THE POTENTIAL FOR SHORT‐RUN SHIFTING OF A CORPORATE PROFITS TAX

Can the owners of a firm shift a corporate profits tax to consumers? Not in the short run if the tax is stated as a proportion of profits and the firm is a profit maximizer. But what if the firm wishes to pursue a strategy other than profit maximization, say revenue maximization subject to a profit constraint? Under such a condition the firm's reaction to a tax or tax increase might be a price rise that captures part of the foregone profits. We show that firms which operate at a point on their demand curve that differs from profit maximization have an incentive to raise price in response to the tax – and that high cost firms have a greater incentive to raise price than do low cost firms. Our empirical analysis of the US beer industry confirms this finding, and sheds light on the Krzyzaniak–Musgrave analysis of the 1960s which suggested that the corporation income tax produced significant short‐run shifting.     

STRATEGIC LOBBYING BY POTENTIAL INDUSTRY ENTRANTS*

A firm which lobbies government for a change in policy, say an import tariff, can increase its profits in two ways. First, the policy can increase the profits of all firms in the industry. This effect therefore involves a free-rider problem. Second, a firm's lobbying expenditures may signal other firms about its costs and interests. For example, a firm with low marginal costs may profit much from an import ban. Other firms which see that this firm expects to profit much from the ban may decide not to enter the industry. This may further increase the low-cost firm's profits.     

The common pool of transitional profits

Transitional profits are above-normal profits that can be earned by firms as a result of changes in market conditions or entrepreneurial innovations of the firm. They are a common pool and are competed away by firms that enter profitable markets or imitate the innovations of profitable firms. The economics literature provides two conflicting views on transitional profits. One is that above-normal profit is a sign of economic inefficiency and is the result of either monopoly power or disequilibrium. The other is that economic profit is necessary for economic efficiency because profit is the lure that pushes entrepreneurs to allocate resources more efficiently. Both views are considered, along with an analysis of whether this common pool resource is competed away too rapidly, as the theory of common pool resources would suggest.     

The determinants of privatization prices: evidence from Turkey

This paper analyses the determinants of privatization prices in a multi-industry study using a sample of 68 recently privatized firms from Turkey. Results show that revenue and market characteristics are significant determinants of privatization prices while current cost and profit indicators are not. It is argued that potential buyers regard these state firms as inefficient, therefore do not take into consideration their current costs and profits in determining their value. When the dependent variable is altered by dividing the firm's privatization price by the firm's sales (revenues), it is found that sales-adjusted privatization prices are responsive to firms profit margins. However, this result does not hold when the sample is restricted to a single industry. Profit margins along with other profitability and firm efficiency measures are no longer significant determinants of sales-adjusted privatization prices in the cement industry analysis. Unexploited production opportunities measured by capacity utilization ratios, and complete private ownership resume a more important role.     

The exceptional performance of Chinese outward direct investment firms

This paper finds that Chinese manufacturing firms that engage in outward foreign direct investment (ODI) have better economic performance than non-ODI manufacturing firms. Overall, ODI firms are more productive and have higher profitability than non-ODI firms. The sector analysis shows that the exceptional performance is significant for labor-intensive industries. Finally, the ODI activity can raise the productivity of other firms in an industry. The larger the ODI within an industry, the higher the productivity of all firms in that industry. The paper suggests that domestic firms set up their firm’s global strategy and reallocate the firm’s resources according to the changing investment environment, taking advantages of profit opportunities outside of domestic markets and invest abroad to get new markets and new technology.     

Irrationality and monopolistic competition: An evolutionary approach

This paper shows that a monopolistically competitive equilibrium can evolve without purposive profit maximization. Specifically, this paper formulates a precise evolutionary dynamic model of an industry where there is continuous entry of firms that randomly select their output levels on entry and fix their output levels thereafter. Firms exit the industry if they fail to pass the survival test of making nonnegative wealth. This paper shows that the industry converges in probability to the monopolistically competitive equilibrium as the size of each firm becomes infinitesimally small relative to the market, as the entry cost becomes sufficiently small, and as time gets sufficiently large. Consequently, in the limit, the only surviving firms are those producing at the tangency of the demand curve to the average cost curve and no potential entrant can make a positive profit by entry.     

Noise traders,firm-specific uncertainty and technical trading effectiveness

This is the first study to document evidence of technical trading effectiveness at firm level in the Chinese A-share market by investigating the relationship between excess profits of technical trading rules and firm-specific characteristics. Our results reveal that firms with higher excess profits from technical trading have more noise traders and higher institutional ownership and that those firms tend to be growth firms with lower liquidity and higher firm-specific uncertainty. Further analysis shows that the profitability of technical trading rules is unsustainable and the excess profits of the highest technical trading profit quintile portfolio disappear in the following year.     

