Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation

We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.     

The Asset Growth Effect and Investor Protection in Emerging Markets: The Role of the Global Financial Crisis

The previous evidence shows that firms experience lower returns after a period with higher growth in assets. Two alternative explanations have been raised to explain this effect: mispricing and optimal investment. This study examines this effect in 26 emerging markets over the period of 2005–2013 with a special attention to the recent global financial crisis. We find a stronger asset growth effect during the crisis years relative to other years. This effect is stronger in firms with small or medium stock turnover ratio and firms operating in industries with low R&D intensity. We also investigate the heterogeneity across countries and find that a stronger asset growth effect during the crisis years exists only for emerging markets with low protection of shareholders and creditors. We argue that this evidence is in line with the mispricing hypothesis.     

Valuation in Emerging Markets: A Simulation Approach

Most of the foundations of valuation theory have been designed for use in developed markets. Because of the greater, and in some cases different, risks associated with emerging markets (although recent experience might suggest otherwise), investors and corporate managers are often uncomfortable using traditional methods. The typical way of capturing emerging-market risks is to increase the discount rate in the standard valuation model. But, as the authors argue, such adjustments have the effect of undermining some of the basic assumptions of the CAPM-based discounted cash flow model. The standard theory of capital budgeting suggests that estimates of unconditional expected cash flows should be discounted at CAPM discount rates (or betas) that reflect only “systematic,” or “nondiversifiable,” market-wide risks. In practice, however, analysts tend to take what are really estimates of “conditional” expected cash flows—that is, conditional on the firm or its country avoiding a crisis—and discount them at higher rates that reflect not only systematic risks, but diversifiable risks that typically involve a higher probability of crisis-driven costs of default. But there is almost no basis in theory for the size of the increases in discount rates. In this article, the authors propose that analysts in emerging markets avoid this discount rate problem by using simulation techniques to capture emerging-market risks in their estimates of unconditional expected cash flows—in other words, estimates that directly incorporate the possibility of an emerging-market crisis and its consequences. Having produced such estimates, analysts can then discount them using the standard Global CAPM.     

Valuation Model of Defaultable Bond Values in Emerging Markets

This paper develops a model to value defaultable bonds in emerging markets. Default occurs when some signaling process hits a pre-defined default barrier. The signaling variable is considered to be some macro-economic variables such as foreign exchange rates. The dynamics of the default barrier depend on the volatility and the drift of the signaling variable. We derive a closed-form solution of the defaultable bond price from the model as a function of a signaling variable and a short-term interest rate. The numerical results show that the model values generated by using foreign exchange rates as the signaling variables can broadly track the market credit spreads of defaultable bonds in South Korea and Brazil. Given an expected level of the foreign exchange rate, defaultable bond values under a stressed market situation can be obtained.     

The Effects of Public Venture Capital Investments on Corporate Governance: Evidence From IPO Firms in Emerging Markets

This study examines the impact of public venture capital (hereafter PVC) investments on corporate governance of initial public offering (hereafter IPO) firms in emerging markets. Using data collected from Taiwan PVC investments during 1996–2005, we analyse three corporate governance features in IPO firms: earnings management, board characteristics, and excess control by controlling shareholders. We find that PVC‐backed firms use fewer accounting accruals in their IPO financial statements than non‐PVC‐backed firms. This result suggests that PVC‐backed IPO firms engage in less earnings management than non‐PVC‐backed IPO firms. We also find PVC‐backed firms tend to set up their boards with fewer non‐independent directors and supervisors at IPO. This result indicates that PVC‐backed IPO firms have better board structures than non‐PVC‐backed IPO firms. Finally, we find that controlling shareholders are less likely to exert excess control in PVC‐backed firms than in non‐PVC‐backed firms. Overall, our results indicate that PVC investments add value to new IPO firms not only in financing their capital needs but also in creating better corporate governance structures in emerging markets.     

大股东控制、投资者保护与公司治理

本文旨在提供一个对大股东控制下的公司治理实践差异的理论解释。在缺乏有效保护中小股东利益的外部法律,并且存在政府对证券市场发展托市行为的基础上,较低的公司治理绩效和证券市场的表面繁荣可以共存。公司治理模式选择的方向不在于公司股权的分散化,而在于政府改变对证券市场发展的特殊偏好。     

Investor Protection and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Worldwide CEO Turnover

Recent research asserts that an essential feature of good corporate governance is strong investor protection, where investor protection is defined as the extent of the laws that protect investors' rights and the strength of the legal institutions that facilitate law enforcement. The purpose of this study is to test this assertion by investigating whether these measures of investor protection are associated with an important role of good corporate governance: identifying and terminating poorly performing CEOs. Our tests indicate that strong law enforcement institutions significantly improve the association between CEO turnover and poor performance, whereas extensive investor protection laws do not. In addition, we find that in countries with strong law enforcement, CEO turnover is more likely to be associated with poor stock returns when stock prices are more informative. Finding that strong law enforcement institutions are associated with improved CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity is consistent with good corporate governance requiring law enforcement institutions capable of protecting shareholders' property rights (i.e., protecting shareholders from expropriation by insiders). Finding that investor  protection laws are not associated with improved CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity is open to several explanations. For example, investor protection laws may not be as important as strong law enforcement in fostering good governance, the set of laws we examine may not be the set that are most important in promoting good governance, or measurement error in our surrogate for extensive investor protection laws may reduce the power of our test of this variable.     

Investor Sentiment and Pre-IPO Markets

We examine whether irrational behavior among small (retail) investors drives post‐IPO prices. We use prices from the grey market (the when‐issued market that precedes European IPOs) to proxy for small investors' valuations. High grey market prices (indicating overoptimism) are a very good predictor of first‐day aftermarket prices, while low grey market prices (indicating excessive pessimism) are not. Moreover, we find long‐run price reversal only following high grey market prices. This asymmetry occurs because larger (institutional) investors can choose between keeping the shares they are allocated in the IPO, and reselling them when small investors are overoptimistic.     

Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets

We provide the impact on asset prices of search-and-bargainingfrictions in over-the-counter markets. Under certain conditions,illiquidity discounts are higher when counterparties are harderto find, when sellers have less bargaining power, when the fractionof qualified owners is smaller, or when risk aversion, volatility,or hedging demand is larger. Supply shocks cause prices to jump,and then "recover" over time, with a time signature that isexaggerated by search frictions: The price jump is larger andthe recovery is slower in less liquid markets. We discuss avariety of empirical implications.     

Comply or Explain: Investor Protection Through the Italian Corporate Governance Code

Nearly 86% of listed Italian companies now claim to be in formal compliance with the provisions of the Italian Corporate Governance Code, which, like many codes in EU countries, give companies the option to either comply or explain their decision not to do so. But in the wake of the recent financial crisis, the effectiveness of such self‐regulatory corporate governance codes has been subjected to increasing skepticism. In particular, critics wonder whether such governance codes actually encourage the adoption of best practices and promote better governance. This article presents a governance indicator (CoRe) devised by the authors that attempts to assess the actual, or effective, levels of compliance with the Italian Corporate Governance Code in terms of listed companies' procedures for dealing with related party transactions (RPTs). The authors report that the companies' level of effective compliance with regard to RPTs is considerably lower than their publicly reported levels of formal compliance. The authors also report that higher levels of effective compliance tend to be found in companies where (1) minority shareholders have appointed one or more directors; (2) independent directors serve on important committees; and (3) there are significant holdings by institutional investors—particularly foreign investors—who participate in general shareholder meetings.     

Corporate Governance and Its Impact on R&D Investment in Emerging Markets

Corporate R&D activities are inherently risky but also difficult to monitor. Against this background, we examine the impact of ownership concentration and legal shareholder rights protection on corporate R&D investments in emerging markets. Based on a comprehensive sample of publicly listed firms from 24 countries, we find that R&D intensity is lower in firms with (strategic) block ownership, and this effect is more pronounced in countries with stronger shareholder rights protection. This suggests that, similar to the situation in developed economies, dispersed ownership, which allows shareholders to diversify their investment risks, is beneficial for corporate R&D and that this effect is intensified by more developed institutions.     

Risks and Rewards in Emerging Market Investments

In light of the recent currency crises in East Asia, this article questions the accepted wisdom that emerging market securities deserve to be included in global portfolios primarily because of their low correlations with more conventional asset classes. The authors suggest that the basic cycle of emerging market loans and securities appears to have been compressed, and its swings accentuated, by the herd-like behavior of global institutional investors. This is not the irrational behavior of crowds infected by investment euphoria, but the rational behavior (however volatile) of a large number of institutional investors with huge stakes in the market, each trying to outperform or at least keep up with the others. While stressing the benefits of foreign capital for emerging nations, Smith and Walter also point to the adverse consequences of abrupt shifts in investor sentiment and capital flows. Citing a recent World Bank study, the authors suggest that the effect of portfolio equity inflows on many developing economies has been a “glut” of foreign exchange and liquidity, which tends to cause inflationary pressure and appreciation of real exchange rates. Such currency appreciation can in turn have unwanted “real” effects, such as increases in trade deficits. Going somewhat “against the grain of the Washington Consensus,” the authors suggest that emerging nations undertake a gradual, though steady movement toward adoption of freemarket policies. In particular, they cite with approval attempts by more successful emerging nations such as Chile and South Africa to limit portfolio capital inflows to avoid this problem of excess liquidity. As the authors conclude, “At no point in their development did now-established countries like Japan, Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Spain, and Chile adopt a totally free-market approach. They moved purposefully over decades in that direction, but only at a pace that could be accommodated by the accompanying political thinking and infrastructure-building.”     

资本市场与资产评估

一、资产评估对我国资本市场持续健康发展的作用 资产评估作为一种专业化中介服务行业,服务于诸多重要经济领域和经济活动．在规范交易行为、降低交易成本、维护经济秩序、保障金融安全、促进经济发展等方面发挥着十分重要的作用。     

标准的投资者保护制度和替代性投资者保护制度：一个概念性分析框架

基于在标准的投资者保护制度和替代性投资者保护制度之间做出的区分,本文提出了一个概念性分析框架,并对国有股权的制度安排在中国股票市场发展中的作用进行了初步的解释。标准的投资者保护制度——市场、法律和管制——固然重要,但是对于转轨国家而言,由于缺乏支撑标准的投资者保护制度运转的制度资源,利用替代性的投资者保护制度对于股票市场的早期发展就是至关重要的。     

Investor Trading Behavior and Sentiment in Futures Markets

This study investigates the effects of investor trading behavior and investor sentiment on futures market return. We find that the spot investor trading behavior, futures investor trading behavior, spot market sentiment, and futures market sentiment all have positive effects on daily futures returns in Chinese financial market. More importantly, we show that the effect of (spot) futures investor trading behavior has better explanatory power than (spot) futures market sentiment on futures returns. Further supporting our results, high investor trading behavior and high investor sentiment strengthen the positive relation between sentiment-returns and behavior-returns.     

新兴金融市场的发展

大量新兴国家所采取的积极的债务管理措施使得本国资产负债表的波动性显著降低,节约了为数可观的债务成本。本文引用两个典型例子:巴西采取减少其与美元相关的负债的政策,使得这部分负债的规模从2002年底占净负债总额的30％下降到2004年7月的15％。墨西哥实施富有创意的全球债券债务交换的方案,以期利用全球债券收益率曲线的特性来节约债务成本。