EXPORT AND HEDGING DECISIONS UNDER CORRELATED REVENUE AND EXCHANGE RATE RISK

This paper examines the behaviour of a competitive exporting firm under joint revenue and exchange rate risk. The firm can trade unbiased currency futures contracts for hedging purposes. We show that neither the separation theorem nor the full‐hedging theorem holds when the revenue shock prevails. If the correlation between the revenue shock and the random spot exchange rate is non‐positive, the firm optimally produces less than the benchmark level when the revenue shock is absent. If, in addition, the firm is prudent, the optimal futures position is an under‐hedge. Finally, we derive sufficient conditions under which the firm's optimal output level is higher in the presence than in the absence of the revenue shock. Operational hedging and financial hedging as such interact in a complicated way to better cope with the multiple sources of uncertainty faced by the firm.     

Export Flexibility And Currency Hedging*

This article studies the behavior of an export‐flexible firm under exchange rate uncertainty. We show that the separation theorem holds if selling exclusively in the domestic market is suboptimal even under the most unfavorable spot exchange rate. Otherwise, the firm's optimal output depends on its preferences and on the underlying uncertainty. We further show that the full‐hedging theorem holds only when the firm always finds it optimal to sell its entire output in the foreign market. Otherwise, export flexibility introduces a convexity into the firm's foreign exchange risk exposure, which calls for the use of currency options for hedging purposes.     

Export-Flexible Firms and Forward Markets

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of an exporting firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm is export flexible in that it can distribute its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market, after observing the realized spot exchange rate. The firm is a monopoly in the domestic market but a price-taker in the foreign market. It is shown that the separation theorem holds if selling exclusively in the domestic market is suboptimal even under the most unfavorable sport exchange rate. Otherwise, the firm's optimal output depends on its preference and on the underlying exchange rate uncertainty. Furthermore, the export-flexible firm underhedges its exchange rate risk exposure in a currency forward market wherein the forward exchange rate contains a non-positive risk premium. [D21, F31]     

Currency Hedging For Export-Flexible Firms *

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of a competitive exporting firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm possesses export flexibility in that it can distribute its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market, after observing the true realization of the exchange rate. It is shown that the separation theorem does not hold under export flexibility, i.e., the firm's optimal output depends on the firm's preference and on the underlying exchange rate uncertainty. Furthermore, the export- flexible firm underhedges its exchange rate risk exposure in a currency forward market where in the forward exchange rate contains a non-positive risk premium. [D21, F31]     

OPTIMAL EXPORT AND HEDGING DECISIONS WHEN FORWARD MARKETS ARE INCOMPLETE

This paper examines the behaviour of the competitive firm that exports to two foreign countries under multiple sources of exchange rate uncertainty. There is a forward market between the home currency and one foreign country's currency, but there are no hedging instruments directly related to the other foreign country's currency. We show that the separation theorem holds when the firm optimally exports to the foreign country with the currency forward market. The full‐hedging theorem holds either when the firm exports exclusively to the foreign country with the currency forward market or when the relevant spot exchange rates are independent. In the case that the relevant spot exchange rates are positively (negatively) correlated in the sense of regression dependence, the firm optimally opts for a short (long) forward position for cross‐hedging purposes.     

THE EFFECT OF FORWARD MARKETS ON MULTINATIONAL FIRMS

This paper presents a model of a risk averse multinational firm under exchange rate risk. The firm, which owns and controls assets in two countries, is engaged in production, sales and forward contracting whenever forward markets exist. First, we investigate the effects of exchange rate uncertainty without any risk sharing markets. It is shown that the firm internalizes missing hedging markets by increasing foreign production and lowering foreign sales. Therefore the firm hedges by repatriating foreign profits in the form of goods. Second, the implications of the existence of forward markets of global market decisions are discussed. It is shown that a separation theorem holds. This does not imply that the multinational firm shifts all the risk into the forward exchange market.     

