Investor climate sentiment and financial markets

We propose to measure investor climate sentiment by performing sentiment analysis on StockTwits posts on climate change and global warming. In financial markets, stocks of emission (carbon-intensive) firms underperform clean (low-emission) stocks when investor climate sentiment is more positive. We document investors overreaction to climate change risk and reversal in longer horizons. Salient but uninformative climate change events, such as the release of a report on climate change and abnormal weather events, facilitate the investor learning process and correction of the mispricing.     

The SEC and Improving Sustainability Reporting

In this discussion that took place at the SASB 2016 Symposium, the former Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission explores recent developments in corporate sustainability reporting with three Directors—two past and one current—of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance (or “CorpFin”). The consensus of the panelists was that investors want companies to provide more and better disclosure of their ESG exposures, particularly climate change, and their plans to manage those exposures. According to the current director of CorpFin, the most common demand expressed in the thousands of “comment letters” elicited by the SEC's recent concept release was for more and better sustainability information. And among the many issues cited by investors in those letters, including economic inequality, corruption, indigenous rights, and community relations, the subject of greatest interest by far was climate change. While none of the panelists claimed to see private‐sector demand for SEC action and a new set of mandatory requirements, all seemed to agree that many companies would welcome the establishment of voluntary guidelines and standards for providing ESG information—and that the guidelines recently developed by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board are a promising model. For companies in each of 79 different industries, the SASB has identified a specific set of “material” concerns along with metrics or KPIs that can be used to evaluate corporate performance in responding to those concerns. Perhaps the most important advantage of this approach is that, by limiting such reporting to material exposures (and so adhering to a principle that has long informed SEC requirements), the SASB guidelines should significantly increase the relevance and value to investors—while possibly holding down the costs—of the sustainability reports that large companies in the U.S. and abroad have been producing for decades. But, as the former SEC Chair also notes in closing, the adoption of such guidelines by companies should be viewed as just a first step toward improving disclosure. To help companies develop the most useful and cost‐effective disclosure practices, investors themselves will have to become more active in communicating their own demands and preferences for information.     

An Honorable Harvest: Universal Owners Must Take Responsibility for Their Portfolios

Despite a maturing industry of ESG professionals and coordinated efforts by shareholders calling for more responsible corporate behavior, we continue to see unabated climate and water crises, growing political instability, and continuing abuses of human rights in supply chains. The founder of a movement called The Shareholder Commons argues that to help business to address these systemic challenges, corporate responsibility must move beyond the company‐by‐company decision‐making model. An economy based on market competition cannot rely on individual businesses to adopt basic sustainability rules that take priority over profit. Critical sustainability boundaries must be implemented collectively to be effective. The crux of the problem is that although shareholder returns derive mainly from efficiency and productivity gains, they can also result from careless exploitation of common resources or powerless workers. And the competition for margin and capital makes it difficult for companies to recognize, let alone forgo, profitable exploitation. A sustainable economy demands that we help companies to distinguish between honorable and dishonorable profits, and to find ways to eliminate or offset the latter. The author holds out a model of capitalism that limits the availability of choices that exploit negative externalities and inequality while preserving the principles and practices that create value and a reasonable sharing of gains among all stakeholders. Universal owners—long‐term diversified investors—appear to be in the best position to formulate and enforce such a model, given the current design and practices of our capital markets. Such global investors have the incentive and power to engage in the collective decision‐making necessary for a sustainable economy. The power exerted by institutional investors through their allocation and stewardship of equity capital can be used to insist on more sustainable business practices. Because they are diversified across thousands of companies, universal owners can bypass the competitive bottleneck for margin and capital that holds sustainability back at the company level. These large investors can work together to establish authentic sustainability boundaries for the companies they invest in; and by so doing, they can allow us to leverage all the good work done to date on disclosure and ESG integration, and so realize a world in which companies continue to compete for profits, but also for a truly honorable harvest.     

Do climate risk beliefs shape corporate social responsibility?

Global climate change is one of the most pressing issues of our time, potentially affecting everyone, both individuals and businesses. This paper examines whether differences in beliefs about climate change affect firms' decision-making in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) commitment. Using county-level climate change beliefs data from Yale Climate Opinion Maps, we find that firms' Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) scores are higher if they are located in counties where more people believe in global climate change. We then use natural disasters as exogenous shocks to the beliefs about climate risk and continue to find a positive association between CSR and perceptions of climate risks. Furthermore, we discover a stronger correlation between CSR and climate risk beliefs when firms have more local investors.     

