An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy

We propose a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi-commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal commitment plans, to be tempted to renege on them, and to succumb to this temptation with a constant exogenous probability known to the private sector. By interpreting this probability as a continuous measure of the (lack of) credibility of the monetary policy authority, we investigate the welfare effect of a marginal increase in credibility. Our main finding is that, in a simple model of the monetary transmission mechanism, most of the gains from commitment accrue at relatively low levels of credibility.     

Optimal sustainable monetary policy

In recent monetary policy literature, optimal commitment policy and its variant from a timeless perspective have been studied with emphasis on welfare gains from policy commitment. These policies, however, involve a time-consistency problem called a stabilization bias in forward-looking models. We analyze Chari and Kehoe's [1990. Sustainable plans. Journal of Political Economy 98, 783-802] sustainable equilibrium and examine optimal sustainable policy, i.e. a policymaker's strategy in the best sustainable equilibrium. This paper shows that such a policy becomes consistent with the optimal commitment policy in sufficiently later periods. It also shows that whether the optimal sustainable policy can attain the Ramsey equilibrium outcome depends on the magnitude of shocks hitting the model economy. Moreover, the paper finds a sustainable policy that attains higher social welfare than discretionary policy does.     

A model in which monetary policy is about money

Optimal monetary policy is studied in a model with (i) heterogeneity in the degree to which different people are monitored (have publicly known histories); (ii) idiosyncratic shocks that give rise to heterogeneity in earning and spending realizations; and (iii) central-bank intervention in a “market” in claims or credit in which the participants are those who are heavily monitored. A special case of the model has everyone perfectly monitored. In that case, there is no role for money and no role for central-bank intervention. In the example displayed with imperfect monitoring, optimal intervention is not simple.     

Regime switching and monetary policy measurement

This paper applies regime-switching methods to the problem of measuring monetary policy. Policy preferences and structural factors are specified parametrically as independent Markov processes. Interaction between the structural and preference parameters in the policy rule serves to identify the two processes. The estimates uncover policy episodes that are initiated by switches to “dove regimes,” shown to Granger-cause both NBER recessions and the Romer dates. These episodes imply real effects of monetary policy that are smaller than those found in previous studies.     

Political monetary cycles and a de facto ranking of central bank independence

Political monetary cycles are less likely to occur in countries with independent central banks. Independent central banks can withstand political pressure to stimulate the economy before elections or finance election-related increases in government spending. Based on this logic and supporting evidence, we construct a de facto ranking of central bank independence derived from the extent to which monetary policy varies with the electoral cycle. The ranking avoids well-known problems with existing measures of central bank independence and provides independent information about average inflation and inflation volatility differences across countries.     

New measures of monetary policy surprises and jumps in interest rates

We propose new surprise measures to characterise two important dimensions of monetary policy. Our measures outperform the traditional monetary shocks in explaining variation of interest rates in the event-study framework. We also study the extent to which the ECB caused jumps in euro area interest rates. The new surprises still prevail upon the traditional ones. Jumps play a great role in the variation of interest rates and the ECB induced several jumps with its decisions, but its predictability has improved over time. We find that, although the surprise measures become somewhat distorted due to money market tensions during the financial turmoil, our model still provides an interesting insight into interest rate behaviour throughout the crisis.     

Interest rate pass-through,monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability

In this paper we analyze equilibrium determinacy in a sticky price model in which the pass-through from policy rates to retail interest rates is sluggish and potentially incomplete. In addition, we empirically characterize and compare the interest rate pass-through process in the euro area and the U.S. We find that if the pass-through is incomplete in the long run, the standard Taylor principle is insufficient to guarantee equilibrium determinacy. Our empirical analysis indicates that this result might be particularly relevant for bank-based financial systems as for instance that in the euro area.     

