Foreign Direct Investment and Environmental Taxes

Abstract. This paper studies the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policy stringency in a two-country model with trade costs, where FDI could be unilateral and bilateral and both governments address local pollution through environmental taxes. We show that FDI does not give rise to ecological dumping because the host country has an incentive to shift rents away from the source country toward the host country. Environmental policy strategies and welfare effects are studied under the assumption that parameter values support FDI to be profitable.     

Endogenous Pollution Havens: Does FDI Influence Environmental Regulations?*

We suggest a novel perspective on the relationship between the stringency of environmental policies and foreign direct investment (FDI). We develop a political economy model with imperfect product market competition where local and foreign firms jointly lobby the local government for a favorable pollution tax. FDI is found to affect environmental policy, and the effect is conditional on the local government's degree of corruptibility. If the degree of corruptibility is sufficiently high (low), FDI leads to less (more) stringent environmental policy, and FDI thus contributes to (mitigates) the creation of a pollution haven. Our empirical results using panel data from 33 countries support the predictions of the model.     

Foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaties: An international political perspective

This paper investigates the effect of the implementation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on the bilateral stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI). We argue that the understanding of how BITs affect FDI requires recognizing that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are not Stateless and that their investment return may well depend on the quality of political relations between the home and host countries. Using bilateral FDI data and event data to measure political interactions between countries, we show that the effect of the entry into force of a BIT crucially depends on the quality of political relations between the signatory countries; it increases FDI more between countries with tense relationships than between friendly countries. We also find evidence that BITs and good domestic institutions are complementary. BITs should therefore be understood as a mechanism for host governments to credibly commit not to expropriate investors in the future.     

Does FDI improve economic development in North African countries?

This article examines the relationship between FDI inflows and welfare improvement in North African countries. Using net per capita FDI inflows and the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index as the principal variables, our analyses confirm the positive and strongly significant relationship between net FDI inflows and welfare improvement in North Africa, although we do find significant differences among the countries in the region. This relationship holds even after we control for government size, country indebtedness, macroeconomic instability, infrastructural development, institutional quality, political risk, openness to trade, education and financial market development. Hence, at the aggregate level, FDI contributes to economic growth in North Africa, in turn generating additional revenues for governments and populations in the region through fiscal policies and jobs creation. We also found that FDI received by countries in the region are mainly concentrated in very few industries (particularly extractive petroleum, services and tourism, construction and utilities); relatively fewer of these investments are directed towards the nonextractive primary industries, which are pro-poor sectors and highly labour intensive, or the manufacturing sector, with a high potential for spillover effects in the economy. This lack of diversification of FDI received in the region’s economies in part explains the differences observed in the link between FDI and welfare in these countries. It is therefore essential for governments in the region to continue investing in social infrastructures while improving the quality of their institutions and their governance; doing so will probably help avoid the type of unrest we have witnessed recently.     

Democratic Accountability,Regulation and Inward Investment Policy

We examine the effect of domestic political accountability on leaders' strategies for attracting foreign direct investment to less developed countries. We consider two policy areas: the tax burden imposed on firms and the regulatory environment in which they operate. We find that democratic governments are more likely to offer relatively lower tax rates to foreign investors, whereas autocratic governments are more likely to offer relatively lax regulation. This result is driven by the greater elasticity of the political survival function to environmental and labor regulations in more democratic countries. Analyses of firm‐level survey data confirm our main theoretical conclusions.     

FDI,Poverty, and the Politics of Potable Water Access

How does foreign direct investment (FDI) affect the wellbeing of the poor? We address this question by analyzing the impacts of FDI on access to potable water. We predict that higher levels of greenfield FDI in water‐intensive sectors slow the rate of access to potable water in developing countries, with these adverse effects conditional on subnational politics. We hypothesize that this is more likely to occur in polities marked by relatively large poor and marginalized populations, where regulatory capture is more likely to occur. To test our intuition, we analyze subnational data on greenfield FDI in India, confirming that multinational investment in “thirsty” manufacturing sectors are negatively associated with improvements in potable water access. We then present a controlled comparison case study of two Indian states, Kerala and Rajasthan, highlighting the political mechanisms conditioning FDI's effects on potable water.     

How China is Reorganizing the World Economy*

We analyze the impact of China's integration into the global economy on other countries, Asian countries in particular. We first examine how the growth of China's exports is affecting the exports of other countries in Asia and the rest of the world. Our innovation is to distinguish exports of capital goods, consumer goods, and intermediates and to disaggregate textiles and consumer electronics, the most visible sectors where China's presence is felt. We next look to the impact of China on direct foreign investment flows. Here our innovation is to distinguish vertical and horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI) and to consider how they are affected by supply‐chain relationships. We then look more closely at factors influencing the articulation of these supply chains, the fragmentation of production, and the emerging international division of labor, focusing on two industries, electronics and autos, that exhibit very different responses. The results suggest that countries specializing in the production and export of components and raw materials feel positive effects from China's growth, while countries specializing in the production of consumer goods feel negative effects. Similarly, countries that compete with China for horizontal FDI find it more difficult to attract foreign investment as a result of that country's emergence, while countries that are potentially attractive destinations for vertical FDI find it easier to attract foreign investment as a result of trade links, especially in components and intermediates, that allow them to take advantage of supply chains involving their large and dynamically growing neighbor.     

