产业技术创新制度环境评价指标体系研究

在对产业技术创新的制度环境的内涵和构成要素进行分析的基础上,构建了产业技术创新制度环境的评价指标体系。这一指标体系的建立对于评价国家和地区之间产业技术创新制度环境的优劣具有极为重要的理论和实践意义。     

环境绩效评估指标体系研究——以云南省为例

环境绩效评估是进行环境管理的重要手段。在本文中,笔者对环境绩效评估指标体系构建方法与原则进行了探讨,并将上述理论应用于云南省,初步构建了云南省环境绩效评估指标体系。     

区域制度环境、上市公司聚集与绩效

制度环境对区域金融乃至经济发展具有举足轻重的作用.上市公司是产业资本和金融资本高度结合的企业组织形式,产业发展水平、金融深化程度、投资者权益保护等区域制度环境影响区域上市公司聚集,并最终影响上市公司绩效差异.以我国不同省份在上海和深圳证券交易所的上市公司为样本,对我国区域制度环境与区域内上市公司聚集数量的相关性,以及区域间上市公司绩效差异性进行实证检验,检验结果支持上述理论分析.研究表明,优化制度环境是提高区域产业化、金融发展水平和改进区域企业绩效与价值的重要途径.     

我国环境审计制度问题评价

健全完善的环境审计制度是提高环境审计"免疫力"的重要保障,文章首先定性分析了目前我国环境审计制度中存在的问题;其次通过专家打分法对目前环境审计制度中存在的问题进行了评价;然后利用综合模糊评价法对环境审计制度存在问题的严重程度进行了定量评价;最后得出我国目前环境审计制度存在的问题"特别严重"的研究结论。     

内部人股权比例与债务期限结构——基于制度环境的分析

制度环境状况会影响债权市场中供求双方的谈判地位,内部人股权比例作用于债务期限结构的机制会随债务期限的决策者不同而产生差异:掌握公司控制权的管理者或控股股东(内部人)的股权比例,在制度环境较差的情况下只是发挥信号作用,内部人与外部人利益的一致性只能发生于制度环境相对较好的情景.因此,内部人股权比例对债务期限结构的影响,在很大程度上依赖于制度环境,制度环境是问题研究所必须考虑的重要影响因子.     

环境管理正式制度与非正式制度研究

经济增长中有两种制度安排:正式制度和非正式制度.正式制度通过法律规定来约束人们的行为;非正式制度通过意识形态、道德潜规则等发挥作用.在环境治理过程中也存在着环境管理的正式制度与非正式制度,二者以不同的形式,对污染治理起到了积极的管制作用.我国环境管理亟需建立正式管理制度与非正式管理制度共同作用的制度体系.     

中国省域制度环境的区域差异及动态演进——基于金融集聚的制度影响因素考察视角

文章基于金融集聚的制度影响因素考察视角,结合制度金融学理论,从"产权制度、市场制度和法律制度"三个维度构建了制度环境评价指标体系,借助熵权法测算出中国省域制度环境指数,并结合Dagum基尼系数和Kernel密度估计考察制度环境的区域差异及动态演进特征.研究发现:中国制度环境存在显著的空间非均衡特征;中国制度环境的总体差异呈继续扩大趋势,区域间差异是造成空间非均衡局面的首要原因;中国制度环境整体不断得以优化,但绝对差异进一步扩大,多极分化问题突出.     

来华留学教育发展的环境优化策略

优良的环境是来华留学教育发展的基础和保障。进一步落实科学的发展观，贯彻“扩大规模、提高层次、保证质量、规范管理”的来华留学教育工作思路；必须建立一整套招生、教学、管理服务等规章制度，创造优良的学校内部调控环境；健全并完善来华留学教育质量评估制度和体系，促进评估制度的规范化和评估指标体系的科学化。     

论促进企业自主创新的制度环境构建

历史证明,推动技术发展的主要力量并非技术自身的演进,而是有利于创新的制度安排.恰当的制度环境是创新的基础、动力和前提,是对经济发展具有决定性作用的重要因素.后发国家所引进的技术能否充分发挥作用与制度文化、人员素质紧密相关.目前,我国制度改革明显滞后于经济的发展,技术创新面临的许多问题都是由制度因素引起的.因此,我们在加大企业技术创新力度的同时,应当更加重视有利于技术创新的制度环境建设和完善.     

环境行政许可制度研究

环境行政许可制度是保护自然资源的合理利用和维护生态平衡的重要途径之一,是防范环境风险最主要的法律制度.因为这一制度便于把影响环境的各种开发、 建设、 排污活动纳入国家统一管理的轨道,把各种影响环境的活动严格限制在国家规定的范围内,使政府能够有效进行环境管理,因而其得到广泛应用.然而由于这一制度的固有缺陷以及缺乏后期监管等问题,仍需进一步进行完善.     

John Stuart Mill's Theories of Wealth and Income Distribution

Although he was much influenced by David Ricardo when he wrote the classical part of his Principles , John Stuart Mill was not a Ricardian when he penned his theories of wealth and distribution. They are based on a triple foundation. First, a belief that economics is a moral discipline. Second a theory of custom-driven human behavior. Third, an empirically formed conviction that the institutions of state, education and business cooperate to structure the distribution of income. On the basis of these presuppositions, Mill formulated 1) an institutional theory of the formation of human and non-human wealth and 2) an even more institutional theory of distribution demonstrating how the aforementioned institutions malignantly skew the distribution of income to the advantage of the propertied classes and to the extreme disadvantage of the working class. As a social economist, Mill recommended institutional reforms designed to eradicate the poverty of the working class.     

