How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too‐Big‐to‐Fail Problem*

As bank regulatory reform tries to come to grips with the lessons of the financial crisis, several experts have proposed that some form of contingent convertible debt (CoCo) requirement be added to the prudential regulatory toolkit. In this article, the authors show how properly designed CoCos can be used not just to absorb losses, but more importantly to encourage banks to recognize losses and replace lost equity in a timely way, as well as to manage risk more effectively. Their proposed CoCos requirement strengthens management's incentives to promptly replace lost capital and enhance risk management by imposing major costs on the managers and existing shareholders of banks that fail to do so. Key elements of the proposal are that conversion of the CoCos into equity would be (1) triggered at a high trigger ratio of equity to assets (long before the bank is near an insolvency point), (2) determined by a market trigger (using a 90‐day moving average market equity ratio) rather than by supervisory discretion, and (3) significantly dilutive to shareholders. The only clear way for bank managements to avoid such dilution would be to issue equity into the market. Under most circumstances—barring an extremely rapid plunge of a bank's financial condition—management should be able and eager to replace lost capital in a timely way; as a result, dilutive conversions should almost never occur. Banks would face strong incentives to maintain high ratios of true economic capital relative to risky assets, and to manage their risks effectively. This implies that “too‐big‐to‐fail” financial institutions would not be permitted to approach the point of insolvency; they would face strong incentives to recapitalize long before that point. And if they should fail to issue new equity in a timely manner, the CoCos conversion would provide an alternative means of recapitalizing banks well before they reach the brink of insolvency. Thus, a CoCos requirement would go a long way to resolving the “too‐big‐to‐fail” problem. Such a CoCos requirement would not only increase the effectiveness of regulation, but also reduce its cost. It would be less costly for banks to raise CoCos than equity, reflecting both the lower adverseselection costs of CoCos issuance and the potential tax advantages of debt. And precisely because of the low probability of CoCo conversion, the Cocos would be issued at relatively modest (if any) discounts to otherwise comparable but straight subordinated debt. Thus requiring a mix of equity and appropriately designed CoCos would be less costly to banks, and would entail less of a reduction in the supply of loans than would a much higher book equity requirement alone.     

Reforming Banks Without Destroying Their Productivity and Value

Government‐protected banking systems tend to blow up, imposing huge losses on taxpayers. In a recent much‐publicized book, The Bankers' New Clothes, Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig propose to fix this problem by forcing banks to maintain 25% of their assets in the form of equity rather than debt. But this author argues, the book overstates the benefits and understates the costs of the proposed reform, while also failing to identify additional necessary reforms. Because bank equity is not true equity, and equity must be evaluated only in relation to risk, increasing required book equity ratios will not necessarily reduce the risk of bank failure significantly. Raising equity requirements is also socially costly because it reduces banks' willingness to lend. When banks need to raise their equity‐to‐asset ratios, they often choose to do so by cutting back on new loans, rather than paying the high costs of raising new equity. The reduction in loan supply that comes from raising equity ratios can be substantial, and is not just a one‐time cost. Balancing the costs and benefits of higher equity implies a much lower required equity ratio than the 25% posited in The Bankers' New Clothes. Finally, because equity ratios relative to risk should be the focus of prudential regulation, additional regulatory policy reforms that strengthen incentives for more effective risk management are needed in addition to higher capital ratios.     

Have SFAS 166 and SFAS 167 improved the financial reporting for securitizations?

Critics have alleged that securitization accounting prior to 2010 was among the causes of the recent financial crisis. In response to this criticism, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) implemented two new accounting standards, SFAS 166 and SFAS 167, to improve the financial reporting for securitizations. Bank regulators have stated their belief that SFAS 166/167 will result in a consolidated balance sheet (and risk-based capital ratios based thereupon) that better reflects a bank's exposure to risk related to securitized assets. We document that, by ceding retained power or influence through the servicing/special servicing functions to third parties, SFAS 166/167 resulted in real effects to the extent that banks (particularly those that were weakly capitalized) achieved their accounting objectives in the post-SFAS 166/167 period through legitimate transaction structuring in line with the intent of the new rules. Further, we use capital market participants’ assessments of risk retention by sponsoring banks as a benchmark, and provide evidence consistent with bank regulators’ beliefs. In particular, following SFAS 166/167, equity investors of sponsoring banks do not consider (consider) as risk relevant securitized assets that receive off-balance sheet (on-balance sheet) treatment. Securitized assets that are consolidated under SFAS 166/167 exhibit the same risk relevance as assets that are not securitized, despite contractual provisions that would seem to imply substantial risk transfer.     

Can subordinated debt constrain banks’ risk taking?

