Interest linkages between the US,UK and German interest rates: should the UK join the European Monetary Union?

In light of continuing mixed results in the literature, this paper re‐examines the German Dominance Hypothesis (GDH) and considers whether the UK should join the Eurozone. For this purpose, short‐term interest rate relationships between the UK, Germany, the Eurozone and the USA, for the period January 1982 to June 2007, are studied. The policy implication of a loss of monetary autonomy for the UK in favour of Germany or the European Central Bank (ECB) would give support to the UK joining the EMU as an economic response. From the early 1980s the Bundesbank’s responsibility was to use money growth targets to keep average inflation rate down in the long run. This long run objective suggests that an appropriate methodology for testing the GDH is to test whether the German stochastic trend is a driving stochastic trend. In other words we determine whether a permanent shock to the German interest rate has a permanent effect on the UK interest rate. To this end the structural shocks in a VECM are identified by imposing long‐run restrictions of the type developed in King et al. (1991). We apply the same techniques to testing whether the UK has suffered a loss of monetary autonomy in favour of the ECB.     

Monetary Cooperation in Europe and the Problem of Differential Productivity Growth: an argument for a ‘two-speed’ Europe

Cointegration analysis of a productivity-modified purchasing power parity relation supports the hypothesis that—in the long run—the nominal exchange rate adjusts to accommodate different national rates of productivity growth in the traded goods sector. Accordingly, in the long run, an absence of exchange rate flexibility combined with productivity growth differentials is likely to generate an intractable adjustment problem. Because Germany and France display a similar evolution of productivity, this analysis supports their participation in monetary union, whereas a markedly different pattern of productivity growth in the UK constitutes an argument against membership. In passing, we find empirical support for Michael Porter's hypothesis that continuous devaluation can reduce the rate of productivity growth. This also has implications for UK membership.     

The role of global financial conditions for credit supply in EMU periphery countries

The article analyses the role of global financial conditions for credit supply and growth performance in individual member states of the European Monetary Union (EMU). In line with the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, we find that in the short run, the Fed and European Central Bank (ECB) interest rate policy compensate for changes in global risk assessment thereby supporting net private credit flows to the European periphery. However, in later periods, a worsened risk sentiment weighs on credit flows to these countries. In contrast, EMU core countries are generally less affected by global financial shocks. This asymmetric influence of global conditions on EMU member states are smoothed by the uniform access of commercial banks to the Eurosystem’s open market operations in conjunction with the redistribution of liquidity via the TARGET mechanism.     

The Economic Case for Monetary Union in the European Union

Differential requirements for seigniorage provide a weak case for retaining monetary independence. As regards adjustment to asymmetric shocks, nominal exchange rate flexibility is at best a limited blessing and at worst a limited curse. Absence of significant fiscal redistribution mechanisms among EU members is not an obstacle to monetary union. Neither is limited international labour mobility. Convergence of real economic performance is irrelevant for monetary union. A common currency is the logical implication of unrestricted capital mobility. The Maastricht criteria need not hinder monetary union provided the political will exists to adopt a flexible interpretation of the fiscal criteria.     

External monetary shocks and monetary integration: Evidence from the Bulgarian currency board

Starting July the 1st 1997, Bulgaria adopted a Currency Board (CB) monetary system. This paper aims at investigating if the adoption of the CB monetary system, which involves the cost of losing monetary autonomy, has provided a relatively better (with respect to other CEEC) monetary integration of Bulgaria with the European Monetary Union (EMU). Since Bulgarian monetary variables are endogenous under a CB, we focus on the ECB and FED interest rates as the main sources on monetary volatility. First, we find that ECB shocks are more rapidly absorbed and have less significant impact of domestic variables, with respect to other external monetary shocks (FED rate changes). Second, the responses of Bulgarian variables following changes in the ECB interest rate present lower persistence and significance, with respect to what the previous literature emphasized for other CEEC with monetary autonomy. This latter result still holds when accounting for different sources of cross-country heterogeneity outlined in the literature, thus supporting that the adoption of the CB may have worked as a rather good device in terms of integration of Bulgaria into the EMU.     

Cross‐country asymmetries in monetary policy transmission: evidence from EMU members

This paper analyzes monetary policy asymmetries in EMU participating countries. In particular, we use a structural dynamic modelling approach to investigate asymmetric monetary transmission in Europe. Asymmetries are investigated in two different ways. First, we restrict the estimated structural models reflecting the monetary constraints each country faced during the EMS period. We obtain well‐behaved and comparable effects of monetary policy shocks. Second, efficiency frontiers for the selected EMU countries are estimated. In computing the optimal combinations of output gap and inflation volatility we use a weighted average of interest rate and exchange rate, i.e. the Monetary Condition Index (MCI), as a policy instrument. The impulse response analysis implemented with the MCI shows relatively small differences in the responses of the real economy to monetary policy shocks. Altogether the results suggest that, no matter which policy instrument is used, output gap and inflation respond to identical monetary shocks with a similar speed and movement, albeit with a different degree of effect.     

