Indeterminacy, aggregate demand, and the real business cycle

We show that under indeterminacy aggregate demand shocks are able to explain not only aspects of actual fluctuations that standard RBC models predict fairly well, but also aspects of actual fluctuations that standard RBC models cannot explain, such as the hump-shaped, trend reverting impulse responses to transitory shocks found in US output (Cogley and Nason, Am. Econom. Rev. 85 (1995) 492); the large forecastable movements and comovements of output, consumption and hours (Rotemberg and Woodford, Am. Econom. Rev. 86 (1996) 71); and the fact that consumption appears to lead output and investment over the business cycle. Indeterminacy arises in our model due to capacity utilization and mild increasing returns to scale.     

Monetary policy, taxes, and the business cycle

This paper analyzes the interaction of inflation with the tax code and its contribution to aggregate fluctuations. We find significant effects operating through the tax on realized nominal capital gains. A tax on nominal bond income magnifies these effects. Our innovation is to combine monetary policy shocks with non-indexed taxes in a model where the central bank implements policy using an interest rate rule. Monetary policy had important effects on the behavior of the business cycle before 1980 because policymakers did not exert effective control over inflation. Monetary policy reform around 1980 led to better control, and with more stable inflation, the effect of the interaction between monetary policy and the nominal capital gains tax has become negligible.     

Comparing New Keynesian models of the business cycle: A Bayesian approach

The baseline New Keynesian model cannot replicate the observed persistence in inflation, output, and real wages for sensible parameter values. As a result, several extensions have been suggested to improve its fit to the data. We use a Bayesian approach to estimate and compare the baseline sticky price model of Calvo's [1983. Staggered prices in a utility maximizing framework. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 383-398.] and three extensions. Our empirical results are as follows. First, we find that adding price indexation improves the fit of Calvo's [1983. Staggered prices in a utility maximizing framework. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 383-398.] model. Second, models with both staggered price and wage setting dominate models with only price rigidities. Third, introducing wage indexation does not significantly improve the fit. Fourth, all model estimates suggest a high degree of price stickiness. Fifth, the estimates of labor supply elasticity are higher in models with both staggered price and wage contracts. Finally, the estimated inflation parameters of the Taylor rule are stable across models.     

Managerial incentives,capital reallocation,and the business cycle

We argue that when managers have private information about the productivity of assets under their control and receive private benefits, substantial bonuses are required to induce less productive managers to declare that capital should be reallocated. The need to provide incentives for managers to relinquish control links executive compensation to capital reallocation and managerial turnover over the business cycle, rendering them procyclical if expected managerial compensation increases when more managers are hired. Moreover, capital is less productively deployed in downturns because agency costs make reallocation more costly. Empirically, we find that both CEO turnover and executive compensation are remarkably procyclical.     

Entrepreneurial activity, risk, and the business cycle

This paper analyzes a model in which the risk associated with entrepreneurial activity implies that the amount of such activity is procyclical and results in amplification and intertemporal propagation of productivity shocks. In the model risk averse agents choose between a riskless project and a risky project with higher expected output (‘the entrepreneurial activity’). Agents who become entrepreneurs need to bear part of the project-specific risk for incentive reasons. More agents become entrepreneurs when productivity is high, because agents are more willing to bear risk and need to bear less risk for incentive reasons. Furthermore, cross-sectional heterogeneity can be countercyclical.     

Do long swings in the business cycle lead to strong persistence in output?

