Upstream Mergers,Downstream Competition,and R&D Investments

In this paper, we provide an explanation for why upstream firms merge, highlighting the role of R&D investments and their nature, as well as the role of downstream competition. We show that an upstream merger generates two distinct efficiency gains when downstream competition is not too strong and R&D investments are sufficiently generic: The merger increases R&D investments and decreases wholesale prices. We also show that upstream firms merge unless R&D investments are too specific and downstream competition is neither too weak nor too strong. When the merger materializes, the merger‐generated efficiencies pass on to consumers, and thus, consumers can be better off.     

Monopoly Pricingand Regulatory Oversight

This paper analyzes the interaction between a regulator and monopolist in the determination of the price for the monopolist's product, where only the monoplast knows ex ante its true marginal cost of production. The regulator observes the market price proposed by the monopolist and decides whether to hold a rate hearing, where suck a hearing is a costly means of verifying the monopolist's marginal cost. Subsequent to a rate hearing, the regulator can impose a market price for the monopolist's product; in the absence of a rate hearing, the market price is set equal to the monopolist's proposed price. Equilibrium behavior by the monopolist and regulator is characterized, and the degree of regulatory "activism," as defined by the probability a rate hearing is held, is seen to vary ex post with the monopolist's true marginal cost .     

上下游投资、下游研发的收益分配和成本分担的机制

本文针对企业上下游投资、下游研发的合作模式提出了一种收益分配机制和成本分担机制。得出研发合作后的产量、价格、收入均高于合作前等结论，并考虑了联盟规模和各因素的关系。在成本分担机制中研究了研发资金、联盟规模、成本分担系数等。     

供应链中上下游企业间讨价还价的博弈分析

运用鲁宾斯坦的讨价还价模型的思想,构造了供应链上下游企业间不完全信息轮流出价的讨价还价模型,求解模型并对所得结果进行分析,得出双方达成协议主要取决于双方的“谈判成本”及其关于对方价格的预期。     

When Is Advertising a Signal of Product Quality?

A model of advertising is presented in which consumption experience is an imperfect indicator of product quality. In equilibrium, neither price nor advertising signal the quality of newly introduced goods. Advertising of established products can be a signal of quality, but if it is, it must be an imperfect signal leaving residual uncertainty that influences consumers' repurchase decision. A set of observable implications follow.     

With a Little Help from My Enemy: Comparative Advertising as a Signal of Quality

We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal   using a model where an entrant can choose to advertise by comparing its product to that of an established incumbent. Comparative advertising, comparing quality of one's own product to that of a rival's, empowers the latter to file for court intervention if it believes the comparison to be false or misleading. We show that comparative advertising can be a signal in instances where generic advertising is not viable.     

Explaining Downstream Integration

We examine the downstream integration decision by businesses, deriving hypotheses from the transaction cost literature which are empirically tested for a sample of 1392 businesses operating in a wide spectrum of industries. Our results provide corroboration for each dimension of the transaction cost framework in explaining why firms might integrate their downstream business activities. Given the large cross-sectional sample, our results provide some evidence of the general validity of the transaction cost framework within the context of downstream integration.     

Endogenous R&D Networks among Upstream Firms

This paper studies the endogenous formation of R&D networks among upstream firms and the welfare implications thereof. Both under an upstream price setting and an upstream quantity setting, it is shown that the complete R&D network emerges in equilibrium but only if spillovers are sufficiently low. Yet, under a quantity setting, the complete network arises within a larger range of spillovers. In both cases, however, there is a potential conflict between private incentives for R&D collaboration and societal ones. We discuss policy measures that may help to steer firms towards a more socially desirable outcome. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

广告语用分析

广告作为直接为经济服务的一种手段,是社会语用学的一个重要研究课题。它用语言招徕顾客,进行宣传,为企业促销,并树立良好的商业形象,它直接影响人们的日常工作和生活并随着社会的发展和经济的繁荣,这种影响将日益扩大。     

Advertising a second-price auction

This study examines a symmetric private-value second-price auction model in which the seller solicits bidders at a cost, sets a reserve price, and receives a payoff which is a convex combination of revenue and welfare. The bidder’s valuations are drawn from a distribution with a decreasing hazard rate and non-decreasing virtual valuations. We find that at equilibrium the seller adopts an advertising policy which minimizes the uncertainty over the number of participants, and sets a reserve price which only depends on the distribution of valuations and the weight on revenue in the objective function. A welfare-maximizing seller is shown to advertise more than a revenue-maximizing seller, and a ceteris paribus increase in the advertising level is proved to increase the expected winner’s rent.     

