Firm‐specific knowledge resources and competitive advantage: the roles of economic‐ and relationship‐based employee governance mechanisms

The resource‐based view of the firm emphasizes the role of firm‐specific resources, especially firm‐specific knowledge resources, in helping a firm to achieve sustainable competitive advantage. However, the deployment of firm‐specific knowledge often requires key employees to make specialized human capital investments that are not easily redeployable to other settings. Thus, in the absence of effective safeguards and trust building devices, employees with foresight may be reluctant to make such specialized investments. This study explores both economic‐ and relationship‐based governance mechanisms that might mitigate this underinvestment problem. Effective use of these governance mechanisms enables a firm to obtain greater performance from its efforts to deploy firm‐specific knowledge resources. Empirical results further support these key arguments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific human capital,organizational incentives,and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking

This paper explores conflicting implications of firm‐specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more‐sophisticated ‘gaming’ of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high‐FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high‐FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stakeholder management as a predictor of CEO compensation: main effects and interactions with financial performance

We test the effects of stakeholder management on CEOs' salaries, bonuses, stock options, and total compensation. We also examine the extent to which the interaction of stakeholder management and financial performance determines compensation. Using a longitudinal database of 406 Fortune 1000 firms, our results suggest that stakeholder management is relevant to boards of directors when setting CEO compensation. Specifically, we found a significant, negative main effect of stakeholder management on CEO salaries. Further, we found that stakeholder management typically reduces the rewards CEOs may get for increasing levels of financial performance. In tandem, these results indicate that CEOs may jeopardize their personal wealth by pursuing stakeholder‐related initiatives. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Increase in takeover protection and firm knowledge accumulation strategy

Research summary : We argue that the extent to which a firm faces takeover threats affects its knowledge structure. In particular, takeover threats may lead to managers' reluctance to adopt a strategy toward firm‐specific knowledge accumulation because implementing this strategy requires them to acquire specialized skills, which are at risk under takeover threats. Conversely, takeover protection leads to an increase in firm‐specific knowledge. Further, the relationship between takeover protection and firm‐specific knowledge is positively moderated by managerial ownership, which helps align managerial interests with those of shareholders. But the relationship is negatively moderated by managerial tenure, as long‐tenured managers have already committed to their firms. Using a differences‐in‐differences method with Delaware antitakeover rulings in the mid‐1990s as an exogenous shock, we found results supporting these arguments. Managerial summary : We examined how changes in the Delaware antitakeover rulings in mid‐1990s affected the knowledge structure of firms incorporated in Delaware. We reasoned that with a greater level of takeover protection, top managers of those firms incorporated in Delaware felt higher job security, thus providing them stronger incentives to make strategic decisions toward the development of firm‐specific knowledge and to make corresponding human capital investments in specialized skills. Empirically, firms incorporated in Delaware were found to have an increase in the level of firm‐specific knowledge in their knowledge structure after the mid‐1990s. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the role of takeover protection on top manager incentives is particularly salient when the managers are awarded with more company shares and when the managers have shorter organizational tenure. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO compensation in relation to worker compensation across countries: The configurational impact of country‐level institutions

Executive compensation and its relation to that of rank and file employees are vital areas of strategy research. This study contributes to our understanding of cross‐national differences in executive compensation by exploring how key formal and informal country‐level institutions of social power structures combine to shape CEO and worker compensation across countries as well as the resulting pay dispersion. Analyzing data spanning 54 countries using the configurational approach fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), the study also explores the causal asymmetry underlying compensation outcomes by investigating institutional configurations linked to high CEO compensation, high worker pay, and high pay dispersion and those configurations linked to the absence of these outcomes. The article concludes by discussing the study's implications for theory and research on executive compensation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO compensation: A resource advantage and stakeholder‐bargaining perspective

