失业保险金与再就业行为

现有的失业理论及实证研究都认为失业保险金的提高会增加失业者的失业持续时间。在本文中，我们试图从失业者面临工作机会的工资分布结构出发，对失业保险金与失业者再就业工资分布的关系进行描述。通过对传统工作搜寻理论模型的扩展，我们证明失业保险金对失业持续时间的影响存在三种不同的传导路径，同时我们得到两个推论：失业保险金的增加一方面将提高失业者接受“高”工资工作机会的概率；但另一方面对失业者从事“低”工资工作机会的影响是不确定的。如果将正武工作视为“高”工资的工作机会，而将非正式工作视为“低”工资的工作机会；则基于微观层面的数据所进行的实证研究结果验证了我们的推论。     

失业救济金与中国城镇人口失业持续时间

失业救济金作为工作的机会成本可能会降低失业者接受工作的概率,从而会延长失业持续时间。本文利用持续数据模型和国家统计局2003年的专项调查数据对失业救济金与失业持续时间的关系进行了考察,发现失业救济金降低了失业者再就业概率,且预期失业持续时间对失业救济金的反应弹性为0.1166,即失业者月失业救济金每提高1%,预期失业持续时间提高0.12%。本文的政策建议是政府应该提高失业救济金的覆盖面,并向失业者提供职业培训。     

企业产权性质对失业再就业影响的实证分析

本文利用有关厦门市城镇调查失业登记的样本数据,运用生存模型中的非参数方法和Cox半参数方法,分析了失业者失业前所在企业产权性质对失业者再就业的影响.分析结果表明,国有、集体企业失业者与其他性质企业的失业者在失业持续时间和再就业机会上存在显著的差异,国有、集体企业失业者的再就业机会是其他企业失业者的0.52倍.这一结果可能是由于国有、集体企业失业者的福利依赖、失业者个人责任的认知程度、就业观念、正规部门与非正规部门的社会保险差异所导致的工作机会与接受工作机会的概率降低.因此,促进经济与就业和谐发展、转变就业观念、完善与非正规就业相适应的社会保障,是解决我国失业再就业问题,构建和谐社会的重要途径.     

隐性失业：国有企业转机过程中必须解决的一大难题

隐性失业是相对于显性失业(具有劳动能力并处在就业年龄而没有找到工作的)而言的,意指名义上就业而实际上失业的那部分人。例如,有相当一部分职工,名义上参加工作而实际上在企业中或单位中没工作可作,无工资或发部分工资在家的,或在企业中有工资而实际上无具体工作或工作负荷太轻、有效工作时间太短、高职低就的,就属于隐性失业者。     

我国失业保险金给付标准合理性研究

失业保险制度具有保障失业者基本生活和促进就业的双重作用,这两种作用的有效发挥,依赖于失业保险金给付标准的合理确定.本文通过对我国失业保险金与最低生活保障标准、最低工资标准的分析比较,对我国现行失业保险金标准是否合理做出判断,并提出改革建议.     

论我国失业保障体系构建的关键面向——以日本治理长期失业的经验为启示

长期失业人群是日本失业治理中的痼疾,直观其发生机理,主要为:劳动力需求方面,劳动力市场排斥长期失业者;劳动力供给方面,失业时间长短影响劳动者就业能力;另外,雇佣保险、解雇规制在制度层面上也具有相乘作用。探究其根本原因,主要是社会福利下失业者基于成本收益分析后产生的福利依赖心理。为此,日本关注"社会福利发展",重整社会福利在治理长期失业中的逻辑思路,改革雇佣保险制度、建立求职者支援制度、丰富民间职业支援事业。参考日本经验,我国失业保障体系应以提高失业者就业能力为关键进行构建,同时重视失业保障制度的功能转型、协调当前我国供给侧结构性改革中的"退"与"进"、促进再就业支援多元、发挥政府的新型管理监督职能等。     