This paper investigates how the occasional long swing in the business cycle can produce long-memory behavior in US output. To prove this theoretical relationship, we extend the Hamilton Markov chain regime switching model of real aggregate output to include the occasional long regime. We do this by modeling the duration length of the expansion and recession regimes as draws from a fat-tailed distribution with realized durations that are high in variability and occasionally extreme in value. Empirically, we find that the tail indices for the length of US economic booms and busts correspond with the long-memory parameter estimates of Diebold and Rudebusch [1989. Long memory and persistence in aggregate output. Journal of Monetary Economics 24, 189-209] and Sowell [1992a. Modeling long-run behavior with the fractional ARIMA model. Journal of Monetary Economics 29, 277-302] for real US output. Estimates of our extended regime switching model produce better short- and long-run forecasts of output in comparison to forecasts with a fractionally integrated model. Furthermore, our estimated regime-switching model finds US expansions to be fragile during their infancy, but become more and more likely to continue after surviving the first seven quarters.     

The influence of product market dynamics on a firm's cash holdings and hedging behavior

Prior work suggests that if a firm shares a larger proportion of its growth opportunities with rivals, an inability to fully invest in these opportunities leads to predatory behavior on the part of rivals and losses in market share. We examine whether firms manage this predation risk. We find inter- and intra-industry evidence that the extent of the interdependence of a firm's investment opportunities with rivals is positively associated with its use of derivatives and the size of its cash holdings. Moreover, an analysis of investment behavior provides evidence that if this interdependence is high, the management of predation risk provides strategic benefits. Our results indicate that predation risk is an important determinant of corporate financial policy choices and investment behavior.     

Financial shocks and the US business cycle

Employing the financial accelerator (FA) model of Bernanke et al. [1999. The Financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework. In: Taylor, J.B., Woodford, M. (Eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1C. Handbooks in Economics, vol. 15. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 1341-1393] enhanced to include a shock to the FA mechanism, we construct and study shocks to the efficiency of the financial sector during post-war US business cycles. These shocks are found to (i) be very tightly linked with the onset of recessions, more so than TFP or monetary shocks; (ii) remain contractionary after recessions have ended; (iii) account for a large part of the variance of GDP; (iv) be generally much more important than money shocks and (v) be strongly negatively correlated with the external finance premium.     

The scarring effect of recessions

According to the conventional view, recessions improve resource allocation by driving out less productive firms. This paper posits an additional scarring effect: recessions impede the developments of potentially superior firms by destroying them during their infancy. A model is developed to capture both the cleansing and the scarring effects. A key ingredient of the model is that idiosyncratic productivity is not directly observable, but can be learned over time. When calibrated with statistics on entry, exit and productivity differentials, the model suggests that the scarring effect dominates the cleansing effect, and gives rise to lower average productivity during recessions.     

Understanding the inventory cycle

Careful examination of aggregate data from the U.S. and other OECD countries reveals that production and inventory behavior exhibit paradoxical features: (1) Inventory investment is strongly countercyclical at very high frequencies (e.g., 2-3 quarters per cycle); it is procyclical only at relatively low-cyclical frequencies such as the business-cycle frequencies (e.g., 8-40 quarters per cycle). (2) Production is less volatile than sales around the high frequencies; it is more volatile than sales only around business-cycle or lower frequencies. (3) Unlike capital investment or GDP, the bulk of the variance of inventory investment is concentrated around high frequencies rather than around business-cycle frequencies. These features of production and inventory behavior at the low and high frequencies provide a litmus test for inventory theories. This paper shows that the stockout-avoidance theory [Kahn, J., 1987. Inventories and the volatility of production. American Economic Review 77, 667-679.] has much better potential than other competing theories for explaining the seemingly paradoxical features of inventory fluctuations observed at different cyclical frequencies. My analysis suggests that demand shocks are the main source of the business cycle.     

The Firm Size Effect and the Economic Cycle

Small firms have, on average, lower return on assets and higher leverage than do large firms. Small firms tend to do well in good economic conditions but to perform poorly in the worst economic conditions. We investigate the hypothesis that the small firm effect is manifest in the expansion phase of the economic cycle but not in the contraction phase. The empirical results of our study confirm the hypothesis for 1976–95. We use the alpha, residual, and regression methods in testing the hypothesis.     