This paper studies how CEO pay and its composition is shaped by strategic factors related to the firm's capacity to generate rents and value, the uncertainty of its resource advantage, and the competitive interaction between firm stakeholders and top management. This is done using an analytical framework in which the CEO and other firm stakeholders interact over the firm's resource surplus as utility‐maximizing claimants based on their relative bargaining power while providing shareholders their market‐based required return. Results from the model yield a number of cogent strategic insights and predictions on the causal interplay between CEO pay, firm growth and risk characteristics, stakeholder management, corporate strategy (e.g., offshoring production), and behavioral biases such as CEO optimism and overconfidence. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic human capital management in the context of cross‐industry and within‐industry mobility frictions

Research Summary: We develop and test a theory examining how frictions that restrict mobility across industries and frictions constraining mobility within an industry can co‐occur to effectively isolate individual human capital, ultimately changing the firm's make‐versus‐buy decision for human capital. Empirically, we demonstrate that when cross‐industry frictions in the form of limited skill transferability and within‐industry frictions in the form of noncompete enforceability are both present, employees exhibit longer tenures, firms hire workers with less initial experience, firms change the amount and nature of training provided, and wages marginally increase. These findings suggest that sufficiently strong and complementary mobility frictions shift the emphasis of firms’ human capital management practices toward internal development of human capital relative to acquisition on the external market. Managerial Summary : In the face of frictions to employee mobility both within and across industries, which we capture empirically using measures of noncompete enforceability and limited skill transferability across industries, firms tend to hire less experienced workers, such workers exhibit longer tenures, and firms invest more in their training, particularly in the development of new skills. Our findings imply that for firms operating under such complementary frictions, better hiring and internal development capabilities are particularly important for performance, while those firms without such capabilities may benefit from considering ways to circumvent the mobility frictions, including moving out of the focal state or lobbying for different noncompete laws.     

The influence of lead indicator strength on the use of nonfinancial measures in performance management: Evidence from CEO compensation schemes

Nonfinancial measures (NFMs) are a common feature of strategic performance management frameworks. We examine the role of one widely used NFM: customer satisfaction, in one aspect of strategic performance management: CEO compensation schemes. Drawing on agency theory precepts, we hypothesize that the extent to which firms link CEO compensation to customer satisfaction is influenced by satisfaction's ability to act as a leading indicator of future profitability (lead indicator strength). We further hypothesize that the extent to which customer satisfaction's lead indicator strength influences the weighting of satisfaction in CEO compensation schemes has a positive influence on future shareholder value. Our empirical results offer strong support for both hypotheses and extend research on the use and efficacy of NFMs in CEO compensation schemes. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is performance driven by industry‐ or firm‐specific factors? A reply to McNamara,Aime, and Vaaler

We revisit the questions of identification of outlying firms within industries and their impact on the relative importance of firm‐ and industry‐specific factors for firm performance. In response to McNamara, Aime and Valler (2005), we argue that the key results in Hawawini, Subramnian and Verdin (2003) are insensitive to the varying methods used to identify firm outliers. Further, we argue that conducting tests on industry outliers are inconsistent to what is indicated by theory and past empirical results on the relative importance of firm and industry effects to firm performance. Firm effects may matter most for outperforming and underpeforming firms, while industry effects may be at least as important to firms ‘stuck in the middle’. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Alleviating managerial dilemmas in human‐capital‐intensive firms through incentives: Evidence from M&A legal advisors

Research summary: We examine how human‐capital‐intensive firms deploy their human assets and how firm‐specific human capital interacts with incentives to influence this deployment. Our empirical context is the UK M&A legal market, where micro‐data enable us to observe the allocation of lawyers to M&A mandates under different incentive regimes. We find that law firms actively equalize the workload among their lawyers to seek efficiency gains, while “stretching” lawyers with high firm‐specific capital to a greater extent. However, lawyers with high firm‐specific capital also appear to influence the staffing process in their favor, leading to unbalanced allocations and less sharing of projects and clients. Paradoxically, law firms may adopt a seniority‐based rent‐sharing system that weakens individual incentives to mitigate the impact of incentive conflicts on resource deployment. Managerial summary: The study highlights the dilemmas when professional service firms allocate their key individuals to incoming projects, and the role that monetary incentives play in aggravating or alleviating these dilemmas. In the context of UK M&A law firms, we find that partners have a tendency to be attached to too many projects and not to share enough work, which is exacerbated when individual monetary incentives are stronger. Firms adopting a seniority based incentive system (lockstep system) are able to alleviate this effect. This implies that there is a trade‐off between rewarding personal performance versus balancing workloads and fostering collaboration among professionals. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific human capital investments as a signal of general value: Revisiting assumptions about human capital and how it is managed

