Chief strategy officers: Contingency analysis of their presence in top management teams

Drawing upon contingency theory, we analyze the antecedents and performance consequences of chief strategy officer (CSO) presence in top management teams (TMTs). We argue that strategic and structural complexity affects the decision to have a CSO in the TMT and its effect on firm performance. The results of a sample of S&P 500 firms over a five‐year period reveal that diversification, acquisition activity, and TMT role interdependence are positively associated with CSO presence. However, we also find that the structural choice to have a CSO in the TMT does not significantly affect a firm's financial performance. This first systematic analysis of CSO presence informs research on CSOs and contributes to the emerging literature on TMT structure. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Top management team compensation: the missing link between CEO pay and firm performance?

In this research we discuss the relationship between CEO and top management team (TMT) member compensation, and explore the implications of TMT pay for firm performance. Specifically, we suggest that firm performance may benefit due to agency and group behavioral issues when top management team member pay is aligned—alignment is defined as the degree to which TMT member pay reflects (1) shareholder interests and (2) key political and strategic contingencies within the firm. In support of our theorizing, we found CEO pay to be related to TMT pay; TMT compensation, in turn, predicted performance (i.e., return on assets and Tobin's q) when aligned with shareholder interests and internal contingencies. Moreover, the effect of CEO pay on future firm performance was dependent on top team pay. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sharing the wealth: social comparisons and pay dispersion in the CEO's top team

The antecedents and consequences of pay dispersion are studied using theory that focuses on the social comparisons that occur among members of the CEO's top team. Results from a sample of large public firms indicate that when members of this elite group were similar on a variety of dimensions, and thus likely to compare their pay, the board allowed less dispersion. In addition, pay dispersion was negatively related to company performance, particularly when it exceeded what could be justified by characteristics of the industry, firm, or team. But the strength of that relationship depended on how uniformly members of the team would benefit from subsequent performance gains. Specifically, the negative effect was particularly strong in firms where major differences in compensation—that is, some executives were given significantly more stock options—combined with a volatile stock price to provide only a few team members with the opportunity to realize very large financial gains in the future. The study demonstrates that the social‐psychological factors that affect comparisons among members of the CEO's top team impact the board's pay setting process, which in turn affects pay dispersion, and ultimately firm performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Changes in executive compensation following an environmental shift: the role of top management team turnover

In this study we examine the changes in executive compensation at the top management team (TMT) level following an environmental shift. Using the context of deregulation in the airline industry, we find that: (1) a dramatic environmental change that heightens managerial discretion leads to greater pay level and performance sensitivity of TMT compensation; and (2) the greater the magnitude of turnover among TMT members following the environmental shift, the greater the compensation change. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model

Several studies have addressed the CEO duality-performance relationship, with inconsistent results. This paper proposes that these inconsistencies can be resolved by integrating agency and stewardship perspectives on duality. Using data from 192 firms in 12 industries, both the direction and magnitude of the duality-performance relationship was found to vary systematically across Dess and Beard's (1984) environmental dimensions. These results provide partial support for both agency and stewardship perspectives.     

Structural interdependence within top management teams: A key moderator of upper echelons predictions

Studies of the effects of top management team (TMT) composition on organizational outcomes have yielded mixed and confusing results. A possible breakthrough resides in the reality that TMTs vary in how they are fundamentally structured. Some are structured such that members operate independently of each other, while others are set up such that roles are highly interdependent. We examine the potential for three facets of structural interdependence—horizontal, vertical, and reward interdependence—to resolve ambiguities regarding effects of TMT heterogeneity. Based on a sample of TMTs in technology firms, we find that the three facets of structural interdependence are potent moderators of two classic predictions: the positive association between TMT heterogeneity and member departures, and between TMT heterogeneity and firm performance. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of CEO relative standing in acquisition behavior and CEO pay

In this study, we develop and test a theory of CEO relative pay standing. Specifically, we propose that CEOs with negative relative pay standing status (underpaid relative to comparison CEOs) will engage in acquisition activity, as a self‐interested means of attempting to realign their pay with that of their peers. We further propose that, when CEOs with negative relative pay standing acquire, they will tend to finance those acquisitions more heavily with stock than cash, to mitigate the risk associated with those deals. Finally, we argue that acquisition activity will partially mediate the influence of CEO negative relative pay standing on subsequent CEO compensation increases; however, that pay growth will come primarily in the form of long‐term incentive pay. Our results support our predictions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dynamic managerial capabilities: Configuration and orchestration of top executives' capabilities and the firm's dominant logic

This paper contributes to the understanding of the executive team dynamic managerial capabilities by developing theory about the interplay between the firm's dominant logic and dynamic managerial capabilities (including managerial human capital, social capital, and cognition). We underscore the criticality of the two key CEO‐level functions: configuration and orchestration of senior executive team dynamic capabilities. We develop theory on how these functions create and sculpt the management team's absorptive capacity, which in turn shapes the team's adaptive capacity. We present theory about the distributed nature of efforts for organizational renewal where CEO's dynamic managerial capabilities in concerto with senior executive managerial capabilities will drive top management's ability to revitalize the firm's dominant logic and to achieve evolutionary fit. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does top management team diversity promote or hamper foreign expansion?

