Political Affiliation and Pay Slice: Do Blue CEOs Accept Less Green?

We examine the relationship among CEO political alignment, compensation, and pay disparity (relative to other high‐earning executives) and find that Democratic CEOs accept less pay and a significantly lower pay slice. That is, left‐leaning CEOs put their money where their mouth is regarding the Democratic ideology of economic and social equity. This smaller pay gap is not a function of variations in managerial ability; if anything, Democratic CEOs are more talented than Republican CEOs. Results suggest that Democratic CEOs may be more effective at running firms in which collaboration among top executives is more valuable than are the potential gains from tournament incentives.     

Top management team turnover, CEO succession type, and strategic change

While previous research suggests that CEO turnover correlates with strategic changes in firm's operations such as discontinuation of operations, we demonstrate that such findings apply only to specific types of CEO turnover, and only if non-CEO members of the top management team also exit the firm. Our analysis examines cases of contender, follower, and outsider succession and reinforces the key role of non-CEO departures in strategic change at a firm. The results support an integration of the upper echelons perspective and the power circulation theory view of top management team turnover.     

财务困境中CEO权力、高管层薪酬差距与公司业绩

以2005—2009年深沪两市上市公司为样本,设定财务困境公司与财务健康公司两个对比组,分析CEO权力对高管层薪酬差距的影响,以及薪酬差距、CEO权力和两者的交互效应对公司业绩的影响。研究发现:CEO强权在财务困境公司中不会导致高管层薪酬差距显著扩大,而在财务健康公司则会;财务困境公司中较大的高管层薪酬差距和CEO强权均能促进公司业绩的提升,且比财务健康公司更显著;CEO权力与薪酬差距对公司业绩的影响在财务困境公司中呈互补关系,而在财务健康公司中呈替代关系。     

非家族高管更加“患不均”？——家族企业CEO身份对高管薪酬差距的影响研究

文章通过衡量家族企业中CEO与非家族高管之间的薪酬差距,试图探讨非家族高管的激励问题。依据社会比较理论和锦标赛理论的不同解释逻辑,并基于家族高管与非家族高管的不同特点,文章首先考察影响高管薪酬差距的前因变量,提出非家族CEO与薪酬差距之间关系的竞争性假设,并探讨薪酬差距对企业绩效的影响作用。利用2009〖KG-*4〗-〖KG-*6〗2016年中国家族上市公司数据,研究发现,当非家族成员担任CEO时,CEO与非家族高管之间的薪酬差距减小;另外,薪酬差距与企业绩效呈负相关关系,说明非家族高管中“不均”的薪酬安排会影响企业绩效。综合来看,相比锦标赛理论,社会比较理论对解释家族企业CEO身份对其与非家族高管之间薪酬差距的影响更具预测力与解释力。     

Americanization as a driver of CEO pay in Europe: The moderating role of CEO power

This paper examines the relationship between Americanization and CEO pay levels in Europe and how this relationship is moderated by CEO power. Based on neo-institutional theory, our study provides empirical support for a link between Americanization and CEO pay levels. Drawing on a sample of large listed European firms, our results suggest that various dimensions of Americanization, i.e., Americanization of the CEO, of the firm and of the industry, can be associated with higher CEO pay. Combining neo-institutional approaches with managerial power perspectives, we show that Americanization can have an even stronger effect on pay when the CEO is powerful.     

Managerial power,perquisite consumption and the efficiency of property right system: Evidence from Chinese listed companies

This research uses data of Chinese listed companies during 2001–2004 to test the effects of managerial power on perquisite consumption and firm performance from the perspectives of CEO duality, ownership dispersion and long-term tenure of top executives. Results show that companies with higher managerial power tend to incur higher perquisite consumption, while their performance does not improve accordingly. Moreover, perquisite consumption fails to offer effective incentives to managers, and non-state-controlled listed companies have greater managerial power, higher perquisite consumption, and worse performance than that of their state-controlled peers. Results also show that managerial power is an important factor influencing compensation incentive.     