Research summary : Prior scholarship has assumed that firm‐specific and general human capital can be analyzed separately. This article argues that, in some settings, this is not the case because prior firm‐specific human capital investments can be a market signal of an individual's willingness and ability to make such investments in the future. As such, the willingness and ability to make firm‐specific investments is a type of general human capital that links firm‐specific and general human capital in important ways. The article develops theory about these investments, market signals, and value appropriation. Then, the article examines implications for human resource management and several important questions in the field of strategic management, including theories of the firm and microfoundations of competitive advantage. Managerial summary : While managers don't often use the terms firm‐specific and general skills, they certainly recognize that investments employees make in their skill sets are more or less relevant to a specific firm. For instance, investing in specific relationships within a firm or learning a firm's proprietary software would be considered firm‐specific investments. While such skills may seem relevant only to the particular firm in which they were invested, these investments may also send valuable signals to competing firms that such employees are willing and able to make similar investments elsewhere. Hence, managers should be interested in determining if a potential hire has made prior firm‐specific investments to help them know whether that person might be likely to make such investments in his or her future place of employment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social networking relationships,firm‐specific managerial experience and firm performance in a transition economy: A comparative analysis of family owned and nonfamily firms

The effect of social networking relationships, firm‐specific managerial experience, and their interactions on performance between family owned and nonfamily firms are studied. Using data from 106 organizations in Ghana, the findings show that family owned firms benefit more from networking relationships with bureaucratic officials than do nonfamily firms. However, nonfamily firms benefit more from networking relationships with community leaders and firm‐specific managerial experience than do family owned firms. Networking relationships with politicians impede performance for nonfamily firms. Nonfamily firms are better able than family owned firms to use their firm‐specific managerial experience to manage the resources and capabilities obtained from networking relationships with community leaders to create value. Moreover, firm‐specific managerial experience attenuates the detrimental effects of networking with politicians for both types of firms. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance deviations and acquisition premiums: The impact of CEO celebrity on managerial risk‐taking

Research summary: This article draws on identity control theory and a study of acquisition premiums to explore how CEO celebrity status and financial performance relative to aspirations affect firm risk behavior. The study finds that celebrity CEOs tend to pay smaller premiums for target firms, but these tendencies change when prior firm performance deviates from the industry average returns, thereby leading these CEOs to pay higher premiums. The study also finds that the premiums tend to be even larger when celebrity CEOs have more recently attained celebrity status. Taken together, these findings contribute to identity control theory and CEO celebrity literatures by suggesting that celebrity status is a double‐edged sword and that the internalization of celebrity status by CEOs strongly influences the decision‐making of CEOs. Managerial summary: The purpose of this article is to examine how CEO celebrity status and financial performance relative to aspirations affect the size of acquisition premiums. The study finds that celebrity CEOs tend to pay smaller premiums for target firms. However, when celebrity CEOs' prior firm performance is either better or worse than the industry average, these CEOs pay higher premiums. This situation is exacerbated when the CEO has only recently been crowned a celebrity. In effect, these CEOs feel great pressure to match the inflated performance expectations that come with celebrity status. These findings suggest that being a celebrity is a double‐edged sword. The implication here is that CEOs who have recently been crowned a celebrity should be aware of these pressures and cope accordingly. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Employee mobility,spin‐outs,and knowledge spill‐in: How incumbent firms can learn from new ventures

