On competition,risk, and hidden assets in the market for bank credit cards

The market for credit cards has been the subject of recent attention and controversy because of ‘high’ profits earned on credit cards and substantial premiums on the resale of credit-card receivables. This paper estimates risk—return profiles for credit-card banks and explores the role of intangible assets in determining resale premiums on credit-card receivables. In addition, the effects on the resale market of securitization and the opportunity cost of acquiring new accounts are analyzed. Using alternative measures of risk and alternative control groups, we find, for the years 1989 to 1995, that credit-card banks earned significantly higher returns on assets but that these returns were associated with greater risk-taking. Analysis of premia for the years 1993 to 1995 suggest that acquiring banks pay higher premia for mid-sized regional accounts than for larger, national portfolios, perhaps because of richer cross-selling opportunities.     

THE EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1991 ON BANK STOCKS

In this study we use a multivariate regression model to investigate the effect of the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 on returns to the shareholders of bank-holding companies. The empirical results suggest that the shareholders of well-capitalized banks benefited from the enactment of the FDICIA, while those of undercapitalized banks experienced significant losses during the announcement period. However, the shareholders of adequately capitalized banks did not gain or lose significantly from the enactment of the FDICIA. The FDICIA also affected stock returns of large and small bank-holding companies similarly.     

A preliminary look at gains from asset securitization

This paper conducts tests of stockholder and bondholder wealth changes upon the securitization of non-government guaranteed assets for 236 transactions during the years 1991–1996. It finds that securitization is significantly wealth creating for stockholders, adding ∼5% per transaction to the excess returns of the stock. It finds, on a subsample of 137 transactions, that securitization is not wealth destroying for bondholders, adding an insignificant 0.21% to bondholders wealth. The effects on stockholders are larger for manufacturers than for banks and finance companies. Securitizations from corporations with poorer credit standing are subject to larger gains for asset sellers. We interpret these findings to mean that, for the frequent securitizers that form most of the observations in our sample, a comparative advantage in asset origination and servicing rather than wealth appropriation from bond holders explains the gains from securitization.     

Bank exposure to market fear

We find that increases in implied market volatility (a proxy for market fear) have a significant impact on returns of bank stocks, above and beyond systematic risk proxied by the expected excess market return during a bad economic regime. Large bank returns are favorably affected by increases in implied market volatility during the crisis, while small banks are adversely affected by increases in implied market volatility. We attribute the different effects among the size-categorized bank portfolios to the perception that large banks are protected by too-big-to-fail policies. Within the sample of small banks, the adverse share price response to increased implied market volatility is more pronounced for banks that rely more heavily on non-traditional sources of funds, use a high proportion of loans in their assets, have a higher level of non-performing assets, and have a relatively low provision for loan losses. The adverse effect of negative innovations in implied market volatility on small bank returns during the crisis is primarily driven by exposure of their loan portfolio to weak economic conditions.     

Asset sales and firm strategy: an analysis of divestitures by UK companies

This paper examines the financial causes and consequences of the decision to sell-off non-financial assets as part of a new or ongoing restructuring programme by UK non-financial companies between 1993 and 2000. We report that asset sales follow a period of declining operating returns and tend to occur in diversified companies with high levels of financial leverage. Stock prices respond positively to asset sale announcements. This arises due to improvements in operating returns and a decline in financial leverage and corporate diversification subsequent to the disposal. Our findings suggest that asset sales represent an effective operational response to a firm's poor financial condition. However, we also find that a manager's decision to sell assets is strongly influenced by the explicit threats to their control from lenders and competition from product, labour and takeover markets.     

A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation

Systemic risk is modeled as the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks undertake correlated investments, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are commonly based only on a bank’s own risk fail to mitigate aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk. Prudential regulation is shown to operate at a collective level, regulating each bank as a function of both its joint (correlated) risk with other banks as well as its individual (bank-specific) risk.     

SOME EVIDENCE THAT BANKS USE INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS TO LOWER CAPITAL COSTS

To the extent raising external capital is especially costly for banks (as the preceding article suggests), bank managers have incentives to manage their internal cash flow in ways that minimize their need to raise external equity. One way to accomplish this is to establish bank holding companies that set up internal capital markets for the purpose of allocating scarce capital across their various subsidiaries. By “internal capital market” the authors mean a capital budgeting process in which all the lending and investment opportunities of the different subsidiaries are ranked according to their risk-adjusted returns; and all internal capital available for investment is then allocated to the highestranked opportunities until either the capital is exhausted or returns fall below the cost of capital, whichever comes first. As evidence of the operation of internal capital markets in bank holding companies, the authors report the following set of findings from their own recent studies:

• ? For large publicly traded bank holding companies, growth rates in lending are closely tied to the banks' internal cash flow and regulatory capital position.
• ? For the subsidiaries of bank holding companies, what matters most is the capital position and earnings of the holding companies and not of the subsidiaries themselves.
• ? The lending activity of banks affiliated with multiple bank holding companies appears to be less dependent on their own earnings and capital than the lending of unaffiliated banks.

