独立董事制度与创业板上市公司治理结构

为了规模上市公司的法人治理结构，使董事会更公正地代表股东利益尤其是中小股东的利益，针对创业板市场中民营企业比例较大的特点，借鉴国际市场经验，笔者认为，在创业板上市公司中引入独立董事制度将是完善创业板上市公司治理结构的重要步骤。     

独立董事与基金治理结构

在上市公司治理结构中，管理层与股东的利益冲突和大股东侵害小股东利益问题是两个研究重点。由于基金的运作具有非公开性和基金股份的分散性，投资者无法进入董事会，密切的监督基金经理的决策是否符合他们的利益是不可能的，由此产生了以独立董事为核心的美国共同基金治理结构模式。本文即对这一模式尤其是独立董事在基金治理结构中的作有做一分析。     

我国独立董事定位的理论研究

由于我国上市公司多由国有企业改制而来,所以造成了普遍的"一股独大"局面,也因此引发了第二类代理问题,中小股东利益得不到有效的保障。在这一背景下,从国外引进独立董事制度,因独立董事的独立性,对大股东形成制衡,以期能够改善公司治理结构,保护中小股东的权益。     

建立有中国特色独立董事制度,促进有效公司治理发挥积极作用

独立董事制度是我国上市公司近年来为完善公司治理结构而从西方引入的一项重要措施。独立董事制度的功能定位主要在于阻止大股东侵害国家和中小股东利益的不当行为,维护证券市场的公平原则。     

上市公司法人治理结构与股东权益保护

我国上市公司治理结构存在很多缺陷：股权结构不合理，董事会独立性不强，形同虚设，股东法律保护程度低，信息披露不规范等。改善我国上市公司法人治理结构，必须改善股权结构，完善独立董事制度，强制采用“累积投票制”，建立有效地股东民事赔偿制度，建立中小股东维权组织等。     

独立董事制度与上市公司绩效——基于对我国医药行业样本的实证分析

现代公司法人治理结构的一个突出表现是：公司的所有权和经营权分离。不容忽视的是，公司制度下所涉利益主体的多元化与各种主体间组织形式的复杂化，迫使人们思考，应采取怎样的制度安排，来实现对公司的良性控制，并最大限度地发挥其绩效。我国上市公司一般是由国有大中型企业改制而成，国家股、法人股在上市公司股权结构中占有较高比重，国家股、法人股股东需要雇佣代理人来行使上市公司股东的权利，     

建立和完善上市公司独立董事制度

我国上市公司治理结构中存在制约机制不够健全的问题，特别是董事会结构中存在种种缺陷，为维护公司整体利益，保证中小股东的合法权益不受损害，发挥独立董事的制衡和监督作用，健全上市公司董事会功能，有必要尽快建立和完善适合我国上市公司实际需要的独立董事制度。     

关于我国独立董事制度的再思考

建立有效的公司治理机制是我国证券市场目前的一个主要任务。公司治理结构是否健全在很大程度上与董事会是否具有独立地位，是否能真正代表全体股东利益有关，独立董事制度能够较好地达到这一目标。因此建立和完善独立董事制度对完善我国公司的治理结构是非常必要的。要制定独立董事相关法律制度，明确独立董事选聘程序等。     

浅析独立董事的独立性

独立董事制度首创于美国，是指在上市公司董事会中设立独立董事的制度。由于独立董事特有的独立性，使得独立董事一方面可以有效制约控股股东和经理层，遏制内部人控制问题；另一方面还可以凭借专业知识及独立判断提高董事会决策的科学化、透明化程度，促进上市公司规范运作。因此，独立董事制度是完善公司治理结构、保护中小股东利益的有效途径。     

我国的独立董事制度探索

随着管理层对上市公司治理结构的日益重视，如何保证董事会的独立性和有效性，如何保护广大投资的利益，成为不可回避的问题。独立董事制度则基于其“独立性”，为解决这些问题提供了有效途径。我国应借鉴国外经验，尽快完善我国的独立董事制度。     

慈善组织理事会治理对会计信息质量的权变影响研究

利用2005-2019年中国慈善基金会数据,基于权变理论视角,探讨慈善组织理事会治理对会计信息质量的影响效应。研究发现：理事会规模越大、理事的平均年龄越大、理事中国家工作人员越多、女性理事占比越低,慈善基金会会计信息质量越高;而理事长和秘书长两职合一对慈善基金会会计信息质量不存在显著影响;理事会治理对会计信息质量的影响随着慈善基金会捐赠依赖度和外部审计质量的不同而发生权变,捐赠依赖度越小、外部审计质量越高的慈善基金会,理事会治理对会计信息质量的监督效应越强。     

How do female directors improve board governance? A mechanism based on norm changes

Prior literature documents that corporate boards with female directors produce better governance outcomes than all-male boards. However, female directors constitute the minority on most boards, which precludes majority voting as the mechanism through which they change board decisions. We identify changing the norms of how the board works as this mechanism. Using the market for norms framework, we explain how female directors are effective even without possessing a board majority or other sources of symbolic power, such as hierarchical authority and social gravitas. Empirically, we show that independent female directors, compared to their male counterparts, are more effective at changing board norms (board processes) and improving governance (board outputs).     