Third-party endorsements of CEO quality,managerial discretion,and stakeholder reactions

Research on the influence of third-party endorsements of CEO quality generally does not account for the context in which such signs manifest. To address this limitation, the present study examines how a CEO's level of managerial discretion shapes boards' and shareholders' responses to external endorsements of his or her quality. Managerial discretion refers to the range of strategic options that executives have at their disposal in a given business context. The findings indicate that boards only react to CEO endorsements in high-discretion settings, and this reaction is positive (i.e., more pay). In contrast, shareholders – regardless of discretion levels – positively respond to CEO endorsements in the short-term, while these responses become more equivocal over the time. These results suggest that – at least in the short term – directors more adeptly interpret and respond to external information about CEO quality than shareholders.     

The Effects of Fraud and Lawsuit Revelation on U.S. Executive Turnover and Compensation

This study investigates the impact of fraud/lawsuit revelation on U.S. top executive turnover and compensation. It also examines potential explanatory variables affecting the executive turnover and compensation among U.S. fraud/lawsuit firms. Four important findings are documented. First, there was significantly higher executive turnover among U.S. firms with fraud/lawsuit revelation in the Wall Street Journal than matched firms without such revelation. Second, although on average, U.S. top executives received an increase in cash compensation after fraud/lawsuit revelation, this increase is smaller than that of matched non-fraud/lawsuit firms. Third, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to change top executive when chief executive officer (CEO) was not the board chairman and CEO had been on the board for a short time. Fourth, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation when profitability was low, firms were involved in fraud, the compensation committee size was small, and the board met more often. These findings indicate that although, in general, U.S. fraud/lawsuits firms did not reduce their executive cash compensation, those involved in fraud were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation than to change their top executives. The finding, that ethical standards is not a significant factor for U.S. executive turnover nor compensation reduction, suggests that ethics appears to play no part in the board’s decisions, and that U.S. firms may have ethical standards in writing but they do not implement nor enforce the standards.     

Does the Market for Top Executives Work? CEO Pay and Turnover in Small U.K. Companies

This paper presents the results of our investigation into the operation of the managerial labour market in small and medium sized manufacturing companies. Using a sample of some 40 or so companies we study the sensitivity of managerial pay and tenure to company performance. Managerial pay in this type of firms is much lower than the six digit figures quoted for large public companies and CEO turnover is much higher than we expected. We find some evidence to suggest that pay in small companies is sensitive to sales growth and that CEO tenure in public companies responds to the growth in sales.     

Nonroutine CEO Turnover in Korean Chaebols

This study seeks to assess the relationship between firm performance and nonroutine CEO turnover in Korean conglomerates known as chaebols. Utilizing data collected from a period following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, findings indicate a negative relationship between performance and nonroutine CEO turnover. However, the status of CEOs as chaebol founding family members is also negatively correlated with nonroutine turnover. This research suggests areas where managerial accountability has been improved in chaebol and areas where further improvements are needed. The unique contribution of this study is that it considers corporate governance in chaebols after postfinancial crisis reforms and looks at CEO family membership as a factor.     

管理层权力、TMT网络与高管薪酬

文章基于管理层权力理论和社会网络理论,以2010〖KG-*4〗-〖KG-*6〗2014年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了管理层权力对高管薪酬的影响,并考察TMT网络的调节作用。研究发现：管理层权力显著提高了高管薪酬水平,但显著降低了高管薪酬业绩敏感度;而TMT网络显著增强了它们之间的相关关系。研究为管理层权力与高管薪酬之间关系的研究提供了增量证据,为完善我国高管薪酬激励制度、抑制管理层权力、规范高管之间的兼任行为提供了参考和借鉴。     

The Effects of CEO Founder Status and Stock Ownership on Entrepreneurial Orientation in Small Firms