This paper presents a model in which requiring banks to issue a proper amount of subordinated debt can constrain their risk taking both before and after debt issuance. The main idea is that the prospect of issuing debt motivates banks to invest in safe assets before debt issuance; holding such assets then constrains their risk taking after debt issuance. The model helps understand the existing empirical findings, and offers a new testable prediction. It also suggests that: (1) regulators should set the amount of subordinated debt within a range; and (2) subordinated debt cannot entirely substitute for equity capital.     

Does Macro‐Prudential Regulation Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment

The regulation of bank capital as a means of smoothing the credit cycle is a central element of forthcoming macro‐prudential regimes internationally. For such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate supply of credit it must be the case that: (i) changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated banks, and (ii) unregulated substitute sources of credit are unable to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks. This paper examines micro evidence—lacking to date—on both questions, using a unique data set. In the UK, regulators have imposed time‐varying, bank‐specific minimum capital requirements since Basel I. It is found that regulated banks (UK‐owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries) reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements. But unregulated banks (resident foreign branches) increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks. This “leakage” is substantial, amounting to about one‐third of the initial impulse from the regulatory change.     

Funding liquidity and bank risk taking

This study examines the relationship between funding liquidity and bank risk taking. Using quarterly data for U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2014, we find evidence that banks having lower funding liquidity risk as proxied by higher deposit ratios, take more risk. A reduction in banks’ funding liquidity risk increases bank risk as evidenced by higher risk-weighted assets, greater liquidity creation and lower Z-scores. However, our results show that bank size and capital buffers usually limit banks from taking more risk when they have lower funding liquidity risk. Moreover, during the Global Financial Crisis banks with lower funding liquidity risk took less risk. The findings of this study have implications for bank regulators advocating greater liquidity and capital requirements for banks under Basel III.     

Subordinated Debt,Market Discipline,and Bank Risk

This paper demonstrates that subordinated debt (subdebt thereafter) regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks. By reducing the chance that managers of distressed banks can take value‐destroying actions to benefit themselves, subdebt regulation may encourage banks to lower asset risk. Moreover, subdebt regulation and bank capital requirements can be complements for alleviating the banks’ moral hazard problems. To make subdebt regulation effective, regulators may need impose ceilings on the interest rates of subdebt, prohibit collusion between banks and subdebt investors, and require subdebt to convert into the issuing bank's equity when the government provides assistance to the bank.     

Capital, Portfolio, and Growth: Bank Behavior Under Risk-Based Capital Guidelines

This paper examines banks' capital, portfolio and growth decisions from 1986 to 1995, when risk-based capital guidelines were proposed and implemented. Overall, we observe complementarity between equity financing and risk. We find no systematic differences in pre- and postregulation behavior consistent with banks reacting to risk-based capital standards implementation. We do find significant differences, however, between low-capital banks and other banks. For example, increases in equity generally do not lead to increases in assets unless the bank has low capital. We also find that the impact of regulatory variables, such as the ratio of equity to total assets or the of ratio risk-weighted assets to total assets, have the predicted, significant effects for low-capital banks but not necessarily for other banks.     

Inefficient liquidity creation

We present a model in which intermediaries create liquidity by issuing safe debt. Two types of intermediaries emerge: Traditional banks that create liquidity by issuing equity and holding assets to maturity, and market-based intermediaries that create liquidity by selling assets in fire sales in downturns. We show that the reliance on market-based intermediation is necessarily too high, but liquidity creation is not. It can also be too low as the endogenous fire-sale risk can push liquidity creation below its optimum. We argue that standard capital or liquidity regulation are ineffective, and optimal macroprudential regulation should instead target market-based intermediation.     

Estimating the potential impact of requiring a stand-alone board-level risk committee

Motivated by the requirement under the Dodd-Frank Act that all large bank holding companies create a stand-alone, board-level risk committee, this paper investigates the association between such a committee and regulatory risk both before and during the financial crisis. I focus the analysis on the set of banks that did not have a risk committee in place prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, as these are the banks that were most affected by the regulation. I find that matched control banks with a risk committee in place had higher capital ratios during the financial crisis, but lower capital ratios during more stable economic conditions relative to the banks without a risk committee. This paper contributes to the literature by narrowly investigating the effects a board-level risk committee, by focusing on a risk measure that is of interest to the regulators who implemented the new regulation, and by documenting that this association changes over time which highlights the importance of estimating the effects of new regulations across different economic conditions.     

