Job mobility and the gender wage gap in Italy

This paper investigates the contribution of gender differences in job mobility to the emergence of a gender wage gap in the Italian labour market. We show that over the first 10 years of labour market experience job mobility accounts for up to 30% of total log wage growth for men and only 8.3% for women, and that this difference is mainly due to differences in returns to mobility. The gender mobility gap is robust to the inclusion of individual, job and firm characteristics, to different ways of accounting for individual unobserved heterogeneity, and is mainly found for voluntary job moves. Looking at the characteristics of the jobs and the firms' workers move to, we find that moves to larger firms represent by far the main source of gender differences in returns to mobility. We offer two possible explanations for this finding; one which involves differences in bargaining behaviour and one which relates to the theory of compensating differentials.     

The role of job assignment and human capital endowments in explaining gender differences in job performance and promotion

We test a job ladders theory of career progression within internal labor markets as developed by Lazear and Rosen (1990). The theory argues that gender promotion gaps are due to sorting of men and women into career tracks with different promotion opportunities based on ex ante quit probabilities. Analyzing US federal government employees using a dynamic unobserved panel data model, we find that job assignment is one of the strongest predictors of gender differences in promotion. We also find that women have to jump higher performance hurdles to promote across grades, but, within grades, their promotion probabilities are comparable to those of men. In this organization, women can be found in both fast- and slow-track jobs, based on their promotion history, suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity is revealed to the firm over the worker's career.     

Unemployment insurance and subsequent job duration: job matching versus unobserved heterogeneity

The relationship between Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit duration, unemployment duration and subsequent job duration is investigated using a multi‐state duration model with state specific unobserved heterogeneity. I examine two potential explanations for the negative correlation between unemployment and job spell durations; UI benefits increase job matching quality (the ‘Matching’ effect) versus unobserved heterogeneity (‘Adverse Selection’). The Matching effect is found to be weak. Although new jobs accepted within 5 weeks of benefit termination seem to have a higher dissolution rate, the negative correlation between unemployment and job duration is mostly explained by unobserved heterogeneity. Various simulations indicate that increasing the maximum benefit duration by one week will raise expected unemployment duration by 1.0 to 1.5 days but will raise expected job duration by 0.5 to 0.8 day only. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A journey home: What drives how long people are homeless?

This paper uses survival analysis to model exits from two alternative forms of homelessness: sleeping on the streets (‘literal homelessness’) and not having a home of one's own (‘housing insecurity’). We are unique in being able to account for time-invariant, unobserved heterogeneity. Like previous researchers, we find results consistent with negative duration dependence in models which ignore unobserved heterogeneity. However, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, we find that duration dependence has an inverted U-shape with exit rates initially increasing (indicating positive duration dependence) and then falling. Exit rates out of both literal homelessness and housing insecurity fall with age. Women are more likely than men to exit housing insecurity for a home of their own, but are less likely to exit literal homelessness. Persons with dependent children have higher exit rates. Finally, education seems to protect people from longer periods of housing insecurity.     

Whose wages do unions raise? A dynamic model of unionism and wage rate determination for young men

We estimate the union premium for young men over a period of declining unionization (1980–87) through a procedure which identifies the alternative sources of the endogeneity of union status. While we estimate the average increase in wages resulting from union employment to be in excess of 20% we find that the return to unobserved heterogeneity operating through union status is substantial and that the union premium is highly variable. We also find that the premium is sensitive to the form of sorting allowed in estimation. Moreover, the data are consistent with comparative advantage sorting. Our results suggest that the unobserved heterogeneity which positively contributes to the likelihood of union membership is associated with higher wages. We are unable, however, to determine whether this is due to the ability of these workers to extract monopoly rents or whether it reflects the more demanding hiring standards of employers faced by union wages. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Wage differentials in the presence of unobserved worker,firm, and match heterogeneity

We consider the problem of estimating and decomposing wage differentials in the presence of unobserved worker, firm, and match heterogeneity. Controlling for these unobservables corrects omitted variable bias in previous studies. It also allows us to measure the contribution of unmeasured characteristics of workers, firms, and worker-firm matches to observed wage differentials. An application to linked employer-employee data shows that decompositions of inter-industry earnings differentials and the male-female differential are misleading when unobserved heterogeneity is ignored.     