Democratic transitions can attract foreign direct investment: Effect,trajectories, and the role of political risk

Using a difference-in-differences method on a panel of 115 developing countries from 1970 to 2014, we find that democratic transitions do not affect foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, on average. However, consolidated democratic transitions, i.e. transitions that do not go into reverse for at least five years, increase FDI inflows, with the bulk of the improvement appearing 10 years after the transition. Furthermore, when controlling for political risk, the effect of consolidated democratic transitions appears immediately after they have occurred, suggesting that higher political risk in the early years of the new regime offsets their positive intrinsic effect on FDI.     

DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH? EVIDENCE FROM EAST ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA

Although there is considerable evidence on the link between foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic growth in developing countries, causal patterns of the two variables has not been investigated yet with a reliable procedure. This article provides an empirical assessment of the issue by using data for 11 economies in East Asia and Latin America. Although FDI is expected to boost host economic growth, it is shown that the extent to which FDI is growth-enhancing appears to depend on country-specific characteristics. Particularly, FDI tends to be more likely to promote economic growth when host countries adopt liberalized trade regime, improve education and thereby human capital conditions, encourage export-oriented FDI, and maintain macroeconomic stability.     

中国式分权下地方政府FDI税收竞争的策略性及其经济增长效应

中国式分权机制下,政治和经济双重激励使地方政府竞相降低税率吸引FDI流入,本文考察了这种税收竞争的策略性及其对FDI经济增长效应的影响。模型表明地区间策略性税收竞争将通过降低外资质量影响FDI经济增长效应。使用1999-2006年省级面板数据进行实证分析,回归结果表明,经济发展水平相近的地区间外资企业实际所得税率具有显著的空间正相关性;税收优惠对FDI经济增长效应具有明显的阻碍作用;并且税收优惠幅度越大,阻碍作用越强。因此,我国需要加大对地方政府招商引资行为的监督和约束,以使地方政府放弃对FDI的盲目追捧,转而注重FDI质量,提高FDI对国民福利的促进作用。     

Trade,foreign direct investment or acquisition: Optimal entry modes for multinationals

We examine multinationals' optimal entry modes into foreign markets as a function of market size, FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs. Our results highlight why large countries are more likely to attract acquisition investment, while intermediate sized countries may be served predominantly through trade, even in the presence of high tariffs. Small countries are most likely to experience either FDI or no entry. We also show how these results vary with the competition intensity in the host country.FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs are crucial not only in determining whether to engage in FDI or trade, but they are also shown to influence the acquisition choice as trade and FDI threats influence the acquisition price. Finally, we explore the welfare implications of tariff reductions for both the local firm and the multinational and investigate political motives to impose endogenous tariffs that influence not only the welfare of a local firm, but also the entry mode of the multinational.     

Bankruptcy costs,economic policy uncertainty,and FDI entry and exit

In this paper, we examine how the effect of economic policy uncertainty on foreign direct investment (FDI) entry and exit varies with the cost of bankruptcy resolution. Using a sample of bilateral FDI entry and exit for 23 countries and areas from 2004 to 2012, we find that an increase in bankruptcy costs in a country exacerbates the dampening effect of economic policy uncertainty on both FDI entry and exit. Subsample analysis reveals that the bankruptcy resolution channel only exists in high political risk countries. We also find that the bankruptcy resolution channel does not exist for foreign portfolio investment, which is consistent with real option theory. Broadly put, our contribution is at the nexus of institutional theory and FDI, as we identify the bankruptcy resolution channel through which economic policy uncertainty affects FDI entry and exit.     

Impact of firm heterogeneity on direct and spillover effects of FDI: Micro-evidence from ten transition countries

This paper presents a comparative study of the importance of direct technology transfer and spillovers through FDI on a set of 10 transition countries, using a common methodology and appropriate methods to account for selection and simultaneity correction. This paper considers by far the largest firm level dataset (more than 90,000 firms) used by any study on the spillover effects of FDI. The main novelty of the paper is the explicit control for various sources of firm heterogeneity when accounting for different effects of FDI on firm performance. This work shows that the heterogeneity of firms in terms of absorptive capacity, size, productivity and technology levels affect the results. Controlling for these variables leads to some interesting results, which contrast with the previous empirical work in the field. We find that horizontal spillovers have become increasingly important over the last decade, and they may even become more important than vertical spillovers. Positive horizontal spillovers are equally distributed across size classes of firms, while negative horizontal spillovers seem to be more likely to accrue to smaller firms. Moreover, positive horizontal spillovers seem more likely to be present in medium or high productivity firms with higher absorptive capacities, while negative horizontal spillovers are more likely to affect low to medium productivity firms. These findings suggest that both direct effects from foreign ownership as well as the spillovers from foreign firms substantially depend on the absorptive capacity and productivity level of individual firms. In addition, these results show that foreign presence may also affect smaller firms to a larger extent than larger firms, but this impact may be in either direction.     