Bank Recapitalization,Regulatory Intervention,and Repayment

We use prudential supervisory data for all German banks during 1994–2010 to test if regulatory interventions affect the likelihood that bailed‐out banks repay capital support. Accounting for the selection bias inherent in nonrandom bank bailouts by insurance schemes and the endogenous administration of regulatory interventions, we show that regulators can increase the likelihood of repayment substantially. An increase in intervention frequencies by one standard deviation increases the annual probability of capital support repayment by 7%. Sturdy interventions, like restructuring orders, are effective, whereas weak measures reduce repayment probabilities. Intervention effects last up to 5 years.     

Bank capital regulation as an incentive mechanism: Implications for portfolio choice

This paper contrasts the conventional interpretation of prudential capital regulation as a system of ex ante enforcement (`hard wired') with an alternative interpretation as a system of sanctions for ex post violation (`incentive based'). Under the incentive based interpretation risk-weightings affect portfolio choice only when assets are illiquid. Under both interpretations, the medium term impact on portfolio allocation depends upon the relative costs of debt and equity finance. Viewing enforcement as incentive based suggests there is relatively less need to match risk weightings accurately to portfolio risk.     

Why European Banks Are Undercapitalized and What Should Be Done About It

Major European banks are significantly undercapitalized as compared to large American banks, and, more importantly, as compared to the capital levels they would need to survive another severe financial crisis. Bank capital shortfalls in Italy, Spain, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, in particular, are largely the consequence of European bank regulations that: (1) apply static risk weights to assets like mortgages and sovereign debt; (2) fail to require an overall market‐based capital ratio that is high enough to enable banks to survive a severe financial crisis; (3) fail to get banks to promptly write down their impaired assets to market value; (4) subject banks to weak stress tests that can create a false impression of capital adequacy; and (5) fail to compel banks to retain sufficient earnings and to raise sufficient capital externally to eliminate capital shortfalls promptly, all apparently out of fear that being tougher might cause investors and customers to lose confidence in the banks. This article summarizes important recent independent bank stress testing that has quantified the capital shortfalls in European banks. The recent highly publicized regulatory interventions to resolve failing European banks were inevitable due to these shortfalls. The authors recommend steps European bank regulators should take to address the problem and to eliminate the risk of serious capital shortfalls. In the absence of such steps, bank depositors, customers, and security holders should be prepared to expect further unwelcome surprises as the risks inherent in allowing undercapitalized banks to operate will continue to materialize in more bank failures.     

Capital changes at large affiliated banks

The federal bank regulators imposed numerical capital guidelines in December 1981. If these guidelines are binding, then banking organizations may respond to the costs of regulation in various ways. If the regulations are not binding, then further reliance may be placed on market discipline. This study develops two models of changes in the equity capital to assets ratio of large banks affiliated with bank holding companies—a regulatory model in which capital regulations are a binding influence and a market model in which financial markets influence capital ratios. The two models are examined empirically through a disequilibrium framework and maximum likelihood estimation techniques. The results suggest that most banks are predominantly influenced by regulatory forces. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Florida State University     

Basel II: The Route Ahead or Cul‐de‐Sac?

Despite the best efforts of regulators, banking crises throughout the world have been on the rise and proved costly both in terms of the burden on taxpayers and the effect on output. The revised Basel Accord establishes new procedures for measuring the risk of bank loans and for calculating the capital that needs to be held against these loans. But if these new rules are undoubtedly an improvement on the existing ones, their continued focus on the risk of individual loans suggests that bank regulation is heading down a cul‐de‐sac. Ideally, one would like to be able to view individual loans as parts of portfolios, with better diversified portfolios assigned lower risks and capital requirements. But because of the difficulty of measuring the risk of loan portfolios (which stems from their complicated covariance structure), the author suggests that the regulators and their constituencies would be better served by requiring more realistic valuations of loan portfolios and other bank assets. In this sense, the design of effective capital adequacy rules involves a trade‐off between developing developing more precise measures of risk, on the one hand, and improving the frequency and accuracy of asset valuations, on the other. The author urges bank regulators to focus less on refinements of risk measurement and more on efforts to incorporate fair value accounting.     

Getting the Right Mix of Capital and Cash Requirements in Prudential Bank Regulation*