Macroeconomic shocks under alternative exchange rate regimes: the Irish experience

The paper investigates the nature of Irish macroeconomic shocks and their correlation with German and UK shocks. A restricted VAR of real output and prices is employed to distinguish aggregate demand and supply shocks for the three countries. To identify the role of Irish exchange rate policy two periods are considered: the preERM period and the ERM period. The results indicate that while the change in exchange rate policy had an effect on the nature of demand and supply shocks, the ERM did not have the effect of increasing the correlation of Irish shocks with Germany or the UK. Evidence of substantial asymmetric shocks with Germany and the UK exist. Thus, Ireland as a member of the EMU faces increased cost of adjustment to asymmetric macroeconomic shocks.     

In or out? The welfare costs of EMU membership

Sweden and the UK have repeatedly refused to join the European and Monetary Union (EMU). Surprisingly, there is very little work on the welfare consequences of the loss of monetary policy flexibility for these countries. This paper fills this void by providing a framework to evaluate quantitatively the economic costs of joining the EMU. Using a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices we investigate the economic implications of the loss of monetary policy flexibility associated with the EMU for each country. The main contribution of our general equilibrium approach is that we can evaluate the effects of monetary policy in terms of welfare. Our findings suggest that these economies may experience sizable welfare losses as a result of joining the EMU. Results show that the cost associated with the loss of the monetary policy flexibility is higher in the presence of persistent government consumption shocks and small trade shares with the EMU.     

MONETARY POLICY IN EMU WITH ASYMMETRIC TRANSMISSION AND NON-TRADABLE GOODS

Which policy objective should a central bank pursue in a monetary union with asymmetric monetary transmission and different rates of inflation? Should it base its decisions on the EU‐wide average of inflation and growth or should it instead focus on (appropriately weighted) national utility losses based on national rates of inflation and growth? We find that a policy which minimises the sum of national utility losses leads to higher average utility if the variability of common shocks is large relative to idiosyncratic demand shocks in the non‐tradables sectors. We draw conclusions for the appropriate weight of common and national objectives in the union.     

Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU

This paper constructs various models of the EMU and ECB when member countries have different objectives. Voting in pursuit of national interest can yield moderate and stable inflation. The metaphor of Walsh-type contracts implements a monetary policy rule that averages the member countries’ most preferred rules. In a repeated relationship where a country suffering a large adverse shock can use political bargaining to subvert the ECB's commitment, the optimal rule should incorporate some flexibility to forestall that. Finally, freedom of national fiscal policies undermines the ECB's monetary commitment; this may justify fiscal constraints like the Stability and Growth Pact.     

Do asymmetries matter for European monetary policy?

In this paper we analyze the impact of economic and institutional (ECB decision rules) asymmetries on the effectiveness of monetary policy in Euroland. We consider a model where asymmetric shocks and divergent propagation of shocks in output and inflation are potential causes of tensions within the ECB concerning the conduct of common monetary (interest rate) policy. Welfare implications of the alternative decision procedures are discussed.     

THE ROLE OF HOUSE PRICES IN THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM ACROSS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

This paper provides a discussion of the ‘housing market’ channels of the monetary transmission mechanism and offers some evidence of institutional differences in the European housing and mortgage markets. Using a number of Vector Autoregressive models, estimated individually for nine European countries over the pre‐EMU period, we find that house prices are significantly affected by interest rate shocks. The relative role of these interest‐rate‐induced fluctuations in house prices for private consumption is then investigated. We show that house prices may enhance the effects of interest rate shocks on consumer spending in those economies where housing and mortgage markets are relatively more developed and competitive.     

Sharing Money Creation in a Monetary Union*

How to share money creation among the members of the European Monetary Union? To address this issue, we construct a two‐country New Open‐economy Macroeconomics model of an asymmetric monetary union with an incomplete financial market and home bias in consumption. We consider two sharing rules consistent with the current regulations of the European System of Central Banks. First, each participating National Central Bank supplies half of the European Central Bank determined money creation in the monetary union. Secondly, each National Central Bank adapts the national increase in money demand, under the constraint that the total money creation in the union does not exceed the level determined by the ECB for the whole union. We show that the current sharing rule, which ignores countries’ heterogeneity, is superior in terms of welfare. The key role of the current account is emphasized. It proves an efficient decentralized mechanism for allocation of money.     

