International channels of the Fed's unconventional monetary policy

Previous research has established that the Federal Reserve's large scale asset purchases (LSAPs) significantly influenced international bond yields. We use dynamic term structure models to uncover to what extent signaling and portfolio balance channels caused these declines. For the U.S. and Canada, the evidence supports the view that LSAPs had substantial signaling effects. For Australian and German yields, signaling effects were present but likely more moderate, and portfolio balance effects appear to have played a relatively larger role than in the U.S. and Canada. Portfolio balance effects were small for Japanese yields and signaling effects basically nonexistent. These findings about LSAP channels are consistent with predictions based on interest rate dynamics during normal times: Signaling effects tend to be large for countries with strong yield responses to conventional U.S. monetary policy surprises, and portfolio balance effects are consistent with the degree of substitutability across international bonds, as measured by the covariance between foreign and U.S. bond returns.     

A model in which monetary policy is about money

Optimal monetary policy is studied in a model with (i) heterogeneity in the degree to which different people are monitored (have publicly known histories); (ii) idiosyncratic shocks that give rise to heterogeneity in earning and spending realizations; and (iii) central-bank intervention in a “market” in claims or credit in which the participants are those who are heavily monitored. A special case of the model has everyone perfectly monitored. In that case, there is no role for money and no role for central-bank intervention. In the example displayed with imperfect monitoring, optimal intervention is not simple.     

Financial crises,unconventional monetary policy exit strategies,and agents׳ expectations

A central bank may purchase assets during a financial crisis and then exit from those purchases. Agents have rational expectations about financial crises as rare events, the probability the central bank purchases assets, and the exit strategy. Selling off assets quickly produces a double-dip recession while slowly unwinding generates a smooth recovery. Expectations about the exit strategy influence the initial effectiveness of purchases. Increasing the probability of purchases during crises distorts the pre-crisis economy and depends upon the exit strategy. The welfare benefits of unconventional policy may differ ex-ante versus ex-post, as can the preferred exit strategy.     

A wicksellian indicator of monetary policy

This paper compares actual U.S. monetary policy with an ideal policy based upon Wicksell's theory of natural and market rates of interest. For the period 1952–1971, this comparison indicates that actual policies behaved in a distinctly pro-cyclical manner with the result that monetary policies amplified the magnitude of the business cycles. The explanation offered suggests that this stems from the central bank's attempt to stabilize the interest rate which is consistent with one of the paper's findings of a highly significant positive relationship between changes in the natural rate of interest and changes in the monetary base.     

The dynamic effects of monetary policy: A structural factor model approach

A structural factor model for 112 US monthly macroeconomic series is used to study the effects of monetary policy. Monetary policy shocks are identified using a standard recursive scheme, in which the impact effects on both industrial production and prices are zero. The main findings are the following. First, the maximal effect on bilateral real exchange rates is observed on impact, so that the “delayed overshooting” puzzle disappears. Second, after a contractionary shock prices fall at all horizons, so that the price puzzle is not there. Finally, monetary policy has a sizable effect on both real and nominal variables.     

对中央银行非常规政策退出的几点思考

当前,随着全球经济复苏态势的不断显现,关于非常规货币政策的有序退出也逐步提上了各国央行的议事日程。该文对于非常规货币政策的概念、类别,以及金融危机以来美日欧等主要经济体所采取的非常规政策进行了梳理,在此基础上对于非常规货币政策的效果评价,及非常规货币政策的退出时机、节奏和顺序等战略决策进行了相关探讨和思考。     

货币政策可信度的理论分析

货币政策可信度是指经济主体相信中央银行采取系统性的行动以最终达到所承诺的政策目标.如果公众相信中央银行将言行一致地进行货币政策操作,那么这样的货币政策就是可信的.市场经济中,货币政策的可信度在很大程度上影响到货币政策的效率.因此,明确货币政策可信度的涵义,分析货币政策可信度的影响因素,致力于提高货币政策可信度的制度建设,对提高货币政策的有效性具有现实意义.     

Optimal sustainable monetary policy

In recent monetary policy literature, optimal commitment policy and its variant from a timeless perspective have been studied with emphasis on welfare gains from policy commitment. These policies, however, involve a time-consistency problem called a stabilization bias in forward-looking models. We analyze Chari and Kehoe's [1990. Sustainable plans. Journal of Political Economy 98, 783-802] sustainable equilibrium and examine optimal sustainable policy, i.e. a policymaker's strategy in the best sustainable equilibrium. This paper shows that such a policy becomes consistent with the optimal commitment policy in sufficiently later periods. It also shows that whether the optimal sustainable policy can attain the Ramsey equilibrium outcome depends on the magnitude of shocks hitting the model economy. Moreover, the paper finds a sustainable policy that attains higher social welfare than discretionary policy does.     

