Social polarization, fiscal instability and growth

We present a dynamic model of fiscal policy in a simple growth framework where social polarization (of preferences) plays a central role in the evolution of fiscal instability and growth collapse. In a highly polarized society, a deficit occurs endogenously, fiscal spending path becomes more volatile, output collapses, and economic growth rate is reduced along the transition path to a new lower level of output. One novel feature is that the size of fiscal deficit, the magnitude of fiscal volatility, and the size of reduction in output and growth rate are explicitly shown to be increasing functions of the degree of social polarization. This is because of the positive relationship between the polarization of preferences and the incentive for policymakers (or socio-economic groups) to overexploit the government resources in a common pool setting (polarization effect). Thereby, we offer a fiscal instability channel that negatively links social polarization and growth, which is an alternative yet distinct explanation for the empirical finding that social polarization is harmful to growth. Moreover, we fully distinguish the incentive to engage in such short-term policies under political uncertainty from that under polarization. Polarization and political uncertainty are shown to be distinct yet critical to the dynamic coordination failure in the common pool setting.     

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC VOLATILITY: EVIDENCE FROM STATE‐LEVEL CROSS‐SECTION DATA OF THE USA*

This paper examines the implications of fiscal decentralization for economic stability. It has been discussed that fiscal decentralization reduces the variance of GDP growth, due to the greater diversification of performance across jurisdictions. We examine this theoretical result using a panel data set of the 50 states of the USA over the period of 1992–1997. We show that the theoretical specification of the production function is supported. We also show a negative significant relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic volatility. The results are robust when we take into account the endogeneity of fiscal decentralization.     

Political democratization, economic liberalization, and growth volatility

This study empirically investigates the effects of political and economic liberalization on growth volatility using a difference-in-difference method for a sample of 158 countries over the 1970-2005 period. The results show that, when examined separately, economic liberalization leads to a significant reduction in volatility while democratization is not followed by a decrease in growth volatility. For countries that undertake only one liberalization, opening up the economy to international trade reduces volatility in growth; becoming a democracy, on the other hand, seems to increase macroeconomic instability. For countries that implement both political and economic liberalizations, no statistically significant effect on volatility is detected. These results serve to provide additional support for the policy recommendation that developing countries should liberalize their economy first and then consider political liberalization.     

收入差距与经济增长研究新动态

收入差距与经济增长之间的关系一直是经济研究中的重要问题之一, 一些新方法新理论被不断发掘,如收入差距与经济危机、收入差距和财政波动、收入差距与产出波动等。本文对该领域影响力较大的新文献进行梳理和评述,为研究收入差距和经济增长问题提供参照平台,同时也为研究和解决我国收入差距问题提供建议和参考。     

Fiscal institutions and public spending volatility in Europe

This work provides empirical evidence for a sizeable, statistically significant negative impact of the quality of fiscal institutions on public spending volatility for a panel of 23 EU countries over the 1980–2007 period. The dependent variable is the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy, which does not represent reactions to changes in economic conditions. Our baseline results thus give support to the strengthening of institutions to deal with excessive levels of discretion volatility, as more checks and balances make it harder for governments to change fiscal policy for reasons unrelated to the current state of the economy. Our results also show that bigger countries and bigger governments have less public spending volatility. In contrast to previous studies, the political factors do not seem to play a role, with the exception of the Herfindahl index, which suggests that a high concentration of parliamentary seats in a few parties would increase public spending volatility.     

Economic downturns,inequality, and democratic improvements

This paper explores the extent to which discrete improvements in the democratic quality of political institutions can be explained by income inequality. Empirical tests of this relationship have generally yielded null results, though typically test an unconditional relationship. Guided by a theoretical nuance of the “new economic view” of democratization and using an instrumental variable strategy, we re-examine the relationship conditional on the state of the macroeconomy. We demonstrate that the more unequal are societies, the higher the probability of experiencing democratic improvements following economic downturns. Following growth periods, higher income inequality has a slight negative or null effect on the likelihood of democratic improvement. The conditional result provides a simple explanation for why previous literature has found largely null results concerning inequality and democratization and offers additional evidence in support of the new economic view.     

