Eco-efficiency and firm value

Eco-efficiency refers to a process that seeks to maximize the effectiveness of business processes while minimizing their impacts on the environment. Fundamental to eco-efficiency is adoption of a management philosophy that stimulates the search for environmental improvements that yield parallel economic benefits [President’s Council on Sustainable Development, 1996a. Sustainable America: A New Consensus for Prosperity, Opportunity, and a Healthy Environment. Government Printing Office, Washington DC; President’s Council on Sustainable Development, 1996b. Eco-efficiency: Task Force Report. Government Printing Office, Washington DC; World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), 2000. Eco-efficiency: Creating More Value with Less Input. Geneva]. Eco-efficiency is increased by activities that create economic value while continuously reducing ecological impacts and the use of natural resources [DeSimone, L., Popoff, F., 1997. Eco-efficiency: The Business Link To Sustainable Development. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA]. This study empirically examines the proposition that implementation of eco-efficient business strategies is associated with higher firm value. We posit that, firms which adopt eco-efficient business strategies and, as a consequence, achieve reduced costs and increased profits should be more highly valued by the market than similar firms that do not adopt eco-efficient business strategies. Our empirical testing supports this proposition.     

Blockholder dispersion and firm value

Multiple blockholder structures are a widespread phenomenon in the U.S. The theoretical literature, however, provides conflicting predictions on whether a single large blockholder or a set of dispersed smaller blockholders is better for firm value. Using U.S. data, we find a negative correlation between Tobin's Q and blockholder dispersion. The findings are robust to a wide variety of model specifications and controls and differ from results for other geographic regions such as Europe and Asia.     

Stock market liquidity and firm value

This paper investigates the relation between stock liquidity and firm performance. The study shows that firms with liquid stocks have better performance as measured by the firm market-to-book ratio. This result is robust to the inclusion of industry or firm fixed effects, a control for idiosyncratic risk, a control for endogenous liquidity using two-stage least squares, and the use of alternative measures of liquidity. To identify the causal effect of liquidity on firm performance, we study an exogenous shock to liquidity—the decimalization of stock trading—and show that the increase in liquidity around decimalization improves firm performance. The causes of liquidity's beneficial effect are investigated: Liquidity increases the information content of market prices and of performance-sensitive managerial compensation. Finally, momentum trading, analyst coverage, investor overreaction, and the effect of liquidity on discount rates or expected returns do not appear to drive the results.     

Managerial ownership dynamics and firm value

From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year for American firms. We find that managers are more likely to significantly decrease their ownership when their firms are performing well and more likely to increase their ownership when their firms become financially constrained. When controlling for past stock returns, we find that large increases in managerial ownership increase Tobin's q. This result is driven by increases in shares held by officers, while increases in shares held by directors appear unrelated to changes in firm value. There is no evidence that large decreases in ownership have an adverse impact on firm value. We rely on the dynamics of the managerial ownership/firm value relation to mitigate concerns in the literature about the endogeneity of managerial ownership.     

Dominant institutional owners and firm value

This research analyzes the impact of control by dominant institutional owners (banking institutions and investment funds) on firm value. The analysis considers the level of voting rights in the hands of the dominant institutional owner and other large shareholders. The results reveal a different effect on value depending on whether the dominant institutional investor is a banking institution or an investment fund. Moreover, the results show that the presence of other large shareholders affects firm value when a dominant institutional owner controls the firm.     

Signaling firm value to active investors

Active investors provide risk-sharing and value-adding effort in form of advising, networking, monitoring, etc. This paper demonstrates a conflict between two key objectives for high-quality entrepreneurs: to elicit such investor effort and to signal the firm’s type by retaining shares. This conflict may give rise to stable (and economically meaningful) pooling equilibria for startup firms. More established firms, with access to multiple signals, can always realize both of these objectives but may still decide to forego investor effort if eliciting it would require them to deviate substantially from the cost-minimizing signal mix. In comparison with otherwise identical pure-exchange settings (with passive investors), we find that the potential for investors to be active always increases the signaling cost in case of noncontractible investor effort, whereas the effect is ambiguous if investor effort is contractible. At the same time, we identify conditions under which signaling is welfare-enhancing as it helps guide investors’ effort towards more promising ventures.     