Unconditionally optimal monetary policy

We develop a simple and intuitive approach for analytically deriving unconditionally optimal (UO) policies, a topic of enduring interest in optimal monetary policy analysis. The approach can be employed in both general linear-quadratic problems and in the underlying non-linear environments. A detailed example is provided using a canonical New Keynesian framework.     

对当前货币政策的一些思考

在当前世界生产分工呈现新格局,我国贸易巨额顺差格局没有发生重大变化,以及我国汇率政策将继续坚持渐变战略的情况下,货币调控问题越来越突出,这将是目前及以后一个较长时期内宏观调控诸问题中的主要难点.在今后一个可预期的时期内,通常意义上的紧缩政策应该是央行货币政策的主要倾向,但"此紧缩"不完全等同于"彼紧缩".过去采取紧缩手段的惟一目的,是针对过热的实体经济,而目前采取的紧缩手段,尽管也有针对实体经济偏热进行预防的目的,但更多则是针对实体经济增长合理对应的货币需求之外,外贸和外汇储备双过高增长引发的过多供应货币进行对冲.     

Rules,discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy

In a discretionary regime the monetary authority can print more money and create more inflation than people expect. But, although these inflation surprises can have some benefits, they cannot arise systematically in equilibrium when people understand the policymaker's incentives and form their expectations accordingly. Because the policymaker has the power to create inflation shocks ex post, the equilibrium growth rates of money and prices turn out to be higher than otherwise. Therefore, enforced commitments (rules) for monetary behavior can improve matters. Given the repeated interaction between the policymaker and the private agents, it is possible that reputational forces can substitute for formal rules. Here, we develop an example of a reputational equilibrium where the outcomes turn out to be weighted averages of those from discretion and those from the ideal rule. In particular, the rates of inflation and monetary growth look more like those under discretion when the discount rate is high.     

The impact of unconventional monetary policy on the market for collateral: The case of the French bond market

We consider the channel consisting in transferring the credit risk associated with refinancing operations between financial institutions to market participants. In particular, we analyze liquidity and volatility premia on the French government debt securities market, since these assets are used as collateral both in the open market operations of the ECB and on the interbank market. In our time-varying transition probability Markov-switching (TVTP-MS) model, we highlight the existence of two regimes. In one of them, which we refer to as the conventional regime, monetary policy neutrality is verified; in the other, which we dub the unconventional regime, monetary policy operations lead to volatility and liquidity premia on the collateral market. The existence of these conventional and unconventional regimes highlights some asymmetries in the conduct of monetary policy.     

Learnability and monetary policy: A global perspective

The recent literature on monetary policy design has emphasized the importance of equilibrium determinacy and learnability in the choice of policy rules. This paper contains an analysis of the learnability of the equilibrium in a class of simple, micro-founded models in which the policy authority uses a Taylor-type monetary policy rule. Unlike previous analyses, the model economy is not linearized about a steady state—instead, a global perspective is adopted. Globally, the nonlinear model economy can possess rational expectations equilibria other than the steady state consistent with the inflation target of the monetary authorities. These include a second, low inflation ‘liquidity trap’ steady state, periodic equilibria, and sunspot equilibria. The main results in the paper characterize the conditions under which these alternative equilibria maybe stable under adaptive learning, even when the policy rule obeys the Taylor principle. The stability of multiple equilibria is associated with policy rules which are forecast-based. An important finding is that backward-looking Taylor-type policy rules can guarantee that the unique learnable equilibrium is the steady state associated with the inflation target of the monetary authority.     

货币政策透明度的新领域:政策路径的信息沟通

政策路径的信息沟通是货币政策透明度研究的一个新领域。目前绝大多数央行只公布当前的政策利率,对未来政策利率走势的预测很少提及。本文分析央行政策路径构建的基础和沟通方式,通过比较各国央行在政策路径沟通实践上的差异,探寻制约央行公布政策路径的原因。     

现行国际货币体系难以承受之重：美国货币政策的量化宽松

美联储第二轮量化宽松的货币政策出台前后,国际社会争议不断。文章从量化宽松货币政策与国际货币体系的关系着手分析,指出本次国际金融危机再次暴露出现行国际货币体系内在缺陷,量化宽松货币政策有可能加剧国际金融风险,并提出了改革国际货币体系的对策建议。