Corporate Real Estate and Stock Market Performance

An interesting question in corporate real estate literature is whether real estate can improve the stock market performance of property-intensive non-real estate firms. Using a data set comprising 75 non-real estate corporations that own at least 20 percent properties, this paper empirically assesses and compares the pair-wise return, total risk, systematic risk and Jensen abnormal return performance of composite (with real estate) and hypothetical business (without real estate) firms. We employed Morgan Stanley Capital International world equity index instead of a local market index to provide some insights into the performance of the local market relative to the global market during the 1997–2001 volatile periods experienced by many Asian countries. Our results suggest the inclusion of real estate in a corporate portfolio appears to be associated with lower return, higher total risk, higher systematic risk and poorer abnormal return performance. It is therefore likely that non-real estate firms own properties for other reasons in addition to seeking improvement in their stock market performance. Further research is needed to explore the main factors contributing to corporate real estate ownership by non-real estate firms.     

The impact of settlement period on sales price

This study is an empirical investigation of the impact of settlement period on sales price while controlling for marketing period and standard explanatory variables. The hypothesized positive relationship between settlement period and sales price is confirmed by the results of this study. The estimated coefficient on settlement period is 0.0008 meaning that our market, on average, exacts a premium of 0.08 percent per day of settlement period beyond a norm of 60 days. The estimated coefficient on marketing period (a control variable) is –0.0003 meaning that our market, on average, requires a discount of 0.03 percent per day of marketing period. Our findings show the relative importance of settlement period in making real estate pricing decisions.     

Heterogeneity in Financial Market Participation: Appraising its Implications for the C-CAPM

This paper presents empirical evidence that accounting for heterogeneity in financial market participation is important for evaluating the empirical performance of the Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (C-CAPM). Using the US Consumer Expenditure Survey as a common testing ground, I re-assess three well-known characterizations of the equity premium puzzle (i) the inconsistency of the representative agent's IMRS with Hansen and Jagannathan bounds; (ii) Mehra and Prescott's calibration of a large representative agent's risk aversion; (iii) Hansen and the Singleton's large structural estimates of the preference parameters based on aggregate data. In all three cases, the estimates of risk aversion conditional upon financial market participation are not as far from reasonable values as the corresponding unconditional ones. The differences suggest that part of the equity premium puzzle can be accounted for by the use of a representative agent assumption rather than a more appropriate "representative stockholding agent assumption.     

Comparing Alternative Hedge Accounting Standards: Shareholders' Perspective

We study the economic consequences of alternative hedge accounting rules in terms of managerial hedging decisions and wealth effects for shareholders. The rules we consider include the fair-value and cash-flow hedge accounting methods prescribed by the recent SFAS No. 133. We illustrate that the accounting method used influences the manager's hedge decision. We show that under no-hedge accounting, the hedge choice is different from the optimal economic hedge the firm would make under symmetric and public information. However, under a certain definition of fair-value hedge accounting, the hedging decision preserves the optimal economic hedge. We then demonstrate that long-term and future shareholders prefer a certain definition of fair-value hedge accounting to no-hedge accounting, while short-term shareholders prefer either approach depending on risk preferences and the level of uncertainty. We speculate about circumstances in which a manager would choose not to adopt fair-value hedge accounting when he has the option not to do so.     

Pension Plan Investment Management Mandates: An Empirical Analysis of Manager Selection

We examine the impact of several factors on the selection of portfolio managers for Australian pension plan mandates. Performance measures do not affect the probability of a mandate allocation. Pension sponsors tend to choose managers with top-quartile five-year performance who have recently beaten a market benchmark. Management expenses have a negative impact on a managers chances. A surprising result is sponsors tolerance for high portfolio trading costs. Mandates are spread across manager investment styles. The style and institutional attributes of preferred managers suggest trustees reputation and prudential concerns matter, particularly for the aggregate annual mandate allocations.     

“Investor sentiment” and the closed-end fund puzzle: A 7 percent solution

Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) argue that the irrational noise trader model of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) ... is consistent with the published evidence on closed-end fund prices. ... However, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler provide no indication of how much of the variability of a closed-end fund's discounts and premiums is due to such investor sentiment. Using the signal extraction technique of French and Roll (1986) to measure noise, this article estimates that on average only 7 percent of the variance of a standardized measure of weekly changes in discounts and premiums can be attributed to noise-trading activity. Investor sentiment, therefore, seems to account for very little of a closed-end fund's discount and premium variability over time.     

