with one another within international joint ventures (IJVs). We argue that contract and cooperation are not substitutes but complements in relation to IJV performance. An IJV contract provides an institutional framework guiding the course of cooperation, while cooperation overcomes the adaptive limits of contracts. Our analysis of 293 IJVs in a dynamic market demonstrates that previous cooperation bolsters contractual adaptability, which in turn nurtures current cooperation between the same partners. We find that contract completeness and cooperation drive IJV performance both independently and interactively. When contracts are more complete, cooperation contributes more to performance. Contract and cooperation differ in their quadratic effects such that the contribution of contract completeness to performance declines as completeness increases but the contribution of cooperation remains linear. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.