This paper studies how governance drives entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in small firms. We argue that founder status and ownership create powerful personal incentives for small firm CEOs to engage in behaviors that influence EO. Integrating stewardship theory and the principal‐principal branch of agency theory, we test our hypotheses on a sample of 339 Swedish firms, and find that CEO founder status is significantly and positively associated with EO, while CEO stock ownership significantly but negatively predicts EO. We additionally test two boundary conditions that show that the founder‐CEO's prior managerial experience in start‐up firms positively moderates the founder‐EO relationship, while contrary to expectations, CEO ownership diversification has no effect on the negative association between ownership and EO. Thus, our study adopts a corporate governance perspective to explain how variations in EO across small firms are driven by the goals and motivations of its leader. Our research also shows that in small, private firms the balance of power is tipped in favor of the CEO rather than the board of directors. Finally, we underline the importance of adopting alternative theoretical lens like stewardship and principal‐principal agency, given that traditional principal‐agent problems are largely mitigated in the small firm context.     

Top management teams and corporate success in an emerging industry

This longitudinal study investigates changes in top management teams of a cohort of firms established in an emerging, high growth industry-the minicomputer industry. Given the turbulent conditions that organizations in this industry must contend with, top management teams do not remain stagnant. Most firms in the industry require a new set of executives to bring forth the organizational changes necessary to cope with major shifts in the environment.Little consensus exists in the literature on the impact of new executives on organizational performance. Studies have found that executive succession may be either positively, negatively, or unrelated to subsequent organizational effectiveness. The authors argue that a weakness of the existing research stream is a failure by scholars to adequately consider either the characteristics and skills of newly appointed executives or the patterns of change in management characteristics over time. The authors propose that organizational performance implications of executive succession events can be clarified by examining who the newly recruited executives are.When executive replacements are made, new successors often have characteristics which widely deviate from those of their predecessors. Such deviations in top management characterisics are shown to be pronounced where top management changes are made in response to crisis. In crises, successors are apparently recruited in an attempt to compensate for the shortcomings of their predecessors. However, while both high and low performing organizations make executive replacements as they evolve, the types of top management revisions they make differ. This study provides evidence that the types of senior management team changes made and the characterisics of newly recruited top management are related to organizational performance. High performing firms recruit new top management with new skills that are appropriate to the evolving environment. Lower performing firms somehow replace executives in response to crises, but seem to make the wrong executive recruitment decisions, apparently because the successors in the lower performing organizations do not match the changing competitive conditions in the industry. Low performing firms appear to recruit executives that entirely lack the types of top executive expertise are necessary for new environmental conditions.Although the majority of minicomputer firms required sizable changes in their executive teams over time, a small but significant subgroup of exceptional firms were identified that defy conventional wisdom. These extraordinary organizations were led by visionary CEOs—capable of maintaining management team stability as they successfully repositioned their firms' strategies to cope with continual environmental change. Among the conventional theories that these exceptional managers defy are: 1. Firms in high growth industries can be highly successful even if they retain their CEO/ Founders well beyond the embryonic stage. 2. Firms in high growth industries can retain a significant proportion of management ownership and still grow exponentially without financial crises. 3. Firms in high growth industries can maintain a high level of insider recruitment and still not become inbred.There appear to be two entirely distinct patterns of CEO/executive team success:Pattern 1 involves firms with no CEO change. This visionary CEO tends to be a founder who appears to be able to systematically recruit a limited number of external recruits in the top management team, selecting recruits who fit a changing environment yet also making maximum use of the existing team's longstanding experience and relationships. To maintain the necessary external perspective and avoid an inbred mindset, these firms a) tend not to allow the CEO to also be chairman, b) encourage a modest level of external ownership.Pattern 2 involves firms in which there is extensive turnover in both CEO and senior management teams, once again bringing in the kind of skills needed to match the changing environment. The CEO tends also to be chairman, and the external perspective is provided by having many external recruits plus low level of management ownership.     

Does CEO transformational leadership influence top executive normative commitment?

Grounded in social exchange theory logic, this study proposes that CEO transformational leadership causes high normative commitment among top executives but this relationship is nonlinear. Specifically, top executives in Turkey express less normative commitment when their CEOs exhibits moderate levels of transformational leadership than low or high levels of transformational leadership. Additionally, CEO transformational leadership exhibits a similar nonlinear relationship to affective commitment which fully mediated the J-shaped relationship between CEO transformational leadership and normative commitment. The findings highlight the need to consider the nonlinear effects of leadership types as well as implications for further exploration of antecedents of normative commitment.     