Loan Portfolio Swaps and Optimal Lending

Theories on loan portfolio swap hedging are based on a portfolio-choice approach. This paper presents an alternative: a firm-theoretic model for bank behavior with loan portfolio swaps. Our paper derives the optimal loan rate and rate-taking loan amount of the banks portfolio, and relates them to the market loan rate, counterparty loan rate, swap default risk, capital-to-deposits ratio, and deposit insurance. We find that in the bilateral default risk approach, the comparative static results are generated by four factors: the banks risk magnitude about the equity market value, loan composition in the swap contract, the substitution effect in the loan portfolio, and the income effect from the swap transaction. The results imply that changes in the payoff asymmetry in the event of swap default and the banks regulatory parameters have a direct effect on the banks loan portfolio for lending and swap transactions.We would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments and advice.     

Conduit Entities: Implications of Indirect Tax-Efficient Financing Structures for Real Investment

As well known, companies shift income from high to low tax jurisdictions. Typically, profit shifting is achieved by direct financing structures whereby companies use debt finance in the high tax entity and equity finance in the low tax entity. However, certain tax policies can lead to indirect financing structures whereby a conduit entity provides an opportunity to achieve at least two deductions for interest expenses for an investment made in the host country. The effect of direct and indirect financing structures on real investment is compared.     

Commercial Mortgage Default: A Comparison of Logit with Radial Basis Function Networks

This article explores the use of artificial neural networks in the modeling of foreclosure of commercial mortgages. The study employs a large set of individual loan histories previously used in the literature of proportional hazard models on loan default. Radial basis function networks are trained (estimated) using the same input variables as those used in the logistic. The objective is to demonstrate the use of networks in forecasting mortgage default and to compare their performance with that of the logistic benchmark in terms of prediction accuracy. Neural networks are shown to be superior to the logistic in terms of discriminating between good and bad loans. The study performs sensitivity analysis on the average loan and offers suggestions on further improving prediction of defaulting loans.     

The effect of early resolution of uncertainty on the valuation of assets: A dichotomy into market and non-market information

We reconsider how the temporal resolution of uncertainty about the future payoffs from capital assets affects the initial valuation of these assets. Our results regarding valuation indicate that, in an intertemporal CAPM framework, the early resolution of market uncertainty leads to an increase in the value of the market portfolio. The values of individual assets change in direct proportion to their betas. We reconcile the differing conclusions of Ross (1989) and Epstein and Turnbull (1980) regarding the early resolution of what they term idiosyncratic and asset specific information respectively.     

What is the Truth About the Scale of Japanese Banks' Bad Debts? Is the Situation Manageable?

In January 1998, the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF, 1998) released figures which suggested that the Japanese banking industry';s bad debts might be as high as ¥77 trillion (since revised upward to ¥87.5 trillion, if cooperative-type institutions are included; Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA), 1998). This compared with the previous official estimate of ¥28 trillion. The revelation was designed to do three things: (1) to convince investors, at home and abroad, who had long suspected that the true level of bad debts was much higher than the authorities (and the banks) were willing to admit to, that the authorities were sincere in their quest to enhance disclosure by local financial intermediaries; (2) to stifle opposition to the government's plans to use up to ¥30 trillion (since increased to ¥60 trillion) of public funds to stabilize the financial system¹ by underlining the gravity of the situation facing the Japanese economy; and (3) to pave the way for the introduction of more transparent reporting by the banks in April 1998 when a regime of prompt corrective action (PCA)² was scheduled to commence. This article explains the evolution of bad debt disclosure by the Japanese banking industry and assesses the significance of the latest figures. In particular, it highlights the extent to which accounting forbearance has been, and continues to be, used to mask the true level of the banks' bad debts and refutes the claim that the industry's bad debt burden peaked in 1995. The banking industry's ability to handle the continuing bad debt problem, in the face of a significant impairment of economic capital and the market's relentless drive for full disclosure and transparency, also is assessed.     

On Transitory Earnings

The paper develops a concept of transitory earnings and contrasts this source of earnings to core (or recurring) earnings. It is shown that any two of the following three attributes of transitory earnings imply the third: (i) forecasting irrelevance with respect to next-period aggregate earnings, (ii) value irrelevance, and (iii) unpredictability. The paper makes the case that the current dirty surplus items make sense, especially if one expands the valuation perspective to also allow for agency considerations.     