Hedging exchange rate risk: The multiperiod case

We analyse production and hedging in a multiperiod framework for a risk-averse exporting firm facing a random exchange rate. We extend the separation theorem to this multiperiod model. Our study shows that unbiased currency forward markets in all periods do not imply standard full hedging. Under some conditions, the firm tends to overhedge compared to the one-period hedging models.     

The effects of abandonment options on operating leverage and forward hedging

This paper examines the behavior of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when the firm is endowed with an abandonment option and has access to a forward market for its output. When the realized output price is less than its marginal cost, the firm optimally exercises its abandonment option and ceases production. The firm lets its abandonment option extinguish, thereby producing up to its capacity, only when the realized output price exceeds its marginal cost. The ex post exercising of the abandonment option as such convexifies the firm's ex ante profit with respect to the random output price. We show that neither the separation theorem nor the full-hedging theorem holds in the presence of the abandonment option. The firm under-hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a nonpositive risk premium. When the set of hedging instruments is expanded to include options, we show that both the separation and full-hedging theorems are restored. We further show that the firm prefers options to forwards for hedging purposes when both types of contracts are fairly priced.     

Cross-Hedging of Exchange-Rate Risk

For currencies with highly developed forward markets a well-known separation theorem holds which implies that international firms fully hedge the exchange rate risk if the forward markets are unbiased. In this paper we present a model of a risk-averse firm when perfect hedging instruments are not available. Instead the firm can cross-hedge the exchange-rate risk by using the forward markets of a third country's currency. We demonstrate that the unbiasedness of all forward markets does not imply full hedge, although the firm has the option to hedge all the risks.     

Extension of Oi's price instability theorem

Oi's theorem that product price variability raises the average profit of a single-product perfectly competitive firm is generalized in this paper to cover the case of an n-commodity firm. Under similar conditions to those mentioned by Oi for the single-product case, commodity (factor or product) price instability raises the average profit of an n-commodity perfectly competitive firm.     

Wage differentials in a dynamic theory of the firm

The behavior of a profit-maximizing firm in a market characterized by uncertain wage differentials for a homogeneous occupation is studied. The firm must make a number of interdependent decisions at every moment of time. It must choose a wage rate, a level of vacancies and the rate at which it will fill them, and the scale of production. Individual behavior plays an important role in the model. Individuals must decide whether to quit their current job to search for a better position if they are employed and whether to accept any forthcoming offers if they are unemployed. The model is set up as a dynamic optimization problem. The determinants of the firm's relative wage rate are its turnover costs, price of output, the aggregate vacancy-unemployment ratio, and other individual and market variables. It is shown that a firm faced with an excess supply of willing applicants will not lower its wage. This introduces an inflationary bias into the market when changes in the unemployment rate are considered.     

Institutional quality and new firm survival

The existing literature on firm survival focuses almost exclusively on firm‐ and industry‐level determinants. What is generally overlooked, albeit extremely important for firm survival in developing countries, is the impact of institutional quality. Using data from manufacturing firms in China for the 1998–2005 period, we find that institutional quality has a significant and positive impact on the survival of private enterprises. Specifically, a one‐standard‐deviation increase in the security of property rights protection leads to an 8.8 percent decrease in the hazard rate of private enterprises. Our results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and to various checks.     

Privatization Neutrality Theorem: When a Public Firm Pursues General Objectives

This paper examines the privatization neutrality theorem when a public firm pursues general objectives other than welfare maximization. This theorem states that when the government gives firms optimal subsidies, welfare is exactly the same before and after privatization. However, we present a seemingly paradoxical result. When a public firm incorrectly assumes that subsidies change the welfare size, privatization is necessarily welfare neutral, whereas when the public firm correctly recognizes that subsidies only bring about income redistribution, without affecting welfare, the situations in which neutrality holds are limited.     

Location and the comparative statics of the theory of production

This paper applies modern methods of doing comparative static analysis to the theory of the firm when location as well as input levels are the firm's choice variables. Many results are obtained including all previously known results. Moreover, it is shown that traditional results in the theory of the firm such as downward sloping derived demand curves, generalize to the location problem. New results, such as an increase in a transportation rate decreasing transportation in terms of ton-miles of an input, are also obtained. Many new symmetry conditions are also found.     