KNOWLEDGE AND INNOVATION: PROMOTING A SYSTEM APPROACH OF INNOVATION PROCESSES

Abstract

This contribution intends to clarify for the current discussion about knowledge and its importance within economic systems. It relies on the complementary character of the economics of knowledge of Marshall and Hayek. One of them is useful to discuss opportunities and limits of the so-called resource-based theory of the firm in order to deal with the relationship between the governance of knowledge and firms' innovative behaviours; the other is useful to insist on the importance of knowledge channelled by and within market dynamics. As a consequence, their combination allows one to pave better grounds to current knowledge economic importance by exploring in-depth characteristics of knowledge, expressing the need to deal with the governance of technological knowledge, and promoting the localized and distributed characters of firms' innovative behaviours. This finally leads to promote an innovation-system approach based on that localized character of innovative behaviours of firms in order to depict proper use made by firms in matters of knowledge generation, use, dissemination, and trade.     

Profit persistence and stock returns

This article attempts to assemble further empirical evidence on the relationship between the product and the financial market. Drawing back on work in industrial organization, we analyse the relationship between profit persistence and factor-adjusted stock returns looking at about 2000 listed US firms over the last 34 years. While the relationship between (current, lagged and unexpected) profits/earnings and returns has been extensively analysed before, to our knowledge this is the first study to look at the relationship between stock returns and profit persistence. We interpret profit persistence as a result of market competition and innovation of the firm. It is shown that firm-specific long-run profit persistence after correction for other additional economic fundamentals of the firm has a positive impact on four-factor adjusted returns and a negative impact on their volatility.     

STRATEGIC DEBT AND RJV COMPETITION*

Firms first choose their debt level, next form an RJV and choose R&D investment, and then choose output in Cornot competition. Through the use of debt, a firm commits an aggressive stance, a higher output level, and higher R&D investment, whereby the latter helps solve the free‐riding problem that usually exists in R&D studies. However, a firm in an unleveraged industry gains the highest profit, while a leveraged firm in an asymmetric industry (which achieves the highest profit in Brander and Lewis (1988)) gains the lowest profit. As a result, both firms using debt and both firms not using debt are the two equilibria, and the latter survives as a focal outcome. This is in sharp contrast to Brander and Lewis who find that both firms using debt is a prisoner's dilemma outcome.     

Product customization

The advent of the Internet has revolutionized the way companies advertise, develop and distribute products. Firms can now customize their advertising messages and products to the particular characteristics and needs of customers. Customers themselves can create their own products. We investigate investments by firms in product-customization capabilities within a duopoly model of horizontal product differentiation. We find that (i) if brand name effects are not too strong, one firm emerges as a leader in product customization—firms make asymmetric investments in product-customization technologies in order to reduce price competition, (ii) if brand name effects are strong, both firms make extensive investments in product customization, and (iii) the possibility of product customization can raise industry profits if brand names are weak, but not when they are strong.     

中国工业产业结构与企业技术研发行为的实证分析

产业结构升级一直是我国经济学界所关心的一个问题，工业产业的升级更是一个众所关注的焦点。本文在前人研究的基础上，利用中国工业产业数据，采用了经典的SCP范式模型．对熊彼特的两个经典假说进行了验证。发现竞争与企业利润同时对企业研发具有促进作用．熊彼特两个相互矛盾的结论同时得到了支持。通过对应分析，我们对中国工业内产业不同特点和企业不同特点进行了归类，提出国有企业在不同行业的产值比重是导致了这两个看似矛盾的结论同时并存的原因。     

Duopoly Competition with Corporate Social Responsibility

This paper highlights the effect of firms’ position on firms’ strategies with corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices under three different cases: Cournot competition; Stackelberg competition with the CSR firm taking the leader position and turnover, with the profit maximising (PM) firm playing as the leader. Some interesting conclusions are achieved. First, the CSR firm always produces more than the PM firm. Second, the outputs of both firms (the consumer surplus) under the PM firm's leading position are larger than those under Cournot. Third, the profits of both firms (producer surplus) under the PM firm playing the leading position are less than those under Cournot. Surprisingly, when the PM firm first moves, the PM firm's profits are the lowest while the CSR firm's outputs are the highest in all three cases. Finally, the relationship of social welfare under the three cases is ambiguous.     

