Changing banking relationships and client‐firm performance: Evidence from Japan for the 1990s

The extant literature generally suggests that the performance of client firms deteriorates if their distressed main bank reduces the supply of credit. However, this insight is only consistent with the notion that main banks have an information advantage over other banks to the extent that a client firm has trouble getting access to credit if the firm changes its main bank. This paper shows that Japanese firms did change their main banking relationship when their main banks become distressed in a period with financial shocks. Surprisingly, these firms did not suffer from loss of access to credit and actually their performance significantly improved after their change of main banks.     

How do banks resolve firms’ financial distress? Evidence from Japan

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate how banks resolve firms?? financial distress in Japan. Our results show that distressed firms that have more unsecured bank debt are more likely to restructure debt successfully out of court. Second, private debt restructuring is conducted during the year in which a financially distressed firm would be compelled to report negative net worth because of substantial accounting losses if no debt restructuring plans were implemented. Third, firms that are already in a negative net worth situation are more likely to receive debt forgiveness and/or debt-for-equity swaps. Finally, both the 1-year-lagged total liabilities-to-assets ratio and accounting losses are positively related to the private workout level. These results suggest that banks resolve firms?? financial distress in shareholders?? and creditors?? interests. We argue that, along with bankruptcy laws, the stock exchange rules and the fact that banks are allowed to hold shares in these firms affect the resolution of firms?? financial distress.     

When do banks take equity in debt restructurings?

This article examines the conditions under which bank lendersmake concessions by taking equity in financially distressedfirms. I show that the role banks play in debt restructuringsdepends on the financial condition of the firm, the existenceof public debt in the firm's capital structure and the abilityof public debt to be restructured. Empirically, I find thatfor firms with public debt outstanding, banks never make concessionsunless public debtholders also restructure their claims. Whenbanks do take equity, on average they obtain a substantial proportionof the firm's stock, and they maintain their position for overtwo years.     

The real effects of bank distress: Evidence from bank bailouts in Germany

How does bank distress impact their customers' probability of default and trade credit availability? We address this question by looking at a unique sample of German firms from 2000 to 2011. We follow their firm-bank relationships through times of distress and crisis, featuring the different transmission of bank distress shocks into already weakened firm balance sheets. We find that a distressed bank bailout, which is subject to restructuring and deleveraging conditions, leads to a bank-induced increase of firms' probabilities of default. Moreover, bailouts tend to reduce trade credit availability and ultimately firms' sales. We further find that the direction and magnitude of the effects depends on firm quality and the relationship orientation of banks.     

Can investors restrict managerial behavior in distressed firms?

In this article, we show that only distressed firms not identified as distressed by creditors are able to transfer wealth from creditors to shareholders. Using the number of years to future bankruptcy as a proxy for genuine distress and measures based on observable firm characteristics as proxies for perceived distress, genuinely distressed firms incorrectly perceived as healthy cut payouts to shareholders more slowly and invest more aggressively as uncertainty increases than correctly identified distressed firms. Consistent with the idea that incorrectly identified distressed firms actively hide their troubles, we show that they tend to follow more aggressive accounting policies and often resort to earnings misstatements. We also show that they are often not restricted by covenants and can borrow further debt capital at affordable rates, suggesting that a lack of monitoring by creditors allows them to transfer wealth to shareholders.     

Financial Distress and Bank Lending Relationships

We use a unique data set of bank loans to examine the wealth effects on lead lending banks when their borrowers suffer financial distress. We find a significant negative announcement return for the lead lending bank when a major corporate borrower announces default or bankruptcy. Banks with higher exposure to the distressed firm have larger negative announcement-period returns. The existence of a past lending relationship with the distressed firm results in larger wealth declines for the bank shareholders. Finally, financial distress also has a significant negative effect on borrower's returns.     

The effect of banking relationships on the future of financially distressed firms

In this study I empirically examine U.S. publicly traded firms to determine the impact of banking relationships on the future of financially distressed firms. Results demonstrate that obtaining a relationship-backed loan in the six months prior to distress identification significantly increases the probability of future firm emergence from distress. However, this effect decreases as the severity of firm distress increases. These results are robust to variations in banking relationship measures and to addressing endogeneity. This study provides evidence consistent with the value of lending relationships stemming from the ease of transmission of “soft” information within the lender's organization.     

