Strategy,human capital investments,business‐domain capabilities,and performance: a study in the global software services industry

Research summary : In knowledge‐based industries, continuous human capital investments are essential for firms to enhance capabilities and sustain competitive advantage. However, such investments present a dilemma for firms, because human resources are mobile. Using detailed project‐level operational, financial, and human capital data from a leading multinational firm in the global IT services industry, this study finds that deliberate investments in improving general human capital can help firms develop superior capabilities and maintain high profits. This paper identifies two types of capabilities essential for success in this industry—technological and business‐domain capabilities—and provides empirical evidence justifying such investments. Theoretical and practical implications of capability‐seeking general human capital investments are discussed. Managerial summary : The primary managerial implication of this research is that capability‐seeking investments in developing general human capital through strategic learning (training and internal certifications) can enhance firm performance. Although investing in general human capital is risky, the firm considered this a strategic necessity in order to thrive in the fast paced IT services industry. By leveraging general technological skills in combination with business‐domain knowledge to address customer's business problems firms can earn and sustain higher profits. Our study also demonstrates how a developing‐country firm responded to strong competitive challenge from global rivals possessing superior capabilities by upgrading the capabilities of its employees through internal development. In doing so the firm was able to narrow the capability gap vis‐à‐vis its foreign peers and expand its business globally. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific human capital investments as a signal of general value: Revisiting assumptions about human capital and how it is managed

Research summary : Prior scholarship has assumed that firm‐specific and general human capital can be analyzed separately. This article argues that, in some settings, this is not the case because prior firm‐specific human capital investments can be a market signal of an individual's willingness and ability to make such investments in the future. As such, the willingness and ability to make firm‐specific investments is a type of general human capital that links firm‐specific and general human capital in important ways. The article develops theory about these investments, market signals, and value appropriation. Then, the article examines implications for human resource management and several important questions in the field of strategic management, including theories of the firm and microfoundations of competitive advantage. Managerial summary : While managers don't often use the terms firm‐specific and general skills, they certainly recognize that investments employees make in their skill sets are more or less relevant to a specific firm. For instance, investing in specific relationships within a firm or learning a firm's proprietary software would be considered firm‐specific investments. While such skills may seem relevant only to the particular firm in which they were invested, these investments may also send valuable signals to competing firms that such employees are willing and able to make similar investments elsewhere. Hence, managers should be interested in determining if a potential hire has made prior firm‐specific investments to help them know whether that person might be likely to make such investments in his or her future place of employment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Let them go? How losing employees to competitors can enhance firm status

Research summary : Because employees can provide a firm with human capital advantages over competitors, firms invest considerably in employee recruiting and retention. Departing from the retention imperative of strategic human capital management, we propose that certain employee departures can enhance a firm's competitiveness in the labor market. Specifically, increased rates of career‐advancing departures by a firm's employees can signal to potential future employees that the firm offers a prestigious employment experience that enhances external mobility opportunities. Characterizing advancement based on subsequent employers and positions, we analyze data on U.S. law firm hiring and industry surveys of perceived firm status between 2004 and 2013. We find that increased rates of employee departures lead to increases in a firm's prestige when these departures are for promotions with high‐status competitors. Managerial summary : Firms often emphasize employee retention. Employee departures, especially as a result of being hired away by competitors, are often viewed as threats to a firm's competitive advantage. We propose, however, that employee retention need not be an unconditional strategic imperative. We argue that certain employee departures can enhance a firm's competitiveness in the market for human capital by signaling to potential employees that the firm offers a prestigious employment experience, which can help them obtain attractive positions with other employers. Analyzing data on U.S. law firm hiring and industry surveys of firm associates between 2004 and 2013, we find that increased rates of employee departures lead to increases in a firm's prestige when these departures are for promotions with high‐status competitors. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Incubation of an industry: Heterogeneous knowledge bases and modes of value capture

