Vertical integration and investor protection in developing countries

The industrial organization of developing countries is characterized by the pervasive use of subcontracting arrangements among small, financially constrained firms. This paper asks whether vertical integration relaxes those financial constraints. It shows that vertical integration trades off the benefits of joint liability against the costs of rendering the supply chain more opaque to external investors. In contrast to the commonly held view that pervasive input and capital market imperfections are conducive to vertical integration, the model predicts that the motives for vertical integration are not necessarily higher in developing countries. In particular, vertical integration is more likely to arise at intermediate levels of investor protection and better contract enforcement with suppliers reduces vertical integration only if financial markets are sufficiently developed. Evidence supporting both predictions is discussed.     

Uncertainty, co-ordination and path dependence

Our objective is to assess whether dynamics hinder or assist co-ordination in a game with strategic complementarities. We study two dynamic aspects: different agents make decisions at different points in time; and extra information about a payoff-relevant state of nature becomes available over time. We find that the dynamic resolution of information matters most for uniqueness of equilibrium. This is demonstrated by showing that the condition for uniqueness is weaker when learning occurs. We also analyse how successfully agents co-ordinate when there is a unique equilibrium. Finally, we show that path dependence occurs: the order in which signals arrive matters, as well as the total amount of information received.     

Natural capital, subjective well-being, and the new welfare economics of sustainability: Some evidence from cross-country regressions

The measurement of natural capital and its management during the economic development process are important aspects of the capital approach to sustainable development. However, the assessment of social welfare in terms of genuine savings (or changes in total wealth per capita) is arguably too limited. This paper tries to make a case for the incorporation of subjective well-being measures in debates about sustainable development by exploring the macro-level relationship between subjective well-being and natural capital in a cross-country setting. It is tested whether natural capital per capita is correlated with subjective well-being in a sample of fifty-eight developed and developing countries, using natural capital data from the World Bank's Millennium Capital Assessment. Bivariate regressions indicate that it is. When multiple regression models are estimated that include (a) major country-level determinants of subjective well-being (GNI per capita, social capital, income distribution, unemployment, inflation), and (b) regional dummy variables for ex-Soviet Union and Latin American countries, the positive correlation remains. The role of data outliers is carefully explored, and the sensitivity of the results to the use of alternative subjective well-being measures (i.e. life satisfaction, happiness, and a combined life satisfaction and happiness index) is investigated. This does not change the nature of the results. The findings arguably strengthen the case for a ‘new welfare economics of sustainability’ that takes subjective well-being measures into account.     

Social learning,neighborhood effects,and investment in human capital: Evidence from Green-Revolution India

This paper empirically identifies social learning and neighborhood effects in schooling investments in a new technology regime. Social learning implies that learning is most efficient when observed heterogeneity in schooling is greatest. The estimates of learning-investment rule, from farm household panel data at the onset of the Green Revolution in India, show that (i) agents learn about schooling returns from income realizations of their neighbors, and (ii) the speed of learning is high when the variation of schooling is large. Thus, schooling distribution of the parents' generation in a community has externalities to schooling investments in children. Simulations show that the variations in schooling within and across communities generate variations in child enrollment rate and average household income.     

Multiple equilibria in dynamic rational expectations models: A critical review

Multiple equilibria are a ubiquitous feature of dynamic rational expectations models. Researchers have been divided on the implications of this phenomenon. Some have viewed this as a reflection of reality and a possible explanation of a wide range of economic phenomena. Others have suggested various selection criteria for choosing one among the many equilibria. This paper reviews the major selection criteria that have been proposed, and through application to three well-known models shows under what circumstances one might expect them to choose the same or different equilibria. In addition, this paper proposes a new criteria based on the limit of finite-horizon equilibria and investigates its relation to the other criteria.     

A critical review of multi-criteria decision making methods with special reference to forest management and planning

This paper provides a review of research contributions on forest management and planning using multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) based on an exhaustive literature survey. The review primarily focuses on the application aspects highlighting theoretical underpinnings and controversies. It also examines the nature of the problems addressed and incorporation of risk into forest management and planning decision making. The MCDM techniques covered in this review belong to several schools of thought. For each technique, a variety of empirical applications including recent studies has been reviewed. More than 60 individual studies were reviewed and classified by the method used, country of origin, number and type of criteria and options evaluated. The review serves as a guide to those interested in how to use a particular MCDM approach. Based on the review, some recent trends and future research directions are also highlighted.     

Robust estimation and control under commitment

In a Markov decision problem with hidden state variables, a decision maker expresses fear that his model is misspecified by surrounding it with a set of alternatives that are nearby as measured by their expected log likelihood ratios (entropies). Sets of martingales represent alternative models. Within a two-player zero-sum game under commitment, a minimizing player chooses a martingale at time 0. Probability distributions that solve distorted filtering problems serve as state variables, much like the posterior in problems without concerns about misspecification. We state conditions under which an equilibrium of the zero-sum game with commitment has a recursive representation that can be cast in terms of two risk-sensitivity operators. We apply our results to a linear quadratic example that makes contact with findings of T. Ba?ar and P. Bernhard [H^∞-Optimal Control and Related Minimax Design Problems, second ed., Birkhauser, Basel, 1995] and P. Whittle [Risk-sensitive Optimal Control, Wiley, New York, 1990].     