CEO控制权、事务所选择与审计公费

本文以2007-2014年A股上市公司为研究对象，实证检验了CEO控制权、事务所选择与审计公费之间的关系。研究发现： CEO 控制权越大，越不倾向选择“四大”，而更倾向选择本土大所； CEO控制权越大，越倾向支付较低的审计公费；控制了事务所自选择后，由“四大”审计的上市公司CEO控制权对审计公费的影响不明显，而由综合排名十大和本土十大审计的上市公司CEO控制权与审计公费显著负相关。     

Whom to dismiss? CEO celebrity and management dismissal

Based on the power dynamics in strategic leadership ranks, this study examines whether chief executive officer (CEO) celebrity serves as a source of CEO power and empirically investigates its role in management dismissal. In the spirit of scapegoating theory, this study proposes that CEO celebrity weakens the likelihood of CEO dismissal but strengthens the likelihood of executive dismissal in the face of poor firm performance. This study goes further to explore the previously unexamined question of “whom to dismiss” and argues that less powerful non-board executives as opposed to board executives are more likely to be handy scapegoats of power dynamics. The data from Korean public firms in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis largely support such a scapegoating hypothesis.     

Founder/Chief Executive Officer Exit: A Social Capital Perspective of New Ventures

The founder/chief executive officer (CEO) exit is a significant event for all business organizations. However, a social capital perspective suggests that the exit of the founder/CEO may be more disruptive for new start-ups due to the critical role the founder/CEO plays in the new organization and the heightened potential chance for failure of a new venture. A social capital perspective suggests that the ability of the entrepreneurial firm to perform better is affiliated with the social capital within the organization. This study supports a social capital perspective of CEO exit and social capital's impact on performance. It helps establish a foundation of study of CEO exit and new ventures from this perspective.     

CEO任期、董事会治理与绩效强制变更敏感性

本文以2010-2014年我国沪深A股主板上市公司以及在此期间的1341例CEO变更事件为初始研究样本,采用Logit模型和OLS模型研究CEO任期对公司绩效与CEO强制变更敏感性的影响,并从董事会治理视角,进一步说明敏感性发生变化的原因。研究发现,任期是识别CEO能力的重要标识,随着CEO任期逐渐延长,绩效与CEO强制变更的敏感性、以及董事会的监督力度均显著降低,董事会治理机制能够反映股东监督CEO并获取相关信息的需求。     

Editorial Note

Using survey data from China, we demonstrate that the performance consequences of managerial turnover depend on firm characteristics and managerial ties outside of the firm. An insider CEO has better knowledge of the organization but may be bound by existing social ties within the firm. An outsider CEO may turn around the firm more efficiently and possess valuable business and political ties. The author finds outside CEOs are associated with higher efficiency gains in state-owned firms with a large labor force and dependent on government support. The finding is robust after controlling for the selection of CEOs.     

Power and responsibility: How different sources of CEO power affect firms' corporate social responsibility practices

Does greater CEO power come with more responsibility? Previous scholarly work in this field entails divergent results on this question. Based on the upper echelons theory and CEO power literature, this study aimed to explore the mechanisms underlying how different sources of CEO power, including structural, ownership, expert, and prestige power, affect firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices and whether such relationships are moderated by firm visibility. Using a panel dataset comprising 6604 yearly observations of Chinese publicly traded firms from 2009 to 2019, we found that structural power is negatively related to CSR practices and that expert power is positively related to CSR practices, whereas ownership power and prestige power have no direct relationship with CSR practices. Our results show that firm visibility weakens the negative relationship between structural power and CSR practices and strengthens the relationship between expert power and CSR practices, respectively. Overall, this study reconciles the mixed results of previous studies on the impact of CEO power on CSR and integrates the effect of firm visibility as a contextual factor. This article concludes with practical recommendations on how to manage CSR engagement.