The authors also report that, after being acquired, previously unaffiliated banks increase their lending in local markets. This finding suggests that, contrary to the concerns of critics of bank consolidation, geographic consolidation may make banks more responsive to local lending opportunities.     

Securitization without risk transfer

We analyze asset-backed commercial paper conduits, which experienced a shadow-banking run and played a central role in the early phase of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We document that commercial banks set up conduits to securitize assets worth $1.3 trillion while insuring the newly securitized assets using explicit guarantees. We show that regulatory arbitrage was an important motive behind setting up conduits. In particular, the guarantees were structured so as to reduce regulatory capital requirements, more so by banks with less capital, and while still providing recourse to bank balance sheets for outside investors. Consistent with such recourse, we find that conduits provided little risk transfer during the run, as losses from conduits remained with banks instead of outside investors and banks with more exposure to conduits had lower stock returns.     

Bank mergers: Integration and profitability

The Treasury Department's 1991 recommendations for financial service reform would have allowed interstate branching by banks, eliminating the requirement that banking companies form a separate subsidiary for each state in which they do business. Supporters of the proposal argue that allowing bank holding companies to merge their subsidiary banks would improve performance. We tested this proposition by studying the before- and-after performance of all bank mergers in the New England states between 1982 and 1987. In the aggregate, merging banks did not achieve significant improvements in operating profits relative to other banks during the first two years after a merger. It is important to distinguish, however, between mergers of newly acquired banks and mergers of banks acquired earlier by the holding company. Mergers of previously acquired banks performed significantly better than mergers of newly acquired banks and, measured by operating return on assets, achieved significant performance improvements relative to the industry.This article may not be reproduced in any form without permission of the authors, who hold the copyright.     

The return to retail and the performance of US banks

The US banking industry is experiencing a renewed focus on retail banking, a trend often attributed to the stability and profitability of retail activities. This paper examines the impact of banks’ retail intensity on performance from 1997 to 2004 by developing three complementary definitions of retail intensity (retail loan share, retail deposit share, and branches per dollar of assets) and comparing these measures with both equity market and accounting measures of performance. We find that an increased focus on retail banking across US banks is linked with significantly lower equity market and accounting returns for all banks, but lower volatility for only the largest banking companies. We conclude that retail banking may be a relatively stable activity, but it is also a low return one.     

Winners and Losers as Financial Service Providers Converge: Evidence from the Financial Modernization Act of 1999

The Financial Modernization Act of 1999 dramatically increased insurers' and investment banks' authority to provide an array of financial services and allowed commercial banks to offer investment banking and insurance services. In this paper we examine the market response to this legislation. We find a strong positive response among insurance companies and investment banks, and no significant response among commercial banks. Larger institutions in all three financial sectors earn higher abnormal returns. Additionally, better performing banks earn higher abnormal returns. Our results suggest that allowing financial convergence can add value through synergies and that large players are needed to exploit the scope economies.     

Factors influencing the performance of foreign-owned banks in New Zealand

This article reviews factors affecting the performance of foreign-owned banks in New Zealand, where they control 99.2% of all banking system assets. Two sets of pooled cross-sectional time-series data—seven banks over the 10-year period 1991–2000 and eight banks over the 8-year period 1991–1998—provided the basis for the econometric analysis. The most important variables for bank performance were the length of time the foreign bank had been in New Zealand and the parent bank's return on assets. This suggests that parent-bank specific ownership advantages are the dominant factor in their subsidiaries’ performance in New Zealand.     

International diversification gains and home bias in banking

This paper studies international diversification in banking, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers the operations of 38 global banks and their subsidiaries overseas during 1995–2004. The paper finds that banks with a larger share of assets allocated to subsidiaries in emerging market countries were able to attain higher risk-adjusted returns. These gains were somewhat reduced by the concentration of bank subsidiaries in specific geographical regions, which is typical of the observed international expansion strategies. The paper also finds a substantial home bias in the international allocation of bank assets relative to the results of a mean–variance portfolio optimization model.     