Research summary : We examine firms' technological investments during an industry's incubation stage—the period between a technological breakthrough and the first instance of its commercialization. Using the agricultural biotechnology context, we develop stylized findings regarding the understudied knowledge evolution preceding product evolution in an industry's life cycle, the trend and diversity of firms undertaking technological investments in anticipation of industry emergence, their leverage of markets for technology and corporate control, and their use of alternative modes of value capture. We juxtapose these stylized findings with existing literature to identify new theoretical insights, and set the stage for future scholarly work to develop and test new theories for the incubation period, examine its existence in other industries, and study its impact on subsequent firm and industry evolution. M anagerial summary : New technological breakthroughs present managers of existing firms and aspiring entrepreneurs with opportunities to create altogether new industries. During the vibrant incubation period, we find that multiple firms capitalize on diverse knowledge bases to shape the industry's knowledge evolution and also capture economic value in diverse ways. Existing firms in the obsolescing industry are more likely to become targets in acquisitions given their complementary knowledge. Science‐based start‐ups are more likely to engage in acquisitions and collaborations with established firms. Diversifying firms are more likely to commercialize products after leveraging of internal development, acquisitions, and alliances. Our study highlights the importance for managers to think about “success” and “failure” across multiple yardsticks of performance, rather than only as product commercialization as the sole goal. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic human capital management in the context of cross‐industry and within‐industry mobility frictions

Research Summary: We develop and test a theory examining how frictions that restrict mobility across industries and frictions constraining mobility within an industry can co‐occur to effectively isolate individual human capital, ultimately changing the firm's make‐versus‐buy decision for human capital. Empirically, we demonstrate that when cross‐industry frictions in the form of limited skill transferability and within‐industry frictions in the form of noncompete enforceability are both present, employees exhibit longer tenures, firms hire workers with less initial experience, firms change the amount and nature of training provided, and wages marginally increase. These findings suggest that sufficiently strong and complementary mobility frictions shift the emphasis of firms’ human capital management practices toward internal development of human capital relative to acquisition on the external market. Managerial Summary : In the face of frictions to employee mobility both within and across industries, which we capture empirically using measures of noncompete enforceability and limited skill transferability across industries, firms tend to hire less experienced workers, such workers exhibit longer tenures, and firms invest more in their training, particularly in the development of new skills. Our findings imply that for firms operating under such complementary frictions, better hiring and internal development capabilities are particularly important for performance, while those firms without such capabilities may benefit from considering ways to circumvent the mobility frictions, including moving out of the focal state or lobbying for different noncompete laws.     

Slack resources,firm performance,and the institutional context: Evidence from privately held European firms

Research summary : Integrating the behavioral and institutional perspectives, we propose that a country's formal institutions, particularly its legal frameworks, affect managers' deployment of slack resources. Specifically, we explore the moderating effects of creditor and employee rights on the performance effects of slack. Using longitudinal data from 162,633 European private firms in 26 countries, we find that financial slack enhances firm performance at diminishing rates, whereas human resource (HR) slack lowers performance at diminishing rates. However, financial slack has a more positive effect on firm performance in countries with weaker creditor rights, whereas HR slack has a more negative effect on performance in countries with stronger employee rights. The results provide a richer view of the relationship between slack and firm performance than currently assumed in the literature. Managerial summary : A key dilemma managers often encounter is whether, on the one hand, they should build in excess resources to buffer their firms from internal and external shocks and to pursue new opportunities or whether, on the other hand, they should develop “lean” firms. Our study suggests that excess cash resources—which are usually viewed as easy to redeploy—benefit firm performance, especially when firms operate in countries with weaker creditor rights. However, excess human resources—which are usually viewed as more difficult to redeploy—hamper firm performance, particularly when firms operate in countries with stronger labor protection laws. Thus, the management of slack resources critically depends on the characteristics of these resources (e.g., redeployability) and the institutional context in which managers operate. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Human capital and learning as a source of sustainable competitive advantage