Job separation in a non‐stationary search model: a structural estimation to evaluate alternative unemployment insurance systems

This paper considers a job search model in which the environment is not constant throughout the unemployment spell and where jobs do not last for ever. In this situation, reservation wages can be lower than they would be in a model without consideration of such separations, but they can initially be higher precisely because of the non‐constant environment. The model is estimated structurally by using Spanish data for the period 1985–1996. The main finding is that, after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the unemployment hazard rate is almost flat during the first six months. However, after this duration, the highly decreasing job offer arrival rate comes to be the only significant factor, given that acceptance probabilities become equal to one. The estimated parameters are used to evaluate different unemployment insurance designs. We conclude that a non‐monotonic pattern in unemployment benefits, joint with a tax paid by workers and based on unemployment duration, makes this duration 13.2% lower than it currently is in Spain. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The pervasive absence of compensating differentials

We study the relation between individual preferences for job amenities (e.g., type of work, job security) and compensating wage differentials in cross‐section. To this end, we estimate a partial equilibrium job search model on panel data from eight European countries. There are five non‐wage job characteristics and two sources of job‐to‐job mobility: on‐the‐job search and reallocation shocks. We also allow for two types of unobserved heterogeneity. We find strong preferences for amenities, especially job security, yet, these preferences do not translate into significant wage differentials in cross‐section. Counterfactual experiments show that one would need extremely low levels of search frictions for compensating differentials to arise. Lastly, a similar exercise on the distribution of job change outcomes reveals the role of constrained job‐to‐job mobility in the absence of compensating wage differentials. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

New Men and New Women? A Comparison of Paid Work Propensities from a Panel Data Perspective

British Household Panel Survey data for waves 1–5 (1991–5) is used to compare paid work participation rates of men and women. Year-on-year persistence in paid work propensities is high, but greater for men than women. Non-work persistence is higher for women. Using panel data probit regression models, we also investigate why men's and women's participation rates differ, comparing the roles of differences in observable characteristics and differences in rates of return to these characteristics, while also controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Most of the difference in participation rates is accounted for by the differences in returns associated with the presence of children, especially young ones.     

Transitions From School to Work and the Early Labour Market Experience

We consider transitions from school to work and the early market experience. The duration of post-school unemployment, wages, and job duration are estimated simultaneously. We find that individuals with higher levels ofschooling get jobs more quickly and have longer employment durations. Apprentices have shorter unemployment periods and stay longer in their jobs than others at the same educational level. Females have shorter unemployment periods and lower wages, and also stay in the first job longer. The unemployment duration and the accepted wage affect job duration positively, but the estimated covariance terms suggest unobserved factors working in the opposite direction.     

The role of observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the duration of unemployment

This paper studies the degree to which observable and unobservable worker characteristics account for the variation in the aggregate duration of unemployment. I model the distribution of unobserved worker heterogeneity as time varying to capture the interaction of latent attributes with changes in labor-market conditions. Unobserved heterogeneity is the main explanation for the duration dependence of unemployment hazards. Both cyclical and low-frequency variations in the mean duration of unemployment are mainly driven by one subgroup: workers who, for unobserved reasons, stay unemployed for a long time. In contrast, changes in the composition of observable characteristics of workers have negligible effects.     

Optimal unemployment policy in a matching equilibrium

This paper considers optimal unemployment policy in a matching equilibrium with risk averse workers and unobserved job search effort. The Planner chooses unemployment benefits, taxes and job creation subsidies to maximise a Utilitarian welfare function. Optimal policy involves a trade-off between higher employment taxes (which finance more generous unemployment benefits) and greater market tightness (which reduces the average unemployment spell). Optimal UI implies the initial UI payment equals the wage, thus ensuring consumption is smooth across the job destruction shock, and UI payments then fall with duration.     