Modeling Foreign Bank Performance and Lending Behavior

This paper examines the profitability and commercial loan growth of foreign banks using a simultaneous‐equation framework. Maximizing behavior provides a two‐equation system in which bank profitability depends on variables related to expected returns, costs, and risks and in which loan growth is determined by risk and return variables. The model is tested to evaluate the determinants of foreign bank performace and lending behavior in the United States between 1987 and 1991. Overall the results indicate that factors such as capital strength, commercial and industrial loan growth, and assets composition were important in determining foreign banks' return‐on‐assets in the period under study. The role of capital appears to be particularly important in explaining foreign bank performance. The single significant determinant of loan growth was found to be previous period's loan growth.     

Debt-overhang banking crises: Detecting and preventing systemic risk

This paper shows how the debt-overhang distortion on bank lending can generate a self-fulfilling-expectations banking crisis accompanied by a plunge in the value of banks’ assets and a contraction of bank lending and economic activity. Moral hazard in banking adds an additional channel that can generate multiple equilibria, worsen the debt-overhang distortion, and deepen the crisis. Some signals of systemic risk include: high volatility and the presence of two modes in the probability distribution functions of the returns on bank-issued bonds and on portfolios of bank-issued bonds and equities; and high correlation between the returns on bank-issued bonds. Macroprudential regulation should discourage the exposure of banks to the economic and financial cycle by raising the capital requirements for banks with more cyclical assets.     

Market's perception of deferred tax accruals

This study investigates the value relevance and incremental information content of deferred tax accruals reported under the ‘income statement method’ (AASB 1020 Accounting for Income Taxes) over the period 2001–2004. Our findings suggest that deferred tax accruals are viewed as assets and liabilities. We document a positive relation between recognized deferred tax assets and firm value using the levels model, while the results from the returns model suggest that deferred tax liabilities reflect future tax payments. The balance of unrecognized deferred tax assets provides a negative signal to the market about future profitability, particularly for companies from the materials and energy sectors and loss‐makers.     

Oil price and reserve location—Effects on oil and gas sector returns

We provide market evidence of the effects of reserve location on oil and gas (O&G) company returns. Prior studies have shown that commodity sector stock returns are affected by commodity prices. In a new contribution to natural resource valuation literature, returns for 51 O&G companies are shown to be directly and negatively affected by exposures to (location specific) progressive fiscal terms. We add a reserve location proxy—‘R’—to the Fama–French framework; differentiating between companies' performances based on the proportion of oilfield assets subject to progressive tax terms. Companies with oilfield assets owned under progressive production sharing fiscal terms are unable to capture the benefits of oil price increases—and as result significantly under-perform companies with concession asset holdings.     

The Penn Square Bank failure: Effect on commercial bank security returns — a note

In this paper, we apply standard event methodology to test the effect of the Penn Square Bank failure on the daily returns of three groups of bank holding companies. During the 75-day event period, upstream banks which had Penn Square loan participations faced nearly continual declines in daily returns; banks in the same economic region followed a pattern of less severe but continuously declining returns; while returns for banks outside the region were not significantly affected. We conclude that the market viewed the Penn Square failure as an isolated event which did not significantly affect banks away from regional economic influences.     

Liquidity Requirements,Free-Riding,and the Implications for Financial Stability Evidence from the Early 1900s

Maintaining sufficient liquidity in the financial system is vital for its stability. However, since returns on liquid assets are typically low, individual financial institutions may seek to hold fewer such assets, especially if they believe they can rely on other institutions for liquidity support. We examine whether state banks in the early 1900s took advantage of relatively high cash balances maintained by national banks, due to reserve requirements, to hold less cash themselves. We find that state banks did hold less cash in places where both state legal requirements were lower and national banks were more prevalent.     

What explains the lack of monetary policy influence on bank holding companies?

In this paper, we investigate how monetary policy innovations affect the equity returns of bank holding companies (BHCs). We also examine bank characteristics to determine what explains the cross-sectional and time-series variation in the returns' sensitivity. Similar to non-financial firms, we find that only unanticipated components affect bank equity returns; however, this effect is absent in the second half of our sample period. Smaller, less liquid banks have higher sensitivity; a higher ratio of time deposits to total deposits reduces this sensitivity. A higher ratio of non-interest income to total income also reduces this sensitivity, while capital-constrained banks have a higher sensitivity to monetary policy innovations. We argue that a higher dependence on non-interest income and the use of interest rate derivatives together may explain the disappearing influence of monetary policy on these BHCs.