This paper seeks to identify the sources of wide and persistent variations in learning performance in the semiconductor manufacturing industry. In the resource‐based view of the firm, human capital is frequently assumed to contribute to competitive advantage due to its inimitability based on its intangible, firm‐specific, and socially complex nature. Consistent with this view, we find that investments in firm‐specific human capital have a significant impact on learning and firm performance. More specifically, human capital selection (education requirements and screening), development through training, and deployment significantly improve learning by doing, which in turn improves performance. However, we find that acquiring human capital with prior industry experience from external sources significantly reduces learning performance. We also find that firms with high turnover significantly underperform their rivals, revealing the time‐compression diseconomies that protect firm‐specific human capital from imitation. These results provide new empirical evidence of the inimitability of human capital. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Real options and real value: the role of employee incentives to make specific knowledge investments

Real options reasoning emphasizes the strategic value of making flexible investments in a turbulent environment. Employees' investments in specific human capital are often critical to the success of a real option project, but the very flexibility that allows a firm to change course in response to new information also affects employees' incentives to make such specific human capital investments. We develop a model of real option investment that explicitly incorporates the role of employee incentives. The model suggests that the effect of investing in a real option project on employee incentives may be positive, further increasing the value of the project, or negative, sometimes more than offsetting the benefit of flexibility and resulting in reduced project value. Therefore, firms and managers should take into consideration the role of employee incentives when applying real options logic to investment decision making. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Time compression (dis)economies: An empirical analysis

Research Summary: To investigate time compression diseconomies (TCD), this study estimated time–cost elasticities using 459 oil and gas global investment projects (1997–2010). Results show that the average cost of accelerating investments is negative: a firm could cut $6.3 million in costs of a single project by accumulating asset stocks 1 month faster. About 88% of the projects exhibit negative time–cost elasticities with over 39% of unrealized economies of time compression. Only 12% of the projects are subject to TCD. These time inefficiencies or frictions do not negate the existence of TCD, but suggest they are less prevalent than assumed in the literature. Management experience, R&D investment, firm size, economic development, and political stability are shown to be associated with greater time compression efficiency. Managerial Summary: How fast should firms invest? The conventional view is that acceleration increases market revenues but also inflates costs. However, there is no recent empirical evidence of this tradeoff. Our article systematically investigates the costs of compressing time in investment projects. Results show that most firms in the oil and gas industry are significantly time inefficient in their operations. Specifically, by accelerating investments, firms would also substantially decrease costs. We estimate the magnitude of these time inefficiencies for specific oil and gas industries and firms and study which strategies might mitigate this problem. This fine‐grained analysis should help firms assess their financial incentives to accelerate projects and prove informative to stock market analysts’ valuations of firm investment timing.     

Employee Mobility and Interfirm Relationship Transfer: Evidence from the Mobility and Client Attachments of United States Federal Lobbyists, 1998–2014

Research summary : Employee mobility can erode competitive advantage by facilitating interfirm knowledge and relationship transfer. This study investigates the latter and identifies factors that influence the likelihood of its occurrence. Using a novel database that tracks the employment and client attachments of U.S. federal lobbyists, I show that repeated exchange with employees (firms) increases (decreases) the likelihood clients follow employees who switch firms. Structurally, multiplexity reduces the likelihood of client transfer and weakens the effect of employee–client repeated exchange, with the multiplexity effect strongest when team members have specialized expertise. By examining the main and interactive effects of repeated exchange, multiplexity, and specialized human capital, this study extends prior work by demonstrating how individual, organizational, and structural relationship characteristics affect client transfer and retention ex‐post employee mobility . Managerial summary : When do clients follow employees who switch firms? What can firms do to guard against it? These questions are important in service‐based industries where clients may become loyal to individual employees within the firm rather than to the firm itself. This study provides evidence that helps practicing managers: (a) identify which clients are most at risk of defecting if employees exit, and (b) structure relationships in ways that mitigate the likelihood that employee exit results in client loss. Findings suggest that a client is more likely to defect when she has extensive history working with the exiting employee, particularly if the employee was the sole link between the client and firm. Managers, however, can reduce the risk of client loss following employee exit by structuring relationships so that clients work with teams of employees rather than exclusively with an individual and by increasing the degree of specialization within these teams . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Whom are you promoting? Positive voluntary public disclosures and executive turnover