广告创意教学法初探——以汽车广告为例

文章从广告创意的教学法入手,旨在分析汽车广告创意的基本方法,从而引出广告创意的三种方法,并结合实例进行深度的剖析,对于广告创意的提升提出了解决思路。     

纳入品牌效应的纵向合作广告成本直接分担模型研究

本文研究了合作广告成本直接分担方式下的供应链纵向合作广告问题,考虑了制造商的全国性广告对品牌效应的影响,运用微分对策方法建立模型,根据最优控制理论的极值原理和Hanmilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB)方程求得Stackelberg博弈和协同合作博弈下的最优广告策略,并对模型的最优解进行了比较分析。     

广告中的不正当竞争行为

改革开放以来，我国的广告事业取得了飞速发展，在市场开拓和信息传播等方面起到了积极的作用。但同时，我们也该清楚地看到，当前广告活动中的不正当竞争行为表现得日益突出，严重地损害了广大经营和消费的合法权益，扰乱了社会主义市场秩序。本通过对广告活动中各种不正当竞争形式的分析，探究其形成的原因，进而提出解决这些不正当竞争的对策。     

Upstream market structure and downstream partial ownership

Existing studies on partial ownership usually overlook the effects of vertically related markets. Our paper highlights the importance of the upstream market on downstream firms' incentives to acquire partial ownership and the consequent welfare implications. In the main model, we assume that there are three firms in the downstream market, two of which may form a partial ownership arrangement. We find several results that are in contrast to those in the literature. First, the two firms will engage in partial ownership if the upstream market is an oligopoly (triopoly or duopoly). Second, partial ownership may raise total production, consumer surplus, and social welfare. This happens when the upstream market consists of a duopoly and the two firms involved in partial ownership are supplied by different suppliers. Third, the outsider, commonly known as a free rider in the literature, may become a victim of partial ownership. Our results are robust to several extensions, including a general $n$-firm framework, product differentiation, and uniform pricing by upstream firms. We also provide the conditions under which the curvature of the demand function and the convexity of the cost function motivate firms to form partial ownership.     

Upstream Foreclosure Decisions under Successive Monopoly Structure

This article models the upstream foreclosure decisions using the successive monopoly structure, whereby production requires two types of inputs, exclusive materials, and commonly available labor. An opportunity for upstream foreclosure arises when a downstream firm strategically merges with the material supplier, thereby foreclosing its rival's access to the exclusive input. The model shows that upstream foreclosure is not always optimal. A downstream firm opts for upstream foreclosure only when its relative positions in the labor‐management and material‐procurement negotiations are sufficiently strong. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare

I analyze the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). When bargaining is over a uniform input price, a decrease in the intensity of competition (or a merger) between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. When bargaining is over a two-part tariff, a decrease in the intensity of competition reduces downstream profits and upstream utility and raises consumer surplus and overall welfare. Standard welfare results of oligopoly theory can be reversed: less competition can be unprofitable for firms and/or beneficial for consumers and society as a whole.     

第15届中国国际广告节 中国广告长城奖

一、名称Title中国广告长城奖China Advertising Great-wall Awards二、奖项简介Awards introduction本奖项是以创意和制作为准绳,考核、衡量和奖励年度内已在媒体上公开发布过的商业广告作品。这一在中国历史上最悠久、规模最     

报业巨子的广告经

<福布斯>报业集团创始于1917年,是美国历史上最悠久的财经杂志,也是全球最著名的财经类杂志.现任福布斯集团总裁和<福布斯>杂志主编的史蒂夫·福布斯是<福布斯>王国的第三代传人、是<福布斯>杂志第二代掌门人马孔·福布斯的长子.史蒂夫·福布斯1966年毕业于马萨诸塞斯州的北安多弗(North Andover)布鲁克斯学院(BrooksSchool).1970年,他在普林斯顿大学获历史学学士学位.在普林斯顿,他是<今日商业>(Business Today)的首任总编辑.<今日商业>是由学生办给学生看的最大型的杂志,发行量达20万.直到如今,这份杂志依然由普林斯顿的本科生出版.     

Advertising persuasion in dual markets

Many firms operate in ‘dual’ markets by selling the same products and services to both individual and institutional customers. Can they also persuade both with the same advertising content? The authors investigate this issue by examining a unique database including information on institutional and individual mutual fund flows, advertising frequency, and (persuasive and informative) advertising content. They find that the effects of persuasive advertising content on institutional and individual fund flows are similar and sizeable in terms of elasticity. In addition, they find that only the individual market responds to informative advertising content. Hence, dual‐market firms can use persuasive content to achieve advertising economies.