劳动力市场收入冲击对消费行为的影响

失业会造成不利的收入冲击,外部收入冲击会影响消费者的消费行为。失业对食品和教育支出的影响不同,平均而言,消费者对食品支出具有更强的修匀能力,教育水平对教育支出具有正向修匀作用。失业者实现再就业之后,食品支出比例显著下降,教育支出相对上升,失业持续时间对再就业者教育支出依然具有负向影响。女性失业会降低家庭的食品和教育支出比例,女性再就业后会提高家庭的教育支出。     

城市差别对失业的影响：基于中国东西部地区的经验研究

不同城市存在风俗差别下的工作搜寻模型,即不同城市间存在风俗差别下的工作搜寻理论和风俗差别程度对于失业者对于职位搜寻的影响,城市差别可能会对工作搜寻者的搜寻行为产生内生的冲击,即不同城市的风俗差别程度可以产生一个对于它的适应成本,进而影响职位搜寻中的选择,从而影响到整个社会的就业均衡;只要这个差别存在并引起了对于它的适应性成本,那么这个社会就不可能有一个统一的一致均衡工资的出现,但会有一个混同均衡。同时,通过实证发现,我国存在着这种状态下的失业现象,并拟合出了具体的计量模型。     

我国失业社会保险制度改革现状及对策

失业社会保险是指就业者由于非本人自愿的原因而失去工作,中断收入。由国家或社会保险机构对失业者发放一定数额失业保险金的一种社会保险制度。失业社会保险制度在我国具有一定的特殊性。中国政府曾于1950年颁布过《救济失业工人暂行办法》,但这并不是失业社会保险,而是一种社会救济。长期以来,中国没有关于失业方面的制度。自20世纪80年代中期开始,中国才逐步建立起失业社会保险制度。     

失业利益与工资谈判:一个博弈模型

本文通过一个可以中途退出谈判的讨价还价模型 ,刻画了存在失业利益条件下的工人和企业之间的工资议价行为。结论是 :失业利益将加强工人的工资要价能力 ,降低工人求职的努力程度 ,过高的失业利益甚至导致工人提前结束谈判 ,而过低的失业利益导致工人在各阶段的工资要价都较低 ;由于信息不对称 ,企业可以凭借信息优势对工人的要价进行压价。理论上 ,存在最优的失业保障。     

AN ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH MODEL OF CRIME,INEQUALITY, AND UNEMPLOYMENT*

We extend simple search models of crime, unemployment, and inequality to incorporate on‐the‐job search. This is valuable because, although simple models are useful, on‐the‐job search models are more interesting theoretically and more relevant empirically. We characterize the wage distribution, unemployment rate, and crime rate theoretically, and use quantitative methods to illustrate key results. For example, we find that increasing the unemployment insurance replacement rate from 53 to 65 percent increases unemployment and crime rates from 10 and 2.7 percent to 14 and 5.2 percent. We show multiple equilibria arise for some fairly reasonable parameters; in one case, unemployment can be 6 or 23 percent, and crime 0 or 10 percent, depending on the equilibrium.     

Labor Market Experiment

This experiment involves having students search in a hypothetical job market for jobs paying wages in a known range but an unknown wage distribution. Different trials change variables to allow for search costs, unemployment insurance, recessions, and investment in human capital.     

The effect of unemployment insurance on the riskiness of occupational choice

This paper examines the effect of unemployment insurance on the riskiness of occupational choice by postulating a model of job search in which job offers have two characteristics; their wage and their security of tenure. Two versions are considered: a general case in which the unemployment benefit is earnings-related, and a special case in which the benefit is of a flat-rate form. Of particular interest in the paper is the individual's desired trade-off between wage and security of tenure, and how this trade-off is affected by the type of insurance scheme in operation. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that an earnings-related scheme encourages risk-taking behaviour by the poor, and risk-avoiding behaviour by the rich; in contrast, a flat-rate scheme neither encourages nor discourages risk-taking.     