Institutions and growth in limited access societies

We build a dynamic political economy model with a two-class society, workers and the elite, in which the elite formation, the innovation rate and fiscal policy are endogenous. The model generates a mapping between institutions and patterns of growth consistent with empirical evidence. Ex ante, when facing constraints in choosing institutions, the elite may delegate policy control to some of its members, even though such delegation exacerbates the conflict within the elite and causes policy failures. Committing to such institutional arrangements prevents more harmful outcomes, such as rapid entry and subsequent deterioration of the elite?s economic and political power.     

相机抉择政策、经济增长与地区产出波动

本文旨在研究地方政府的相机抉择政策对经济增长和产出波动的实际影响。本文首先从预算软约束和晋升激励的角度分析这一政策的作用方式，然后用模型测度出相机抉择政策，并以2000—2013年的省际面板数据进行实证检验。研究表明，相机抉择的确刺激了地方经济增长，但却带来了明显的产出波动。不过相机抉择政策具有明显的时滞，其真实效果集中凸显在政策实施的两年后。因此，我国应加强公共财政制度的建设，使相机抉择政策在规则的框架下更为合理地使用。     

Growth volatility and the interaction between economic and political development

Research on the effect of democracy on economic growth has not reached a definitive conclusion. Yet, research on the effect of democracy on economic growth volatility has consistently found that higher levels of democracy reduce volatility. Similarly, research has found that higher levels of economic development retard volatility. Using a novel empirical approach, this article presents evidence of an interactive effect between higher levels of democratization and economic development on growth volatility. Specifically, the marginal effect of political development on volatility is negative until countries reach per capita income levels of about $2,700, depending on the conditioning set. The marginal effect is insignificant for countries with higher levels of income. This implies that at a minimum, nearly 50% of the countries in our sample could enjoy less volatile economies with greater political development.     

Policy volatility and growth

The paper aims to examine how fiscal and monetary volatility might affect the balanced economic growth rate using a standard monetary growth model characterized by nominal wage rigidity and productive public spending. The model shows that any type of shock — monetary or fiscal — can generate either a negative or positive relationship between short-run volatility and long-run growth, critically depending on the size of government and the elasticity of output with respect to labor/capital. In particular, given the labor income share, it shows that excessive government spending may cause the impact of fiscal volatility on long-run growth to turn from positive to negative. In addition, a rise in the volatility of the monetary shock is capable of generating either an increase or decrease in the mean of growth. With the range of the labor share values in reality, the model produces results consistent with the fact that the relationship between volatility and growth is generally found empirically to be more negative in developing than in developed countries. The model can be seen as a further explanation for the ambiguous empirical evidence in the existing literature.     

The effect of growth volatility on income inequality

This paper assesses the long-run effect of growth volatility on income inequality using a comprehensive panel of annual U.S. state-level data during the 1945 to 2004 period. Using the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator, we find evidence supporting the hypothesis that larger growth volatility positively and significantly associates with higher income inequality. Our key finding is robust to alternative lag structures, conditioning variables, inequality measures, volatility indicators, time periods, and panel estimators. Our key finding does change for asymmetric effects, where larger growth volatility positively and significantly associates with higher income inequality only for positive economic growth. The volatility effect proves positive, but insignificant, for negative economic growth.     

Income inequality and economic growth in an open economy

Income inequality has a strong impact on fiscal policy when majority voting enables those individuals with less-than-average income to decide on tax rates. This study analyzes the impact on economic growth of income inequality in an open economy where tax revenues are partially used for international transfers. In any case, income inequality is harmful for growth. In an economic union, positive effects of international integration raise the growth rate as long as net transfers do not grow proportionally. In a political union, unionwide voting makes distributive politics depending on the union's median voter. In this case, additional output growth on aggregate level is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a majority of voters to accept union membership.     

Public capital,deficit financing,and economic growth in a stochastic economy

This paper examines the relationship among deficit-financing fiscal policy, risk and economic growth in a stochastic endogenous growth model with private and public capital. We show that there are positive balanced-growth rate and a debt-to-GDP ratio that depend on deep parameters such as the income tax rate and the standard deviation of the growth rate of private and public capital. Investment and fiscal shocks influence the mean and variance of the growth rate and the debt dependency rate through portfolio changes and capital accumulation. In particular, an increase in the risk of private investment destabilizes the economy and reduces the mean growth rate if the portfolio change is drastic, and this increase in risk increases the debt-to-GDP ratio. In contrast, an increase in the income tax rate stabilizes the economy, increases the mean growth rate, and has a positive or negative effect on the debt-to-GDP ratio according to the ratio of public to private capital if the income tax rate is sufficiently small.     