Prior research suggests that top management team (TMT) diversity increases strategic innovation. We extended this argument to the case of entering new geographic areas. In addition to exploring the cognitive implications of TMT diversity, as done in prior research, we explored when diversity may lead to the formation of subgroups within TMTs hampering communication and the propensity to enter new geographic areas. We also examined how these positive cognitive and negative social implications change over time as TMT members interact over the years. The hypotheses were tested using ordinal probit analysis and data on 2,159 expansions of 25 companies over a period of more than three decades. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Politically connected boards and top executive pay in Chinese listed firms

Drawing on social comparison theory, this study examines the relationship between politically connected boards and top executive pay. Moreover, given the socialist orientation of China, tests are also carried out to establish the relationship between politically connected directors and pay dispersion across the firm. We find a negative association between politically connected boards and top executive pay. We also find that politically connected boards are negatively associated with pay dispersion, i.e., the higher the number of political directors on the board the smaller the gap between top executive pay and average employee pay. Finally, our study shows that politically connected directors weaken the pay‐performance link. These findings have important theoretical, policy, and managerial implications. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Good learners: How top management teams affect the success and frequency of acquisitions

We develop new theory and hypotheses on how a firm's top management team learns from acquisition experience, why, in consequence, the composition of the team is crucial, and how this affects acquisition frequency and success. We focus on the diversity of the top team and argue that heterogeneous teams, as compared to homogenous ones, acquire less but benefit more from their acquisition experience and are more successful with their acquisitions because they avoid mis‐transferring their experiences. We tested our hypotheses on acquisition frequency and success using longitudinal data on more than 2,000 acquisitions by 25 Dutch companies over four decades (1966 to 2006). Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Influences of top management team incentives on firm risk taking

In our work, the influences on subsequent firm risk taking of fixed incentives relative to variable incentives as well as the separate effects on subsequent corporate risk taking of variable incentives are examined. Focusing on the top management team members, we find a higher proportion of incentives that are devoted to fixed incentives relative to variable incentives tend to be inversely associated with subsequent firm risk taking. Managerial stock options are directly and uniformly associated with subsequent corporate risk taking. Executive shareholdings, however, display a curvilinear relationship with subsequent enterprise risk taking. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Red,blue, and purple firms: Organizational political ideology and corporate social responsibility

Research summary : Why do firms vary so much in their stances toward corporate social responsibility (CSR )? Prior research has emphasized the role of external pressures, as well as CEO preferences, while little attention has been paid to the possibility that CSR may also stem from prevailing beliefs among the body politic of the firm. We introduce the concept of organizational political ideology to explain how political beliefs of organizational members shape corporate advances in CSR . Using a novel measure based on the political contributions by employees of Fortune 500 firms, we find that ideology predicts advances in CSR . This effect appears stronger when CSR is rare in the firm's industry, when firms are high in human capital intensity, and when the CEO has had long organizational tenure . Managerial summary : Why do firms vary in their stances toward corporate social responsibility (CSR )? Prior research suggests that companies engage in CSR when under pressure to do so, or when their CEOs have liberal values. We introduce the concept of organizational political ideology, and argue that CSR may also result from the values of the larger employee population. Introducing a novel measure of organizational political ideology, based on employees' donations to the two major political parties in the United States, we find that liberal‐leaning companies engage in more CSR than conservative‐leaning companies, and even more so when other firms in the industry have weaker CSR records, when the company relies heavily on human resources and when the company's CEO has a long organizational tenure . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Polychronicity in top management teams: The impact on strategic decision processes and performance of new technology ventures

This study focuses on polychronicity as a cultural dimension of top management teams (TMTs). TMT polychronicity is the extent to which team members mutually prefer and tend to engage in multiple tasks simultaneously or intermittently instead of one at a time and believe that this is the best way of doing things. We explore the impact of TMT polychronicity on strategic decision speed and comprehensiveness and, subsequently, its effect on new venture financial performance. Contrary to popular time‐management principles advocating task prioritization and focused sequential execution, we found that TMT polychronicity has a positive effect on firm performance in the context of dynamic unanalyzable environments. This effect is partially mediated by strategic decision speed and comprehensiveness. Our study contributes to research on strategic leadership by focusing on a novel value‐based characteristic of the TMT (polychronicity) and by untangling the decision‐making processes that relate TMT characteristics and firm performance. It also contributes to the attention‐based view of the firm by positioning polychronicity as a new type of attention structure. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment

Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Upper‐echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while “accounting” CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non‐MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce “strategic” CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity‐based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post‐hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper‐echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource‐based view, and assortative matching literatures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Postacquisition turnover among U.S. top management teams: an analysis of the effects of foreign vs. domestic acquisitions of U.S. targets

An analysis of postacquisition top management turnover among 168 cross-border and 102 purely domestic acquisitions, and a control group of 120 nonacquired U.S. firms, revealed that turnover rates in firms acquired by non-U.S. acquirers were significantly higher than in firms acquired by other U.S. firms or the control group. Further, the timing of postacquisition turnover differed in the foreign vs. domestic acquisitions. Finally, the nationality of the foreign acquirer was found to be an important predictor of turnover in certain acquisition categories. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Offshoring and firm innovation: The moderating role of top management team attributes

This study attempts to increase the understanding of how offshoring influences the introduction of new products and services. Focusing on the offshoring of those business functions that provide direct knowledge inputs for innovation (i.e., production, R&D, and engineering), we propose that offshoring has an inverted U‐shaped influence on firm innovativeness. Additionally, we provide an upper echelon contingency perspective by considering the moderating role of two top management team (TMT) attributes (i.e., informational diversity and shared vision). Using a cross‐industry sample with lagged data, we find that offshoring has an inverted U‐shaped influence on firm innovativeness and that this relationship is steeper in firms with high TMT informational diversity and in firms with low TMT shared vision. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.