Independent directors’ board networks and controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior

As one of the channels by which board directors build important relationships, board networks can affect the governance role of independent directors. Defining director board networks as their connections based on direct ties they establish when serving on at least one common board, this paper explores the role of the network centrality of independent directors in restraining tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders in the Chinese capital market. Our empirical evidence shows that tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders is negatively related to the network centrality of independent directors and that this relationship is stronger when non-operating fund occupation is used as the measure of tunneling. The results of our study show that board networks can help independent directors to restrain tunneling behavior by large shareholders, which plays a positive role in corporate governance.     

Competition For Board Seats Following Stock‐For‐Stock Mergers

We examine the board structure of firms following stock‐for‐stock mergers. We find that former target inside (outside) directors are more likely to join the combined firm board when target insiders (outsiders) have a relatively strong position on the pre‐merger target board. The relative size of the target firm, target firm profitability, and target blockholder ownership also influence whether target directors join the combined board. We conclude that competition for board seats on the combined board is won by target directors with greater bargaining positions.     

独立董事:代理问题之一部分

本文研究独立董事制度。经理人的性质在于其是以经营才能方面的人力资本优势加入企业合约而实质拥有企业剩余控制权的人力资本所有者。当董事和董事会实质拥有企业剩余控制权时, 独立董事和内部董事都是企业的经理人, 董事会就是企业的管理层, 董事 (董事会) 与股东之间存在着实质的代理关系和代理问题。因此, 作为经理人的独立董事, 其本身首先是代理问题的一部分, 只有在其与股东之间的代理问题得到较好解决之后, 独立董事才可能成为一种有效的公司治理机制。本文认为, 有关各方缺乏对独立董事的经理人性质和其本身首先是代理问题的一部分的共同认知, 而这正是导致企业董事会的独立性与企业业绩之间不存在显著关系或呈现显著负相关关系的根本原因之所在。     

Founders and board structure: Evidence from UK IPO firms

This study investigates whether a company's founders affect the combination of executive, grey and independent directors on its board at the time of initial public offering (IPO) in the UK. Particularly, we analyse how venture capitalists are associated with board structure in founder-managed and non-founder-managed firms. We find that UK IPO firms managed by founders tend to have more executive directors. Further, they are more likely to stack non-executive directors with more independent directors relative to grey directors. Venture capital ownership is not significantly associated with board structure at the IPO stage. However, further evidence suggests that venture capital ownership is negatively related to the percentage of executive directors and positively related to the percentage of grey directors in the founder-managed firms.     

董事网络、独立董事治理与高管激励

独立董事的治理行为受到所处社会网络的影响。基于"董事在董事会同时任职的直接或间接联结关系"而形成的董事网络,本文利用社会网络分析方法检验了独立董事的网络特征对其发挥在促进高管激励有效性影响中的作用机理。结果发现:公司独立董事网络中心度越高,高管薪酬-业绩敏感性越强;与非国有上市公司相比,国有上市公司中独立董事网络中心度与高管薪酬-业绩敏感性的正相关关系更弱;进一步研究发现,用独立董事网络中心度解释的高管薪酬部分对未来业绩有促进作用。结论丰富了"网络和治理"研究的证据。     

New Evidence on the Market for Directors: Board Membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310

We examine the relation between a board's decision to reject antitakeover provisions of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 and subsequent labor market opportunities of those same board members. Compared to directors retaining all provisions, directors rejecting all protective provisions of SB1310 are three times as likely to gain additional external directorships and are 30 percent more likely to retain their internal slot on the board of that same Pennsylvania company. For external board seats, the results are driven by nonexecutive directors who are not members of the management team; for internal board seats, the results are driven by executive directors.     

董事会隐性层级、公司投资行为及效率——基于我国A股上市公司的实证检验

董事会内部非正式的隐性特征如董事们的才能、地位、影响力等在群体决策过程中发挥无形的作用.以董事会内部非正式的隐性层级为出发点,研究它与公司投资行为及投资效率的关系.研究结果表明:董事会隐性层级分化程度越高,公司投资规模越大;相对于非国有上市公司,国有上市公司中董事会隐性层级分化度对投资规模的影响显著变小;董事会隐性层级分化度越大,公司投资效率越低,出现投资过度或投资不足可能性越大.     

Does independent directors’’ monitoring affect reputation? Evidence from the stock and labor markets

Using novel data on independent directors’ opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying “no” to major board decisions. We find that the market reacts negatively to modified director opinions, but positively to firms interlocked with the directors who said “no.” We further find substantial turnover and decline in board seats after independent directors issue modified opinions. Overall, we identify a dilemma in China whereby the labor market does not reward vigilant directors for standing up to firm insiders, although investors add a premium to effective board monitoring.