Staggered boards,corporate opacity and firm value

We explore the effect of corporate opacity on the relation between staggered boards and firm value. We find that through mitigating takeover pressure, staggered boards become increasingly beneficial to firm value as opacity increases. In addition, we document that staggered boards reduce value only in transparent firms. Additional tests indicate that, as opacity increases, staggered boards bear an increasingly positive relation to research and development and CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Taken together, these results suggest that corporate opacity affects the value impact of takeover protection.     

Insider ownership and firm value in New Zealand

The relationship between insider stock ownership and firm value is examined for a sample of publicly traded companies in New Zealand. Results in this study confirm earlier findings of a curvilinear relationship reported for larger markets. Insider ownership and firm value are positively related for ownership levels below 14% and above 40% and inversely related at intermediate levels of ownership. These results are fairly robust to different measures of firm performance (Tobin's q, market to book ratio and return on equity) and to several different estimation techniques such as ordinary least squares, two stage least squares, seemingly unrelated regressions and fixed effects regressions on panel data over 1994–1998. Findings in this study contribute to the growing body of international evidence that the non-linear cubic relationship between insider ownership and firm value is robust to differences in governance structures across markets.     

Corporate governance and firm value: International evidence

In this paper, we investigate the relation between firm-level corporate governance and firm value based on a large and previously unused dataset from Governance Metrics International (GMI) comprising 6663 firm-year observations from 22 developed countries over the period from 2003 to 2007. Based on a set of 64 individual governance attributes we construct two alternative additive corporate governance indices with equal weights attributed to the governance attributes and one index derived from a principal component analysis. For all three indices we find a strong and positive relation between firm-level corporate governance and firm valuation. In addition, we investigate the value relevance of governance attributes that document the companies' social behavior. Regardless of whether these attributes are considered individually or aggregated into indices, and even when “standard” corporate governance attributes are controlled for, they exhibit a positive and significant effect on firm value. Our findings are robust to alternative calculation procedures for the corporate governance indices and to alternative estimation techniques.     

Deviations from optimal CEO ownership and firm value

The transaction cost theory of managerial ownership and firm value predicts that deviations from optimal managerial ownership reduce firm value. This paper empirically tests the transaction cost theory by studying the relation between deviations on either side of optimal CEO ownership and firm value. We find that both above-optimal and below-optimal deviations reduce firm value. We find that a change in CEO ownership is associated with a higher (lower) abnormal return if it moves the ownership towards (away from) the optimal level. These findings are consistent with the transaction cost theory of managerial ownership and firm value.     

Nondisclosure and adverse disclosure as signals of firm value

We present a model in which some of the firm's information ('news')can be disclosed verifiably and some information ('type') cannot,to show that some firms may voluntarily withhold good news anddisclose bad news. We describe an equilibrium in which high-typefirms withhold good news and disclose bad news, whereas low-typefirms disclose good news and withhold bad news. Under some parametervalues, this equilibrium exists when other more traditionalequilibria are ruled out by standard equilibrium refinements.The model explains some otherwise anomalous empirical evidenceconcerning stock price reactions to disclosure, provides somenew empirical predictions, and suggests that mandatory disclosurerequirements may have the undesirable consequence of makingit more difficult for firms to reveal information that cannotbe disclosed credibly.     

Board meetings,committee structure,and firm value

In this study, we examine the determinants of board monitoring activity and its impact on firm value for a broad panel of firms over a six-year period from 1999 to 2005. During this period, Congress and the exchanges promulgated regulations that increased pressure upon firms for more independent and active boards. Economists have debated whether board activity and externally imposed regulations benefit or harm firms. We develop and examine several proxies for board monitoring and examine the relationship between board monitoring activity, firm characteristics, and firm value in a structural equation framework. One set of our proxies is based on the number of annual board and Audit Committee meetings. We show that prior performance, firm characteristics and governance characteristics are important determinants of board activity. We also show that the board monitoring is driven by corporate events, such as an acquisition or a restatement of financial statements. We find that board activity has a positive impact on firm value. Our results also indicate that the external pressure has had a salutary effect and recent regulations have led to some increase in firm value. A second set of proxies is based on the shift to a fully independent Audit, Compensation and Nominating Committees. We find that firms increased the independence of these Board committees following the enactment of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.     