Research summary: This paper uses signaling theory to bring together two complementary research streams that have largely ignored each other: strategic human resource management and media relations management. We argue that when publicly traded firms voluntarily and publicly disclose positive information about their value creation and appropriation activities, they also send positive signals to managerial labor markets regarding executives' capabilities. Accordingly, we hypothesize a positive association between public disclosures and voluntary executive turnover. An analysis of pharmaceutical and communications equipment firms from 1990 to 2004 supports this prediction, underscoring the need to understand better the effects of voluntary public disclosures on a firm's ability to protect its human capital. More generally, our results highlight the importance of considering the impact of a single signal on multiple receivers. Managerial summary: Given the organizational benefits of positive media coverage, the considerable effort that firms put into managing their image in the media is not surprising. We argue and show, however, that when a firm enhances its public image it also improves its executives' positions in the managerial labor market and, by so doing, increases their likelihood of voluntarily leaving the firm. In particular, we find that corporate press releases, an important mechanism for managing information released in the public domain to signal a firm's competitive advantages, may result in unintentional loss of senior management talent. This trade‐off suggests that firms should increase coordination between their strategy, human resources, and corporate communications/investor relations departments to ensure that they collectively weigh the benefits and costs of publicly disclosing value‐relevant information. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A tale of two effects: Using longitudinal data to compare within‐ and between‐firm effects

Research summary : We investigate the theoretical and empirical implications of longitudinal data in strategy research. Theoretically, longitudinal data allow strategy researchers to distinguish between relationships among constructs within versus between firms. Empirically, longitudinal data contain information about two types of relationships: within‐ and between‐firm. We describe how the hybrid approach, a technique used in other disciplines, disentangles within‐ and between‐firm relationships. We reexamine a study of research and development expenditures to illustrate the advantages of the hybrid approach. Based on our theory and reexamination, we offer a series of recommendations for researchers using longitudinal data to test theoretical perspectives . Managerial summary: Strategy research examines two sources of variation over time: what is occurring within the firm (e.g., Do firms perform better over time when investing more in R&D?) and what is occurring between firms (e.g., Do firms investing more in R&D outperform firms investing less in R&D?). These two sources may be similar or different in both direction and magnitude, and when significant differences exist in either direction or magnitude, researchers must carefully consider the implication of these differences to their theoretical rationale and statistical testing. Our article highlights the benefits of theorizing and testing these two sources of variance, providing scholars the ability to broaden both the theoretical and empirical contribution of their research. This distinction is important to how research informs managerial decision making . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Alleviating managerial dilemmas in human‐capital‐intensive firms through incentives: Evidence from M&A legal advisors

Research summary: We examine how human‐capital‐intensive firms deploy their human assets and how firm‐specific human capital interacts with incentives to influence this deployment. Our empirical context is the UK M&A legal market, where micro‐data enable us to observe the allocation of lawyers to M&A mandates under different incentive regimes. We find that law firms actively equalize the workload among their lawyers to seek efficiency gains, while “stretching” lawyers with high firm‐specific capital to a greater extent. However, lawyers with high firm‐specific capital also appear to influence the staffing process in their favor, leading to unbalanced allocations and less sharing of projects and clients. Paradoxically, law firms may adopt a seniority‐based rent‐sharing system that weakens individual incentives to mitigate the impact of incentive conflicts on resource deployment. Managerial summary: The study highlights the dilemmas when professional service firms allocate their key individuals to incoming projects, and the role that monetary incentives play in aggravating or alleviating these dilemmas. In the context of UK M&A law firms, we find that partners have a tendency to be attached to too many projects and not to share enough work, which is exacerbated when individual monetary incentives are stronger. Firms adopting a seniority based incentive system (lockstep system) are able to alleviate this effect. This implies that there is a trade‐off between rewarding personal performance versus balancing workloads and fostering collaboration among professionals. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choose to Fight or Choose to Flee? A Network Embeddedness Perspective of Executive Ship Jumping in Declining Firms