Benefit Transfers in Italy: An Empirical Study of Mobility Lists in the Milan Area

This paper uses administrative data on mobility lists in the largest economic region of Italy, Lombardia, to test whether the more favourable treatment of older workers, who can draw benefits longer and transfer a larger sum to potential employers, affects in a positive way their hazard from unemployment into a permanent job. Our reduced form estimates show that older workers who draw benefits longer have a significantly lower hazard than their younger colleagues. The reduction in the hazard from unemployment is particularly pronounced for older women in the sample. Apparently, the negative effect of the treatment on the supply side, due to a higher reservation wage, prevails in our data over the positive effect, stimulated by the larger potential benefit transfers. We conclude that, if the aim of the policy is to increase the hazard from the list into a permanent job, the treatment should be modified either by reducing passive income support or by increasing the potential for benefit transfers, or, finally, by reducing the entitlement period.     

The effect of collaboration network on inventors' job match,productivity and tenure

It has been argued in the economic literature that job search through informal job networks improves the employer–employee match quality. This paper argues that inventors' research collaboration networks reduce the uncertainty of firms about the match qualities of inventors prior to hiring. We estimate the effect of inventors' collaboration networks on their productivity and mobility using the U.S. patent application database. It is found that networked inventors are more productive and have longer tenure than non-networked inventors. The evidence from fixed-effect regressions shows that the higher productivity and longer tenure of networked inventors are not solely attributable to unobserved ability of inventors or unobserved characteristics of firms. These results are consistent with the job match hypothesis between inventors and firms through their collaboration networks.     

Temporary contracts and employee effort

Temporary contracts provide employers with a tool to screen potential new employees and have been shown to provide “stepping stones” into permanent employment for workers. For both reasons, workers on temporary contracts have an incentive to provide more effort than permanent employees. Using indicators for unpaid overtime work and absences taken from the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS), we present evidence that temporary workers indeed provide higher effort than permanent employees: Their probability of working unpaid overtime exceeds that of permanently employed workers by 60%. We show the heterogeneity of this effect across different types of temporary contracts, investigate differences between men and women, and discuss the relevance of endogenous selection into temporary employment.     

Exits from temporary jobs in Europe: A competing risks analysis

We study transitions out of temporary jobs using the waves 1994–1999 of the European Community Household Panel applying a discrete time duration model. Specifically, we use a multinomial logit model distinguishing between exits into permanent employment and non-employment. Two different specifications are presented, one does not account for unobserved heterogeneity while the other does. Unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to follow a discrete distribution. The competing risks model is estimated jointly for all EU Member States. The duration dependence parameters suggest that in general for EU as a whole, very short contracts provide higher chances of labour market exclusion especially for men. We discuss potential implications of our findings.     

Urban effects on participation and wages: Are there gender differences?

This paper estimates participation and wage equations using panel data from the United Kingdom to explore gender differences in urban wage and participation premiums. The results suggest a small but economically significant urban participation premium for women but none for men. Results from the wage estimations suggest that after controlling for sample selectivity, observed and unobserved heterogeneity, the urban premium is larger for women. This wage premium is also larger for married or cohabiting women relative to others. There is also evidence of higher urban returns to experience for men and lower urban wage depreciation for both men and women.     

Urban effects on participation and wages: Are there gender differences?

This paper estimates participation and wage equations using panel data from the United Kingdom to explore gender differences in urban wage and participation premiums. The results suggest a small but economically significant urban participation premium for women but none for men. Results from the wage estimations suggest that after controlling for sample selectivity, observed and unobserved heterogeneity, the urban premium is larger for women. This wage premium is also larger for married or cohabiting women relative to others. There is also evidence of higher urban returns to experience for men and lower urban wage depreciation for both men and women.     

Labor market flexibility and poverty dynamics

The past two decades have witnessed a rapid growth in flexible work arrangements that, in some instances, could expose workers to a higher poverty risk via limited job stability, few advancement opportunities, and low wages. Nowhere in the world has this increase in flexible work arrangements being more evident than in Spain, where about a third of the wage and salary workforce holds fixed-term contracts. Using Spanish panel data and maximum-likelihood binary models that account for state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity, we examine the poverty implications of past and present temporary employment. Our findings suggest that fixed-term contracts are linked to a greater poverty exposure among women and older men relative to open-ended contracts. Furthermore, this greater poverty exposure can last several years due to feedback effects operating via job instability or via the transition to work statuses characterized by higher poverty hazards. Finally, the adverse impact of temporary employment is linked to the short duration of some contracts, thus signaling the importance of work attachment.