The “Rent-To-Own” mortgage and prepayment risk

The most important risk factor in the mortgage and mortgage-backed security market has been prepayment risk. Various innovations have arisen to deal with it but none hedge it fully. The Rent-To-Own (RTO) mortgage discussed here is a mortgage instrument that reduces or even reverses prepayment risk. It does so by creating an incentive structure within the framework of the mortgage contract that penalizes prepayment when interest rates are low and rewards it when interest rates are high. This is the opposite of standard mortgages. The RTO incentive structure is based on a unique buyout feature. Borrowers who want to buy out the financial interest of the lender may do so whenever they want, but the buyout price is a negative function of the market interest rates prevailing currently, that is, at the time of the buyout. Hence the lower these rates, the higher the buyout price. Other advantages of the RTO mortgage are also described.     

Modernizing Financial Regulation: The Relation Between Interbank Transactions and Supervisory Reform

Modernized financial firms are larger than traditional institutions, and they provide a broader range of services. Although the individual regulatory issues raised by modernization are not new, the pace and scope of these market changes may imply a qualitative change in the ability of governments to guarantee financial system stability. Private market discipline is more flexible, and the value of flexibility seems to have risen. In order to elicit private monitoring, however, governments must credibly eschew too-big-to-fail policies. Toward this end, national regulators should encourage ongoing efforts to implement secure interbank settlement systems.     

Company Tax Structure and Company Tax Incidence

This paper reviews conflicting theories of company tax incidence impliedby the alternative new and traditional views of dividends andexamines their contrasting policy implications. Whereas, under thetraditional view, closer integration of the corporate and personalincome tax systems is suggested, an alternative policy orientationemphasizing the non-distorting features of the classical system is impliedby the new view. Even if the traditional view is accepted, theimplications for design and reform of the company tax vary widely underalternative specifications of domestic and international tax policy objectives. Schedular alternatives to global income taxation are alsoconsidered.     

Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises

In a world of high capital mobility, the threat of speculative attack becomes a central issue of macroeconomicpolicy. While first-generation and second-generation models of speculative attacks both have considerablerelevance to particular financial crises of the 1990s, a third-generation model is needed to make sense of thenumber and nature of the emerging market crises of 1997-98. Most of the recent attempts to produce such amodel have argued that the core of the problem lies in the banking system. This paper sketches another candidatefor third-generation crisis modeling—one that emphasizes two facts that have been omitted from formal modelsto date: the role of companies' balance sheets in determining their ability to invest, and that of capital flows inaffecting the real exchange rate.     

A note on January returns in the U.S. government bond market: The term effect

This study documents a previously unobserved January effect in the market for riskless debt. Long-term government bonds have significantly lower returns in January than in the rest of the year. This January effect is opposite in sign to the January effects that have been previously documented in the markets for equity and the markets for risky debt. Tax-loss selling in the equity markets in conjunction with parking the proceeds may provide a possible explanation for the negative January effect in the market for government bonds.     

Do Market Makers Suffer from Splitting Headaches?

Studies of transactions surrounding stock split ex-dates often conclude that splitting firms either experience a decline or an improvement in their stock's liquidity, based on independent measures of trading costs and trading activity. In contrast, our evidence suggests that splits from outside into what often is deemed to be the optimal stock price range of $10.00 to $39.99 are nonevents for market makers: The spread-setting behavior of the market does not change after a split. Our analysis accounts for the interdependencies between bid-ask spreads and market microstructure effects and distinguishes between optimal and all other splitting firms.     

A survey of exchange-traded basket instruments

This survey discusses basket financial instruments generically known as Index Participation shares (IPs). An IP is a hybrid instrument that has characteristics similar to those of existing index-futures contracts, options contracts, and stock-index mutual funds. An IP is a contract and does not represent direct ownership over any individual security. Similar to other derivatives, an IP has a clearing house guaranteeing its performance and a zero net supply. The equilibrium market price of an IP will differ from its underlying index's cash price by an amount defined as the IP basis. The IP basis will be determined by the dividend stream of the underlying index and expected short-term interest rates. IP contracts opened trading on the AMEX and PHILX exchanges on May 12, 1989, after the SEC lifted a temporary stay of trading.     

Interest-only and principal-only mortgage strips as interest-rate contingent claims

Interest-only (IO) and principal-only (PO) mortgage strips are valued in a stochastic interest-rate environment. The prepayment rate of the underlying mortgages is affected by two considerations not present in the pure financially rational model: (1) The property owner's holding period is assumed to follow a Gamma distribution, resulting in the possibility of prepayment due to the sale of the property (i.e., prepayment that is too early based on market interest rates); and (2) borrowers are assumed to face heterogeneous transaction costs related to refinancing the existing mortgage, and delay refinancing when market conditions make it optimal to do so (refinancing too late). Properties of IO/PO strips are identified by the finite difference method.