Variables influencing the customer relationship management of banks

Banks are important role players to the economy of any country. However, to survive in a competitive business environment banks need to focus on building and maintaining client relationships and to identify how their employees influence these relationships. This study investigates the influence of variables, with regard to bank employees, on the customer relationship management (CRM) of banks. A literature study explains CRM, the banking industry and employees' involvement with banking clients. To assess the impact of the predetermined variables from literature on the CRM of banks, a number of hypotheses were constructed and tested empirically among a sample of banking clients. The findings reveal that the variables knowledgeability and attitude of bank employees have a statistically significant impact on the effectiveness of the CRM strategies of banks. Based on the findings of the empirical investigation, strategies are provided for banks to improve their employees' knowledgeability and attitude in order to ensure more effective CRM strategies.     

Does banks’ dual holding affect bank lending and firms’ investment decisions? Evidence from China

This study investigates the effect of banks’ dual holding on bank lending and firms’ investment decisions using a sample of listed firms in China. We find that dual holding leads to easier access to bank loans, a result that is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than SOEs. We also find that dual holding distorts banks’ lending decisions and harms the investment efficiency for SOEs, while resulting in optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. For non-SOEs, further analysis suggests that optimal lending decisions and efficient investment can be achieved for firms with higher ownership concentration, and firms in which the family and foreign investors are the controlling shareholders. We argue that, in emerging markets, whether a bank plays a monitoring role by directly holding the debt and equity claims of companies relies heavily on whether the potential collusion between firm executives and bank managers can be averted, which in turn is determined by the firms’ governance framework and ownership structure.     

The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses

We test hypotheses about the effects of bank size, foreign ownership, and distress on lending to informationally opaque small firms using a rich new data set on Argentinean banks, firms, and loans. We also test hypotheses about borrowing from a single bank versus multiple banks. Our results suggest that large and foreign-owned institutions may have difficulty extending relationship loans to opaque small firms. Bank distress appears to have no greater effect on small borrowers than on large borrowers, although even small firms may react to bank distress by borrowing from multiple banks, raising borrowing costs and destroying some relationship benefits.     

The choice between informal and formal restructuring: The case of French banks facing distressed SMEs

This empirical paper investigates the paths leading to the resolution of financial distress for a sample of small and medium-sized French firms in default, focusing in particular on their decisions between bankruptcy and informal (out-of-court) renegotiations. The procedure is depicted as a sequential game in which stakeholders first decide whether to engage in an informal renegotiation. Second, conditional on opting for renegotiation, the debtor and its creditors may succeed or fail in reaching an agreement to restructure the firm’s capital structure. We test different hypotheses that capture (i) coordination and bargaining power issues, (ii) informational problems, (iii) firm characteristics, and (iv) loan characteristics. The empirical implementation is based on sequential LOGIT regressions. First, we find that the likelihood of informal renegotiations increases with loan size and the proportion of long-term debt. These two results support the argument that size matters when deciding whether to opt for informal renegotiation. Second, the probability of a successful renegotiation decreases when (i) the bank in charge of handling the process is the debtor’s “main” creditor and when (ii) the firm is badly rated and its management is considered faulty. Third, the estimations show that collateral plays a significant role in the first stage of the renegotiation process. However, it does not impact the likelihood of success in reaching a renegotiated agreement. Finally, some banks are clearly better than others at leading successful renegotiation processes.     

The Importance of Cash-Flow News for Financially Distressed Firms

Previous studies have shown that stock prices are moved primarily by news about discount rates (expected returns). I argue that when a firm experiences financial distress, news about cashflows becomes more dominant in driving its stock returns. Applying Campbell's (1991) variance decomposition framework to financially distressed firms supports this argument. Furthermore, I find that more bankruptcies occur after negative shocks to expected cashflows than after positive shocks to discount rates; and that stock prices of distressed firms are less sensitive than those of sound firms to changes in equity risk.     

Bank power,block ownership,boards and financial distress likelihood: An investigation of Spanish listed firms

We investigate the effects of bank power, block ownership and board independence on the likelihood of financial distress. Using a matched sample design, we find that firms in which banks have power are more likely than their counterparts to enter financial distress. However, the bank power effects are moderated by block ownership and board independence. Specifically, on the one hand, financial distress due to bank power is lower for firms with greater ownership by pressure resistant blockholders and such blockholders appear to be the largest blockholder in the firm. The bank power effects are also lower in firms with greater outside directors and this appears to be primarily driven by proprietary directors than independent directors. On the other, we document evidence suggesting that the bank power effects are magnified for firms in which the board chair is a proprietary director aligned to non-financial blockholders or CEO/Chair, suggesting that banks might partly influence decisions via board chairs. Overall, the findings are consistent with bank power actions being detrimental to the firm, but the extent to which such actions harm the firm depends on the monitoring intentions of blockholders and/or board of directors. These findings have important implications for policymakers.     