Factors Influencing Corporate Environmental Disclosures

We investigate the effectiveness of the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), a not‐for‐profit organization that facilitates environmental disclosures of firms with institutional investors, thereby serving as a corporate governance mechanism for shareholders to influence the firm's environmental disclosures. We examine firm characteristics associated with firms' decisions to disclose carbon‐related information via the CDP for a sample of 319 Canadian firms over a four‐year period. In particular, we examine how firms' decisions to disclose via CDP are associated with shareholder activism, litigation risk, and the opportunity for low‐cost positive publicity once requested by the firms' “signatory” investors. Our results also show that management's decision to release climate change data is associated with domestic, but not foreign, signatory investors. We also find that disclosing firms tend to be those from lower polluting industries with less exposure to litigation risk. This suggests that this new form of coordinated shareholder activism may not be successful at altering the behavior of firms that are heavier polluters.     

Competitive advantage on a warming planet

Whether you're in a traditional smokestack industry or a "clean" business like investment banking, your company will increasingly feel the effects of climate change. Even people skeptical about global warming's dangers are recognizing that, simply because so many others are concerned, the phenomenon has wide-ranging implications. Investors already are discounting share prices of companies poorly positioned to compete in a warming world. Many businesses face higher raw material and energy costs as more and more governments enact policies placing a cost on emissions. Consumers are taking into account a company's environmental record when making purchasing decisions. There's also a burgeoning market in greenhouse gas emission allowances (the carbon market), with annual trading in these assets valued at tens of billions of dollars. Companies that manage and mitigate their exposure to the risks associated with climate change while seeking new opportunities for profit will generate a competitive advantage over rivals in a carbon-constrained future. This article offers a systematic approach to mapping and responding to climate change risks. According to Jonathan Lash and Fred Wellington of the World Resources Institute, an environmental think tank, the risks can be divided into six categories: regulatory (policies such as new emissions standards), products and technology (the development and marketing of climate-friendly products and services), litigation (lawsuits alleging environmental harm), reputational (how a company's environmental policies affect its brand), supply chain (potentially higher raw material and energy costs), and physical (such as an increase in the incidence of hurricanes). The authors propose a four-step process for responding to climate change risk: Quantify your company's carbon footprint; identify the risks and opportunities you face; adapt your business in response; and do it better than your competitors.     

Do Large Blockholders Reduce Risk?

The conventional assumption in the asset pricing literature is that the identity of a company's owners is largely irrelevant, but studies of companies with “blockholders”—shareholders with large positions in a particular company—provide grounds for questioning this assumption. Unlike the well‐diversified investors of modern portfolio theory, blockholders have strong incentives to monitor corporate performance and, when necessary, to exert control over ineffective managements and boards. The findings of many studies support the idea that blockholders have a positive effect on rates of return. The authors of this article report the findings of their recent investigation of whether blockholders might also have a positive effect on shareholder value by reducing the risk of the companies in which their holdings are concentrated. After distinguishing between companies with individual as opposed to corporate blockholders, and those with one share, one vote as opposed to those with dual‐class shares, the authors find that ownership of large positions by individuals—but not corporations—was associated with lower systematic risk (when using both Fama‐French multiple factor and CAPM models). At the same time, they find that the firm‐specific risk of such companies was higher, but “biased” toward positive outcomes—that is, smaller downsides with larger upsides. What's more, this upward shift in performance and risk‐profile was achieved at least partly through increases in productivity as reflected in higher profit margins, profitability, profit per employee, and operating leverage, and lower costs of goods sold, SGA, and cash holdings. By contrast, in the case of blockholders in companies with dual‐class share structures, all of these positive associations with blockholders were either significantly weaker, or reversed. That is, whereas the presence of individual blockholders appears to increase productivity and value under a one share, one vote governance regime, blockholders in companies with dual‐class structures were associated with higher systematic risk and reduced productivity and value.     

