农民专业合作经济组织问题探析——基于博弈理论的实证分析

农民专业合作经济组织是农产品供应链体系健康发展的基础环节和重要保证。运用博弈理论和实证研究,揭示了农民专业合作经济组织发展的内在规律和现实困境。认为需要采取加深博弈主体认知程度、强化对博弈主体的监督和支持力度、形成以产权为基础的三方利益联结机制等措施,来保障农民专业合作经济组织的健康发展,保障农民获得产业链正常利润,推动农业产业化高效运转。     

我国新型农民专业合作组织发展分析和对策

加快发展农民专业合作组织是应对加入WTO挑战、提高农业市场竞争力和增加农民收入的重要措施。本文通过对江苏农民专业合作组织发展状况的调查分析 ,提出了新形势下我国农民专业合作组织发展的基本思路和对策     

洛阳市农民专业合作组织调查研究

采用问卷调查和访谈的方式,对洛阳市农民专业合作组织发展情况进行调查研究。通过调查,分析洛阳市农民专业合作组织的基本情况、主要服务水平与业务模式、发展过程中存在的主要问题等。结果表明,洛阳市农民专业合作组织促进了本地农业产业化,顺应了大市场的需求;但也存在缺乏可持续发展的动力、农民专业合作组织的融资渠道单一、政府和社会力量扶持缺乏针对性与持续性、组织生产模式需要转型升级等问题。在此基础上提出促进洛阳市农民专业合作组织良性发展的建议。     

农民专业合作经济组织参与农业技术推广的理论分析

基于博弈论的视角，针对农民专业合作经济组织参与农技推广服务这条主线派生出两组不确定性委托一代理模式下的非合作博弈模型，在对以上两组非合作博弈进行系统全面分析的基础上，最后得出，一旦委托达成，即农民专业合作经济组织成功参与农业技术推广，将直接导致社会总福利的增加。     

乌鲁木齐市芦草沟乡农民专业合作组织发展研究

农民专业合作组织是发展现代农业,推进农业产业化经营,提高农民组织化程度,促进农牧民增收的基础力量。从乌鲁木齐市米东区芦草沟乡农民专业合作组织发展的现状及特点入手,分析了该乡农民专业合作组织发展中存在的问题,借鉴新疆疆内疆外的模式,提出了芦草沟乡农民专业合作组织的基本模式选择,并给出了促进该乡农民专业合作组织健康发展的保障措施与建议。     

马克思合作经济思想与中国新型农民专业合作组织

马克思的合作经济思想是指导中国新型农民专业合作组织不断发展的理论基石。中国新型农民专业合作组织的基本理论和指导原则继承了马克思的合作经济思想,同时在经营与决策机制、管理与分配机制等方面有所发展和创新。中国新型农民专业合作组织应进一步发挥比较优势,获取规模效益。     

新型农民合作组织发展与金融支持问题研究

2012年12月22日中央农村工作会议强调,着力发展多种形式的新型农民合作组织和多元服务主体,通过提高组织化程度实现与市场的有效对接。农民专业合作经济组织已成为增加农民收入、推动农业产业化发展和推动社会主义新农村建设的有效载体。本文归纳总结了我国农民合作组织发展现状,分析了农民专业合作组织发展及金融支持存在的问题,并提出促进金融支持的合理化意见和建议。     

西部农民专业合作组织发展的定位与对策

思路模糊是西部农民专业合作组织发展滞后于农村市场化需要的重要原因。西部农民专业合作组织发展具有现实紧迫性,这些组织需要获得市场谈判资格、具备政治参与权利、分享社会资本的能力。西部农民专业合作组织发展方向需要三部曲:服务合作、金融合作、政经合一。     

政府行为在国外农民合作经济组织发展中的促进作用及其对中国的借鉴

尽管国外农民合作经济组织发展模式不同,但政府在农民合作经济组织中的影响和作用都是客观存在且至关重要的。现阶段中国农民合作经济组织的发展仍然应该以政府推动为主体。政府行为在促进我国发展农民合作经济组织作用中存在着缺陷和不足,要结合中国农民合作经济组织发展的实践,立足于农业和农村经济发展现实,从政府实施农业政策角度入手,以法律保障为基础,从财政、税收、信贷等方面给予扶持,恰当规定政府和农民专业合作经济组织的关系,推进民主管理,构建良好的服务平台,着力培育新型农民,通过实施农业项目促进农民专业合作组织发展健康发展。     