Research summary: Executives in declining firms may engage in ship‐jumping behavior (i.e., voluntarily move to new employers before the failure occurs) to avoid the stigma of failure. However, it is unclear how executives decide whether or not to jump ship. Building on a network embeddedness perspective, we highlight how three network‐based indicators (i.e., executive social capital, the social capital of other peers in the declining firm, and the declining firm's alliance network) influence the executive‐level ship‐jumping decision by shaping its benefits and opportunity costs. Using data from executives at failing firms in China, we find support for our hypothesized relationships. Our research provides important insight into the network mechanisms driving the ship‐jumping decision. Managerial summary: Executives at failing firms have a choice: stay and attempt to rescue the firm from failure or exit and avoid the stigma of the failure (i.e., jump ship). Yet, little is known about what factors affect this choice. We propose that social capital plays an important role in the decision. Our evidence from specially treated (*ST) public firms in China finds that ship jumping is lowest at low and high values of social capital, and highest at moderate levels of social capital (an inverted U‐shaped relationship). In addition, higher levels of peer social capital (in the declining firm) as well as a well‐established firm‐level alliance network discourage the ship‐jumping choice. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Entrepreneurial beacons: The Yale endowment,run‐ups,and the growth of venture capital

Research summary : This article investigates the social context of entrepreneurship in organizational sectors. Prior research suggests that firm foundings are driven by collective patterns of activity—such as patterns of prior foundings in a given sector. Building on research on social salience and signals, we consider the influence of singular sector‐level triggers, which we call entrepreneurial beacons. We argue that the actions or outcomes of single, salient organizations attract and motivate entrepreneurs, thus increasing the rate of foundings. We test this logic by examining the impact of the Y ale U niversity endowment's investment choices and of venture‐capital‐backed IPO run‐ups on venture‐capital foundings between 1984 and 2011. We find support for the existence and influence of beacons and outline boundary conditions for their effects . Managerial summary : What leads entrepreneurs to found new companies in nascent sectors? In contrast to prior research, which emphasizes patterns of activity, we argue that entrepreneurial activity can sometimes be driven by the actions of a singular trigger—what we call an entrepreneurial beacon. We examine the influence of two such beacons, Y ale U niversity's endowment investments and exceptional venture‐capital‐backed IPO run‐ups, on the founding of new venture‐capital firms over a 28‐year period. We find that Y ale's increased allocations to the venture‐capital asset‐class has a significant influence on the founding of new venture‐capital firms, while exceptional venture‐capital‐backed IPO run‐ups only influence venture‐capital foundings under certain conditions. Overall, we offer an explanation for heretofore anecdotal accounts of certain organizations or events that appear to have an outsized influence on entrepreneurial activity . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Increase in takeover protection and firm knowledge accumulation strategy