Using PDA consistency checks to increase the precision of profits and sales measurement in panels

Personalized Digital Assistants (PDAs) and other forms of hardware needed to collect survey data electronically have become more affordable and powerful in recent years, leading to their use in a number of surveys in developing countries. Simple use of these devices can offer the prospect of more timely data entry and greater accuracy in guiding respondents through skip patterns. Further benefits are possible through the use of more complex consistency checks. We use PDAs to measure sales and profits for microenterprises, which are notoriously noisy. Consistency checks in the cross-section compare sales and profits, while those in the panel query responses which result in large changes from one period to the next. Cross-sectional checks also served as a second prompt in the case of missing profits. These checks do succeed in reducing the standard deviation and in increasing the correlation of the observations for which corrections are made. However, we find that the vast majority of large changes in enterprise sales and profits are confirmed by firm owners as genuine, highlighting the volatility of income in this sector. As a result, the overall impact of these consistency checks on the full sample is rather limited, suggesting that while such checks are useful if computerized forms of data collection are being used, the consistency checks per se are not a strong reason for using computerized data collection in collecting firm profits and sales.     

Unawareness and bankruptcy: A general equilibrium model

Summary. We present a consistent pure-exchange general equilibrium model where agents may not be able to foresee all possible future contingencies. In this context, even with nominal assets and complete asset markets, an equilibrium may not exist without appropriate assumptions. Specific examples are provided. An existence result is proved under the main assumption that there are sufficiently many states that all the agents foresee. An intrinsic feature of the model is bankruptcy, which agents may involuntarily experience in the unforeseen states. Received: April 23, 1997; revised version: May 19, 1997     

Overlapping risk adjusted sets of priors and the existence of efficient allocations and equilibria with short-selling

The theory of existence of equilibrium with short-selling is reconsidered under risk and ambiguity modelled by risk averse variational preferences. No-arbitrage conditions are given in terms of risk adjusted priors. A sufficient condition for existence of efficient allocations is the overlapping of the interiors of the risk adjusted sets of priors or the inexistence of mutually compatible trades, with non-negative expectation with respect to any risk adjusted prior. These conditions are necessary when agents are not risk neutral at extreme levels of wealths. It is shown that the more uncertainty averse or risk averse the agents, the more likely are efficient allocations and equilibria to exist.     

Are labor markets segmented in developing countries? A semiparametric approach

We test the hypothesis that observably similar workers earn higher wages in the formal sector than in the informal sector in developing nations. Using data from Argentina's household survey and various definitions of informal employment, we find that on average, formal wages are higher than informal wages. Parametric tests suggest that a formal premium remains after controlling for individual and establishment characteristics. However, this approach suffers from several econometric problems, which we address with semiparametric methods. The resulting formal premium estimates prove either small and insignificant, or negative. Neither do we find significant differences in measures of job satisfaction between the two sectors. We invoke these results to question the mainstream view that labor markets are segmented along formal/informal lines in developing nations such as Argentina.     

The formation of production expectations in manufacturing industry for nine industrialized countries

Using tendency surveys in the manufacturing industry for nine countries, different production expectations formation mechanisms are tested. Simple expectations hypotheses are compared by conducting nested and non-nested tests, and whether other information than that based solely on past production and expectations, is taken into consideration. It is found that expectations in most cases are formed regressively and/or follow a combined regressive and adaptive process and that information other than past production and expectations, only influence the formation of current expectations weakly. Finally, the rational expectations hypothesis is weakly rejected.I am grateful to Trevor Breusch, Robert Gregory, Paul Grimes, Raja Junankar, Wolfgang Schneider, two anonymous refereces and participants at the Advanced Studies Program in Economic Policy Research Conference at Kiel Institute of World Economics, May 1989, for helpful comments and suggestions.     

A note on free entry under uncertainty: The role of asymmetric information

In a model of competing managerial firms I show that the equilibrium number of firms decreases with uncertainty if entry is relatively more costly than monitoring. The result adds to the earlier contributions and is consistent with the available evidence.     

Improving consumption measurement and other survey data through CAPI: Evidence from a randomized experiment

This paper reports on a randomized survey experiment among 1840 households, designed to compare pen-and-paper interviewing (PAPI) to computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). We find that PAPI data contain a large number of errors, which can be avoided in CAPI. Error counts are not randomly distributed across the sample, but are correlated with household characteristics, potentially introducing sample bias if dubious observations need to be dropped. We demonstrate a tendency for the spread of total measured consumption to be higher on paper compared to CAPI, translating into significantly higher measured inequality. Investigating further the nature of PAPI's measurement error for consumption, we fail to reject the hypothesis that it is classical: it attenuates the coefficient on consumption when used as explanatory variable and we find no evidence of bias when consumption is used as dependent variable. Finally, CAPI and PAPI are compared in terms of interview length, costs and respondents' perceptions.     