Do low-carbon investments in emerging economies pay off? Evidence from the Brazilian stock market

Climate change has created both challenges and opportunities for investors worldwide. Investing in carbon-efficient assets, for instance, may reduce investors' climate risks while contributing to global efforts for climate change mitigation. Investors need updated and robust information on the financial performance of low-carbon investments, especially in emerging markets, where climate finance initiatives are still scattered. In this work, we provide a first insight into the financial performance of a portfolio of shares from Brazilian carbon-efficient companies. To that end, we use as reference the Carbon Efficient Index (ICO2) and assess its financial performance from 2010 to 2019 through the lens of several classic and modern portfolio metrics. We find that the index outperformed both the Brazilian market benchmark and the country's broad sustainability index, and provided competitive risk-adjusted returns compared with other sectorial indices. The results thus indicate that investing in carbon-efficient companies in Brazil has so far positively contributed to portfolio performance while offering investors an opportunity to reduce climate risk exposure in stock markets.     

Global Public‐Private Investment Partnerships: A Financing Innovation with Positive Social Impact

Global bond markets, along with banks and governments, are the main source of funding for investment in environmentally friendly infrastructure and the transition to clean energy. Although such bonds are a relatively recent innovation, the green bond market has grown rapidly from its start in 2008 to around $800 billion in outstanding issues. The problem, however, is that green bonds, which represent less than 1% of global bond markets, have been issued disproportionately by government‐sponsored entities, corporations, and municipalities in developed markets. In the emerging market countries where the infrastructure investments are most needed, they barely exist. The authors describe a new investment vehicle, called the AP EGO fund, whose mission and MO are to channel the vast global pools of institutional savings that are now invested in low or (even negative) yield fixed‐income assets—as much as $17 trillion in 2019—to higher‐return emerging markets green investments, in particular sustainable infrastructure, by creating a new asset class: emerging‐market green bonds issued by banks. The AP EGO fund is premised on and involves a reworking of the public‐private partnership (PPP) into a form they call the global public‐private investment partnership (or GPPIP). Unlike the PPP, which combines a public agency with a private operator, the GPPIP has four instead of just two partners. In addition to the standard public agency and the private concession operator, there is a development bank—in this case the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which is the financial markets affiliate of the World Bank—and private investors that include emerging‐market banks as well as global institutional investors. Along with the mediating role played by a public agency like the IFC, the AP EGO Fund is fundamentally different from other PPPs in that it takes the form of a special purpose securitization vehicle whose shares are backed by a pool of green bonds issued by emerging market banks in multiple emerging market countries. And besides its application to a new asset class, the fund also breaks new ground by applying a securitization technique with a fund structure designed with an embedded “first‐loss” protection to a global pool of green bonds originated in emerging market economies. By means of this structuring, the green‐bond‐backed fund shares issued by the AP EGO are now providing developed market institutional investors with somewhat higher‐yielding fixed income securities that nevertheless carry an investment‐grade rating.     

DIVERGENT EXPECTATIONS AND THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1997

An important question concerning integration of global financial markets is whether local investors in an equity market react differently from international investors, particularly during periods of financial crisis. Considering local investors are closer to information, they might turn pessimistic before foreign investors before a crisis. We examine whether local investors in each of the six Asian stock markets—Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand—reacted differently from international investors during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Our empirical results indicate that, in general, closed‐end country fund share prices (mainly driven by foreign investors) Granger‐cause the respective net asset values (NAVs, mainly driven by local investors). Moreover, this one‐way Granger‐causality effect from share prices to NAVs becomes much stronger during the crisis period after controlling for U.S. stock returns. Our results suggest international investors turned pessimistic before local investors. JEL classification: G15     

Private Equity 4.0: Using ESG to Create More Value with Less Risk

A growing number of private equity firms have responded to the increased focus on climate change, social issues, and technology disruption by broadening their corporate mission to encompass all important stakeholders, as well as their limited partners. And in the process, the management of ESG risks and pursuit of ESG opportunities have become increasingly fundamental to the staying power and value creation potential of PE firms by reducing the risk of their investments, discovering new sources of growth, and increasing their resilience to changes in the political and regulatory environment. This article tells the story of how the Nordic PE firm, Summa Equity, has turned its ESG approach into a core competence and a source of competitive advantage that has enabled the firm to distinguish itself from its competitors and bring about significant improvements in the financial performance of its portfolio companies while providing benefits for their stakeholders. Using the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals to guide them, the firm invests in companies they perceive to be addressing major environmental or social challenges in an innovative and commercially successful way. This has led to investments in significant growth opportunities in areas such as health care, education, waste management, and acqua‐culture. And the firm's returns to its investors have been high enough—and the perceived social benefits large enough—that the firm recently closed its second fund (which was significantly oversubscribed) for 650 million euros, and received the ESG award at the 2019 Private Equity Awards in London.     