Research summary : We argue that the extent to which a firm faces takeover threats affects its knowledge structure. In particular, takeover threats may lead to managers' reluctance to adopt a strategy toward firm‐specific knowledge accumulation because implementing this strategy requires them to acquire specialized skills, which are at risk under takeover threats. Conversely, takeover protection leads to an increase in firm‐specific knowledge. Further, the relationship between takeover protection and firm‐specific knowledge is positively moderated by managerial ownership, which helps align managerial interests with those of shareholders. But the relationship is negatively moderated by managerial tenure, as long‐tenured managers have already committed to their firms. Using a differences‐in‐differences method with Delaware antitakeover rulings in the mid‐1990s as an exogenous shock, we found results supporting these arguments. Managerial summary : We examined how changes in the Delaware antitakeover rulings in mid‐1990s affected the knowledge structure of firms incorporated in Delaware. We reasoned that with a greater level of takeover protection, top managers of those firms incorporated in Delaware felt higher job security, thus providing them stronger incentives to make strategic decisions toward the development of firm‐specific knowledge and to make corresponding human capital investments in specialized skills. Empirically, firms incorporated in Delaware were found to have an increase in the level of firm‐specific knowledge in their knowledge structure after the mid‐1990s. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the role of takeover protection on top manager incentives is particularly salient when the managers are awarded with more company shares and when the managers have shorter organizational tenure. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Entry into Nascent Industries: Disentangling a Firm's Capability Portfolio at the Time of Investment Versus Market Entry

Research summary : This article examines the capability antecedents of firm entry into nascent industries. Because a firm's technological investments in nascent industries typically occur before market entry, this study makes a distinction between firm capabilities at the time of market entry and at the time of initial investment. At the time of market entry, core technical capabilities and complementary assets influence the likelihood of entry. However, at the time of investment, a firm's integrative capabilities as well as the initial stocks of related technical capabilities and complementary assets become critical, as they enable endogenous development of core technical capabilities and complementary assets by the time of entry. The empirical sample consists of firms involved in field experiments in agricultural biotechnology during the period 1980–2010. Managerial summary : New product commercialization in a nascent industry typically requires access to not only core technologies of the focal industry, but also supporting commercialization assets. However, firms may not possess these critical capabilities when they first invest in the industry. Instead, empirical evidence from the context of agricultural biotechnology shows that at the time of first investment, a firm's integrative capabilities partly explain their likelihood of entry. Integrative capabilities encompass a set of practices that enable effective coordination and communication, and in turn put firms in an advantageous position to develop the needed capabilities by the time of entry. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

Money secrets: How does trade secret legal protection affect firm market value? Evidence from the uniform trade secret act

Research summary : We investigate the impact of trade secret legal protection on firm market value in the context of acquisitions. On one hand, market value may increase because trade secret assets become better protected from rivals. On the other hand, market value may decrease because trade secret protection reduces information about the target and its competitors available to potential buyers, increasing uncertainty about its value. Buyers will discount their offers in expectation of being compensated for riskier deals. Using a sample of private equity investments in the United States, we find that trade secret protection has a positive effect in industries with high mobility of knowledge workers, but a negative effect in industries with (1) high resource–value uncertainty and (2) high poor‐investment risk. Managerial summary : We argue that an increase in trade secret legal protection might not unequivocally benefit firm owners when selling their business. A stronger trade secret protection increases the market value of firms in industries with high workers' mobility, but it decreases the market value of firms in industries with uncertain resource value and/or high risk of poor‐acquisition investments. Based on the contingent effect of trade secret protection, companies may want to adjust their strategic decisions, including where to locate or relocate, based in part on whether they will derive benefits or suffer losses when trade secrets are better protected. Finally, our study should help policymakers understand more fully the economic impact of government policies associated with trade secrets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The benefits of geographic sales diversification: How exporting facilitates capital investment

Many strategic investments require firms to make upfront outlays to generate profits at a later date. When firms have limited access to external capital, they have to rely on internally generated funds for these investments. In this case, their strategic investments are constrained by cash flow. I predict that by geographically diversifying sales (i.e., exporting), firms can relax this constraint because exporting signals more stable expected cash flows and firm quality, which can increase external capital providers' willingness to fund investments. Examining a representative sample of Spanish manufacturers from 1990 to 1998, I find support that exporting mitigates investment liquidity constraints allowing firms to make strategic investments they would not otherwise be able to make. This highlights how diversification can be a strategy to create and maintain competitive advantage. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.