Firm's objective function and product and process R&D

Firms undertake different kinds of R&D activities. They do product R&D (R&D aimed at improving the quality of existing products, and creating new products). They also do process R&D (R&D aimed at lowering the cost of making existing and new products). Moreover, firms often do both product and process R&D simultaneously. As far as the objective of firms is concerned, this need not be limited to profit-maximization only. Rather, firms may have a broader objective, where they care about profits as well as consumer surplus. This paper studies effects of a firm having a general objective function (that takes into consideration both profits and consumer surplus) on its product and process R&D choices, and corresponding implications.I consider product and process R&D choices of firms in an infinite horizon set-up with discrete time. Firms in my framework can simultaneously do both product and process R&D in every period, face a discrete-choice model of consumer demand with vertical product differentiation, and maximize a discounted, weighted sum of their profits and consumer surplus over the infinite time horizon.I show how process and product R&D differ from each other in my framework, and the role of a firm's objective function in this regard. I compare process and product R&D choices across firms that differ in their objective function, and illustrate effects of providing general R&D subsidies (subsidies given for any R&D, regardless of whether it is product or process R&D) to firms. I also characterize how in my framework, the choice of process R&D in total R&D — R&D composition — by an individual firm varies over time, and how process and product R&D choices, process and product R&D productivity, and the choice of R&D composition vary across firms that differ in size but are otherwise similar.     

Bargaining with Rent Seekers

Consider a rent‐seeking game, which has government bargain with firms over dividing the rents. In period 1, each firm can invest to increase the probability that the rent will appear. In period 2, the parties bargain. In equilibrium, though firms will invest more than the socially optimal level, rent‐seeking expenditures may be low. Firms that collude to restrict investment maximize joint profits by investing at a positive, non‐infinitesimal level, and restrict investment even if the cost of rent‐seeking effort is zero.     

Electricity market mergers with endogenous forward contracting

We analyze the effects of electricity market mergers in an environment where firms endogenously choose their level of forward contracts prior to competing in the wholesale market. We apply our model to Alberta’s wholesale electricity market. Firms have an incentive to reduce their forward contract coverage in the more concentrated post-merger equilibrium. We demonstrate that endogenous forward contracting magnifies the price increasing impacts of mergers, resulting in larger reductions in consumer surplus. Current market screening procedures used to analyze electricity mergers consider firms’ pre-existing forward commitments. We illustrate that ignoring the endogenous nature of firms’ forward commitments can yield biased conclusions regarding the impacts of market structure changes such as mergers. In particular, we show that the price effects of mergers can be largely underestimated when forward contract quantities are held at pre-merger levels. Whether the profits of the merged firm are greater with fixed or endogenous forward quantities is ambiguous.     

The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms

We consider a downstream duopoly model with a monopolistic common supplier and mutual outsourcing between the two symmetric downstream firms. The market structure captures the recent procurement environment in the smartphone industry. We also incorporate managerial delegation into the duopoly model because deciding on organizational forms within a firm is critical to achieving better performance in almost all industries. There is an equilibrium in which only one of the firms delegates its downstream production to its sales manager. A delegating firm becomes less aggressive. The profits when both firms delegate can be higher than those when no firm delegates. Social welfare when both firms delegate can be smaller than that when no firm delegates.     

Price adjustment in an atomistic market

This paper considers the price adjustment process in a market which retains the characteristics of a perfectly competitive market except that individual firms are price-setters. Buyers, unaware initially of what prices which firms are charging, indulge in search by contacting a sample of firms and buy (according to a demand curve) from the lowest-price firm encountered. Firms set prices to maximise profits over their perceived (or estimated) demand curve, and update their estimated demand curve in accordance with the observed change in demand between successive time periods. It is shown that the price distribution converges to a degenerate distribution centred on the monopoly price.     

A naturalistic approach to the theory of the firm: The role of cooperation and cultural evolution

One reason why firms exist, this paper argues, is because they are suitable organizations within which cooperative production systems based on human social predispositions can evolve. In addition, we show how an entrepreneur, given these predispositions, can shape human behavior within a firm. To illustrate these processes, we will present a model that depicts how the biased transmission of cultural contents via social learning processes within the firm influence employees’ behavior and the performance of the firm. These biases can be traced back to evolved social predispositions. Humans lived in tribal scale social systems based on significant amounts of intra- and even intergroup cooperation for tens if not a few hundred thousand years before the first complex societies arose. Firms rest upon the social psychology originally evolved for tribal life. We also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence on the performance and size of different kinds of organizations. Modern organizations have functions rather different from ancient tribes, leading to friction between our social predispositions and organization goals. Firms that manage to reduce this friction will tend to function better.     

Profits in the long-term for the manufacturing sector

It is foreseeable that the integration of domestic economies into a single market (globalization) will have a direct consequence on firm profits. Firms will see their returns converge in the long-term towards an equilibrium value that is identical to that of diverse firms coming from other economies. The authors' objective is to test the existence of a process of convergence between economies. Thus, they analyze the evolution of the competitive process of the manufacturing sector in eight countries. The results suggest that even though the competitive forces that operate at an international level will result in the convergence of the respective returns of firms in the long-term, the convergence process is only partial. (JEL 16)This research has been financed by the MCYT-FEDER Research Project SEC 2002-00835