Corporate Diversification and the Cost of Capital

We examine whether organizational form matters for a firm's cost of capital. Contrary to the conventional view, we argue that coinsurance among a firm's business units can reduce systematic risk through the avoidance of countercyclical deadweight costs. We find that diversified firms have, on average, a lower cost of capital than comparable portfolios of stand‐alone firms. In addition, diversified firms with less correlated segment cash flows have a lower cost of capital, consistent with a coinsurance effect. Holding cash flows constant, our estimates imply an average value gain of approximately 5% when moving from the highest to the lowest cash flow correlation quintile.     

The Corporate Cost of Capital and the Return on Corporate Investment

We estimate the internal rates of return earned by nonfinancial firms on (i) the initial market values of their securities and (ii) the cost of their investments. The return on value is an estimate of the overall corporate cost of capital. The estimate of the real cost of capital for 1950–96 is 5.95 percent. The real return on cost is larger, 7.38 percent, so on average corporate investment seems to be profitable. A by-product of calculating these returns is information about the history of corporate earnings, investment, and financing decisions that is perhaps more interesting than the returns.     

Cash Flow Estimation and Cost of Capital for Overseas Projects

Several issues concerning foreign project evaluation are critically examined. The paper suggests that the point of view for analysis, cost of capital and cash flow estimation be internally consistent. Three points of views of analysis, local, global, and parent specific, are identified and various inconsistencies in the estimation of the initial outlay and project cash flows are identified. The elimination of the inconsistencies is discussed. It is argued that the treatment of blocked funds is relevant only from the parent specific point of view. A number of alternatives for the estimate of the terminal value is also suggested. The differences between the parent specific point of view and the global and local views are sharply drawn. An integrated scheme is also presented to underscore the need for consistency in evaluating foreign investments.     

企业社会责任信息披露与权益资本成本

运用理论分析和实证检验的方法从权益资本成本的角度研究我国上市公司企业社会责任信息披露的经济动机.研究发现:上市公司上期权益资本成本越高,本期披露社会责任报告的可能性越大,说明降低权益资本成本是上市公司决定是否披露社会责任报告的重要经济动机;对于首次披露企业社会责任报告的公司,上期权益资本成本越高,本期社会责任信息披露质量越高;但对非首次披露企业社会责任报告的公司来说,披露企业社会责任报告的资本成本动机不显著.     

控股股东资本运营代理问题研究——基于控制权与现金流量权分离前提下的思考

在终极控股股东现金流量权和控制权分离的情况下，通过对控股股东在资本运营过程中存在的代理问题理论研究及其在东亚地区、西欧和中国的实现方式的描述，得出在我国研究控股股东和小股东之间代理问题的重要性。     

Corporate Governance and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from Australian Companies

The authors examine a sample of large Australian companies over a 10‐year period with the aim of analyzing the role that firm‐level corporate governance mechanisms such as insider ownership and independent boards play in explaining a company's cost of capital. The Australian corporate system offers a unique environment for assessing the impact of corporate governance mechanisms. Australian companies have board structures and mechanisms that are similar in design to Anglo‐Saxon boards while offering a striking contrast to those of German and Japanese boards. At the same time, however, the Australian market for corporate control is much less active as a corrective mechanism against management entrenchment than its U.S. and U.K. counterparts, making the role of internal governance mechanisms potentially more important in Australia than elsewhere. The authors report that greater insider ownership, the presence of institutional blockholders, and independent boards are all associated with reductions in the perceived risk of a firm, thereby leading investors to demand lower rates of return on capital. In so doing, the study provides evidence of the important role of corporate governance in increasing corporate values.     

Corporate Financial Policy and the Value of Cash

We examine the cross‐sectional variation in the marginal value of corporate cash holdings that arises from differences in corporate financial policy. We begin by providing semi‐quantitative predictions for the value of an extra dollar of cash depending upon the likely use of that dollar, and derive a set of intuitive hypotheses to test empirically. By examining the variation in excess stock returns over the fiscal year, we find that the marginal value of cash declines with larger cash holdings, higher leverage, better access to capital markets, and as firms choose greater cash distribution via dividends rather than repurchases.     