GOVERNMENT DEFICITS IN POST-KEYNESIAN THEORIES OF GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION

This paper examines the role of the government sector in post-Keynesiantheories of growth and distribution. It shows the possibilityof reconciling two views on income distribution, present inthe post-Keynesian tradition, which the literature has consideredalternative. By following Kaldor's suggestions on the role thatmonetary and fiscal policy can play in maintaining steady growthconditions, we find that distributive variables depend bothon the rate of growth of the economy, as pointed out by Kaldorand Pasinetti, and on the money rate of interest, as suggestedby Sraffa and by the subsequent elaborations of a monetary theoryof distribution. The paper first verifies the validity of thePasinetti theorem and the dual theorem, and shows that thesetheorems do not always hold when the government sector is explicitlyconsidered. It extends the analysis to the case of the corporateeconomy and institutional distribution, clarifying limits tothe neo-Pasinetti theorem related to the assumption of an endogenousvaluation ratio in steady-growth equilibrium and to the factthat this theorem does not hold when real capital investmentis also financed through the issue of firms' bonds.     

Optimal privatization and uniform subsidy policies: A note

The privatization neutrality theorem states that the share of public ownership in a firm does not affect welfare under an optimal uniform tax‐subsidy policy. We revisit this neutrality result. First, we investigate the case in which the private firm is domestic. We show that this neutrality result does not hold unless public and private firms have the same cost function. Next, we investigate a case in which both domestic and foreign investors own the private firm. We show that the optimal degree of privatization is never zero, and thus, the neutrality result does not hold, even when there is no cost difference between public and private firms.     

A model of the socialist firm in transition to a market economy

This paper models the dynamic adjustment path of a socialist firm in transition to a market economy by a price shock that renders old capital obsolete. The firm can adjust with investment in more productive capital equipments. The optimal time paths of investment, output, and employment are analyzed and the impact of fiscal incentives like investment subsidies and a reduced corporate income tax rate are studied. Like output, the aggregate capital stock follows a J-curve. The conditions for viability of firms and the impact of variables such as wage increases on the value of the firm are discussed.     

The determinants of pharmaceutical research and development expenditures

Since the late 1970s, pharmaceutical R&D has grown at a rapid rate relative to sales and other variables. In this paper, we examine the determinants of pharmaceutical R&D using a pooled data sample of 11 major drug firms over the period 1974 to 1994. We find that expected returns and cash flows are important explanatory variables of firm research intensities during this period. This is consistent with our results for an earlier sample period characterized by very different growth patterns on R&D.     

Is Corporate Social Responsibility Associated with Lower Wages?

Firms with a reputation as socially responsible may have an important cost advantage: If workers prefer their employer to be socially responsible, equilibrium wages may be lower in such firms. We explore this hypothesis, combining Norwegian register data with data on firm reputation collected by an employer branding firm. Adjusting for a large set of background variables, we find that the firm’s social responsibility reputation is significantly associated with lower wages.     

A dynamic model of advertising by the regulated firm

A profit-maximizing firm subject to price regulation typically seeks alternative variables to control if the regulatory constraint is binding. Advertising may be one such variable. By shifting the demand curve inward or outward between rate hearings, the firm may increase its earnings above the allowed level. Here, a simple discrete-time optimal-control model is proposed to examine the dynamic implications of advertising by the regulated firm. Our results indicate that, in the long run, the combined effect of regulation and advertising leads to a steady-state equilibrium that is closer to the minimum point on the firm's long-run average-cost curve than the original output level. Thus, an invisible-hand property is established that pushes the regulated firm to shift its demand curve toward the minimum point on its long-run average-cost curve in the presence of regulation. As a result, the well-known allocative inefficiency created by rate-of-return regulation (PMC), on which so much has been written over the past 100 years, is reduced (and, under certain conditions, eliminated) if the regulated firm is allowed to advertise.