Climate change disclosure and the information environment in the initial public offering market

We investigate whether climate change disclosures in initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses affect the information environment in the IPO market. We find that climate change disclosures are associated with lower IPO underpricing. Further analyses reveal that reputable underwriters and the Securities Exchange Commission's Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change enhance the information role of climate change disclosures in the IPO market. We demonstrate that firms with more extensive climate change disclosures provide stronger hedging benefits against climate change risks in the post-IPO period. Overall, our results support the crucial role of climate change disclosures in improving the information environment of the IPO market.     

Advancing Sustainability Reporting in Canada: 2019 Report on Progress

This study examines the progress Canada's largest companies are making in their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures. Given the introduction of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Standards and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs) as well as the issuance of the Task Force on Climate‐Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) recommendations, our research reflects the uptake of these guidance documents by both mature and new reporters. Our analysis suggests that challenges persist—processes and progress often fail to reach investors as they are “lost in translation” when issued through third‐party ESG information providers, and reporters are also pressured to respond to a myriad of requests for information from rating and reporting agencies. Nevertheless, we note that Canada has new reporting sectors that must mature to survive the scrutiny of the markets and also hope that stock markets will respond to the recent announcement by the 181 CEOs of the U.S. Business Roundtable, who committed to lead their companies for the benefit of all stakeholders—customers, employees, suppliers, communities, and shareholders. Overall, we believe that our research will provide food for thought for companies interested in continuous improvement.     

Is Managerial Myopia a Persistent Governance Problem?

Critics of U.S. corporations have long argued that companies are overly focused on short‐term results and, as a consequence, sacrifice their own long‐run value and competitiveness. These criticisms have expanded in recent years to include those from prominent politicians, investors, consultants, and academics. If such criticisms have merit, they would imply a massive governance failure in which there has been decades of underinvestment with little adjustment on the part of managers, boards, or the market for corporate control. This article evaluates the economic underpinnings of these criticisms and analyzes their implications in the context of empirical evidence produced by several decades of research on corporate investment policies, the outcomes of corporate control events, investor horizons, and the market pricing of companies with little if any earnings. In reviewing the findings of these studies, the author finds little evidence to support the view that U.S. companies sacrifice long‐run value and competitiveness by systematically underinvesting. First, although U.S. companies have indeed cut back on tangible investments such as property, plant, and equipment, these cutbacks have been more than offset by the dramatic growth in investment in intangibles, such as spending on developing knowledge capital, brand‐building, and IT infrastructure. Second, when subjected to events that have the effect of reducing managerial control over investment policies and transferring control to outside investors—such as leveraged buyouts and recapitalizations, forced CEO dismissals, and shareholder activist campaigns—companies tend to reduce, not increase, investment spending. In fact, it is difficult to find any corporate control threats that have had the goal or effect of increasing investment. Third, and at the same time, the rising concentration of large institutional investors, including indexers such as BlackRock and Vanguard, suggests that investors have become, if anything, more long‐term oriented over time. Fourth, there is no evidence that the market shuns companies that have yet to report large (or indeed any) earnings. These findings suggest that curbing overinvestment, and not discouraging myopia and underinvestment, may well still be the larger corporate governance challenge facing investors when monitoring and attempting to influence the performance of U.S. companies.     

An Analysis of Submissions on Proposed Regulations for Audit and Assurance in New Zealand

After numerous collapses of finance companies in New Zealand, and widespread losses by investors, self‐regulation of the auditing profession was no longer considered adequate or acceptable internationally. The New Zealand Government sought to restore public perceptions of audit quality and investor confidence in the financial markets with proposals to change existing accounting standards and audit and assurance requirements. The proposals included a review engagement for some entities, and imposing the force of law on auditing standards. We analyse the public submissions on the auditing and assurance aspects of these proposals. Many respondents object to the proposal, requiring small public sector and not‐for‐profit entities to obtain review engagements, and to give auditing standards the force of law.     