The Empirical Average Cost of Capital: A New Approach to Estimating the Cost of Corporate Funds

The authors develop a new way to measure the cost of capital, called the empirical average cost of capital (or “EACC”), which is consistent with existing methods of calculating the weighted average cost of capital, but uses information from the firm's financial statements and requires fewer and less subjective inputs. The authors’ model relies on the concept of economic profit while using data from the period 1990‐2012 on net operating profits and total capital to estimate the EACC at both the individual company and industry‐wide levels. Estimates of the EACC and rolling quarterly forecasts of future net operating profits for a single company, McDonald's, for its related industry, and for 57 other U.S. industries are compared to five conventional “textbook” estimates of the weighted average cost of capital published by Ibbotson Associates. The authors find that the EACC yields forecasts of future net operating profit after taxes that compare favorably to those of the five published measures of the weighted average cost of capital, as well as the average and median of these measures.     

Corporate Payout Policy,Cash Savings,and the Cost of Consistency: Evidence from a Structural Estimation

We develop a dynamic structural model to better understand how corporate payout policy is determined in conjunction with other corporate decisions. In a first‐best model, a manager maximizes equity value by choosing the firm's optimal financing, investment, dividends, and cash holdings. By using simulated method of moments, we show that, on average, firms excessively smooth their payout while making corporate savings overly volatile and retaining excess cash. We then extend the model to capture the effect of a manager, who perceives a cost to cutting payouts. Estimating the model, we infer the magnitude of this cost. We find that a managerial preference for consistent payout explains the smooth payout and high volatility of cash holdings.     

The Global CAPM and a Firm's Cost of Capital in Different Currencies

In an integrated global market, a firm's cost of capital expressed in one currency should be consistent with its cost of capital expressed in another currency. This article presents and illustrates a process for estimating consistent costs of capital in different currencies for a U.K. based multinational. In so doing, it uses a simple, easy-to-use version of the global CAPM that attempts to incorporate the effect of uncertain exchange rates by calculating exchange rate betas. As argued in the previous article, at least part of a company's currency exposure is systematically related to the global market and thus should be treated as a component of the firm's systematic equity risk.
For example, the U.K. firm featured in this article is shown to have an exchange rate beta of 0.20 from the perspective of a U.S. investor. This implies that a 10% return on the global market in U.S. dollars tends to be associated with a 2% change in the U.S. dollar value of the British pound. One interesting consequence of incorporating exchange risk in this fashion is that two firms with identical U.S. global betas and costs of equity will have different expected returns expressed in another currency if they have different exposures to that currency.     

Product Market Threats and the Value of Corporate Cash Holdings

We construct a model to show that predatory strategies by a financially strong rival can cause a financially weak firm to underinvest. This threat intensifies when the two firms produce similar products and share similar future investment opportunities. We show that cash holdings become more valuable by providing liquidity to fund investment opportunities as they emerge, thereby mitigating the underinvestment problem. Empirical evidence supports these model predictions. The value of cash is significantly higher for firms facing higher predatory threats. The results are robust to various controls for financial constraints, corporate governance, risk factors, and industry‐level measures of product market competition. An identification strategy that exploits exogenous variation in financial constraints further corroborates the causal effect of predatory threats on the value of cash.     

Quality of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure and Cost of Equity Capital: Lessons from China

This article explores the relationship between the quality of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure and the cost of equity capital by analyzing the financial data and CSR reports of A-share listed firms in China from 2008 to 2014. The quality of the CSR disclosure is shown to be negatively related to the cost of equity capital of the listed firms. This negative correlation proves to be more prominent among firms of environmentally sensitive industries. Taking the ownership of the listed firms into consideration, it is further confirmed that the negative relationship between the CSR disclosure and the cost of equity capital is of higher significance for state-owned enterprises. Our findings also empirically demonstrate that the quality of CSR disclosure is more negatively related to the cost of equity capital among the large listed firms than the smaller ones.     