搜寻理论、失业救济金与中国城镇人口失业持续时间

通过对享受失业救济金者和不享受者失业救济金者的再就业概率的分析,我们可以发现,与享受失业救济金者相比,人力资本特征、家庭特征和宏观经济环境对不享受失业救济金者的再就业概率有显著正向影响,转换模型也得出了失业救济金会降低再就业概率、延长失业持续时间的结论。     

STRUCTURAL EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF JOB SEARCH MONITORING

To evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers, it is important to take account of post‐unemployment wages and job‐to‐job mobility. We structurally estimate a model with search channels, using a controlled trial in which monitoring is randomized. The data include registers and survey data on search behavior. We find that the opportunity to move to better‐paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution toward formal search channels in unemployment. Job mobility compensates for adverse long‐run effects of monitoring on wages. We examine counterfactual policies against moral hazard, like reemployment bonuses and changes of the benefits path.     

On the Provision of Insurance against Search‐Induced Wage Fluctuations*

Should workers be provided with insurance against search‐induced wage fluctuations? To answer this question, I rely on the numerical simulations of a model of on‐the‐job search and precautionary savings. The model is calibrated to low‐skilled workers in the United States. The extent of insurance is determined by the degree of progressivity of a non‐linear transfer schedule. The fundamental trade‐off is that a more generous provision of insurance reduces incentives to search for better‐paying jobs, which increases the cost of providing insurance. I show that progressivity raises the search intensity of unemployed workers, which reduces the equilibrium rate of unemployment, but it lowers the search intensity of employed job seekers, which reduces the output level. I also solve numerically for the optimal non‐linear transfer schedule. The optimal policy is to provide little insurance up to a monthly income level of $1350, so as to preserve incentives to move up the wage ladder, and nearly full insurance above $1450. This policy reduces the standard deviation of labor income net of transfers by 34 per cent and generates a consumption‐equivalent welfare gain of 0.7 per cent. The absence of private savings does not fundamentally change the shape of the optimal transfer function, but tilts the optimal policy towards more insurance, at the expense of a less efficient allocation of workers across jobs.     

Optimal unemployment insurance and redistribution

We characterize optimal income taxation and unemployment insurance in a search‐matching framework where both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous and Nash bargaining determines wages. Individuals decide whether to participate as job seekers and if so, how much search effort to exert. Unemployment insurance trades off insurance versus search and participation incentives. We also allow for different productivity types so there is a redistributive role for the income tax and show that a piecewise linear wage tax internalizes the macro effects arising from endogenous wages. Type‐specific lump‐sum taxes and transfers can then redistribute between individuals of differing skills and employment states. Our analysis embeds optimal unemployment insurance into an extensive‐margin optimal redistribution framework where transfers to the involuntarily and voluntarily unemployed can differ, and nests several standard models in the literature.     

Search costs and efficiency: Do unemployed workers search enough?

Many labor market policies affect the marginal benefits and costs of job search. The impact and desirability of such policies depend on the distribution of search costs. In this paper, we provide an equilibrium framework for identifying the distribution of search costs and we apply it to the Dutch labor market. In our model, the wage distribution, job search intensities, and firm entry are simultaneously determined in market equilibrium. Given the distribution of search intensities (which we directly observe), we calibrate the search cost distribution and the flow value of non-market time; these values are then used to derive the socially optimal firm entry rates and distribution of job search intensities. From a social point of view, some unemployed workers search too little due to a hold-up problem, while other unemployed workers search too much due to coordination frictions and rent-seeking behavior. Our results indicate that jointly increasing unemployment benefits and the sanctions for unemployed workers who do not search at all can be welfare-improving.     

A theory of scar unemployment

A job search model of scar unemployment is presented wherein it is demonstrated that the escape rate from unemployment decreases with unemployment duration, under fairly general conditions on the offer distribution. A striking and counter intuitive result is that the current reservation wage for a scarred worker and an unscarred worker is the same, when faced with identical search environments.     

Job search,wage offers,and unemployment insurance

Several previous studies have estimated that unemployment insurance (UI) causes an increase in the duration of unemployment and have concluded from this that UI raises reservation wages. However, job-search theory implies that UI can also affect duration through its impact on job offer arrival rates and/or through an impact on wage offers. In this paper we attempt to identify these possible additional effects using survey data on a sample of unemployed individuals. Like previous studies, we find that UI significantly increases unemployment duration. However, part of this effect is estimated to stem from a decrease in the offer arrival rate as well as from a higher reservation wage.