论基层政府在农民专业合作组织发展中的角色定位

基层政府在支持农民专业合作组织发展过程中出现了＂越位＂、＂错位＂和＂缺位＂现象。因此,基层政府在农民专业合作组织发展中的角色定位不应笼统,应综合考虑农民专业合作组织的自身性质、基层政府的职能、政府与合作组织的关系等影响因素,在农民专业合作组织发展和完善过程中进行动态具体定位,即建立期的宣传者、倡导者,发展初期的大力支持者和成熟期的服务者。     

发展和完善新型农民合作经济组织初探

发展和完善新型农民合作经济组织,可以形成农民收入增长的长效机制,增强农民市场竞争能力,完善农业社会化服务体系,提升农业整体素质和综合效益.发展农民新型合作经济组织,应结合各地的具体情况,逐步解决发展过程中出现的问题,引导农民按照合作制和股份合作制的一些基本要求,逐步向多模式、网络化、区域化的方向发展.     

FARMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN ECOSYSTEM SERVICE PROVISION: DOES TRUST MATTER?

Ecosystem service provision in agriculture may require cooperation between farmers. Trust fosters cooperation in many economic and social interactions and is important to the success of traditional agricultural cooperatives. Little is known about how trust affects farmers’ willingness to cooperate to provide an ecosystem service, what types of trust are most important, and under what conditions trust may matter. In this study, we present results of a survey of Missouri crop farmers exploring the role trust plays in farmers’ stated willingness to cooperate to control pests. We find that most farmers say they are willing to cooperate, and most farmers are willing to trust others. However, we find little evidence that trust positively influences farmers’ willingness to cooperate to control pests. Instead, we find that trust may only matter under certain conditions, such as when participants’ farms are dissimilar, and that other determinants, such as the perceived benefit of cooperation and environmental concern, are more important than trust to farmers who are contemplating cooperation to control pests.     

Nonlinear behavior of the socio-economic dynamics for lake eutrophication control

To succeed in combating lake eutrophication, cooperation of local inhabitants, small factories, and farmers in reducing phosphorus discharge is very important. But the willingness of each player to cooperate would depend on the cooperation of other players and on the level of environmental concern of the society in general. Here we study the integrated dynamics of people's choice of behavior and the magnitude of eutrophication. Assumptions are: there are a number of players who choose between alternative options: a cooperative and environment-oriented option is more costly than the other. The decision of each player is affected by “social pressure” as well as by economical cost of the options. The lake pollution increases with the total phosphorus released, and a high pollution level in the lake would enhance the social pressure. The model includes a positive and a negative feedback loops which create diverse dynamical behavior. The model often shows bistability — having an equilibrium with a high level of cooperation among people and clean water, and the other equilibrium with low cooperation and polluted water, which are simultaneously stable. The model also shows fluctuation between a high and a low levels of cooperation in alternating years, cycle with a longer periodicity, or chaotic fluctuation. Conservatism of people stabilizes the system and sometimes helps maintaining cooperation. The system may show unexpected parameter dependence — the improved phosphorus removing efficiency might make water more polluted if it causes the decline in the environmental concern and cooperation among people.     

干旱区绿洲农业发展节水灌溉合作经济组织的特征与作用

干旱区农业节水灌溉合作经济组织是节水灌溉技术应用过程中一种新的生产经营管理经济组织形式。运用组织理论对节水灌溉合作经济组织的内涵作了具体的定义,从组织目标、组织结构、组织方式等角度对合作经济组织的特征进行了分析,对其组织发展的作用也进行了分析,并在此基础上,对继续发展节水灌溉合作经济组织建设提出了一定的建议。     

Cooperation in Stochastic OLG games

This paper builds on Cremer's (Quart. J. Econ. 101 (1986) 33) seminal analysis which shows that (almost) complete cooperation can be achieved as an equilibrium in a game played by overlapping generations of players if the institution in which players cooperate is infinitely lived.We analyze a similar model in which the costs of cooperation are subject to random shocks. Even if these random shocks are very small, the range of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained is decreased considerably in comparison to the deterministic case. Furthermore, we show how the efficient outcome can be approximated if the level of cooperation can be varied continuously and the cooperation technology has decreasing or constant returns to scale, while this is not possible in the case of increasing returns to scale.     