Terms of trade volatility,government spending cyclicality,and economic growth

This paper presents estimates of the effects that terms of trade volatility has on real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth. Based on 5‐year nonoverlapping panel data comprising 175 countries during 1980 to 2010, the paper finds that terms of trade volatility has significant negative effects on economic growth in countries with procyclical government spending. In countries where government spending is countercyclical, terms of trade volatility has no significant effect on growth. Conditional on the mediating role of government spending cyclicality, the GDP share of domestic credit to the private sector has no significant effect on the relationship between growth and terms of trade volatility.     

Inequality,unemployment, and endogenous growth in a political economy with a minimum wage

This paper presents development of an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous households and political determination of the minimum wage. We investigate the interaction of inequality, unemployment, and economic growth. First, the arguments in this paper show that a positive correlation exists between inequality and unemployment, Second, the interaction between inequality and economic growth is shown to be a positive relation if high inequality pertains in a society. It is a negative relation if low inequality pertains.      

Education,Rent seeking and the Curse of Natural Resources

Empirical evidence suggests that natural resources breed corruption and reduce educational attainments, dampening economic growth. The theoretical literature has treated these two channels separately, with natural resources affecting growth either through human capital or corruption. In this article, we argue that education and corruption are jointly determined and depend on the endowment of natural resources. Natural resources affect the incentives to invest in education and rent seeking that in turn affect growth. Whether natural resources stimulate growth or induce a poverty‐trap crucially depends on inequality in access to education and political participation, as well as on the cost of political participation. For lower inequality and higher cost of political participation, a high‐growth and a poverty‐trap equilibrium coexist even with abundant natural resources.     

Mandatory spending,political polarization,and macroeconomic volatility

This paper studies the impact of political polarization on macroeconomic volatility in a political economy model of optimal fiscal policy. I introduce the distinction between mandatory and discretionary public spending in a model where consumers disagree on the size of the public sector. In the presence of political turnover and political polarization, public policies that affect individual decision-making lead to macroeconomic volatility. I show that the legislative requirements behind the changes in mandatory public spending can reduce macroeconomic volatility caused by political polarization and political turnover. The numerical simulations of the model suggest that in the presence of a binding constraint on the changes in mandatory spending, an increase in the political polarization is associated with an increase in the share of mandatory spending and a decrease in the macroeconomic volatility, consistent with the U.S. data.     

Decentralization and the shadow economy: Oates meets Allingham–Sandmo

This article studies the impact of decentralization on the shadow economy. We argue that decentralization may decrease the size of the shadow economy mainly through two transmission channels: (1) decentralization enhancing public sector efficiency (efficiency effect), and (2) decentralization reducing the distance between bureaucrats and economic agents, which increases the probability of detection of shadow economic activities (deterrence effect). Using various measures of fiscal, political and government employment decentralization in a cross-section of countries, we find the deterrence effect to be of more importance. The deterrence effect is stronger, the lower the degree of institutional quality. We find no robust evidence of the efficiency effect.     

The impact of the Interaction between institutional quality and aid volatility on growth: theory and evidence

We analyze both theoretically and empirically, the effect of aid volatility and its interaction effect with institutional quality on per capita economic growth. Our theoretical model, in which an aid-recipient government, operating in an institutional environment of some given quality (making choices over the distribution of aid), predicts that a negative effect of aid volatility on growth is mitigated by stronger institutional quality. We use panel data covering the period 1984–2004 for 78 countries to test this theoretical prediction. Using Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) we find the relationship between growth and aid volatility is significantly negative and depends on institutional quality. Our baseline results are robust to various computations of aid volatility and foreign aid, time periods, sub-samples and additional covariates.     

Income Distribution, Redistributive Politics, and Economic Growth

This article studies the political economy of inequality and growth by combining the political economy approach with an imperfect capital market assumption. In the present model, there emerges a class of individuals whose members do not invest privately beyond the state-financed schooling, due to their initial wealth constraint. We show that inequality affects private investment not only through the political effect, which relates inequality to private investment negatively, but also through what we call the threshold effect, which associates inequality to private investment positively. In general, private investment and inequality do not show a monotone negative relationship.