Research summary: We consider conditions in which incumbent firms are particularly poised to benefit from knowledge spilling in from new ventures that employ individuals previously employed by the focal incumbent firm. We distinguish between inventors who leave their incumbent employers to found spin‐outs and those who become non‐founding employees of existing new ventures. Using a sample of new ventures and incumbent firms in the U.S. information technology (IT) sector, we find that incumbents are more likely to benefit from patented knowledge that spills in from their spin‐outs than from new ventures that employ non‐founding inventors formerly employed by the respective incumbent. Any advantage that parent firms have in reaping such knowledge quickly dissipates, however, when these parents have a history of misappropriating the intellectual property of others. Managerial summary: It has long been acknowledged that new ventures can acquire valuable knowledge from their larger and more established counterparts by hiring away their talented employees. We consider the possibility of a reverse flow of knowledge where established firms learn from those new ventures that have poached employees from them. We find that established information technology (IT) firms are more likely to learn and build on the technology of their spin‐outs (i.e., new ventures founded by their former inventors) than from new ventures that simply employ non‐founding inventors formerly employed by the respective IT firm. Any advantage that these IT firms had in reaping technical know‐how from their spin‐outs quickly dissipated, however, when they had a history of misappropriating the intellectual property of others. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of social proximity in professional CEO appointments: Evidence from caste/religion‐based hiring of CEOs in India

Research Summary: The role of homophily in CEO appointments at the largest corporations is an important subject in corporate governance. This subject is particularly important in a country like India where a multitude of religions, castes, and communities form its social fabric. We test for the role of homophily in professional CEO appointments in India by empirically examining the preference for same caste/religion CEOs by the largest firms. Using a unique dataset, assembled by detailed identification of castes/religions from family names and counterfactuals obtained through the Coarsened Exact Matching technique, we find that caste/religion plays a crucial role in CEO selection as a source of information (positive discrimination). The evidence is not consistent with its use to pursue taste‐based preferences (negative discrimination). Managerial Summary: We test for the role of homophily in the appointments of CEOs in India by empirically examining the preference for same caste/religion CEOs by the largest firms. We find that caste/religion plays an important role in CEO selection, i.e., as a form of information or “positive discrimination.” The evidence is not consistent with its use to pursue taste‐based preferences or “negative discrimination.”     

Upper‐echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while “accounting” CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non‐MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce “strategic” CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity‐based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post‐hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper‐echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource‐based view, and assortative matching literatures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

Assessing the effects of mergers and acquisitions on firm performance,plant productivity,and workers: newl evidence from matched employer‐employee data

Empirical studies of mergers and acquisitions typically focus on firm‐level financial performance. In contrast, we use human capital theory to model these events as transactions that simultaneously have cross‐level, real effects on workers, plants, and firms. Our empirical analysis is based on longitudinal, linked employer‐employee data for virtually all Swedish manufacturing firms and employees. We find that mergers and acquisitions enhance plant productivity, although they also result in the downsizing of establishments and firms. Firm performance does not decline in the aftermath of these ownership changes. We conclude that such transactions constitute a mechanism for improving the sorting and matching of plants and workers to more efficient uses. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Acquiring knowledge by foreign partners from international joint ventures in a transition economy: learning‐by‐doing and learning myopia

This paper proposes and tests a model of how firms acquire knowledge from their international joint venturing experience. Based on survey responses from 73 Singapore and 89 Hong Kong firms with respect to their joint ventures set up in China, the results indicate that both overseeing effort and management involvement are significant channels of knowledge acquisition. The former channel is more important for firms with a great deal of operational experience in China and for parents of older joint ventures. This finding indicates that firms improve their skills of knowledge acquisition through learning‐by‐doing. Moreover, the strategic importance of the venture concerned, instead of the learning intent of the parent, is the driving force behind the allocation of resources to the two channels. This implies that firms mainly learn through managing their key joint ventures. Since a venture that provides novel and fruitful learning experience may not, and need not, be an operation of great strategic importance, this finding suggests the existence of learning myopia. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.