Climate game analyses for CO2 emission trading among various world organizations

This paper simulates the saving in terms of the total abatement cost of CO₂ emission reductions for different trading games reflecting the potential cooperation among organizations including the European Union (EU), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries, the Union of South American Nations (USAN), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). A game approach is conducted to determine if the cooperation will come into existence among the organizations stated above. A similar idea is applied to the four largest emission countries, China, the United States, Russia, and India, as four individual players in the trading game.Joining the market is the strictly dominant strategy for any organization from the results. The Nash equilibrium shows that, regardless of the organizations that have already existed in the market, joining the market is always the best policy for the remaining organizations which are currently not in the market. Similarly, India likes the organization to which it belongs, i.e. IOR-ARC, to trade with the EU and APEC, and the U.S. wants the organization to which it belongs, i.e., APEC, to cooperate with the organizations USAN and IOR-ARC. However, China and Russia prefer trading with other countries within their own organizations.     

Cooperation,imitation and partial rematching

We study a setting in which imitative players are matched into pairs to play a Prisonerʼs Dilemma game. A well-known result in such setting is that under random matching cooperation vanishes for any interior initial condition. The novelty of this paper is that we consider partial rematching: players that belong to a pair in which both parties cooperate repeat partner next period, while all other players are randomly matched into pairs. Under certain conditions, this rematching mechanism makes cooperation the unique outcome in the long run. Furthermore, we show that if imitation happens infrequently enough then cooperative behavior is always present in the population.     

谁来支付合作成本?——对乡村建设合作收益与合作成本问题的一般分析

由于农民合作社实现了以较低的内部合作成本对较高的外部交易成本的替代,使得农民通过社区内部多领域的合作,降低了成本,提高了收益,还获得了许多非经济收益,因而农民愿意支付合作成本,将合作社继续办下去。实际上,农民合作社的组织成本相对于外部人对农村资源的利用和价格支付是微乎其微的。只是由于显性收益(经济收益)太小,才导致了对显性成本(已经支付的物质成本)支付的捉襟见肘。而巨大的隐性收益(非经济收益)的获得,在支付隐性成本(机会成本)之余,也抵偿了部分显性成本支付上的不足。继续扩大隐性收益,并努力提高显性收益,才能解决合作社面临的成本支付问题。     

农户参与式水利管理与政府声誉缺失——一个基于博弈框架的分析

为解决农户有效参与水利管理的合作意愿,本文基于博弈论的农户合作管理困境,首先对农户参与水利管理的单次静态博弈进行了合作意愿分析,得出农户在合作的单次博弈中必将陷入两难困境,导致个人理性和集体理性产生冲突,农户产生"搭便车"的倾向,且农户集体之间的合作难以达成。其次,基于不完全信息和有限理性的研究假设,再次对农户所处的两难困境进行重复动态博弈分析,推演出农户参与水利管理的合作意愿主要来自政府的有效激励机制设计及承诺。最后,本文以浙江省为例,对500个农户参与水利管理的合作意愿进行了实地调查,结果显示与农户合作博弈过程中的研究结论相符,并据此得出相应的对策及建议。     

Reciprocity Game

This paper shows that reciprocity comes from the desire to cooperate in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Before playing the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game, players choose the reciprocity level and commit to it, and the reciprocity level is public information. There are T equilibria if the prisoner's dilemma game is repeated for T periods, and each equilibrium is associated with different levels of cooperation. Further, if players choose their reciprocity levels sequentially, then the most cooperative equilibrium will be the unique equilibrium. However, reciprocity does not matter for the one‐period game and the infinitely repeated game.