Why government banks underperform: A political interference view

This study proposes a political interference hypothesis to explain how political considerations depress the performance of government banks. We define political interference as a situation in which government bank executives are replaced within 12 months after the country’s major elections (presidential or parliamentary elections). We classify political and non-political government banks as those that experience or do not experience political interference, respectively. The hypothesis firstly suggests that once government banks undertake political interference, their financial performance deteriorates. That is, political banks display the worst performance, followed by non-political banks and private banks have the best performance. Next, we posit that the impact of political interference is greater in developing countries than in developed countries. Finally, we hypothesize that the underperformance of government banks will be reduced if we remove political interference. By employing bank data from 65 countries from the period of 2003–2007, our hypothesis effectively explains why government banks in developed countries escape relatively unscathed, while those in developing countries suffer significantly.     

The value of durable bank relationships: evidence from Korean banking shocks

Using a large sample of exogenous events that negatively affected Korean banks during the 1997–98 period, we examine the value of durable bank relationships in Korea. We show that adverse shocks to banks have a negative effect not only on the value of the banks themselves but also on the value of their client firms, and that this adverse effect on firm value is a decreasing function of the financial health of both the banks and their client firms. Our results are concentrated in the second half of the sample period when Korean banks experienced severe difficulties.     

Financial derivatives,opacity, and crash risk: Evidence from large US banks

We test how the use of financial derivatives affects banks’ informational structure and future stock performance based on a sample of large bank holding companies in the US. Using banks’ use of financial derivatives as a proxy for opacity, we find that high level use of interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives are associated with an increase in the synchronicity (R²) of stock price movements with the market index, which indicates less revelation of bank-specific information to the market. This finding is consistent with the prediction of the model developed by Wagner (2007). We document that superior corporate governance tempers these effects. Finally, we find that an increase in the opacity is significantly and positively related to an increase in banks’ future stock price crash risk.     

Financial development,government ownership of banks and firm innovation

Using a newly-available World Bank survey of over 28,000 firms from 46 countries, we examine how financial development affects firm innovation around the world. We find that while stock market development significantly enhances firm innovation, banking sector development has mixed effects. We show that the latter result can be explained by different levels of government ownership of banks. Specifically, in countries with lower government ownership of banks, banking sector development significantly enhances firm innovation; while in countries with higher government ownership of banks, banking sector development has no significant or sometimes even significantly negative effects on firm innovation. Such negative effects are significantly stronger for smaller firms. The results are robust to various controls such as firms’ human capital and ownership structure, to estimations using instrumental variable techniques and alternative measures of firm innovation.     

How important are small banks to small business lending?: New evidence from a survey of small firms

Typically, small banks lend a larger proportion of their assets to small businesses than do large banks. The recent wave of bank mergers has thinned the ranks of small banks, raising the concern that small firms may find it difficult to access bank credit. However, bank consolidation will reduce small business credit only if small banks enjoy an advantage in lending to small businesses. We test the existence of a small bank cost advantage in small business lending by conducting the following simple test: If such advantages exist, then we should observe small businesses in areas with few small banks to have less bank credit. Using data on small business borrowers from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance, we find that the probability of a small firm having a line of credit from a bank does not decrease in the long run when there are fewer small banks in the area, although short-run disruptions may occur. Nor do we find that firms in areas with few small banks are any more likely to repay trade credit late, suggesting that such firms are no more credit constrained than firms in areas with many small banks.     

Do banks appraise internal capital markets during credit shocks? Evidence from the Greek crisis

Using data of bank loans to Greek firms during the Greek crisis we provide evidence that affiliated firms, having access to the internal capital markets of their associated group, are less likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, banks require lower loan collateral coverage from affiliated firms and are less likely to downgrade the affiliates’ credit profile. Finally, banks are more likely to show forbearance to affiliated firms with non-performing loans. The results are consistent with the view that banks manage their relationships with firms in a business group jointly, as opposed to viewing each firm as an independent entity. Our findings also suggest that the value of risk sharing through internal capital markets increases when external financing is scarce.     

Manager wealth concentration,ownership structure,and risk in commercial banks

Of key importance in the governance structure of firms is the role of financial incentives for each major player. The main contribution of this article is an analysis of how an insider's concentration of wealth in his or her bank investment affects incentives to take risk. Major empirical findings are that, first, bank earnings variation falls when bank managers have more of their wealth concentrated in their banks; second, hired-manager banks become less risky when a person who has significant motivation to monitor bank management has his or her wealth highly concentrated in the bank; and third, stock ownership by hired managers can increase total risk of a bank. Further analysis suggests that community banks in our sample control earnings variation by manipulating idiosyncratic risk, credit risk, and leverage but not systematic risk or the loan-to-asset ratio.