Disagreement and the Cost of Capital

We assess how forms of disagreement among investors affect a firm's cost of capital. Firms experience a lower cost of capital if investors perceive that other investors are ignoring relevant disclosures (perceived errors of omission), but a higher cost of capital if investors perceive that others are responding to irrelevant disclosures (perceived errors of commission). The impact of these two sources of disagreement on the cost of capital is determined by the distribution of opinion and the nature of disclosure. For example, even though aggregated disclosures reveal less to investors, aggregated disclosures may decrease the cost of capital by eliminating disagreement associated with perceived errors of commission. These and additional results arise because the cost of capital is driven not only by investors’ uncertainty about the firm's future earnings performance, but also by investors’ uncertainty about the evolution of beliefs, which partly determines the path of prices.     

Information and the Cost of Capital

We investigate the role of information in affecting a firm's cost of capital. We show that differences in the composition of information between public and private information affect the cost of capital, with investors demanding a higher return to hold stocks with greater private information. This higher return arises because informed investors are better able to shift their portfolio to incorporate new information, and uninformed investors are thus disadvantaged. In equilibrium, the quantity and quality of information affect asset prices. We show firms can influence their cost of capital by choosing features like accounting treatments, analyst coverage, and market microstructure.     

Corporate Diversification and the Cost of Debt

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - This paper investigates whether corporate diversification by property type and by geography reduces the costs of debt capital. It employs...     

Commentary: Performance Audit of PPPs – Getting the Basics Right

Performance auditing (PA) is an important vehicle for assessing Value for Money (VFM) of Public‐Private Partnerships (PPPs), as well as providing assurance to the Parliament and to the public about the accountability for the supporting strategic and operational frameworks. Experience to date with PPPs in Australia has been limited and mixed in terms of results. Few projects have reached the mature stage, let alone been completed. It has been suggested that we can learn from the audit approaches and systems developed by the National Audit Office in the UK. Australian Audit Offices need to ensure that they have robust PA/VFM auditing systems, analytical methodologies and tools in place to undertake quality evaluations at various stages of a PPP, but experience to date at federal and state levels also indicates that there is still a lot to do to get the basis elements of PPPs “right”.     

Tax‐Aided Financial Services Companies and the Cost of Capital

Over the past two decades, the governments of several European countries have implemented special tax devices to attract the finance centres of multinational companies. This paper determines how the cost of capital for investments made by multinationals is affected by the tax regimes, bringing into play the Irish financial services company, the Belgian co‐ordination centre, the Dutch finance company and the Luxemburg company coupled with a Swiss finance branch. It gives evidence that intermediation of a tax‐aided services company in the financing scheme of a foreign subsidiary provides an important tax saving. However, the home and source countries' tax regimes influence the hierarchy of the less heavily taxed treasury and finance centres. The methodology relies on the marginal effective tax rates theory and consists of an extension of Alworth's (1988) model to include treasury centres.     

Information and the Cost of Capital in a Mean‐Variance Efficient Market

Before information ? arrives, market observers must be uncertain whether the stock price conditioned on ? will be higher or lower than the current price. Otherwise there is an obvious arbitrage opportunity. By assuming this minimal condition of efficient markets, it is shown under the mean‐variance CAPM that information that leaves the future value of a firm more certain, in the sense that its perceived covariance with the market is reduced towards zero, can lead to a higher expected return on that asset. A further result is that it is theoretically possible that the required return on the stock will necessarily fall after observing signal ?, or (in other circumstances) that it will necessarily rise. In general, information that allows better discrimination between firms leads some firms to have higher costs of capital and other firms to have lower costs of capital. Less obviously, better discrimination between firms can induce a higher average cost of capital across the market.