Climate Change Scenario Analysis for Public Market Investors

Academic studies suggest that market participants are demanding higher risk premiums for carbon‐intensive assets, but that natural disasters have yet to be efficiently priced into the market. And as a consequence, asset owners and investors are less than fully informed about the evidence of climate change uncovered by the scientific community. The author assesses the exposure to climate risk of Rockefeller Capital's ‘Ocean Strategy,” an actively managed global equity portfolio, by using three publicaly available climate change scenario analysis tools: (1) Paris Agreement Capital Transition Assessment (PACTA); The Transition Pathway Initiative (TPI), and (3) Carbon Tracker's 2 Degrees of Separation.     

Expected Mispricing: The Joint Influence of Accounting Transparency and Investor Base

We examine how accounting transparency and investor base jointly affect financial analysts' expectations of mispricing (i.e., expectations of stock price deviations from fundamental value). Within a range of transparency, these two factors interactively amplify analysts' expectations of mispricing—analysts expect a larger positive deviation when a firm's disclosures more transparently reveal income‐increasing earnings management and the firm's most important investors are described as transient institutional investors with a shorter‐term horizon (low concentration in holdings, high portfolio turnover, and frequent momentum trading) rather than dedicated institutional investors with a longer‐term horizon (high concentration in holdings, low portfolio turnover, and little momentum trading). Results are consistent with analysts anticipating that transient institutional investors are more likely than dedicated institutional investors to adjust their trading strategies for near‐term factors affecting stock mispricings. Our theory and findings extend the accounting disclosure literature by identifying a boundary condition to the common supposition that disclosure transparency necessarily mitigates expected mispricing, and by providing evidence that analysts' pricing judgments are influenced by their anticipation of different investors' reactions to firm disclosures.     

Finding diamonds in the rough: Analysts’ selective following of loss‐reporting firms

Investors face greater difficulty valuing loss‐reporting than profit‐reporting firms: losses may be due to very different reasons (e.g., poor operating performance or investments in intangibles, and financial accounting information is of more limited use for valuing loss‐making firms than profit‐making firms. Because of increased uncertainty about loss firms’ future financial and business viability, we hypothesize that financial analysts will be more selective when choosing to follow loss firms than profit firms, with the result that “abnormal” analyst following will be more informative to investors regarding the future performance of loss firms than profit firms. Consistent with this prediction, we find that abnormal analyst coverage is useful for predicting firms’ future prospects, and is more strongly associated with future performance (stock returns and ROA) for loss firms than for profit firms. The market, however, does not seem to use this useful information when pricing loss firms: for loss firms a portfolio investment strategy based upon abnormal analyst following can generate positive excess returns over 1‐ to 3‐year holding periods. These results are stronger for persistent‐loss firms than for occasional‐loss firms. We conclude that abnormal analyst following contains useful information about firms’ future prospects, and even more so for loss firms than for profit firms.     

Loyalty‐Shares: Rewarding Long‐term Investors

In the face of growing concern about investors' excessive focus on quarterly earnings, recent research has found new evidence of the benefits of a committed long‐term shareholder base, whether in terms of higher profitability, R&D investment, greater integration of ESG factors, or a reduced cost of capital. In light of this evidence, this article takes up the challenge of proposing a market solution to this problem. Although much has already been done in the financial industry to lengthen the outlook of executives by imposing longer vesting periods for stock options, a significant fraction of institutional shareholders continues to have a short‐term orientation. The authors propose that companies try to attract a more long‐term‐oriented shareholder base by modifying the form of the common share contract to include a special reward for buy‐and‐hold investors. The type of contract proposed—called a “loyalty share”—is a call‐warrant attached to each share that is exercisable at a specified time‐horizon—say, three years—and exercise price, but is nontransferable and hence has value only if the share is held for the entire length of the specified “loyalty period.” Such a reward is expected to encourage a longer‐term valuation outlook, since those shareholders seeking the loyalty reward are likely to be those who are most confident about the company's ability to increase its value through the expiration of the loyalty period.