Market experience eliminates some anomalies—and creates new ones

We report two experiments which investigate whether experience of decision making in repeated markets purges behaviour of preference reversals. We investigate two behavioural mechanisms that may be shaping bids in repeated auctions: A tendency to adjust bids towards previously observed market prices, and a tendency to reduce bids following bad market outcomes. We find little support for the former but strong support for the latter. Also, whilst ‘just enough’ market exposure eliminates the typical preference reversal phenomenon, continued exposure fosters the mirror image anomaly. Therefore, although market experience shapes behaviour, in our experiments, it does not generally promote consistency with standard preference theory.     

Innis Lecture: Inference on income distributions

Abstract This paper attempts to provide a synthetic view of varied techniques available for performing inference on income distributions. Two main approaches can be distinguished: one in which the object of interest is some index of income inequality or poverty, the other based on notions of stochastic dominance. From the statistical point of view, many techniques are common to both approaches, although of course some are specific to one of them. I assume throughout that inference about population quantities is to be based on a sample or samples, and, formally, all randomness is due to that of the sampling process. Inference can be either asymptotic or bootstrap based. In principle, the bootstrap is an ideal tool, since in this paper I ignore issues of complex sampling schemes and suppose that observations are IID. However, both bootstrap inference and, to a considerably greater extent, asymptotic inference can fall foul of difficulties associated with the heavy right‐hand tails observed with many income distributions. I mention some recent attempts to circumvent these difficulties.     

Moral hazard and Marshallian inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia

We formalize the link between optimal cost-sharing contracts and the production technology in the presence of moral hazard by appealing to several well-known results from duality theory. Building on intuitions from the interlinkage literature, we show that optimal contractual structure is determined by the (i) substitution possibilities that exist between different observable factor inputs, as well as (ii) between these inputs and unobservable effort. We endogenize contractual choice using landlord characteristics as instruments, exploiting the fact that, in our dataset, landlords interact with several tenants and vice versa. The approach is applied to an unbalanced plot-level panel of cost-sharing contracts in a Tunisian village, using a translog representation of the restricted profit function. Contractual terms are found to be a significant determinant of input use and therefore lead to Marshallian inefficiency, while the optimality of the underlying contractual structure is rejected.     

Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries

We study the effects on accountability in government service delivery of decentralizing administration of an antipoverty program. While governments at both central and local levels are vulnerable to antipoor policy biases owing to political capture, centralized delivery systems are additionally prone to bureaucratic corruption, owing to problems in monitoring bureaucratic performance. Decentralizing the delivery system promotes cost-effectiveness and improves intraregional targeting at low program scales. But interregional targeting may deteriorate, as central grants to high-poverty regions shrink, owing to high capture of local governments by local elites in such regions.     

Coordination and correlation in Markov rational belief equilibria

Summary This paper studies the effect of correlation in the rational beliefs of agents on the volatility of asset prices. We use the technique of generating variables to study stable and non-stationary processes needed to characterize rational beliefs. We then examine how the stochastic interaction among such variables affects the behavior of a wide class of Rational Belief Equilibria (RBE). The paper demonstrates how to construct a consistent price state space and then shows the existence of RBE for any economy for which such price state space is constructed. Next, the results are used to study the volatility of asset prices via numerical simulation of a two agents model. If beliefs of agents are uniformly dispersed and independent, we would expect heterogeneity of beliefs to have a limited impact on the fluctuations of asset prices. On the other hand, our results show that correlation across agents can have a complex and dramatic effect on the volatility of prices and thus can be the dominant factor in the fluctuation of asset prices. The mechanism generating this effect works through the clustering of beliefs in states of different levels of agreement. In states of agreement the conditional forecasts of the agents tend to fluctuatetogether inducing more volatile asset prices. In states of disagreement the conditional forecasts fluctuatein diverse directions tending to cancel each other's effect on market demand and resulting in reduced price volatility.This research was supported, in part, by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei of Milan, Italy, and by the Research Incentive Fund of Stanford University. The authors thank Carsten K. Nielsen and Ho-Mou Wu for valuable discussions on an earlier draft. Carsten K. Nielsen also made an important contribution to the development of Section 3.     

Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors

Summary. Consider an infinitely repeated game where each player is characterized by a “type” which may be unknown to the other players in the game. Suppose further that each player's belief about others is independent of that player's type. Impose an absolute continuity condition on the ex ante beliefs of players (weaker than mutual absolute continuity). Then any limit point of beliefs of players about the future of the game conditional on the past lies in the set of Nash or Subjective equilibria. Our assumption does not require common priors so is weaker than Jordan (1991); however our conclusion is weaker, we obtain convergence to subjective and not necessarily Nash equilibria. Our model is a generalization of the Kalai and Lehrer (1993) model. Our assumption is weaker than theirs. However, our conclusion is also weaker, and shows that limit points of beliefs, and not actual play, are subjective equilibria. Received: March 3, 1995; revised version: February 17, 1997