Cash reserve requirements are useful as a broadly conceived prudential tool, not just as a narrowly focused means of limiting the risks associated with illiquidity. Indeed, illiquidity risk is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for establishing bank liquidity requirements. The primary means of mitigating the systemic costs of bank illiquidity risk is the creation of an effective lender of last resort (LOLR). But instead of focusing narrowly on bank funding risks when designing liquidity requirements, regulators should consider tradeoffs among capital requirements, liquidity requirements, and LOLR policies for achieving the broader prudential goal of limiting bank default risk. When considering the optimal tradeoff between capital ratios and cash ratios as prudential requirements, five “frictions” are identified that favor the use of one or the other: (1) the adverse‐selection costs of raising equity (which favors the use of cash); (2) the opportunity cost of forgone abnormal profits (or “quasi rents”) from lending (which favors the use of capital); (3) the limited verifiability of loan outcomes (which favors the use of cash); (4) the moral hazard that results from costly or postponed loss recognition, given the incentive for risk shifting in bad states (which favors the use of cash); and (5) the prospect of changes in the risk environment (which favors cash since it creates greater option value for maintaining targeted default risk with lower adjustment costs in the face of changing loan risk or illiquidity risk). When viewed from the perspective of achieving the main prudential goal of controlling default risk at a minimum social cost, capital requirements have some limitations that favor liquidity requirements, and vice versa. And thus the optimal regulatory policy will combine liquidity and capital requirements.     

The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System*

In these excerpts from The Squam Lake Report, fifteen distinguished economists analyze where the global financial system failed, and how such failures might be prevented (or at least their damage better contained) in the future. Although there were many contributing factors to the crisis—including “agency” problems throughout the financial system and a bankruptcy code poorly suited for reorganizing financial firms—at the core of the problem is a potential conflict between the risk-taking proclivity of financial institutions and the interests of the economy at large that must be managed at least in part through more effective regulation. The Squam Lake Report provides a nonpartisan plan to transform the regulation of financial markets in ways designed to limit systemic risk while preserving—to the extent possible and prudent—the economies of scale and scope that justify the existence of today's large financial institutions. To reduce the risks that large banks will fail, the authors call for higher capital requirements based on more effective assessments of the risks of bank assets and liabilities, as well as a new systemic regulator that should be part of the central bank. To reduce the costs of failure when it occurs, the authors propose that banks be required to create “living wills” laying out their plan to sell assets or shut down operations in the event of financial trouble. As part of that plan, regulators are urged to “aggressively encourage” banks to issue “contingent” debt capital securities that convert into equity.     

A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO CAPITAL STRUCTURE FOR BANKS

Like U.S. companies in many industries. American's bank's attention to capital structure is reflected in their high level of stock repurchases in recent years. But, if banks are responding to some of the same economic forces that are driving industrial firms to shed excess capital, there are some important differences between banks and industrials that complicate the process of establishing appropriate capital levels for banks. The most important difference comes from regulation. Since the implementation by FDICIA of risk based capital guidelines in the early 1990s, the capital ratios of U.S. banks have increased substantially. In fact, most U.S. banks today carry considerably more capital than is required by the regulators. This tendency to exceed regulatory capital levels is especially pronounced for smaller institutions, which can in turn be explained by the riskier profile of smaller banks: While such banks have the highest proportion of the lowest-risk assets (such as cash, mortgages, and marketable securities), they also have a much greater degree of concentration (and co-variance) among their riskier assets.
This article recommends using a quantitative economic approach (such as a RAROC model) to generate a lower bound on the amount of necessary capital. This estimate can then be translated into a target capital structure by taking account of a variety of practical, qualitative considerations, including banks' preference to maintain capital levels that provide a comfortable margin above bank regulators' "well capitalized" levels. Although such considerations will vary in importance from one bank to another, they will generally include management's risk tolerance, regulatory constraints, market pressures (as reflected in peer group capital levels), the bank's prospects and investment plans, and, for larger banks, rating agency requirements.     

Dynamic Prudential Regulation: Is Prompt Corrective Action Optimal?

The current U.S. bank capital regulation features prompt corrective action, which mandates regulators to intervene in and liquidate banks based on their book‐value capital ratios. To see if prompt corrective action is optimal, I build a dynamic model of repeated interactions between a banker and a regulator. Under hidden choice of risk, private information on returns and limited commitment by the banker, and costly liquidation, I first characterize the optimal incentive‐feasible allocation. I then demonstrate that the optimal allocation is implementable through the combination of a risk‐based deposit insurance premium and a book‐value capital regulation with stochastic liquidation.     

Conflict of Interest in Commercial Bank Equity Underwriting

This paper examines the pricing characteristics of initial public offerings underwritten by commercial banks. Assuming IPO underpricing is directly related to ex ante uncertainty, if the market rationally perceives these commercial banks to have a conflict of interest, these securities should have more underpricing than non-commercial bank underwritten initial public offerings (all else being equal). On the other hand, if the market believes that commercial bank involvement signals firm quality, less underpricing should be observed. This topic has recently gained in importance with the passage of the Financial Services Reform Act in November 1999. We find that the underpricing of commercial bank underwritten initial public offerings in which the firm had a previous banking relationship with the underwriter is significantly less than those underwritten by investment banks.