Tools of Survival: Sovereign Wealth Funds in Singapore and China

The rise of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) as major investors in the global economy has raised worries that they serve the geopolitical ends of owner countries. However, given the paramount importance of surviving domestic political competitions, SWFs are likely also tools of domestic political survival. In examining the corporate governance and underlying political environment in which SWFs in Singapore and in China operate, this paper further examines the role of political unity in directing SWF behaviour in authoritarian regimes. The main finding is that a highly unified autocracy is more likely to direct SWFs to maximise long-term profit, while a fragmented one like China is more likely to treat its SWF as an arena for domestic political and bureaucratic infighting. SWFs operating in a fragmented regime are unlikely to make long-term profit and foreign policy objectives top priorities, and their behaviour can be highly unpredictable.     

Foreign direct investment and civil liberties: A new perspective

The conjecture that democracy discourages foreign direct investment (FDI) has been widely refuted in empirical studies. However, we find support of this view. We distinguish between civil and political liberties and propose that multinational firms tend to invest in countries with low civil but with high political liberties. We show that the negative relationship between civil liberties and FDI is hump-shaped. A threshold level of civil liberties exists, below which repression of civil liberties is associated with more FDI. The results are explained by different economic motives for FDI in different groups of countries.     

THE POLITICS OF FDI EXPROPRIATION

I examine the role of political instability and fractionalization as potential explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich countries to poor countries (i.e., the Lucas Paradox). Using panel data from 1984 to 2014, I document that (i) developed countries exhibit larger inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), (ii) countries subject to high investment risk (IR) receive low FDI inflows, and (iii) IR is higher in fractionalized and politically unstable economies. These findings suggest a negative relationship between political instability and FDI through the IR channel. I inspect the theoretical mechanism using a dynamic political economy model of redistribution, wherein policymakers can expropriate resources from foreign investors. The proceeds are used to finance group‐specific transfers to domestic workers but hinder economic growth by discouraging FDI. I show that the political equilibrium exhibits overexpropriation and underinvestment.     

Educated dictators attract more foreign direct investment

Since political risk is greater in dictatorships than in democracies, this paper investigates the hypothesis that foreign investors scrutinize public information on dictators to assess this risk. It checks whether foreign investors use five relevant dictators’ characteristics: age, political experience, education level, education in economics, and prior experience in business. The study is performed on a sample of 100 dictatorial countries from 1973 to 2008. We find that educated dictators are more attractive to foreign investors. We obtain strong evidence that greater educational attainment of the leader is associated with higher FDI. We also find evidence that the leader having tertiary education in economics and prior experience in business is associated with greater FDI. By contrast, the leader's age, and political experience have no relationship with FDI.     

Autocracy,Democracy, and FDI Inflows to the Developing Countries

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between political regimes and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to the developing countries for a sample of 134 countries over the 1983–2002 period. Using two categorical measures of regime type and three different measures of FDI, this study finds that, regardless of the measures of regime type, democracies are not significantly associated with either FDI in level or FDI as a ratio to GDP; democracy is positively related to a higher level of per capita FDI, but this result is not robust to alternative measures of political regime. Taken as a whole, there is no evidence of a systematic relationship between democracy and FDI inflows. This result suggests that being a democracy does not help attract higher levels of FDI.     

Privatization, strategic foreign direct investment and host-country welfare

Recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly privatizing their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). We show that there is a two-way causality between privatization and greenfield FDI. Privatization increases the incentive for FDI, which, in turn, increases the incentive for privatization compared to the situation of no FDI. The optimal degree of privatization depends on the cost difference of the firms, and on the foreign firm's mode of entry.     

Do regional trade agreements stimulate FDI? Evidence for the Agadir,MERCOSUR and AFTA regions

The integration of emerging markets into the global economy is heavily promoted by foreign direct investment (FDI ) inflows. Among the factors explaining the location of FDI , regional trade agreements (RTA s) can be relevant for emerging markets, as they can promote economic integration and increase the attractiveness of the region for foreign investors. This paper investigates the impact of South–South trade agreements on the FDI decision of multinationals, where the Agadir, mercado comun del sur (MERCOSUR), and ASEAN free trade area (AFTA) agreements are considered. Three panels of countries are defined, where the members joined a specific agreement or not. Non‐Gulf Arab states are compared to better performing regions in Latin America and Southern and Eastern Asia. The analysis provides evidence that openness to foreign trade and financial markets are among the main catalysts to attract FDI , provided that business‐friendly institutions exist in the host country. Other variables, like the size of the industrial sector, urbanization rates, and external debt appear to be important in some cases. The integration of China into the world economy is a specific trigger for FDI to Asian destinations. Since RTA s influence the market size by reducing barriers to trade, their impact operates via GDP growth and openness. Gains from the agreement are striking for Latin America and Asia, but not for Arab states. To attract more FDI , business‐friendly institutional reforms and mechanisms to support new firm foundation should be implemented in this region.