Instability of sunspot equilibria in real business cycle models under adaptive learning

We provide conditions under which a general, reduced-form class of real business cycle (RBC) models has rational expectations equilibria that are both indeterminate and stable under adaptive learning. Indeterminacy of equilibrium allows for the possibility that non-fundamental “sunspot” variable realizations can be used to drive the model, and several researchers have offered calibrated structural models where sunspot shocks play such a role. However, we show that the structural restrictions researchers have adopted lead to reduced-form systems that are always unstable under adaptive learning dynamics, thus calling into question the plausibility of these sunspot-driven RBC models.     

Financing constraints, irreversibility, and investment dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financing constraints and irreversibility constraints. We use this model to examine the cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and output in the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields three main results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investment is reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint on variable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interaction between the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and material deliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they are highly asymmetrical over the business cycle.     

Costs of business cycles for unskilled workers

Unskilled workers are subject to a much larger risk of unemployment during recessions than are skilled workers. Moreover, unskilled workers earn less income, which limits their ability to self-insure. We examine how this heterogeneity in unemployment risk and income across different skill groups translates into heterogeneity in the cost of business cycles. We find that the welfare cost of business cycles for unskilled workers is substantially higher than the welfare cost for skilled workers.     

Similarities and convergence in G-7 cycles

This paper examines the properties of G-7 cycles using a multicountry Bayesian panel VAR model with time variations, unit specific dynamics and cross-country interdependences. We demonstrate the presence of a significant world cycle and show that country specific indicators play a much smaller role. We detect differences across business cycle phases but, apart from an increase in synchronicity in the late 1990s, find little evidence of major structural changes. We also find no evidence of the existence of a Euro specific cycle or of its emergence in the late 1990s.     

Anticipated growth and business cycles in matching models

In a business cycle model that incorporates a standard matching framework, employment increases in response to news shocks, even though the wealth effect associated with the increase in expected productivity reduces labor force participation. The reason is that the matching friction induces entrepreneurs to increase investment in new projects and vacancies early. If there is underinvestment in new projects in the competitive equilibrium, then the efficiency gains associated with an increase in employment make it possible that consumption, employment, output, as well as the investment in new and existing projects jointly increase long before the actual increase in productivity materializes. If there is no underinvestment, then investment in existing projects decreases, but total investment, consumption, employment, and output still jointly increase.     

Idiosyncratic production risk, growth and the business cycle

We introduce a neoclassical growth economy with idiosyncratic production risk and incomplete markets. Each agent is an entrepreneur operating her own technology with her own capital stock. The general equilibrium is characterized by a closed-form recursion in the CARA-normal case. Incomplete markets introduce a risk premium on private equity, which reduces the demand for investment. As compared to complete markets, the steady state can thus have both a lower capital stock due to investment risk, and a lower interest rate due to precautionary savings. Furthermore, the anticipation of high real interest rates in the future feeds back into high risk premia and low investment in the present, thus slowing down convergence to the steady state. Our results highlight the importance of private risk premia for capital accumulation and business cycles.     

Learning asymmetries in real business cycles

When a boom ends, the downturn is generally sharp and short. When growth resumes, the boom is more gradual. Our explanation rests on learning about productivity. When agents believe productivity is high, they work, invest, and produce more. More production generates higher precision information. When the boom ends, precise estimates of the slowdown prompt decisive reactions: investment and labor fall sharply. When growth resumes, low production yields noisy estimates of recovery. Noise impedes learning, slows recovery, and makes booms more gradual than downturns. A calibrated model generates growth rate asymmetry similar to macroeconomic aggregates. Fluctuations in agents’ forecast precision match observed countercyclical errors of forecasters.“There is, however, another characteristic of what we call the trade cycle that our explanation must cover; namely, the phenomenon of the crisis—the fact that the substitution of a downward for an upward tendency often takes place suddenly and violently, whereas there is, as a rule, no such sharp turning point when an upward is substituted for a downward tendency.” J.M. Keynes (1936)