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1.
Summary. We consider a linear exchange economy and its successive replicas. We study the notion of Cournot-Walras equilibrium in which
the consumers use the quantities of commodities put on the market as strategic variables. We prove that, generically, if the
number of replications is large enough but finite, the competitive behaviour is an oligopoly equilibrium. Then, under a mild
condition, which may be interpreted in terms of market regulation and/or market activity, we show that any sequence of oligopoly
equilibria of successive replica economies converges to the Walrasian outcome and furthermore that every oligopoly equilibrium
of large, but finite, replica is Pareto optimal. Consequently, under the same assumptions on the fundamentals of the economy,
one has an asymptotic result on the convergence of oligopoly equilibria to the Walras equilibrium together with a generic
existence result for the Cournot-Walras.
Received: June 20, 2002; revised version: November 20, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" Part of this paper was written while the second author was visiting the Universidad de Vigo. The support of the department
of mathematics is gratefully acknowledged.
Correspondence to: J.M. Bonnisseau 相似文献
2.
Harrison Cheng 《Economic Theory》2002,20(3):555-577
Summary. In an oligopoly game with cost uncertainty and risk averse firms, we show that Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium have different
convergence properties when the market is replicated. The Cournot equilibrium price converges to the competitive price. Under
very typical and somewhat general conditions, the highest Bertrand equilibrium price converges to one higher than the competitive
equilibrium. We also give examples to show how to compute the limit of the highest Bertrand equilibrium prices and illustrate
the ideas of the proof. We explore conditions under which the supply curve is upward sloping, a useful condition for our results.
Received: April 20, 2000; revised version: May 10, 2001 相似文献
3.
Reiko Aoki 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):653-672
We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product
market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally
on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible
commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition,
higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater
with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus
credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition.
Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai
and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve
Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments
from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this
work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee. 相似文献
4.
Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs.
Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through
a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit
outcomes.
Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000 相似文献
5.
Prabal Roy Chowdhury 《Economic Theory》2002,19(4):811-822
Summary. We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with increasing returns to scale where one of the firms have a cost advantage and prices
vary over a grid. We find that typically more than one equilibria exist. However, there are only two perfect equilibria. Moreover,
as the size of the grid becomes small, both these equilibria converge to the limit-pricing outcome.
Received: February 25, 2000; revised version: January 9, 2001 相似文献
6.
Long run equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Yasuhito Tanaka 《Economic Theory》1999,14(3):705-715
Summary. Consider an oligopolistic industry composed of two groups (or populations) of firms, the low cost firms and the high cost
firms. The firms produce a homogeneous good. I study the finite population evolutionarily stable strategy defined by Schaffer
(1988), and the long run equilibrium in the stochastic evolutionary dynamics based on imitation and experimentation of strategies
by firms in each group. I will show the following results. 1) The finite population evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) output
is equal to the competitive (or Walrasian) output in each group of the firms. 2) Under the assumption that the marginal cost
is increasing, the ESS state is the long run equilibrium in the stochastic evolutionary dynamics in the limit as the output
grid step, which will be defined in the paper, approaches to zero.
Received: September 19, 1997; revised: June 18, 1998 相似文献
7.
Jingang Zhao 《Economic Theory》2000,16(1):181-198
Summary. This paper studies the core in an oligopoly market with indivisibility. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions for
core existence in a general m-buyer n-seller market with indivisibility. When costs are dominated by opportunity costs (i.e., a firm's variable costs are sufficiently
small), the core condition can be characterized by the primitive market parameters. In a 3-2 market with opportunity cost,
the core is non-empty if and only if the larger seller's opportunity cost is either sufficiently large or sufficiently small.
Received: June 9, 1999; revised version: October 22, 1999 相似文献
8.
Martin Peitz 《Economic Theory》2002,20(4):849-860
Summary. I present a class of address models of product differentiation with unit-elastic individual demand and show the existence
of Nash equilibrium in prices under assumptions on utility functions and the taste and income heterogeneity across consumers.
This paper complements the work by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991, Econometrica), who analyze unit demand models of product differentiation.
Received: December 28, 1998; revised version: September 5, 2001 相似文献
9.
Boiteux's solution to the shifting-peak problem and the equilibrium price density in continuous time
Summary. Bewley's condition on production sets, imposed to ensure the existence of an equilibrium price density when is the commodity space, is weakened to allow applications to continuous-time problems, and especially to peak-load pricing
when the users' utility and production functions are Mackey continuous. A general form for production sets with the required
property is identified, and examples are given of technologies which meet the weakened but not the original condition: these
include industrial use and storage of cyclically priced goods. This gives a framework for settling Boiteux's conjecture on
the shifting-peak problem. To make clear the restriction implicit in Mackey continuity, we interpret it as interruptibility
of demand; and we point out that, without this assumption, the equilibrium can feature pointed peaks with singular, instantaneous
capacity charges. The general equilibrium results are supplemented by results for prices supporting individual consumer or
producer optima.
Received: February 16, 2000; revised version: July 7, 2001 相似文献
10.