The optimality of a gulf currency union: Commonalities and idiosyncrasies

A high degree of shared national elements that drive the bulk of observed output volatility between countries is generally seen as a necessary prerequisite for the formation of a successful monetary union. This is because countries in a monetary union accept a one-size-fits all, resigning regions to policies that are based on some aggregate macroeconomic target rather than a country-specific one. For this reason, the cost of monetary union membership depends on the incidence of asymmetric (nation-specific) shocks rather than symmetric, or common shocks. This criteria is examined for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, who reaffirmed plans for the implementation of a single currency. This paper quantifies, using structural factor models with common factor restrictions, changes in output synchronisation, the importance of common factor or idiosyncratic shocks between the regions, and the synchronisation of these shocks across the GCC as well as the implications for GCC-wide macroeconomic policy at short-to-medium term horizons. Despite current difficulties in fulfilling the convergence criteria goals to monetary union, the results show the synchronisation of output growth fluctuations between economies of the GCC to have increased over the past 25 years. This paper also finds that a fairly sizeable proportion of output fluctuations in business cycle frequencies are driven by a common component that, to some degree, reflects U.S. monetary policy and U.S. demand shocks as well as changes in crude oil prices.     

FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION AND BUSINESS CYCLE VOLATILITY IN A MONETARY UNION

This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium two‐country sticky‐price model to analyze the implications of financial market integration for the propagation of asymmetric productivity and government spending shocks in a monetary union. Financial market integration has a small effect on the propagation of these shocks if households can only trade in risk‐free bonds. However, financial market integration has a more substantial effect on the propagation of these shocks in a monetary union with a complete market for state‐contingent claims. This result indicates that it may be important to account for threshold effects in empirical analyses of the impact of financial market integration on business cycle volatility in a monetary union.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy-Makers in the European Economic and Monetary Union: Allies or Adversaries?

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are determined by simulating a global model under alternative assumptions about the objective function of the European Central Bank (ECB) and about cooperation vs. non-cooperation between monetary and fiscal policy-makers and among the latter. The results show the high effectiveness of fixed rules in the presence of supply-side shocks and the usefulness of cooperative discretionary measures against demand-side shocks. More generally, cooperation among fiscal policy-makers in the EMU is nearly always superior to non-cooperative equilibrium solutions, yielding a strong case for the coordination of fiscal policies.     

Asymmetric Exchange Rates and Unofficial Exchange Rate Interventions: The Case of South Korea

Applying Milton Friedman's ‘plucking’ model of output fluctuations, we investigate the behavior of the Korean won/dollar exchange rate using a state-space model with Markov switching, which incorporates both symmetric and asymmetric shocks. We find that the Korean won/US dollar exchange rate rarely falls below its trend, but is plucked upward from time to time by transitory shocks. This asymmetry suggests that the monetary authority unofficially intervenes in the foreign exchange market to support its own target level from below. Further evidence from changes in reserve assets indirectly supports our finding.     

The bank lending channel of monetary policy in EU countries during the global financial crisis

The study examines the existence of the bank lending channel of monetary policy in European Union (EU) countries. The paper advances current research on the monetary transmission mechanism in the following ways: Firstly, we analyze the differences between ‘old’ Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and ‘new’ EU countries. Secondly, we examine the key bank characteristics and monetary policy indicators that may have an impact on the bank lending channel. We assume that short-term market interest rates and monetary aggregate M2 affect banks' activities. We apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) with pooled data from 1999 to 2012. We show that in the pre-crisis period the effect of changing the short-term market interest rates on the bank lending channel of monetary policy is more pronounced among ‘old’ EMU countries, whereas the effect of M2 is significant during the period of the global financial crisis (GFC) among ‘old’ EMU countries. Last but not least the important finding is that banks in ‘new’ EU countries react differently to monetary shocks.     

Asymmetric Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union

We analyze the conduct of monetary policy in a currency union in the face of asymmetric shocks. In particular, we compare the stabilization properties of a currency union versus alternative exchange rate arrangements. The relative performance of a currency union is shown to depend on the extent of economic integration in patterns of consumption and production and on the relative weights placed on price stability versus employment stability in the monetary authority's objective function.
JEL classification : F 33; F 40     

‘Talking down monetary policy’ – a note

There is a recent debate about whether ultra-expansionary monetary policy is no longer effective in stimulating demand, a concern often voiced in the euro area in light of persistently low and even negative inflation. As a response, the European Central Bank (ECB) warns against ‘talking down monetary policy’ (ECB Vice-President Vítor Constâncio, 2016). This note uses a textbook model of optimal monetary policy to study a situation in which the public misperceives the interest rate elasticity of aggregate demand, which reflects policy effectiveness. We show that as a result of underestimating policy effectiveness demand shocks can no longer be stabilized perfectly, thus resulting in inefficient inflation and output dynamics. In the presence of misperceptions, a negative demand shock leads to a prolonged period of negative inflation rates.