Learnability and monetary policy: A global perspective

The recent literature on monetary policy design has emphasized the importance of equilibrium determinacy and learnability in the choice of policy rules. This paper contains an analysis of the learnability of the equilibrium in a class of simple, micro-founded models in which the policy authority uses a Taylor-type monetary policy rule. Unlike previous analyses, the model economy is not linearized about a steady state—instead, a global perspective is adopted. Globally, the nonlinear model economy can possess rational expectations equilibria other than the steady state consistent with the inflation target of the monetary authorities. These include a second, low inflation ‘liquidity trap’ steady state, periodic equilibria, and sunspot equilibria. The main results in the paper characterize the conditions under which these alternative equilibria maybe stable under adaptive learning, even when the policy rule obeys the Taylor principle. The stability of multiple equilibria is associated with policy rules which are forecast-based. An important finding is that backward-looking Taylor-type policy rules can guarantee that the unique learnable equilibrium is the steady state associated with the inflation target of the monetary authority.     

International welfare effects of monetary policy

In this paper, I examine the international welfare effects of monetary policy. I develop a New Keynesian two-country model, where central banks in both countries follow the Taylor rule. I show that a decrease in the domestic interest rate, under producer currency pricing, is a beggar-thyself policy that reduces domestic welfare and increases foreign welfare in the short term, regardless of whether the cross-country substitutability is high or low. In the medium term, it is a beggar-thy-neighbour (beggar-thyself) policy, if the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied (violated). Under local currency pricing, a decrease in the domestic interest rate is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy in the short term, but a beggar-thyself policy in the medium term. Both under producer and local currency pricing, a monetary expansion increases world welfare in the short term, but reduces it in the medium term.     

The impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate: evidence from three small open economies

This paper studies the impact effect of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand during the 1990s. Shocks are identified by the reaction of three month market interest rates to policy announcements that were not themselves endogenous to economic news on the same day. The main result is that a 100 basis point contractionary shock will appreciate the exchange rate by 2-3 percent on impact. The association of interest rate hikes with depreciations that is sometimes observed during periods of exchange market pressure is mainly attributable to reverse causality.     

The high-frequency response of exchange rates to monetary policy actions and statements

This paper investigates the impact of US monetary policy on the level and volatility of exchange rates using an event study with intraday data for five currencies (the US dollar exchange rate versus the euro, the Canadian dollar, the British pound, the Swiss franc, and the Japanese yen). I construct two indicators of news about monetary policy stemming separately from policy decisions and from balance of risk statements. Estimation results show that both policy decisions and communication have economically large and highly significant effects on the exchange rates, with the surprise component of statements accounting for most of the explainable variation in exchange rate returns in response to monetary policy. This paper also shows that exchange rates tend to absorb FOMC monetary surprises within 30-40 min from the announcement release.     

Discretionary monetary policy and inflation persistence

Rational expectations models of staggered price/wage contracts have failed to replicate the observed persistence in inflation and unemployment during disinflationary periods. The current literature on this persistency puzzle has focused on augmenting the nominal contract model with imperfect credibility and learning. In this paper, I re-examine the persistency puzzle by focusing on the discretionary nature of monetary policy. I show that when the central bank is allowed to re-optimize a quadratic loss function each period, imperfect credibility and learning, even in the absence of staggered contracts, can generate a significant amount of inflation persistence and employment losses during a disinflationary period.     

Daily monetary policy shocks and new home sales

The conventional notion of a monetary policy shock as a surprise change in the fed funds rate is misspecified. The primary news for market participants is not what the Fed just did, but is instead new information about the Fed's future intentions. Revisions in these anticipations show up instantaneously in long-term mortgage rates. Home sales do not respond until much later. This paper attributes this delay—and hence much of the hump-shaped response of economic activity to monetary policy—to cross-sectional heterogeneity in search times. This framework allows one in principle to measure policy impacts at the daily frequency.     