Summary. With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent has assumed Cournot competition
in the post-entry game. In contrast, this paper studies a model in which the incumbent and entrant sequentially precommit
to capacity levels before competing in price. Interesting deterrence effects arise because firms need time to build, that is, cannot adjust capacity instantaneously in the post-entry game. This approach produces a simple and intuitive set
of equilibrium behaviors and generates clear predictions about when these different outcomes are likely to arise. Our model
also departs substantially from the existing literature in concluding that sunkness of capacity costs is neither necessary nor sufficient for capacity to have precommitment value.
Received: August 25, 1999; revised version: October 15, 1999 相似文献
11.
Summary. Within the framework proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978) for modelling quality differentiation, consumers are assumed to make
mutually exclusive purchases. A unique pure strategy equilibrium exists in this case. In this note, we allow consumers to
buy simultaneously different variants of the differentiated good. We call this the “joint purchase option”. The paper proposes
a detailed analysis of price competition when this option is opened: first, we show that either uniqueness, or multiplicity,
or absence of price equilibrium arise, depending on the utility derived from joint purchase relative to exclusive purchase.
Second, we characterize these equilibria, whenever they exist.
Received: July 25, 2001; revised version: October 21, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The second author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from Interuniversity Attraction Pole Program- Belgian
State- Federal Office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural Affairs under contract PAI 5/26.
Correspondence to: X.Y. Wauthy 相似文献
12.
Summary. We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information
about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time,
she randomly meets potential buyers who may have incentives to manipulate her learning process strategically. We show that
i) the seller's incentives to post a high price and to experiment are not necessarily monotonic in the information conveyed
by a buyer's rejection; and ii) as the discount factors tend to one, there are equilibria where the seller always ends up
selling the good at an ex-post individually rational price.
Received: January 6, 1999; revised version: July 15, 2000 相似文献
13.
Sonia Weyers 《Economic Theory》1999,14(1):181-201
Summary. For perfectly competitive economies under uncertainty, there is a well-known equivalence between a formulation with contingent
goods and one with state-specific securities followed by spot markets for goods. In this paper, I examine whether this equivalence
carries over to a particular form of imperfect competition. Specifically, I look at three Shapley-Shubik strategic market
games: one with contingent commodities, one with Arrow securities traded under imperfect competition and one with Arrow securities
traded under perfect competition. First I compare the feasibility constraints of these three games. Then I compare their equilibrium
sets. As in Peck and Shell (1989), the only common equilibria between the first and the second game are those which involve
no transfer of income across states. However, if the securities markets are competitive, then the set of equilibria of the
contingent commodities game and the securities game coincide.
Received: June 16, 1997; revised version: April 30, 1998 相似文献
14.
Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters.
The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is
shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates
in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety
of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued
formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented
observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.
Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar
participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful
suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University
of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from
the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín).
Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin 相似文献
15.
Federico Echenique 《Economic Theory》2003,22(1):33-44
Summary. The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies
and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered
by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a
complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend
when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play.
Received: October 16, 2000; revised version: March 7, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I am very grateful to Robert Anderson, David Blackwell, Aaron Edlin, Peter De Marzo, Ted O'Donoghue, Matthew Rabin,
Ilya Segal, Chris Shannon, Clara Wang and Federico Weinschelbaum for comments and advise. 相似文献
16.
Summary. A model that includes the cost of producing money is presented and the nature of the inefficient equilibria in the model
are examined. It is suggested that if one acknowledges that transactions are a form of production, which requires the consumption
of resources, then the concept of Pareto optimality is inappropriate for assessing efficiency. Instead it becomes necessary
to provide an appropriate comparative analysis of alternative transactions mechanisms in the appropriate context.
Received: September 5, 2000; revised version: May 3, 2001 相似文献
17.
18.
Takashi Kamihigashi 《Economic Theory》2000,15(2):463-468
Summary. Ekeland and Scheinkman (1986) prove the necessity of a standard transversality condition under certain technical conditions.
Their result is one of the most powerful on the necessity of a transversality condition currently available in the literature,
and their proof involves numerous estimations and relies on Ekeland's variational principle and Fatou's lemma. This note relaxes
some of their assumptions and provides a simple proof that uses neither Ekeland's principle nor a convergence result like
Fatou's lemma.
Received: April 24, 1998; revised version: September 8, 1998 相似文献
19.
Yasuhito Tanaka 《Economic Theory》2001,17(3):693-700
Using a model according to Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Bonanno and Haworth (1998) we consider a sub-game perfect equilibrium
of a two-stage game in a duopolistic industry in which the products of the firms are vertically differentiated. In the industry,
there are a high quality firm and a low quality firm. In the first stage of the game, the firms choose their strategic variables,
price or quantity. In the second stage, they determine the levels of their strategic variables. We will show that, under an
assumption about distribution of consumers' preference, we obtain the result that is similar to Singh and Vives (1984)' proposition
(their Proposition 3) in the case of substitutes with nonlinear demand functions. That is, in the first stage of the game,
a quantity strategy dominates a price strategy for both firms.
Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: May 31, 2000 相似文献
20.
Summary. This paper proves the C
1,1 differentiability of the value function for continuous time concave dynamic optimization problems, under the assumption that
the instantaneous utility is C
1,1 and the initial segment of optimal solutions is interior. From this result, the Lipschitz dependence of optimal solutions
on initial data and the Lipschitz continuity of the policy function are derived, by adding an assumption of strong concavity
of the integrand.
Received: July 29, 1996; revised version: November 25, 1997 相似文献