Information infrastructure: Who builds broadband networks?

This paper examines the essential difference between the U.S. and Japan, when one considers information infrastructure. There are seven perception gaps between the U.S. and Japan concerning Information Infrastructure policies. These gaps must be understood in order to compare the countries' governmental policies in this area. In looking at the present circumstances, the essential question to answer concerns who is to build, own and operate the network(s) of the infrastructure. Liberalization is certain to be a central factor in the ongoing telecommunications debates. Now that customers have had a taste of the liberalized market-place, the movement toward more open markets will be difficult to stop. When considering options, it is necessary to pay close attention to standardized network access and the increasingly important role software plays. These issues are causing us to take a new approach to the traditional role played by regulators. They also force a closer look at the appropriate structure of utility companies. This paper addresses the above issues in hopes of stimulating dialog on the new telecommunications infrastructure paradigm.     

海岛地区产业演替及资源基础分析--以舟山群岛为例

改革开放以来,舟山市产业构成发生了显著变化,其经济发展过程可以划分为三个阶段。1992年前,是以产业结构渔业占绝对地位的单一结构阶段;1993—1998年,以旅游业为主的第三产业快速发展阶段;上世纪末以来,又进入了新一轮的经济发展时期,即工业产值比重快速增加阶段。根据海岛的自然资源基础和特点,在新世纪的经济发展过程中,舟山市应定位为生态型的港口旅游城市。以港口及临港工业为主导,以海岛旅游和海洋经济为特色,大力发展第二产业和第三产业。海岛地区的主导产业应体现海岛资源优势及区位优势,以集群性环保型产业为主。同时由于海岛地区淡水资源缺乏,主导产业也应着重选择低耗水型产业。     

风险视角下企业治理结构和研发创新——基于委托代理模型的研究

本文基于委托代理模型,从风险的视角研究企业治理结构对研发创新能力的影响。本文构建了一个包含创新活动的委托代理模型进行理论分析,利用动态DEA 模型测算创新能力,并使用2015-2018年我国上市制造业企业数据进行实证检验。实证部分检验了理论结论:委托代理问题不利于企业提升研发创新能力,且客观风险和主观风险厌恶会加剧该负面影响。基于此,本文认为上市企业应根据企业自身研发活动特点有针对性地改善企业治理结构,提出了适当延长代理人任期、推动股权激励计划、提升代理人的风险承担能力等建议。     

生物群落结构原型的仿生学模拟

模拟生命系统管理规律的科学即管理仿生学,是知识时代仿生学研究的新领域与前沿.基于模拟生物群落结构规律的研究目的,采用仿生学模拟的研究方法,以生物群落结构为原型,建立了仿生群落结构模型.结论为:垂直结构、水平结构、时间结构与交错区结构是支持生物群落生命活动的结构规律,以该规律为原型,推理建立了仿生分层结构、仿生优化结构、仿生动态结构与仿生相邻结构,四种仿生结构分别侧重于管理资源的分层管理、局部优化管理、动态过程管理、相邻关系管理,该模型为建立类似生物群落的人造管理系统即仿生群落管理系统提供了仿生结构模型.可以预测,该模型具有广泛的应用价值,能够推动管理仿生学的发展.     

Why rationality may be a consequence of Hume's theory of choice

Facing R. Sugden's criticism of our interpretation, it is shown in this paper that rationality appears as a possible consequence of Hume's theory of choice. We first argue that Sugden's dismissal of the preference relation from the type of rationality through which Hume's theory is apprehended, is highly disputable, from the point of view of both standard choice theory and Hume's theory of passions. Nonetheless, Sugden's criterion of rationality might be restated in Humean terms as a condition of non-revision of preferences in the dynamics of passions. But, since the process of choice that we have described explicitly takes into account the revision of preferences, and shows that, when this last is no longer required, rationality occurs as an outcome of this process, it is not really concerned by Sugden's criticism.     

Team Dynamics Where Followers Have Illusion about Guide

A team is assigned to accomplish a task in each infinitely-repeated period. The guide of the team and his followers are allowed to have asymmetric productivity; also the followers have either a hostile or favorable illusion toward the guide. Respective efforts and the followers’ illusion are private information. At the end of each period, the output of the joint task emerges and the followers evaluate the guide. The analysis shows (1) that potential for an unreasonable evaluation suppresses the guide’s effort down to an average level; (2) letting the followers inform the guide of their illusion in advance increases both sides’ payoffs; (3) abolishing the evaluation reduces both sides’ payoffs in general; and (4) however, if the magnitude of the followers’ hostile illusion weighted by its relative probability is enormous, abolishing the evaluation increases the output and the guide’s payoff.     

US Hegemony and the Origins of Japanese Nuclear Power: The Politics of Consent

This paper deploys the Gramscian concepts of hegemony and consent in order to explore the process whereby nuclear power was brought to Japan. The core argument is that nuclear power was brought to Japan as a consequence of US hegemony. Rather than a simple manifestation of one state exerting material ‘power over' another, bringing nuclear power to Japan involved a series of compromises worked out within and between state and civil society in both Japan and the USA. Ideologies of nationalism, imperialism and modernity underpinned the process, coalescing in post-war debates about the future trajectory of Japanese society, Japan's Cold War alliance with the USA and the role of nuclear power in both. Consent to nuclear power was secured through the generation of a psychological state in the public mind combining the fear of nuclear attack and the hope of unlimited consumption in a nuclear-fuelled post-modern world.