Robust monetary policy with imperfect knowledge

We examine the performance and robustness properties of monetary policy rules in an estimated macroeconomic model in which the economy undergoes structural change and where private agents and the central bank possess imperfect knowledge about the true structure of the economy. Policymakers follow an interest rate rule aiming to maintain price stability and to minimize fluctuations of unemployment around its natural rate but are uncertain about the economy's natural rates of interest and unemployment and how private agents form expectations. In particular, we consider two models of expectations formation: rational expectations (RE) and learning. We show that in this environment the ability to stabilize the real side of the economy is significantly reduced relative to an economy under RE with perfect knowledge. Furthermore, policies that would be optimal under perfect knowledge can perform very poorly if knowledge is imperfect. Efficient policies that take account of private learning and misperceptions of natural rates call for greater policy inertia, a more aggressive response to inflation, and a smaller response to the perceived unemployment gap than would be optimal if everyone had perfect knowledge of the economy. We show that such policies are quite robust to potential misspecification of private sector learning and the magnitude of variation in natural rates.     

Testing Commitment Models of Monetary Policy: Evidence from OECD Economies

Inflation in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries was low in the 1960s, rose for a time before peaking in the 1970s or early 1980s, and then fell back to initial levels. This paper shows that a simple time inconsistency model of monetary policy does not explain OECD inflation outcomes, except in the United States. The hypothesis that time inconsistency mattered only in earlier decades fits the data no better than the baseline model. We find some, albeit limited support for a model in which inflation spills over from the United States into other countries as a result of exchange rate targeting.     

Data revisions and the identification of monetary policy shocks

Monetary policy research using time-series methods has been criticized for using more information than the Federal Reserve had available. To quantify the role of this criticism, we estimate VARs with real-time data while accounting for the latent nature of many economic variables, such as output. Our estimated monetary policy shocks are closely correlated with typically estimated measures. The impulse response functions are broadly similar across estimation methods. Our evidence suggests that the use of revised data in VAR analyses of monetary policy shocks may not be a serious limitation for recursively identified systems, but presents more challenges for simultaneous systems.     

Optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules

Welfare-maximizing monetary- and fiscal-policy rules are studied in a model with sticky prices, money, and distortionary taxation. The Ramsey-optimal policy is used as a point of comparison. The main findings are: the size of the inflation coefficient in the interest-rate rule plays a minor role for welfare. It matters only insofar as it affects the determinacy of equilibrium. Optimal monetary policy features a muted response to output. Interest-rate rules that feature a positive response to output can lead to significant welfare losses. The welfare gains from interest-rate smoothing are negligible. Optimal fiscal policy is passive. The optimal monetary and fiscal rule combination attains virtually the same level of welfare as the Ramsey-optimal policy.     

Ramsey monetary policy with labor market frictions

Traditional New Keynesian models prescribe that optimal monetary policy should aim at price stability. In the absence of a labor market frictions, the monetary authority faces no unemployment/inflation trade-off. The design of optimal monetary policy is analyzed here for a framework with sticky prices and matching frictions in the labor market. Optimal policy features deviations from price stability in response to both productivity and government expenditure shocks. When the Hosios [1990. On the efficiency of matching and related models of search and unemployment. Review of Economic Studies 57 (2), 279-298] condition is not met, search externalities make the flexible price allocation unfeasible. Optimal deviations from price stability increase with workers’ bargaining power, as firms incentives to post vacancies fall and unemployment fluctuates above the Pareto efficient one.     

Forecast rationality and monetary policy frameworks: Evidence from UK interest rate forecasts

We find evidence of heterogeneity and irrationality among professional forecasts for three-month inter-bank rates and ten-year gilt yields at both short and long forecast horizons over the period 1989-2006. The majority of biased forecasts overestimate the future spot rate, consistent with slow adjustment to the declining trend in inflation and interest rates. Furthermore, we produce evidence indicating that both monetary policy actions and elements of communication policy have information content regarding the rationality of forecasts. Changes in official bank rates and disagreement among the Monetary Policy Committee influence the rationality of forecasts. The publication of inflation reports has no effect.