Corporate governance and firm value during a financial crisis

The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effects of management ownership and other corporate governance variables on Hong Kong firms’ stock performance following the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–98). Our results show that Hong Kong firms with a more concentrated management (executive board) ownership displayed better capital market performance during the 13-month period of the Crisis. We also find that firms with more equity ownership by non-executive directors, and in which the positions of CEO and board chairperson were occupied by the same individual experienced a smaller stock price decline. Our findings are consistent with the notion that there is a greater alignment of insiders with outside owners, rather than the expropriation by insiders who have the opportunity to divert value, for firms with higher levels of management ownership during an unexpected capital market crisis.     

Classified boards,firm value,and managerial entrenchment

This paper shows that classified boards destroy value by entrenching management and reducing director effectiveness. First, I show that classified boards are associated with a significant reduction in firm value and that this holds even among complex firms, although such firms are often regarded as most likely to benefit from staggered board elections. I then examine how classified boards entrench management by focusing on CEO turnover, executive compensation, proxy contests, and shareholder proposals. My results indicate that classified boards significantly insulate management from market discipline, thus suggesting that the observed reduction in value is due to managerial entrenchment and diminished board accountability.     

Reexamining the managerial ownership effect on firm value

Whether equity-based compensation and equity ownership align the interests of managers with stockholders is an important question in finance. Early studies found an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm value, but later studies using firm fixed effects found no relation. Managerial ownership levels change very slowly over time which may mask an ownership effect on firm value when using a fixed effect model. This is due to a much smaller within firm variation than between firm variation. We demonstrate that using pay-performance semi-elasticity, rather than pay-performance sensitivity as a measure of managerial ownership incentives, results in meaningful variation within firm over time. The greater within firm variation increases the power to detect a relation between managerial ownership and firm value with fixed effect regressions. As in the early research on this issue, we find a significant inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q in fixed effects regressions and after controlling for endogeneity with both two-stage and three-stage least squares regressions. Our results are consistent with incentive alignment at low levels and risk aversion at high levels of managerial ownership.     

Company name fluency,investor recognition,and firm value

Research from psychology suggests that people evaluate fluent stimuli more favorably than similar information that is harder to process. Consistent with fluency affecting investment decisions, we find that companies with short, easy to pronounce names have higher breadth of ownership, greater share turnover, lower transaction price impacts, and higher valuation ratios. Corporate name changes increase fluency on average, and fluency-improving name changes are associated with increases in breadth of ownership, liquidity, and firm value. Name fluency also affects other investment decisions, with fluently named closed-end funds trading at smaller discounts and fluent mutual funds attracting greater fund flows.     

The use of foreign currency derivatives and firm market value

This article examines the use of foreign currency derivatives(FCDs) in a sample of 720 large U.S. nonfinancial firms between1990 and 1995 and its potential impact on firm value. UsingTobin's Q as a proxy for firm value, we find a positive relationbetween firm value and the use of FCDs. The hedging premiumis statistically and economically significant for firms withexposure to exchange rates and is on average 4.87% of firm value.We also find some evidence consistent with the hypothesis thathedging causes an increase in firm value.     

Company investment announcements and the market value of the firm

This paper examines the stock market reaction to 402 company investment announcements made by UK companies during the 1991–1996 period. The market-adjusted abnormal returns are generally positive but small. Investment announcements are classified according to functional categories, and we find the level of abnormal returns to vary according to the type of capital investment being announced. In particular, we find the market to react more favourably to investments that ‘create’ future investment opportunities, than to investments which can be categorized as ‘exercising’ investment opportunities. The market reaction also varies with firm size, with large companies tending to experience smaller responses to announcements than do smaller firms. Chung et al. (1998 Chung, KH, Wright, P and Charoenwong, C. (1998). Investment opportunities and market reaction to capital expenditure decisions. Journal of Banking and Finance, 22: 41–60.  ) reported that the quality of a company's investment opportunities is the primary determinant of market reactions to capital expenditure decisions. The findings presented here lend some support to a role for investment opportunities in market valuations. Project size is also found to have a significant positive impact on the level of abnormal returns.